The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy and Mexico: The Limits to Unilateralism
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Abstract

The September 11 attacks propelled important changes in United States foreign policy, what has been named by some authors as the “Bush revolution in foreign policy”. This “revolution” implied a radical change in the tools and alliances of the United States more than in the foreign policy goals. However, these changes affected the Washington’s relations with its traditional allies, what provoked diplomatic conflicts with several countries, included Mexico. But, despite the tension between both countries because of the U.S. invasion to Iraq, the truth is that in the end the bilateral relationship was not seriously affected and the occupation of Iraq damaged seriously the foreign and domestic prestige of President Bush. The first part of this paper analyzes the characteristics of the so-called “Bush revolution” in foreign policy and its erosion after the invasion of Iraq. Then the paper describes the U.S, pressure for the “securitization” of its Southern border and the diplomatic conflict with Mexico because of the war in Iraq and how this conflict could not be maintained for a long time, because of the links of interdependence between both countries. Finally the paper suggests in the conclusions that the conflict between Mexico and the U.S. because of the war in Iraq was inevitable, but the strident tone that it acquired was unnecessary. The paper concludes that if the U.S. channels in the future its policies through multilateral organizations and avoid unilateral actions, conflicts with Mexico will be less frequent.

Resumen

Los ataques del 11 de septiembre produjeron cambios importantes en la política exterior de Estados Unidos, lo que algunos autores han calificado como la “revolución Bush en política exterior”. Esta “revolución” implicó un cambio radical en los instrumentos y en las alianzas de Estados Unidos, más que en las metas de política exterior. No obstante, estos cambios afectaron las relaciones de Washington con sus aliados tradicionales, lo que provocó conflictos diplomáticos con varios países, incluido México. Pero, a pesar de la tensión que se vivió entre ambos países a raíz de la invasión estadounidense a Iraq, lo cierto es que al final la relación bilateral no se vio seriamente afectada y la ocupación de Iraq dañó seriamente el prestigio interno y externo del Presidente Bush. En la primera parte de este documento se analizan las características de la llamada “revolución Bush” en política exterior y su erosión después de la invasión a Iraq. Posteriormente se describen las presiones de Estados Unidos para “securitizar” su frontera sur, así como el conflicto diplomático con México a
raíz de la guerra en Iraq y cómo este conflicto no pudo mantenerse por mucho tiempo debido a los nexos de interdependencia entre ambos países. Finalmente, en las conclusiones se sugiere que el conflicto entre México y Estados Unidos por la guerra en Iraq era inevitable aunque el tono estridente que tomó era innecesario. Se concluye que si en el futuro Estados Unidos canaliza sus políticas a través de organizaciones multilaterales y evita las acciones unilaterales, los conflictos con México serán menos frecuentes.
The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy and Mexico: The Limits to Unilateralism

Introduction

The arrival of George W. Bush to the White House has produced radical changes in American foreign policy. These changes, characterized by some authors as an irreversible revolution, represented a turning point in the international relations of the United States. However, this revolution was not about America’s goals but rather about instruments as well as enemies and allies. The Bush revolution in foreign policy redefined the traditional U.S. alliances and abandoned the multilateralist approach of the Clinton Administration. This revolution also redefined the enemies and propelled the United States into Iraq for an occupation that has lasted more than three years and probably will last until the next decade.

Domestically, the Iraq war has caused more than 2,000 casualties has cost nearly 200 billion dollars and has won President Bush the lowest approval rating of any president at this point in his second term, according to Gallup polls going back to World War II (Terry M. Neal, 2005). This shift in foreign policy has also affected the US’s ties with its neighbors. Disagreements over the war in Iraq have strained US-Mexico relations and resulted in a deep diplomatic crisis between both countries. Bush’s war on terror has resulted the reshuffling of its priorities with Mexico. Despite this reshuffling, US-Mexico relations have had their own momentum—the countries’ interdependence has substantially limited the Bush Administration’s margin for maneuver.

In this paper I will analyze the characteristics of the so-called Bush revolution in foreign policy, how it has affected its relationship with Mexico and possible trajectories for US-Mexico relations in the future.

The Bush Revolution in foreign policy: The one-man show

According to Daalder and Lindsay, the Bush revolution in foreign policy has rested upon two beliefs: Firstly, that the best way to ensure U.S. security is by maximizing America’s freedom to act, without depending on others for protection; and second, that the US should use its super power status to democratize the world (Daalder, 2003: 13). Additionally, American foreign policy has been shaped by three characteristics: a decided preference for unilateral action, a preference for the use of preemptive measures to attack possible enemies, and finally, that the US should use its military power to produce regime change in rogue states (Daalder, 2003, and Fukuyama, 2005).

The Bush foreign policy conceived in response to the events on September 11, 2001 were further bolstered by beliefs associated with the Bush team from the very beginning, in part due to the presence of an important group known as “neoconservatives” (or neo-Reaganites) in the president’s inner circle. The
word “neoconservative”, which initially had a large domestic policy component, now more specifically refers to advocates that believe US defense and national security interests should rest upon power and resolve, not in diplomacy and treaties. Moreover, the group is known for its “deep skepticism of traditional Wilsonianism’s commitment to the rule of law and its belief in the relevance of international institutions” (Daalder, 2003: 15), a standpoint that has influenced the Bush administration unilateral approach to foreign policy.

While the US does not formally reject international institutions, the Bush administration has had no qualms about employing an “if it’s good for Bush it’s good for everybody else” doctrine to diplomacy. This has not meant that current policy has embraced isolationism, alliances with other nations, “coalitions of the willing” have been sought in the war in Iraq but only with those nations willing to operate on US terms. The US’s unilateralism has provoked a “crisis of legitimacy” affecting its relationships with other NATO members such as Germany and France (Kagan, 2004 and Tucker, 2004). This diplomatic conflict could, in theory, be counterbalanced by Bush’s efforts to disarm and democratize so-called “rogue” states.

While US foreign policy, absent the attacks, would have reflected President Bush’s conservatism, it would not have been the muscular program that it is today. The best definition of US foreign policy under Bush is one of “democratic imperialism” (Daalder, 2003: 15) based upon the assumption that the “only route to lasting peace is through regime change, and once democratic regimes are established, they will live at peace and cooperate with one another” (Jervis, 2005: 81). However, this alternative source of legitimacy—a very powerful one in the post-Cold War era—has been substantially eroded due to reports of human rights violations committed by members of the US Army in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay prison.

**The impact of September 11 on US foreign policy**

As a consequence of terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration redefined its priorities putting the fight against terrorism at the top of its agenda. Included among the goals of the 2002 “National Security Strategy of the United States” was not only the defense “the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders,” but also the support of democracy abroad. This involved expanding “the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy” and supporting “moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim world, to ensure that the conditions and
ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation” (The White House, 2002: 2, 6).

As mentioned earlier, Bush’s iron-fist approach to protecting American interests have been present in his inner circle since the beginning, however, it was September 11 which gave them political legitimacy: “just as September 11 galvanized Bush to pursue his foreign policy revolution, so it also swept away any inhibition he might have felt about speaking publicly about evil” (Daalder, 2003: 87). As a direct consequence of 9/11, American foreign policy adopted strong moral language that resembled Reagan’s 1982 “evil empire” lexicon which worked well in galvanizing public support. Bush’s popularity climbed and Congress was unable to stop him. Three days after the September 11 attacks, congressmen gave Bush authorization to retaliate against those responsible for the attacks. Seven weeks later the Patriot Act was approved which expanded federal law enforcement powers, especially electronic surveillance (Daalder, 2003: 93).

The Iraq quagmire

Whatever the reasons for Bush’s decision to invade Iraq –fighting evil, promoting democracy, or securing oil— its effects were disastrous for US relations with most European and Latin American countries. The conflict with Europe was particularly serious, and significantly weakened post-World War II alliances. For many nations in Europe and Latin America, the invasion of Iraq had nothing to do with the war on terror and more to do with an imperialist drive. Additionally, as mentioned above, human rights abuses by the US occupation forces in Afghanistan and Iraq and treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, combined with the efforts of the U.S. government to legalize torture practices (Washington Post, 2005), negatively impacted the legitimacy of Bush’s only foreign policy—the democratization of “failed” regimes.

The main cost to the US did not come from the lack of legitimacy of the war on terror but came from the lack of results. After two and a half years of occupation, the instability in Iraq persists with the number of American deaths increasing every day. It has also been disastrous in economic terms costing American taxpayers more than 200 billion dollars. Moreover, the energy expended in Iraq has considerably weakened the rest of Bush’s foreign policy. Given the domestic climate in the US another preemptive strike to depose governments in Iran, Libya or Cuba is unimaginable. Additionally, Bush’s decision to invade Afghanistan and Iraq did not work to prevent terrorist attacks in Madrid and London in 2005. In sum, the war in Iraq has substantially undermined the Bush Doctrine. As Jervis has pointed it out: “Machiavelli famously asked whether it is better to be feared or to be loved. The problem for the United states is that it is likely to be neither” (...) The
failures of the Bush Doctrine has left the United States looking neither strong nor benign, and we may find that the only thing worse than a successful leader is a failed one (Jervis, 2005: 137-138).

The second Bush administration: in search of the lost legitimacy

After two years of turbulent occupation of Iraq, Bush decided to make some adjustments in his foreign policy. He replaced the liberal Colin Powell as Secretary of State and appointed Condoleezza Rice, a member of the neoconservative team that has surrounded Bush since his First Administration. For many observers, that would have meant a victory of the hard liners and unilateralists over soft multilateralists. However, there are signs that this is not completely true. Rice is a pragmatic politician and despite her background, the changes she has implemented in American foreign policy suggest a move in the direction of diplomacy and multilateralism, more than a strengthening of the military tendencies (The Economist, 2005). There are some elements that support this assertion. On the one hand, the peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has made significant progress in 2005, what suggests a greater attempt by the US in achieving a negotiated solution, even when Israel has to give up some of its demands.

Also, there have been some clear signals of change in the use of diplomacy. The call to the UN made by the Bush administration in the elections in Iraq shows an acknowledgement of the importance of international organizations. As Robert Keohane pointed out:

Once they attacked Iraq they discovered that they needed international institutions, because you can’t mobilize a longstanding coalition which is legitimate, of democratic countries whose public care about legitimacy, unless you are aligned in some way with an international institution—the UN or something else—which is seen as representing the views of not just ourselves (Kreisler, 2004).

There have been also changes in rhetoric employed by members of the Bush administration. In her statement before the Senate, in her confirmation as Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice talked constantly about freedom and democracy and redefined US foreign policy goals to: unite the community of democracies “in building an international system that is based in our shared values and the rule of law”, strengthen “the community of democracies to fight the threats to our freedom and democracy throughout the globe”, and “spread freedom and democracy throughout the globe” (Rice, 2005). Rice also announced more emphasis on the promotion of trade as a way to create jobs, a goal that has been reduced in importance since September 11 and also made
a surprising call for alliances and collaboration with “multilateral institutions” as a way to “multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations” (Rice, 2005).

Job creation through commerce and economic reforms was also emphasized in regard to US relations with Latin America. The US stressed job creation as the most urgent task to be undertaken in the region at the Fourth Summit of the Americas that took place in Mar del Plata, Argentina in November 4-5, 2005. Even when the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas is still a long-term goal, in the short term the US conceives the improvement of competition as a priority in Latin America (U.S. State Department, 2005).

Finally, another sign the change to US foreign policy is the appointment of Tom Shannon, professional diplomat and expert on Venezuela, as Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere. Shannon’s appointment seems to indicate a softer approach being taken by the US in the region with an emphasis being placed on negotiation more than on military confrontation (LaFranchi, 2005). In this regard, one question that remains unanswered is what the role will be for the Organization of American States in US strategy.

The clear change in tone with an emphasis in non military instruments to address the challenges that the US is facing now can be attributed to the complications of associated with the Iraq war and the need for international legitimacy. Certainly, the political problems that President Bush faced domestically in 2005 such as the administration’s delayed reaction to the victims of Hurricane Katrina, the scandal surrounding the revelation of the identity of a CIA agent by trusted officials from Bush’s inner circle, and the withdrawal of Bush’s nominee to Supreme Court, Harriet Miers, contributed to the change in tone. Additionally, in the public mind, some of these problems are in some way related to the mistakes in foreign policy, particularly the invasion of Iraq.¹

The weakness of the second Bush administration can be clearly seen in the president’s sinking approval ratings which in May 2006 plummeted to an all-time low of 30 percent (Friedman, 2006). The revelation of a massacre committed in November 2005 by the US marines against Iraqi civilians also contributed to the deterioration of Bush’s image (Smith, 2006). This situation and the prolongation of the Iraq occupation have substantially limited the US’s ability to engage in military operations in the rest of the world. As Gurtov has pointed it out: “Now having undertaken a global war without front lines, the Pentagon finds itself with too many missions and too few soldiers” (Gurtov, 2006: 229).

¹ When Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans in September 2005, there were many who remembered that half of the Louisiana Guard was serving in Iraq.
Relations with Mexico: the disagreement on Iraq

Over the last two decades, Mexico’s gradual economic integration with the United States, as represented by the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), has not been accompanied by a similar process of political adjustment. Traditional anti-US rhetoric shifted following the election of Mexican President Vicente Fox in 2000. Fox, a former CEO of Coca-Cola, had a different view on what Mexico’s relationship to the US should be. Since the beginning of his administration he made it evident he would change traditional Mexican foreign policy. Fox considered that the foreign policy implemented by the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) was aimed to defend the regime and not the national interests (Fox Quesada, 2005 b). Consequently, he proposed changes in many areas of the Mexican foreign policy, including the relationship with the United States. One of the most significant changes Fox proposed was to deepen and broaden NAFTA so that it would impact every region of the country (Fox Quesada, 2005a).

“NAFTA plus” would further deepen US-Mexico economic integration meaning “convergences on the basis of fundamental variables of the economy: convergence of rates of interest, convergence of people’s income, convergence of salaries,” a plan that, according to Fox, could take “10 to 20 years” to implement (Public Broadcasting System, 2001). Following these ideas, Vicente Fox began to talk about an “open border” between Mexico and the United States before his electoral victory in July 2000 (Suarez, 2000). Modeled on the European Union, an “open border” would allow free transit for US and Mexican citizens across their mutual border. Additionally, President Fox has insisted since the beginning of his administration that the signature of a migratory agreement between Mexico and the United States would imply the legalization of millions of illegal Mexican workers living in the US. That was what the first Foreign Minister of Fox, Jorge Castañeda, called the “whole enchilada”. This proposal was the cornerstone of the relationship with the United States during the first years of the Fox Administration. It was a permanent topic in all the bilateral meetings and a strong demand in most of the Mexican media. However, this agreement was not achieved in part because the US Congress is hostile to any amnesty for Mexicans living and working in the US.

From the US’s point of view, Fox represented a healthy change in terms of a democratic transition and the Bush administration warmly received the new Mexican government. In February 2001, President Bush visited Mexico on his first Presidential trip outside the United States and met with President Fox at his ranch in Guanajuato. At their meeting Bush expressed his support for a review of the so-called anti-drug certification process and congratulated Fox’s efforts in fighting drug trafficking. Even when Bush was not enthusiastic about a migration agreement with Mexico, in their final joint statement both
Presidents agreed to begin negotiating “short and long-term agreements” for migration and labor issues (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001a).

A few months after President Bush’s visit to Mexico, in the days leading up to September 11, President Fox visited Washington on his first international trip as President. On the occasion, the most spectacular reception given to any Mexican President in the United States, Bush expressed the importance he placed upon the US’s relationship with Mexico: “the United States has no more important relationship in the world than the one we have with Mexico” (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001b). Notwithstanding Fox’s warm reception, it was quite evident at the meeting that Mexican enthusiasm about a migration agreement was not reciprocated by the Bush administration. Although it was in the US’s interest to maintain cordial ties and advance the two nations’ economic integration, a migration pact that would imply the legalization of millions of undocumented Mexican workers was not seriously considered by President Bush in part due to legal reforms that would have had to receive Congress approval. During the drafting of this paper, migration reforms were being discussed by Congress and the final outcome was still unclear.

In 2001, bilateral collaboration progressed especially in regard to the anti-drug campaign developed by the Fox Administration which led to the arrest of leaders of some of the most notorious drug cartels (Turbiville, 2001 and Chabat, 2002). Collaboration on this front was so successful that both governments began to implement measures, such as the creation of an FBI training school for the Mexican federal police, that would have been unimaginable a decade previously (Sandoval, 2001). However, September 11 changed the US’s priorities and drugs, economic integration and migration sunk to the bottom of the new agenda.

US-Mexico relations deteriorated following the September 11 terrorist attacks due to the Mexican government’s hesitation in giving full support to the US after the terrorist attacks. What the Mexican government learned the hard way was that the logic of the new Bush Doctrine was one of blind loyalties—you are with me or against me.

An impasse developed between the two countries as a result of President Fox’s delay in traveling to “ground zero” in New York which was seen by some sectors of the American public as “too little, too late” for a country that they had identified as a “partner.” US-Mexico relations continued to deteriorate following the United Nations Security Council approval of the resolution 1441 that gave Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council” or risk facing “serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations” (UN Security Council, 2002).2

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2 This resolution reestablished the UN inspections of Iraqi facilities, but was quite ambiguous about how and when these measures would take place if Iraq failed to comply.
Although resolution 1441 was unanimously approved by the Security Council, Mexico’s position was seen by some as hesitant in supporting the United States. An editorial in *The Wall Street Journal* represented this hard-line position very well criticizing Mexico for having joined the “soft-on-Saddam queue.” *The Wall Street Journal* also made reference to Mexico’s interests, linking the possibility of a migration accord with the support to the U.S:

Mr. Bush was already going to have to overcome opposition within his own party for a migration pact. The Mexican stiff-arm on Iraq will only convince more Republicans that our neighbors to the South are more useful as political piñatas than as partners. And. Mr. Bush will be even less inclined to risk his own prestige to help out Mr. Fox (*The Wall Street Journal*, 2002).

Though the discussion at the U.N. Security Council did not lead to an open confrontation between Mexico and the U.S, it did foreshadow what was going to take place in the following months when the White House tried to pass a resolution that would authorize the use of force against Iraq.

**Pressures for the securitization of Mexican borders**

One of the direct consequences of the September 11 attacks was an increase in US concern about Mexican border security involving the possibility that potential terrorists could gain access to Mexico through its border with Guatemala (*La Crónica de Hoy*, 2001a).

In response to US pressures, Fox announced a “profound and systematic” revision of existing laws and mechanisms of surveillance and safeguards in federal governmental facilities in order to prevent terrorists from entering into Mexico (*La Crónica de Hoy*, 2001 b). In October 2001, Ambassador Jeffrey Davidow complained that corruption in Mexico might have facilitated the entrance of terrorists into Mexico. Additionally, the Mexican government itself admitted that the possibility terrorists could use Mexican territory to enter into the United States did exist (Novedades, 2001). In this context, a “smart border” agreement was signed in March 2002 between Mexico and the United States to improve security along the US-Mexico border (Bumiller, 2002). Still in 2004, journalist reports revealed that Al Qaeda was purportedly connecting with local crime factions in Central America (Seper, 2004).

Accordingly, plans were made to modify Mexican migration controls in order to include electronic mechanisms of surveillance. In July 2004, it was announced that a new Integral System of Migratory Operation would be introduced, which would make it possible to have immediate computer-
control of all legal visitors entering into Mexico (México, Presidencia de la República, 2004). Also, both countries have been contemplating the implementation of pre-screening passengers from some points of entry, like Cancun, which would allow for the presence of US agents in Mexican territory.

As the Mexican experience has shown, despite diplomatic differences, collaboration in the area of security has been taking place since September 11, fomented in part by the possibility of terrorists entering the US through Mexico. The most effective way seen to prevent the threat of terrorism has been the development of intelligence capabilities. Consequently, collaboration between Mexico and the US has been based upon intelligence sharing, which has provoked little response from the Mexican public.

The war in Iraq

During February and March 2003, US diplomacy pushed very hard to get authorization from the Security Council to invade Iraq despite reluctance from countries such as France and Russia. In this context, the Mexican vote became crucial and President Fox was put in a very uncomfortable position. On the one hand, he realized that giving support to the US could bring important benefits, such as the migration pact. However, on the other hand, there were important domestic costs associated with supporting the invasion especially since 80 percent of the Mexican population opposed military intervention in Iraq and Congressional elections in Mexico would be held that year (The Economist, 2003).

Nevertheless, in the final phase of the American campaign to obtain the UN’s approval for the war President Bush made it very clear that he would not tolerate Mexico’s opposition to the war. Although Bush discarded a “significant retaliation” against Fox’s government, he pointed out that there would be disciplinary measures taken if Mexico persisted in opposing the war which were echoed in similar statements made by US Ambassador to Mexico, Tony Garza (Carreño, 2003a).

By mid-March 2003 it became evident that Mexico was not going to vote in favor of a US-led invasion to Iraq. In an interview on March 12, 2002, President Fox said that the decision on the vote at the United Nations Security Council would be a “State decision” with the consensus of the country’s main political forces, and that it would not be difficult to say “no” to the United States (Televisa, 2003). This disagreement seriously affected US-Mexico relations and the Bush administration openly objected the lack of Mexican support for the war (Carreño, 2003b).

Conservative sectors of the American public openly criticized Mexico’s position. An editorial published in The Wall Street Journal on March 12 referred to Mexico and Chile’s reluctant positions as a “fandango” and suggested that all trade benefits both countries have enjoyed in their
relationship with the US should be cancelled: “Maybe we should transfer to Bulgaria—which is supporting us sans bribery—the trade benefits that these two nations have is apparently taken for granted” (The Wall Street Journal, 2003). The newspaper also warned about the long-lasting effects that this conflict with the US could have: “These columns have long tried sympathetically to explain Mexican realities to our readers, but President Vicente Fox’s U.N. war straddle will cost his country years of U.S. public goodwill” (The Wall Street Journal, 2003).

**Sweet reconciliation or how interdependence makes for a difficult fight**

Despite the serious conflict that developed around Mexico’s opposition to the invasion of Iraq at the Security Council, it could not last long. In March 2004, one year after the defeat of Saddam Hussein, President Bush and President Fox had a very cordial meeting in Crawford, Texas in which Mexican residents of the border were exempted from the US Visit Program (Carreño, 2004). After a few months of public confrontation, both governments had to return to the negotiating table since there were so many pending bilateral issues to be addressed. Even when there were no significant agreements in the meetings the level of interdependence between the two countries was such that collaboration was crucial. The rapprochement with Mexico was not caused by weakness on the part of the US government or by a redefinition of the Bush Doctrine but clearly the consequence of interdependence. In other words, Bush found his foreign policy revolution would be limited by interdependence.

From the Mexican perspective, the conflict with the US confirmed that it was possible to disagree with the “Colossus to the North.” However, the Iraq war incident showed that motives and arguments are important. Mexico transitioned from arguing the existence of weapons of mass destruction, sustained during the approval of resolution 1441 to taking a pacifist stance by opposing the war. However, the insistence made by President Fox and the Mexican Ambassador to the UN, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, that if a vote would have taken place, Mexico would have opposed the war in Iraq, was unnecessary and only succeeded in annoying the US government. Although the chances of getting a migration agreement between the U.S. and Mexico were unlikely, it was evident that the conflict over the US invasion of Iraq complicated the discussion of this subject.
The future of US-Mexican relations

US-Mexican relations have been shaped by interdependence, which has deepened over the last decade due economic integration brought about by NAFTA. However, integration is not automatic and needs constant support from both governments which can be stunted as a result of conflicts as has been shown during the war in Iraq. There are still certain sectors of the Mexican political elite who do not like Mexico’s rapprochement to the United States. Even when this position is not supported in a clear way by the majority of the Mexican public (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, 2004), it represents a considerable obstacle for integration between Mexico and the United States.

Notwithstanding this, it is reasonable to expect a change in the role developed by Mexican nationalism. Over the last decades, nationalism has resulted in the legitimization of the PRI government since democratic legitimacy was absent. However, since the Zedillo Administration, nationalism has played a minor role as a legitimizing factor because of the democratic origin of the Zedillo and Fox governments. From this point of view, it is feasible to expect that nationalist feelings will be less important in Mexican foreign policy in the future. Certainly, this process will not be quick and easy and will continue to take time. This does not mean that there will not be disagreements between Mexico and the US but that they will probably be more based on legal or technical reasons than on questions of nationalism or anti-US feelings.
The Bush revolution in foreign policy as can be seen in Mexico’s case has affected the world significantly. As has been shown, pressures over Mexico to support the war in Iraq were substantial. However, the war conflicted with Mexico’s interests in many ways: it affected traditional Mexican support for international organizations and represented a very high domestic cost for the Fox administration.

The final outcome of the disagreement with the US proved that even when Mexico is highly vulnerable to the US it still has some margin for maneuver due to the level interdependence between the two countries. In this sense, Mexico’s opposition of the war in Iraq was successful: there were marginal costs for Mexico and it did not alienate the Fox administration from the Mexican public. However, it was probably more costly than it could have been due to the Mexican public’s insistence on disagreeing with the United States and its use of a pacifist argument, which was at odds with the participation of Mexico in the UN Security Council. This public disagreement also complicated the negotiation of a migration agreement and delayed the possibility of a “NAFTA plus”. Certainly, the conflict was inevitable but it seems that public confrontation was not necessary.

It is also worth mentioning that the third element of Bush’s foreign policy revolution—the democratization of rogue states—could have been seen by Mexico in a more positive way than in the past, given the emphasis that President Fox has given to the promotion of democracy and human rights. However, this possible support was overshadowed by the Bush administration’s disdain for international organizations and the human rights abuses committed by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. If the US decides in the future to channel its foreign policy objectives through international institutions, it is highly probable that it will be able to galvanize Mexican support. Notwithstanding this, conflicts will continue to appear from time to time in the US-Mexican relationship. The challenge for both countries is to accept the differences and support them with reasonable arguments.
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Cabrero, Enrique, De la descentralización como aspiración a la descentralización como problema, DTAP-197
Sour, Laura y Eunises Rosillo, ¿Cuáles son los resultados del presupuesto por resultados?, DTAP-198
Arellano, David y Walter Lepore, Prevención y control de conflictos de interés: lecciones para la Administración Pública Federal en México..., DTAP-199
Sour, Laura y Fredy Girón, El efecto flypaper de las transferencias intergubernamentales del ramo 28..., DTAP-200
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Cejudo, Guillermo, Gilberto Sánchez y Dionisio Zabaleta, El (casi inexistente) debate conceptual sobre la calidad del gobierno, DTAP-204

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Hernández, Kólver, State-Dependent Nominal Rigidities & Disinflation Programs in Small Open Economies, DTE-418
Hernández, Kólver and Asli Leblebicioglu, A Regime Switching Analysis of the Exchange Rate Pass-through, DTE-419
Ramírez, José Carlos y David Juárez, Viejas ideas económicas con nuevas tecnologías matemáticas, DTE-420
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