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**Mexico, the Americas and the World**  
Foreign Policy: Public and Leader Opinion 2008

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## Executive Summary

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*The most noteworthy changes in the Mexican public's mood are reflected in seven core characteristics and trends in Mexicans' international attitudes. These seven characteristics and trends echo 2008's rapidly evolving international panorama of increasing political and economic uncertainty.*

***Mexicans are more self-absorbed, pessimistic and detached from the world than they were in 2004 and 2006.***

- *Hostility to globalization has increased.*
- *Interest in international affairs has declined.*
- *Preferred levels and intensity of contacts with the world have decreased.*

***Mexican nationalism is strong but is changing in its nature, continuing patterns seen in the 2004 and 2006 surveys.***

- *National pride and the defense of oil, symbolic elements of Mexican nationalism, are strong among all groups.*
- *Younger and more educated Mexicans are more accepting than older and less educated Mexicans of an interconnected world.*

***The gap between Mexican opinions has widened since 2004 and 2006.***

- *Mexicans living in the south of the country disagree more than they did in 2004 and 2006 with Mexicans living in the center and north of the country.*
- *Mexican leaders and the public now also have more differences of opinion than they did in 2004 and 2006.*
- *Mexican leaders are more polarized by political partisanship than is the Mexican public.*
- *Politicians, government officials and business leaders, Mexico's traditional leadership groups, have notable differences of opinion with social and media leaders, an emerging leadership group in Mexico.*

***Mexicans have lost enthusiasm for North American integration and they are more disenchanted with the United States than they were in 2004 and 2006.***

- *Distrust of the United States has increased since the 2004 and 2006 surveys.*
- *A greater share of Mexicans now believe that their country's proximity to the United States is more of a problem than an advantage than believed this in 2006.*
- *More Mexicans now believe that the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) needs to be renegotiated than believed this in 2006.*

***Mexicans continue to see Latin America as a better option than other regions for Mexico's attention, but Mexicans hold inconsistent views on how Mexico should interact with other Latin American countries. These inconsistent views make it difficult for Mexican foreign policy to pursue a consistent strategy in Latin America that is backed by strong public support.***

- *Mexicans agree that their country's foreign policy should pay more attention to Latin America than any other region.*
- *Mexicans do not hold consistent views on how Mexico should behave in its regional relations.*
- *Mexicans lack the will for leadership in the region.*
- *Mexicans are ambivalent in their attitudes toward Latin American countries.*
- *Mexicans reject providing economic support for their less-developed neighbors.*

***Mexican concerns about social issues in the international arena have gained ground compared with traditional concerns such as security and economic competition.***

- *Mexicans are more worried than they were in 2004 and 2006 about world poverty, epidemics, food shortages and global warming.*
- *Mexicans are less worried than they were in the previous surveys about terrorism and the international economic situation.*

***Mexicans see Asia as an opportunity for their country, but it is far from being a highly visible option.***

- *Mexicans view China's increasing economic influence in the world as positive.*
- *Mexicans have favorable opinions of Asian countries.*
- *Mexicans do not believe that Asia should be a priority for their country's foreign policy.*

## Resumen ejecutivo

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Los resultados más interesantes del tercer levantamiento de la encuesta México y el Mundo se refieren a siete características y tendencias centrales que se observan en el ánimo de la opinión pública nacional frente al cambiante e incierto panorama internacional de 2008:

1. **El país está más ensimismado, pesimista y alejado del mundo:** ha caído el interés por lo internacional al igual que el nivel y la intensidad de los contactos con el exterior, a la vez que ha aumentado la animadversión hacia la globalización.
2. **El nacionalismo mexicano está vigente pero en clara transformación:** mientras que los elementos simbólicos del nacionalismo mexicano como el orgullo nacional y la defensa del petróleo se mantienen, los sectores jóvenes y más educados del país se muestran más abiertos a aceptar los referentes de un mundo global e interconectado.
3. **Las brechas entre los mexicanos aumentan:** crecen las divergencias entre la población y los líderes, el sur del país se diferencia cada vez más de las otras regiones de México; las élites mexicanas se encuentran más polarizadas que la población por divergencias partidistas; y hay diferencias notables entre élites tradicionales (políticos, funcionarios públicos y empresarios) y emergentes (líderes sociales y medios de comunicación).
4. **Los mexicanos han perdido el entusiasmo por la integración con América del Norte y están desencantados con Estados Unidos:** crece la desconfianza hacia el vecino del norte; cae la imagen de ese país; gana terreno la creencia de que hay que renegociar el Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN) así como la percepción de que para México la vecindad con Estados Unidos es más un problema que una ventaja.
5. **América Latina sigue siendo considerada como la mejor opción, pero no hay elementos para una estrategia consistente hacia la región:** si bien los mexicanos coinciden en que hay que prestar más atención a América Latina que a cualquier otra región, no tienen claridad con respecto a cómo hacerlo, carecen de voluntad de liderazgo, muestran actitudes ambivalentes hacia los países latinoamericanos y se niegan a apoyar económicamente a sus vecinos menos desarrollados.

6. ***Hacia una nueva agenda internacional centrada en lo social:*** las preocupaciones sociales como la pobreza en el mundo, las epidemias, la escasez de alimentos y el calentamiento global ganan peso frente a los temas tradicionales de seguridad y competencia económica. Destaca el descenso en la percepción de amenaza del terrorismo y la falta de preocupación por la situación de la economía internacional.
  
7. ***Asia es una oportunidad potencial para México pero dista mucho de ser una opción visible:*** los mexicanos ven con buenos ojos la creciente influencia económica de China en el mundo, tienen una buena opinión de los países asiáticos pero no le asignan a Asia un lugar prioritario en la agenda de la política exterior.



# MEXICO, THE AMERICAS AND THE WORLD

FOREIGN POLICY: PUBLIC AND LEADER OPINION 2008

<http://mexicoyelmundo.cide.edu>

Report on the results of the third biennial national survey of the Mexican general public and leaders on foreign policy and international affairs.

Guadalupe González González Ferran Martínez i Coma Jorge A. Schiavon



**Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas**  
**CIDE División de Estudios Internacionales**

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
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## Foreword

*Mexico, the Americas and the World 2008* is a research project of the International Studies Division of the *Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas* (CIDE) that studies Mexican public and leader opinions on foreign policy and foreign affairs. The project is an on-going biennial survey designed to measure Mexicans' opinions, attitudes, perceptions and values regarding the world and Mexico's role in international affairs. The survey is a representative sample of the adult Mexican population and of a segment of leaders in Mexico.

The central purpose of this study is to help fill the gap which exists in empirical, objective and factual information in a strategic area for Mexican policy and where independent and reliable data are scarce and disperse. Having accurate information on the public's views on how the world works and how the world *should* work is essential in assessing the legitimacy of international institutions, rules and actors as well as the Mexican government's foreign policy performance. Having accurate information also improves public and private decision making and nurtures academic research on foreign policy and international affairs.

The project is unique in both Mexico and Latin America because of its exclusive focus on analyzing social attitudes on international issues, its comprehensive approach covering a wide range of subjects (cultural, economic, political, social

and security), its collection of data on general attitudes about the world rather than on opinions regarding current events, and its inclusion of both general population and leader samples.

Since the first survey in 2004, the results have been disseminated in collaboration with the *Mexican Council on International Affairs* (COMEXI) and the *Chicago Council on Global Affairs* (CCGA), which has also been an important collaborator in the research methodology and questionnaire design. One of the traits that sets *Mexico, the Americas and the World 2008* apart from other research on public opinion and political culture is that it uses a comparative and flexible approach that permits simultaneous comparisons and cross tabulations at five distinct levels: *sub-national*, between different regions of Mexico (North, Center and South); *national* between leaders and the public as well as by economic strata and socio-demographic variables; *intra-elite*, between government, political, business, academic and social leaders; *international*, between the populations of different countries and *longitudinal*, between biennial periods.

Each biennial survey includes a distinct international component. *Mexico, the Americas and the World 2008* includes survey results from Mexico and three other Latin American countries—Colombia, Chile and Peru—in the international comparisons report. The 2006 survey



report included international comparisons between Mexico and the United States as well as survey results from four Asian countries: China, South Korea, India and Japan. The 2004 survey report included survey results from Mexico and the United States.

The questionnaire's structure consists of ten subject areas: *Interest, Contact, Knowledge, Identity, Confidence and Security, Mexico's Foreign Policy and Role in International Affairs, Rules of the Game in International Affairs, Latin American Relations, Mexican – United States Relations and Other Countries and Regions of the World.*

A conceptual framework has been developed to systematically and integrally interpret the results of the study for a variety of subject areas making it possible to plot the attitudes and perceptions of the general public and leaders on four axes: the degree of openness to the world (isolationism versus internationalism), the degree of 'power politics' beliefs (realism versus idealism), the degree of willingness to cooperate (unilateralism versus multilateralism) and types of national alignments (sympathies and antipathies).

*Mexico, the Americas and the World 2008* seeks to reach a broad audience: public and private decision makers in Mexico, the United States, Latin America, international governmental and non-governmental organizations and academic institutions, researchers and students of social sciences. The *Mexico, the Americas and the World 2008* project research team hopes that the readers of this report will use the survey data and analyses as a key instrument in their strategic decision making.

This report presents the most noteworthy results of the third *Mexico, the Americas and the World 2008* biennial survey. The complete dataset, in

SPSS format, survey questionnaires and top line results for the 69 subject and 18 socio-demographic questions are publicly available in English and Spanish, free of charge at <http://mexicoymundo.cide.edu>.



## Executive Summary

The most noteworthy changes in the Mexican public's mood are reflected in seven core characteristics and trends in Mexicans' international attitudes. These seven characteristics and trends echo 2008's rapidly evolving international panorama of increasing political and economic uncertainty.

- 1. Mexicans are more self-absorbed, pessimistic and detached from the world than they were in 2004 and 2006.** Hostility to globalization has increased. Interest in international affairs has declined. Preferred levels and intensity of contacts with the world have decreased.
- 2. Mexican nationalism is strong but is changing in its nature, continuing patterns seen in the 2004 and 2006 surveys.** National pride and the defense of oil, symbolic elements of Mexican nationalism, are strong among all groups. Younger and more educated Mexicans are more accepting than older and less educated Mexicans of an interconnected world.
- 3. The gap between Mexican opinions has widened since 2004 and 2006.** Mexicans living in the south of the country disagree more than they did in 2004 and 2006 with Mexicans living in the center and north of the country. Mexican leaders and the public now also have

more differences of opinion than they did in 2004 and 2006. Mexican leaders are more polarized by political partisanship than is the Mexican public. Politicians, government officials and business leaders, Mexico's traditional leadership groups, have notable differences of opinion with social and media leaders, an emerging leadership group in Mexico.

- 4. Mexicans have lost enthusiasm for North American integration and they are more disenchanted with the United States than they were in 2004 and 2006.** Distrust of the United States has increased since the 2004 and 2006 surveys. A greater share of Mexicans now believe that their country's proximity to the United States is more of a problem than an advantage than believed this in 2006. More Mexicans now believe that the *North American Free Trade Agreement* (NAFTA) needs to be renegotiated than believed this in 2006.
- 5. Mexicans continue to see Latin America as a better option than other regions for Mexico's attention, but Mexicans hold inconsistent views on how Mexico should interact with other Latin American countries.** These inconsistent views make it difficult for Mexican foreign policy to pursue a consistent strategy in Latin America that is backed by strong public support. Mexicans agree that their country's



foreign policy should pay more attention to Latin America than any other region. Mexicans do not hold consistent views on how Mexico should behave in its regional relations. Mexicans lack the will for leadership in the region. Mexicans are ambivalent in their attitudes toward Latin American countries. Mexicans reject providing economic support for their less-developed neighbors.

**6. Mexican concerns about social issues in the international arena have gained ground compared with traditional concerns such as security and economic competition.**

Mexicans are more worried than they were in 2004 and 2006 about world poverty, epidemics, food shortages and global warming.

Mexicans are less worried than they were in the previous surveys about terrorism and the international economic situation.

**7. Mexicans see Asia as an opportunity for their country, but it is far from being a highly visible option.** Mexicans view China's increasing economic influence in the world as positive. Mexicans have favorable opinions of Asian countries. Mexicans do not believe that Asia should be a priority for their country's foreign policy.



## Summary of 2008 trends and results

### *Interest, contact and identity*

- **Mexicans are interested in the world and are in contact with it.** 52% are very or somewhat interested in the news about Mexico's relations with other countries. 28% have traveled outside the country. 56% have relatives residing abroad. 29% have members of their immediate family living outside the country. 15% receive remittances from their relatives abroad (84% of them from the United States).
- **The public and leaders have a strong national identity, although local identities predominate among the public in the South.** 81% of the leaders and 59% of the public consider themselves Mexican rather than an identity based on their region, state or municipality. Local identities (64%) are stronger than the national identity (35%) in the south of the country.
- **Latin American identity is stronger than the North American identity among both the public and leaders.** 55% of the public consider themselves Latin American, 7% consider themselves North American, 6% say they are Central American and 24% consider themselves citizens of the world. Among leaders, as with the public, Latin American (51%) and

international (40%) identities are stronger than North (5%) and Central (1%) American identities.

- **Both the general public and leaders are open to the cultural influence of other countries, but leaders are much more open than is the public.** Half (50%) of the public say that the spread of foreign ideas and customs in Mexico is a good thing for Mexico. 80% of leaders also believe that the spread of foreign ideas and customs in Mexico is positive for Mexico.

### *Threats, confidence and security*

- **The Mexican public is very pessimistic about the state of the world. In contrast, leaders are more optimistic.** 19% of the Mexican public believe that the state of the world is better than it was a decade ago. 23% of the public think that things in the world will be better in the next ten years. 43% of Mexican leaders believe that the state of the world is better than it was a decade ago 52% of leaders expect things in the world to be better in the next ten years.
- **Mexicans are more concerned about issues that directly affect their wellbeing than they are about issues that are more removed from**



**their daily life.** 79% say that drug-trafficking and organized crime are grave threats to Mexico; 77% believe that global warming is a grave threat; 75% believe the same about epidemics like AIDS; 73% agree that poverty and food shortages are grave threats to Mexico; and 69% fear global economic crises. In contrast, just 32% believe that the emergence of China as a world power is a grave threat to Mexico; equal shares of the Mexican public (37%) see ethnic or religious conflicts, the inflow of illegal immigrants into Mexico and populist leaders as grave threats to their country.

- **The perceived threats to Mexico of international terrorism and a tougher US immigration policy have weakened considerably over the past two years.** 63% of Mexicans say that international terrorism is a grave threat to Mexico, seven percentage points fewer (70%) than in 2006. 51% of the public see tighter immigration controls in the United States as a grave threat to their country, fifteen percentage points fewer (66%) than in 2006.
- **Large shares of Mexican leaders and the public want their government to collaborate very closely with the United States in fighting drug traffickers, reflecting their perception of the seriousness of the threat of drug-trafficking to Mexico. However, leaders are more reticent about defending traditional notions of sovereignty in fighting drug trafficking.** 49% of Mexicans would be willing to allow US agents to collaborate with Mexican authorities in the security of Mexico's borders, ports and airports in order to tackle drug-

trafficking and organized crime. In contrast, 61% of the leaders oppose allowing U.S. agents to participate with Mexican agents in this way. 58% of the public are in favor of extraditing criminals from Mexico to the United States. 76% of Mexican leaders agree with extraditing criminals. 55% of the public support receiving financial aid from the United States to fight drug-trafficking and organized crime. 70% of leaders also support this type of aid from the United States.

### *Mexico's Role and Foreign Policy*

- **Mexicans want their country to be an active participant in world affairs. They are not isolationists.** 69% of the public believe that Mexican should participate actively in world affairs. 93% of leaders also want Mexico to be an active participant.
- **Mexicans favor pragmatism over legalism or altruism in their country's foreign policy.** Fighting drug-trafficking and organized crime (81%), protecting Mexico's foreign interests (76%) and environmental protection (76%) are the three most important foreign policy objectives for Mexicans. Strengthening the Organization of American States (31%), promoting democracy in other countries (37%) and bolstering the United Nations (42%) are the three least important foreign policy objectives among those asked about in survey.
- **Mexicans, and especially Mexican leaders, give their government's foreign policy higher**



marks than in previous surveys. 45% of the public agree with the government's current foreign policy as do 73% of the leaders

### ***Rules of the international game: multilateralism and globalization***

- **Mexico's leaders want their country to participate in the United Nations Security Council, but do not want Mexico to contribute peacekeeping forces.** 75% of leaders support Mexico once again seeking a seat as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. 59% of Mexico's leaders oppose Mexico contributing forces to peacekeeping missions. In contrast, 60% of the public favors Mexico contributing forces to UN peacekeeping missions.
- **Despite Mexicans' traditional pacifism, they support the UN Security Council authorizing the use of military force against a state in some circumstances.** 70% of Mexicans support the UN Security Council authorizing the use of military force against a state to avoid serious violations of human rights, such as genocide. 59% support the Security Council authorizing the use of military force to reinstate a democratic government that was overthrown by force.
- **The Mexican public is divided on whether globalization is positive or negative for Mexico. Leaders agree that it is positive.** 38% of Mexicans say that globalization is good for Mexico and 33% believe that it is bad for Mexico. In contrast, 65% of leaders agree that globalization is good for Mexico and just 19% believe that it is bad for their country.
- **Foreign investment is welcomed by the general public, but not in strategic sectors.** 70% of Mexicans regard foreign investment, in general terms, as very or somewhat beneficial for the country. But, 70% oppose foreign involvement in the oil sector; 60% oppose foreign investment in electric power; 51% oppose it in telecommunications; and 50% oppose foreign investment in the media.
- **Leaders agree on reducing restrictions on foreign investment.** 56% of them support foreign investment in the oil sector, 65% in electricity, 86% in telephony and 74% in communication media.
- **Mexicans and their leaders agree that international trade is good for Mexico.** 61% of the public and 70% of leaders believe that international trade is good for the Mexican economy. 55% of the public and 74% of leaders say that trade is good for their standard of living. 59% of Mexicans and 51% of leaders agree that trade is good for Mexican workers. 50% of the public and 42% of leaders, smaller shares than for other sectors of the Mexican economy, believe that the countryside benefits from international trade. Approximately one third of both groups (38% and 29%, respectively), say that the countryside does not benefit from international trade.



## *North America*

- **Mexicans do not trust the United States and this distrust has increased substantially over the past four years.** 61% of Mexicans distrust the United States, an increase of eighteen percentage points compared with the levels of distrust in 2004 (43%) and eight percentage points compared with the levels of distrust in 2006 (53%). 64% of leaders do not trust the United States, an increase of twenty-three percentage points since 2006 when 41% of leaders said that they did not trust the United States. Mexicans who live further from the U.S. border are more distrustful of the United States. In the north of Mexico, 45% of the public distrusts the United States. In the center of the country, 62% do not trust the United States. In the South, 72% of Mexicans distrust the United States.
- **Mexican pragmatism wins out over their distrust of the United States, but this pragmatism is less pronounced than in 2006.** 45% of Mexicans either strongly or somewhat agree with Mexico and the United States forming a single country, if this meant an improvement in their standard of living. 54% of the Mexicans either strongly or somewhat agreed with this in 2006.
- **NAFTA must be renegotiated.** 73% of Mexicans and an equal share of leaders (72%) believe that Mexico should try to renegotiate NAFTA, especially the agricultural sections, even if this means losing some of the benefits acquired.

- **Mexicans do not always prefer the counterweight option in their relations with the United States.** 45% of the public thinks that Mexico should strive for special treatment by the United States instead of coordinating its negotiating positions with Canada (39%). Leaders are divided on this issue: 44% want Mexico to try to negotiate special deals with the United States and 43% prefer to coordinate positions with Canada when negotiating with the United States.

## *Latin America*

- **Mexicans want their government's foreign policy to prioritize relations with Latin America.** 37% of Mexicans say that their government's foreign policy should prioritize relations with Latin America. 30% of the public believe that the priority should be North America. 10% of Mexicans want their government to prioritize relations with Europe; 5% say Africa, 3% say Asia, 2% say the Middle East, and 1% say Oceania.
- **Mexicans want their country to coordinate with other Latin American countries. They do not want their country to seek leadership in the region.** 46% of the public and 54% of the leaders think that Mexico should coordinate with Latin American countries, without trying to be a regional leader. 41% and 45%, respectively, believe Mexico should be the leader in the region.



- **Mexicans do believe that their country has been the most influential country in the region over the past decade.** 22% of the public believes that Mexico has been the most influential country in the region in the last decade. 28% believe that Mexico will continue to be the most influential country in the next decade. Leaders disagree with this opinion. They say that Brazil has been the most influential country in the region over the past decade (64%) and will be in the future (54%).
- **The Mexican public and leaders disagree on the likelihood of an armed conflict in Latin America.** 41% of the public regard strife as *more likely*. 57% of the leaders believe that an armed conflict is *less likely*.
- **Mexicans want their government to react cautiously in situations of conflict and violence in the region.** 39% of Mexicans believe that Mexico should wait and see how the international community reacts, before acting itself, if a Latin American government is overthrown. 32% of the public believe that their government should publicly condemn such acts of violence without severing diplomatic relations. 15% of Mexicans favor their country breaking diplomatic relations with countries that have had their government overthrown. Leaders favor condemnation without breaking relations (59%), over breaking ties (18%) or waiting for international reaction (11%).
- **Mexicans want conflicts in Latin America to be resolved in multilateral organizations.** 60% of the general public believes that the United Nations should act to solve such conflicts. Leaders divide over whether it should be the Organization of American States (35%) or the United Nations (34%) that acts to resolve crises in Latin America.
- **Mexicans agree that Venezuela is the most conflict-prone country in the region.** 23% of the public believe that Venezuela is the country in Latin American that has generated most of the region's conflicts over the past ten years. 24% of the public believe that Venezuela will continue to generate the most conflict in the region over the next ten years. 67% of leaders also cite Venezuela as the most conflict-prone country over the past ten years. 60% of leaders believe that Venezuela will continue to cause regional conflict over the next ten years.
- **Mexicans do not feel a strong commitment to Central America.** 42% of the public believe that Mexico should channel economic resources to promote the economic development of the Central American nations. In contrast, 65% of the leaders say that Mexico should channel resources to Central American nations. Mexican's opinion of Central American immigrants is more unfavorable (for 48% of the public and 49% of the leaders) than favorable (41% and 46%, respectively).
- **Mexicans are divided on whether their country's priority for further economic integration should be Latin America or North America.** 35% of Mexicans and 37% of leaders hold the opinion that Mexico's priority should be to integrate with Latin America. 30%



of the public and 27% of leaders say it should be with North America. Mexicans believe that integration is more likely to continue among Latin American nations and within North America. 73% of Mexicans and 89% of their leaders think that there will be more economic integration among Latin American nations. 71% and 85%, respectively, believe that the economic integration of Mexico, the United States and Canada will increase. Classic measures regarding immigrants in Mexico are gaining ground. Almost half the population (45%) and most leaders (59%) favor of establishing a temporary work program in Mexico for Central American migrants. 36% and 29%, respectively, prefer to establish controls on the southern border to prevent unauthorized entry into Mexico. A small minority of 8% thinks a wall should be built on the border with Guatemala and Belize.

- **Mexicans believe that their country is doing a better job than the United States in its treatment of immigrants.** 71% of the public believe that Mexico treats Central American immigrants in their country better than the United States treats Mexican immigrants in the U.S.

### *Relations with other countries and regions*

- **Mexicans have more favorable feelings towards developed countries than for developing nations.** Germany, Canada, Spain and Japan are seen in a very favorable light by

Mexicans. Latin America countries including, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru and Venezuela are viewed less favorably by Mexicans.

- **The public sees China's economic growth as positive for the world. Leaders see it as negative.** 46% of the public believe that the emergence of China as an economic power is positive for the world. 59% of leaders see it as something negative for the world.



## Introduction

Winds of a greater misunderstanding of the outside world are blowing through Mexico. Mexican public opinion is somewhat more self-absorbed and distant from the world in 2008 than it was in 2006 and 2004. Mexicans are also more parochial than they were in previous surveys. Their interest in the world, about which they know very little, has declined only slightly. Yet, they see foreign policy issues as more distant from their daily lives than they did both two and four years ago.

The Mexican public's attention to news programs declined in 2008, something to be expected in a non-election year in which there are no campaigns that set a clear political agenda. This is not exclusively the public's distancing itself from the world. Rather, it is a more generalized attitudinal change towards greater disinterest in, or perhaps weariness of, politics and policy issues. Although the causes for Mexicans' withdrawal from politics and policy are unclear, one factor that may be affecting public opinion is the increase in criminal violence since the Calderón administration went on the offensive against organized crime and drug-trafficking soon after taking office. The public's increased withdrawal could well be a natural, defensive reaction when confronted with an internal situation in which public insecurity has left its mark with rising crime rates, a wave of

kidnappings and a rising death toll among both drug-traffickers and police.

Looking beyond the current national situation, Mexicans' increased self-absorption is a mystery given the country's two decades of experience with economic openness and massive emigration rates over the same period. Both openness and emigration should imply a gradual and steady increase in the public's interest in world events as a result of growing contact with the outside world.

Paradoxically, interest in international affairs has waned in a context in which the opposite could be expected. The international panorama has been very dynamic and visible in Mexico during 2008 as a result of numerous events that have been given wide coverage in the Mexican media, including the conflict between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela arising from the destruction of an operations base run by the *Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia* (FARC), the food crisis triggered by rising prices, the Olympic games in China, the war in the Caucasus, heightened violence in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan, the presidential elections in the United States, economic turbulence in the United States and its spread to the world economy in the final year of the George W. Bush administration.

Nonetheless, the survey results indicate that the turbulent international situation and rising national insecurity has turned Mexicans away from the



world and to a more immediate environment that is closer to the local community, but is also still somewhere between the local, national and global planes. As interpreted by Jorge I. Domínguez, the results of the survey show that Mexicans "...are not Don Quixote jousting windmills, and neither are they ostriches with their heads buried in the sand."

The purpose of this publication is to draw attention to some of the key issues of Mexico's relationship with the world at a time when the Mexican public and leaders are faced with the need to make strategic decisions to deal with a changing and demanding global environment.

This report is structured around three major questions that form an analytical axis for each chapter: who Mexicans are in their relationship with the world, what they expect from the world and their country's foreign policy and how they think about global and regional geopolitics.

The first chapter casts light on collective Mexican identities, nationalism and the degree of contact with and knowledge about the rest of the world.

The second chapter gathers the assessments made by the public and leaders of Mexico regarding the situation in the world and in the region, potential international threats to Mexico, the government's performance and foreign policy objectives, as well as the role of the major powers and international organizations in international order and stability.

The final chapter analyzes the phobias and phobias of Mexicans towards other countries, perceptions regarding regions of priority interest for Mexicans and attitudes concerning the present and future of Mexico's relations with the countries of North America and Latin America.



## Chapter 1. Between global and local

### *Collective identities: between nationalism and local identity*

As in the two previous surveys, the identity that predominates in most of the Mexican population is being Mexican (59%). Leaders are more likely than the public to cite the national identity over local or international identities—81% consider themselves as Mexicans and 14% cite a local identity. Nevertheless, there is a significant change in the map of collective identities among the public: the feeling of local identity climbed 10 points from 30% to 40%, while the national identity declined from 64% to 59% since 2004.

Mexico has become a more heterogeneous and diverse nation in which the *hometown* or local area have advanced as an identification space to the detriment of the *nation*. The emergence of localism is present throughout the country, although the trend is less perceptible in the center. The most notable change is that on both borders of the country, where there is closer geographic contact with the other countries, local identity has increased among the public. On one hand, the South has characteristics unlike those of the rest of the country, as also was seen in the surveys of 2004 and 2006. On the other hand, while in 2006 the regional identity in the southern states was 10 percentage points stronger than identification with the nation (55% against

45%), in 2008 the distance between the two doubled (64% against 35%), a difference of 24 points below the national average.

The novelty is that in the North, Mexicans also are moving to a clear strengthening of regional identities. The share of the public in the North whose primary identity is their state of residence has increased consistently over the past four years— from 27% in 2004, to 30% in 2006 (30%) and to 42% in 2008. National identity in the North still weighs more heavily than local identity, in contrast to in the South. Nevertheless, there was a decrease of 11 percentage points in the share of northerners who feel primarily Mexican (from 68% in 2006 to 57%).


These trends give reason to believe that regional gaps in identity are widening rapidly. The map of collective identities in Mexico shows that the Center is nationally-oriented, the South is more locally-oriented and the North is in an intermediate position between local and national, with state identities increasing in importance.

There are noteworthy generational differences in preferred identities and young people are more divided than the older Mexicans in terms of local and national identity. Although most of the youngest segment of the interviewees, whose age is between 18 and 29, identify with the nation (55%), there is also a high local identity (43%) among younger Mexicans. Among Mexicans



## National Identity

What do you most closely identify with?



older than age 60, national identity is much higher (63%) than the local identity (36%).

In reference to Mexican identification patterns in political communities or spaces that go beyond the national state, such as the regions of the Americas or the world as a whole, the findings of the three previous surveys are confirmed. Mexicans feel more *Latin American* and *cosmopolitan* than *North American* and *Central American*. Mexicans feel primarily Latin American (55%); very few regard themselves as North Americans (7%) or Central Americans (6%), despite the geographic proximity of both zones. One out of every four Mexicans (24%) see themselves as *citizens of the world*.

Once again, there are significant generational differences in preferred identities beyond the

nation. The percentage of *cosmopolitans* amongst young people (25%) is higher than among Mexicans older than age 60 (18%) while the Latin American, North American and Central American identities are very similar in all the age groups. The map of sub-national and supranational identities of young Mexicans is more diverse than for the older Mexicans, while the share of local and cosmopolitan youths are higher.

Leaders are considerably more cosmopolitan than the general public, but they share the same feeling of Latin American identity and weak identification with North America: 51% of the leaders consider themselves *Latin American*, 40% say they are *citizens of the world* and 5% say they are *North American*. Leaders' cosmopolitanism is 16 percentage points higher than the public's.



Although the greater cosmopolitanism among leaders is predictable, their weak North American identity (5%) is surprising given their intense level of contact with the United States of America

Two out of every five Mexicans would leave the country to live abroad if they could. Among the potential immigrants, the first destination country would be the United States (52%) followed by Canada (13%). Consequently, many Mexicans are willing to “jump the national ship” to try their luck somewhere else in the world.


Mexico’s potential emigrants are the people who have the highest aspirations and means to emigrate: the young, the educated and those whose economic situation is relatively comfortable. As will be shown in subsequent

sections of this report, this is the segment of the population that is the most open to the culture of other countries.

The desire to leave the country among young people ages 18 to 29 is twice as high (51%) as in the group older than age 60 (25%). Mexicans with a higher level of schooling are the ones who are most willing to leave Mexico: 49% of Mexicans with middle-level or higher education would emigrate if they could, while 28% of those with a grade school education would emigrate. Moreover, the desire to emigrate among Mexicans who say that their personal economic situation is good (48%) is higher than among those who are less positive about their personal economic situation (35%).

### Regional Identity

*Tell me, what do you most closely identify with?*





## *The labyrinth of Mexican nationalism*

Nationalism is a complex phenomenon in which attitudes concerning culture, politics and the economy play a role. It is a feeling of belonging to an imaginary, independent and sovereign community that establishes a distinction between those who belong to it—because they share a common culture destiny—and those who do not. This section of the report highlights the results of the fifteen questions that shed light on the following five issues related to nationalism in Mexico: national pride, attitudes to foreigners, political sovereignty, cultural openness and economic protectionism.

Acceptance or rejection of foreign people, languages, religions and customs constitutes the symbolic and cultural dimension of nationalism. The idea of territorial integrity and national sovereignty as the exclusive exercise of government authority over the population, resources and laws of a country constitutes the political dimension of nationalism. The degree of control and openness regarding commercial and financial interaction with other countries constitutes the economic dimension of nationalism.

Each of the three components of Mexican nationalism—cultural, political and economic—has its own dynamic, and these dynamics do not always coincide. This survey shows how Mexican nationalism is most apparent in the symbolic, cultural dimension of national pride. There is a profound unwillingness to grant full participation rights to naturalized foreigners or to open up oil to foreign investment. However, this rejection of the foreign disappears when the wellbeing or security of a person is at stake.

Further complicating simplistic explanations of Mexican nationalism, the Mexican public and leaders have different visions of nationalism. Leaders tend to be more open than the public to foreign cultural and economic influences, but they are noticeably more closed than the average citizen on political issues related to national sovereignty, such as the presence of foreign authorities in Mexico.

### *1. National symbols: pride and international importance*





National pride has strengthened in the last two years. 83% of the public is very proud to be Mexican, 11 points higher than in 2006. This trend is more marked in the South where it rose from 70% to 89%. Feelings of national pride are strong, and have increased since 2006, among all segments of the population.

This increasing national pride is consistent with the widespread belief that Mexico is a country with high (52%) or some (30%) importance internationally. A minority (15%) believe that Mexico is a country with little or no importance internationally. Leaders also see Mexico as an important country internationally, but their assessment of Mexico's international importance is more moderate: 47% of the leaders say that Mexico has little international importance and 40% say that Mexico has some international importance.



### Mexico's importance in the world

How important is Mexico at an international level: very, somewhat, a little or nothing?



Mexicans also believe that their country's international trajectory has been positive over the past decade. 64% of the public and 69% of leaders believe that Mexico is now more important in the world that it was a decade ago. There are significant regional differences in assessments of Mexico's trajectory. In the South, the public's assessment of an improvement is higher (73%) than among Mexicans in the north (55%). Leaders are more likely than is the public to give a negative assessment of Mexico's trajectory. One fourth of the leaders have a negative opinion of the country's current position and they believe it has been losing importance, compared with 15% of the public.

The public is optimistic about Mexico's future world position: 66% believe that the country's international importance will increase over the next ten years and 16% say it will stay the same. 11% are pessimistic and believe the country will be less important in the world in ten years time. Leaders share (73%) the public's optimistic view of the future, albeit with significant differences among leaders in terms of ideology and political party: while 90% of the leaders who support the PAN and 80% of those who favor the PRI believe that the country will be more important, the PRD-leaning leaders (55%) are more skeptical about Mexico's future international importance.

### 2. A xenophobic and distrustful nation?

Mexican nationalism appears forcefully in a deep-rooted rejection and distrust of foreigners, regardless of their nationality. Mexicans believe that to enjoy full political rights and



to be admitted as a member of the national community on an equal footing, one has to be Mexican by birth. There continues to be strong opposition to incorporating foreigners into the national community as citizens with full rights, as was seen in the 2006 survey. 79% of the public opposes naturalized citizens being able to run for Congress and 80% reject opening this possibility to persons with dual citizenship. The level of rejection rises to 84% for the position of president. This rejection is not limited to issues of political representation but also extends to a more generalized xenophobia in the nation's cultural life. This xenophobia is illustrated by the 54% of the Mexicans who oppose foreigners who are naturalized Mexican citizens being permitted to play on the Mexican national soccer team.

The public's rejection of foreigners is not shared by leaders, who are generally more willing to grant political rights to foreigners and provide access to civil and political rights to persons who are not Mexican by birth. For example, 78% of the leaders agree and so do 41% of the public. Though leaders are more open to naturalized citizens having political rights in Mexico, they divide on whether foreigners who become Mexican citizens should be permitted to be elected to Congress: a majority of leaders (56%) favor this and 43% of leaders are against it. The only position in which the leaders share a majority opinion with the public is in prohibiting a person with dual nationality from being elected president of the Republic—66% of leaders oppose this as does 84% of the public.

Mexicans also are not willing to open their country's doors to foreigners, irrespective of

the place of origin, who want to work freely in Mexico. There is no anti-American, anti-Asian, pro-Latin American or pro-European bias here. Depending on the nationality asked about, between 71% and 78% of the public oppose foreigners being permitted to freely enter Mexico to work. Leaders agree with the public on restricting foreign entry into Mexico for employment with leader opposition ranging from 66% to 76%, depending on the nationality asked about. Nevertheless, about one third of leaders agree that Mexico should accept the unfettered entrance of citizens from any country in the hemisphere, while for the public acceptance of unrestricted immigration ranges from 19% for North America, to 21% for South America and 25% for Central America.

### ***3. Granted, shared and delegated sovereignty?***

Political nationalism in Mexico is not only alive, but may in fact be increasing. Nevertheless, Mexicans are willing to grant, share or delegate sovereignty, particularly when their physical security and, to a lesser extent, their economic wellbeing are at stake.

The survey measures, with a particular focus on the United States, how deeply embedded traditional notions of national sovereignty and political independence are by asking a series of questions on topics such as the hierarchy of international treaties, jurisdiction of international courts, extradition of Mexicans, presence of US agents in national territory and a political union between Mexico and the United States.




67% of Mexicans believe that national laws are above international treaties and agreements and 21% believe the opposite. Leaders are divided on this issue and there is a sizeable segment of leaders with a clear internationalist leaning: 40% give more weight to international covenants and 47% to national laws. Ideology and party loyalties are an important influence on leaders' internationalist leanings with regard to international treaties and agreements. Leaders who are members of the center-right PAN are more likely than leaders who are members of the center-left PRI and leftist PRD to accept the supremacy of international treaties. 47% of leaders who support the PAN agree with the supremacy of international treaties and 42% disagree. In contrast nationalism predominates among leaders who align with the PRI (58%) and PRD (61%), who disagree with the supremacy of international treaties and agreements over national laws.

The Mexican public divides on whether international courts should have jurisdiction over Mexican citizens. 45% of the public supports that the *International Criminal Court* (ICC) should bring to trial Mexican citizens who have committed crimes against humanity and 42% of the public disagrees with this type of universal jurisdiction. However, in the South of the country most of the public (57%) disagree. Leaders are clearly more supportive of the universal jurisdiction of international courts than the public; 79% of leaders favor the ICC trying Mexican citizens who have committed crimes against humanity and 14% oppose this.


### International Treaties vs. National Laws

Tell me whether you agree with the following statement or not: *International treaties and agreements should be above national laws*


Agree



Disagree



Depends





Mexican political nationalism becomes blurred when dealing with issues of security, but is clear in matters of lesser importance. Sovereignty is placed second in matters of security, but in first place for matters of convenience. Two questions were included to measure the degree of agreement or disagreement with the possibility of allowing US agents to operate at Mexican airports, ports and borders for two different reasons: fighting drug-trafficking and speeding up the transit of persons traveling from Mexico to the United States. In the first case, there is a high degree of willingness, given the sensitivity of this issue in Mexico, with 49% accepting the presence of US agents in Mexican territory, and 42% rejecting such a presence to help fight drug-trafficking. Leaders are less sure—just a third of leaders agree and most (61%) oppose US agents on Mexican soil to help fight drug-trafficking.

In the second case, both the public and leaders (67%) coincide in their rejection of the presence of US agents at Mexico's exit ports and borders when the purpose is to speed up passenger traffic. However, in the North of the country the public is more accepting of this with one third of northerners agreeing, compared with 18% agreeing in the center of Mexico and 12% agreeing in the South.

Mexicans' defense of national sovereignty becomes a highly variable political dimension of Mexican nationalism when economic wellbeing enters into the equation. The survey measures Mexicans' willingness to share sovereignty in exchange for material benefits with a question about support for Mexico and the United States forming a single country if this meant a better standard of living for Mexicans. There are marked


changes in opinion seen over the last four years concerning this hypothetical case of shared or granted sovereignty. Whereas from 2004 to 2006 there was a swing from widespread rejection to general approval (57% against and 38% in favor in 2004 to 54% in favor and 44% against in 2006), in 2008 the population is divided, with 45% of the opinions in favor and 51% against. Although there is continued support for the idea of sharing sovereignty with the United States in exchange for economic benefits (45% said they agreed very much or somewhat), in the last two years there has been a decline of 9 percentage points in the number of persons who very much agree (from 29% to 23%) or agree somewhat (from 25% to 22%).

Regional differences in support for shared sovereignty with the United States are as expected. Mexicans in the Center and South of the country are more defensive of Mexican sovereignty over economic wellbeing. In the North, Mexicans are more pragmatic. Most Mexicans in the North (57%) would be very much or somewhat in agreement with Mexico and the US becoming a single country if it meant a better standard of living for them and a considerable minority (39%) would be in disagreement with this possibility. In contrast, in the South and center, a majority rejects this proposition (55%) and significant minority approves of it (41% and 42%, respectively).



### Mexico and US union

*How much would you agree to Mexico and the United States forming a single country, if this meant an improvement in your life quality?*



#### 4. Greater openness to foreign cultural influences

Some symbolic elements of Mexican nationalism have become less intense than in 2004 and 2006, such as openness to the dissemination of foreign ideas, while others are just as strong, such as the reluctance to grant political rights to foreigners or permitting foreign investment in oil. There is a very strong and clear trend towards greater cultural acceptance in all the sectors of the population: 50% think that it is good to disseminate foreign ideas and customs in Mexico, although a third (33%) believe the opposite. It should be noted that just four years ago the distribution of preferences

was exactly the opposite: 51% thought that the cultural influence of other countries was negative, compared with 34% in 2006. This trend is more intense in the South and Center of the country where the share of Mexicans who have a positive opinion on the dissemination of foreign ideas climbed by 26 and 24 percentage points respectively between 2004 and 2008.

Differences between regions of the country coincide with the differences noted for other aspects of nationalism, as do differences between the opinion of leaders and the general public. The North, where 56% of the interviewees believe that it is good to disseminate foreign ideas and customs, is more open than the South (47%) and




the Center (49%). Leaders are more open than the public. Although the gap between leaders and the public decreased five percentage points since 2006, the distance is still huge: 80% of leaders are in favor of the dissemination of foreign ideas and cultures in Mexico, compared with just 50% of the public.

Educational level is positively associated with favoring the spread of foreign ideas and cultures in Mexico. 43% of those without basic education disapprove of disseminating foreign

ideas and customs and 33% approve. The results are inverted in the more educated segments of the public: 55% of those with higher education approve and 27% disapprove. Age also matters. Young Mexicans are more open than older Mexicans to the spread of foreign ideas and cultures in their country. 59% of those ages 18 to 29 approve of the dissemination of foreign customs in Mexico compared with 41% of those ages 51 and older.

### Dissemination of non-Mexican customs and ideas

*Do you think that it is good or bad to disseminate the ideas and customs of other countries in Mexico?*





### *5. Economic matters: ambivalent and selective nationalists*

Although Mexicans have a positive opinion of free trade and foreign investment, in general terms, they are wary of economic globalization and they categorically reject opening up the oil sector to foreign capital. These results coincide with the results from the 2004 and 2006 surveys.

The selective nature of Mexican economic nationalism is illustrated by Mexicans' wide-spread opposition to foreign investment in oil (70%) and electricity (60%), even though 70% believe that foreign investment, in general, is very or somewhat beneficial for Mexico. This difference reflects the symbolic importance of the energy sector for Mexicans.

Regional differences of opinion changed from previous surveys. Mexicans in the North of the country have become more nationalist regarding opening the oil sector to foreign investment. However, the 2008 survey was fielded in the context of a national debate on energy reform that led to the mobilization of left-wing parties that opposed the government's proposal to open up the oil sector to private capital. This debate may have influenced the survey results.

Mexican leaders and the general public continue to differ on opening the economy to foreign investment. Leaders (90%) are more likely than the public (70%) to say that foreign investment benefits Mexico. Also, leader opinions are more stable than those of the public regarding the inflow of foreign capital into strategic sectors like oil and electricity. Unlike the public, most leaders continue to support foreign investment in telecommunications (86%), electricity (65%) and oil

(56%). Nevertheless, leaders' support for foreign investment has fallen, with the exception of foreign investment in the telecommunication sector. In the case of oil, there is a sustained decline in the share of leaders that favor foreign investment in the sector: from 76% of leaders favoring foreign investment in the oil sector in 2004, to 62% in 2006 and 56% in 2008.

There is a high degree of ideological and partisan polarization on this issue among leaders. 97% of the PRD-leaning leaders oppose foreign investment. In stark contrast, 83% of the PAN-leaning leaders support it. Leaders who align with the PRI are in the center of the debate: 63% of them favor opening the sector and 32% oppose it. These party differences are reflected, to a lesser extent, among the public. Supporters of the three largest parties have less diverging opinions than among leaders that support different political parties, although most of the public is against opening the oil sector: 74% of those aligned with the PRD oppose foreign investment in the oil sector, 68% of those aligned with the PRI oppose it as do 66% of PAN supporters.





### Foreign investment by sectors

*Do you think that the Mexican government should or should not allow foreigners to invest in..?*



#### Telecommunications

#### Electricity



#### Oil Production, Exploration and Distribution

#### Communication media such as television companies and newspapers



— National    — North    — South    — Center    — Leaders




Economic globalization has never been very popular among Mexicans, most of whom—after two decades of liberal trade and investment policies—are not convinced of its benefits for the country. Economic globalization has lost supporters since the 2006 survey, a finding that is consistent with the general mood of self-absorption in public opinion. Mexicans are more skeptical about the possible benefits of economic globalization in 2008 than they were in

2006: 38% of the interviewees in 2008 say that economic globalization is generally good for the country, compared with 41% who said the same thing in 2006. However, a third (11 percentage points higher than two years ago) think that it is generally bad. Even in the north of the country the share that says economic globalization is generally good fell in 2008 to 39% from 46% in 2006.

### Globalization

*Do you think that the increased contact of our economy with the other economies of the world, which is known as globalization, is generally good or generally bad for Mexico?*





Leader opinions also turned more negative. In 2008, 65% of leaders say that globalization is generally good for Mexico, compared with 83% who said the same in 2006.

Young people have a more positive (43%) than negative (31%) opinion of globalization. Similarly, in the group of people who report a good economic situation or sufficient income to cover their needs, 46% believe that globalization benefits the country and 34% think it is harmful. In terms of the distribution of opinions according to party preferences, those who align with the PAN have a more favorable opinion (42%) than an unfavorable (27%) opinion. Mexicans who align with the PRI are ambivalent (36% have a good opinion and 34% have a bad one), Mexicans who align with the PRD are the most critical (40% think it is bad and 33% think it is good).


Support for free trade has taken root in Mexican society. Leaders have no doubts about the benefits they see free trade bringing to Mexico, with the exception of its benefits for the environment. The public agrees. Most Mexicans believe that free trade is good for the economy of developed countries (75%) and for Mexico's economy and companies (60%). Most Mexicans also believe that free trade is beneficial for *their own standard of living* (55%), *Mexican workers* (59%), *the Mexican countryside* (50%) and *the environment* (47%).

### Free Trade


*In general, do you think that free trade is good or bad for ...?*

#### The economy of developed countries


Good



Bad



Depends (spontaneous)





### Free Trade



*In general, do you think that free trade is good or bad for ...?*

#### The environment

#### The Mexican economy



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

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


## Free Trade

*In general, do you think that free trade is good or bad for ...?*


### The standard of living of people like you

Good




### The Mexican agrarian sector


Good




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
Bad



Depends (spontaneous)



Depends (spontaneous)



Half of the public also agrees Mexico should reduce barriers on the inflow of foreign products, although 40% disagree. In the North of Mexico, support for open trade is 14 percentage points higher than it is in the rest of the country, as may be expected given the north's greater participation

in international trade flows. Protectionist attitudes are also lower among leaders, who are mostly (64%) in favor of reducing barriers on the inflow of foreign products. However, one third of leaders do not agree with the reduction of trade barriers.



### A distant and unknown world

Mexicans have withdrawn their attention from the world and from politics. Mexicans' attention to news about Mexico's relations with the outside world dropped almost 20 percentage points compared with 2004. In 2004 and 2006, 40% and 39% of Mexican, respectively, said that they had a high level of interest in news about the world. The percentage falls to 22% in 2008. Nevertheless, Mexicans' attention to international affairs continues to be relatively high when comparing it to their interest in other issues of national public life, such as finance and the country's economy, which are even lower.


Leaders and the public continue to differ in their interest in and attention to politics, in general, and international issues, in particular: 85% of Mexican leaders closely follow international news, three times more than the public. However, even among leaders there is a lower level of interest in all subjects compared to previous surveys. Educational levels also influence the interest in politics and the world. Mexicans with a college education show twice as much interest in international news (36%) as do those with a basic education (18%).

Mexicans have little knowledge and information about international problems and realities. While it is not surprising that 76% of the

### Interest in the news


When you follow the news, how interested are you in news about...?

#### Finance and economics






**Interest in the news  
Mexico's relations with other countries**



**Interest in the news  
Social and political conditions in Mexico**





population could not correctly identify the initials of the Organization of American States (OAS or OEA in Spanish), there was also a striking lack of knowledge about organizations that are closer to ordinary citizens, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (70% could not identify the initials in Spanish SRE) or even the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA), with 55% expressing ignorance of what the initials signified. 58% of Mexicans did not know that the Euro was the currency of many European Union countries. The only organization that Mexicans easily identified was the United Nations: 61%. They also know the name of the president of the United States; 67% were able to name George W. Bush when asked. This is similar to the level of knowledge concerning local politics—70% of Mexicans knew the name of the governor of their state. By contrast, just 2% knew the name of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

### *The decreasing contact with the world*

The more introspective nature of Mexican public opinion and Mexicans' diminished curiosity about the world may be the result of a decrease in the intensity of Mexicans' contact with the world, reflecting a belief in a less favorable international environment than in the past. Many international analysts believe that globalization's advance has faltered over the last few years.

This survey suggests that the level of Mexicans' international interaction is less than it was two or four years ago. The number of people who say that they have never left Mexico rose from 49% to 68%. The decrease in the level of contact through trips abroad is largely in the South and Center of

the country, where 81% and 71% have never been abroad. In the North, on the contrary, 40% have traveled abroad at least once. As expected, leaders are in close contact with the outside world (70% are frequent international travelers who say that they have made at least 10 trips outside Mexico), but there has been a decline even among leaders, 84% of whom said that they had made at least 10 trips outside Mexico in the 2006 survey.


Most Mexicans (56%) have relatives living outside Mexico and Mexicans in the North and Center of the country have a higher level of international contact through this means than in the South. Nevertheless, a more accurate measurement of the closeness and intensity of contacts with other countries through family networks is the share of Mexicans who have a member of their immediate family living outside of Mexico (29%), seventeen percentage points fewer than the share that have a relative living outside of the country.


An important finding that might reflect changes in the material reality of Mexico's interaction with the world is that the number of persons receiving remittances dropped from 24% to 15% between 2006 and 2008. These data are consistent with the information reported by the Central Bank and they could be a secondary effect of the economic downturn in the last year.



### Travel outside Mexico

Could you tell me how many times you have traveled outside Mexico, approximately?





## Chapter 2. Between assertiveness and passivity

Local and national issues have more resonance for Mexicans than global issues. This affects and explains the opinions held by the public and leaders regarding the level of activism Mexico should maintain in the international arena.

### *Pessimism about the world, tranquility about the region*

A key element in analyzing the public's expectations when carrying out foreign policy is how they perceive the situation in the world. If people are optimistic about how things are going in the world, one might expect greater willingness to interact in the international arena. On the other hand, one might also expect a greater complacency about the need for interaction on the world stage and there could be a move towards greater self-absorption. However, when the international environment is seen as unfavorable, societies may tend to be more concerned about their own affairs. They do not expect good things to come from outside their country's borders or that greater foreign activism by their country will help solve internal problems.

Most Mexicans are pessimistic about the current international situation: 66% believe that the world is worse than it was 10 years ago, while 19% believe that it is better. The world is

perceived differently by Mexicans depending on their region of residence, economic situation and party leanings. Mexicans living in the North are less pessimistic (54%) than those living in the Center (69%) and the South (70%). There is also a positive relation between the economic situation and optimism—24% of those who enjoy a good economic situation say that the world is better, fewer (14%) of those who have major difficulties in their economic situation think the same.

Mexicans who align with the center-right and center-left political parties are less negative about how things are going in the world than those who align with the left. 26% of the PAN supporters think the world is better, followed by 23% in the PRI and 11% of the PRD members. There is no apparent relationship between educational level and assessments of the world's situation.

Leaders see the world's situation with greater optimism than the public, but even leaders are divided. 43% of the leaders think the world is better, but 40% believe that it is worse. Political party preferences provide the sharpest contrasts in leader opinions. While 58% of those showing an affinity for the PAN and 52% who lean towards the PRI think that the world is better, just 26% of the PRD supporters share this optimistic opinion, mirroring the less optimistic view by members of the general public who align with the leftist PRD.



Leaders in the business community (53%), government (52%) and politicians (46%) are more positive about the world's situation. Leaders in the media and academia (48%), as well as in non-governmental organizations and trade unions (53%) are more negative about the world's situation.

Mexicans are also pessimistic about how they think things will be going in the world in ten years time, but less so than about the current situation. Most Mexicans (58%) think the world will be worse in ten years and 23% believe it will be better. Leaders are also more optimistic about the future: 52% of leaders predict a better world and 34% foresee a worse one.

Mexicans living in the center (62%) and South (60%) of the country are the more pessimistic about how things will be going in the world in ten years time than those living in the North (41%). Interestingly, the relationship between the economic situation and optimism that is noted in for current assessments of the world's situation is absent for future predictions about the world. However, political party preference does influence future predictions about the world's situation. Although pessimism predominates among supporters of all the parties, it was the highest among the PRD members (72%), followed by 52% for the PRI and 51% for the PAN.

Differences in leader opinion based on political party preferences are also noteworthy. Leaders aligned with the PAN are much more optimistic about the future than those of the other parties. 69% of those who feel close to the PAN claim that the world will be better in 10 years, followed by 58% of those close to the PRI and 19% of those with the PRD. Pessimism predominates

in the case of the latter, with 68% expecting the world to be worse. In a similar fashion, most of leaders in the government sector (65%), politicians (57%) and businesspersons (63%) are optimistic compared with the pessimistic attitude predominating among leaders in the mass media and academia (48%) and in non-governmental organizations and trade unions (46%).

Even though Mexicans are somewhat wary of the world, they are more placid and assured regarding the regional environment and its future. In their eyes, the world is doing badly but their neighborhood is doing fine. When asked about the situation in Latin America, Mexicans view things positively: 42% think the region is better than 10 years ago and 33% say that it is worse. Leaders are even more positive than the public: 66% say that the region is better than 10 years ago and 24% think it is worse.

Regional differences are noteworthy because they show a higher degree of pessimism among those closer to Latin America. In the South, 39% believe that Latin America is worse than 10 years ago, while 33% think the situation is better. In contrast, optimism predominates in the Center as 44% say that things in Latin America have improved over the past 10 years and 32% say things have worsened. Similarly in the North, 39% of Mexicans say Latin America's situation is better than it was 10 years ago and 33% say it is worse.

Mexicans are optimistic about Latin America's future, although there are some differences between leaders and the public, and between the South and the rest of the country. 43% of the public and 68% of the leaders think the region will be better in 10 years. Mexicans in the North



## Latin America's present situation

*In general, do you believe that Latin America is better or worse than 10 years ago?*

	Better	Worse	Same (spontaneous)	DK/NA	Total
<b>Population</b>					
National	42%	33%	19%	6%	100%
North	39%	33%	23%	5%	100%
South	33%	39%	18%	10%	100%
Center	44%	32%	18%	6%	100%
<b>Party Preference</b>					
PRI	42%	31%	19%	7%	100%
PAN	48%	30%	17%	5%	100%
PRD	36%	40%	18%	5%	100%
<b>Leaders</b>					
Total	66%	24%	9%	1%	100%
<b>Party Preference</b>					
PAN	81%	11%	8%	0%	100%
PRI	62%	28%	7%	4%	100%
PRD	58%	32%	6%	3%	100%
<b>Per sector</b>					
Government	71%	19%	9%	1%	100%
Politics	78%	18%	4%	0%	100%
The business community	62%	28%	10%	0%	100%
Mass media and academics	59%	28%	12%	1%	100%
NGO, unions, religious leaders	62%	26%	9%	2%	100%



## Latin America's future situation

*In general, do you believe that Latin America will be better or worse in 10 years?*

	Better	Worse	Same (spontaneous)	DK/NA	Total
<b>Population</b>					
National	43%	27%	18%	12%	100%
Region					
North	46%	21%	22%	11%	100%
South	38%	28%	17%	18%	100%
Center	44%	28%	17%	12%	100%
Party Preference					
PRI	47%	22%	19%	13%	100%
PAN	51%	23%	17%	10%	100%
PRD	38%	34%	18%	10%	100%
<b>Leaders</b>					
Total	68%	18%	9%	4%	100%
Party Preference					
PAN	79%	13%	8%	0%	100%
PRI	80%	15%	2%	4%	100%
PRD	48%	29%	19%	3%	100%
Per sector					
Government	79%	9%	7%	4%	100%
Politics	68%	23%	9%	0%	100%
The business community	76%	13%	9%	1%	100%
Mass media and academics	46%	31%	13%	9%	100%
NGO, unions, religious leaders	69%	15%	9%	7%	100%



and Center are more optimistic (46% and 44%, respectively) than those in the South (38%). There are objective factors that could support this improved forecast for the region: the region's democracies have mostly gained strength, the region's economies have maintained relatively strong growth and many of the region's human development indicators have improved.

### ***Government performance: criticism and the demand for participation***

Mexicans are generally critical of their government's performance, although this assessment varies by policy area. For the four policies asked about in the survey, the share of the public that strongly agrees with the government's performance never exceeds 20%: for economic policy it is 12%, for public security and foreign policy it is 13% and for educational policy it is 19%. Leaders are more likely than the public to approve of government policies except for education policy, of which a greater share of the public approves than do leaders.

Though most of the public (55%) disagree very much or somewhat with the government's economic policy and 39% agree, 62% of leaders agree with the government's economic policy and 37% disagree with this policy. For public security, 40% of the public and 49% of the leaders agree, whereas 55% and 50% disagree, respectively. 45% of the public approve of the government's foreign policy and 39% disapprove. Most leaders (73%) agree with the government's foreign policy. Educational policy is more popular with the public (53% agree and 43% disagree) than with leaders (41% agree and 57% disagree).

There are marked differences among the public based on political party alignment. These differences are even larger among leaders. Mexicans that support the PAN are less critical of government policies than are those with a PRI or PRD affinity. Mexicans who align with the PRD are the most critical of government policies. Thus, 50% of PAN supporters agree very much or somewhat with the government's economic policy, while the degree of agreement for Mexicans who align with the PRI is 45% and is 33% for those who support the PRD. Regarding public security policy, 48% of the PAN supporters, 49% of PRI supporters and 41% of the PRD supporters agree with the government's policy. The level of agreement with foreign policy is 51% for PAN supporters, 48% among those who favor the PRI and 42% of those who have PRD leanings. In education policy, agreement is higher among the PRI and PAN supporters (61% and 59%, respectively) than among those close to the PRD (49%).

Differences in opinion along party lines are more noticeable among leaders, although less so for leader opinions on foreign policy. 92% of leaders that support the PAN, 72% of those who support the PRI and 6% of leaders that are PRD supporters agree with the government's economic policy. Similar differences are noted in the degree of agreement with the security policy (86% of the PAN supporters, 50% of the PRI supporters and 9% of the PRD followers) and with the education policy (69% among those with PAN leanings, 40% of the PRI followers and 6% of those supporting the PRD). There are fewer differences, although the differences are still quite large, among leaders regarding the government's foreign



policy: 97% of the PAN supporters, 78% of the PRI followers and 37% of those who support the PRD agree very much or somewhat.

Mexicans evaluate their government's performance in foreign policy very negatively while leaders are more positive. The public's evaluation of government performance in foreign policy also is much worse than it was four years ago while leader's evaluation of the government's foreign policy is much better than it was in 2004. In 2004, 37% of the public agreed with the government's performance in foreign policy. In 2008, just 13% of the public agreed with this. The opposite occurred with leader evaluations of government performance in foreign policy. In 2004, 20% of leaders agreed with the government's performance in foreign policy. In 2008, 38% of leaders agreed with this. *Hard core critics* of the government's performance in foreign policy are equal shares (17%) of both leaders and the public.

Curiously, no events or actions in foreign policy are evident that would explain the drop of 24 percentage points in the share of the public and the increase of 18 percentage points in the share of leaders in their very different evaluations of the government's foreign policy performance. One explanation of the public's critical evaluation may be the government's lower profile in foreign policy compared with the previous government and the public's decreased interest in foreign policy. An explanation for the leaders' more positive evaluation of the government's foreign policy may be that leaders prefer the more traditional positions of Mexican diplomacy being followed by the current PAN government of Felipe Calderón to the new international agenda


pursued in the foreign policy of the previous PAN government of Vicente Fox.

Although the Mexican public and leaders are critical of the government's foreign policy performance, they do agree that the president should have the most influence over and responsibility for foreign policy. The public and leaders differ on which other groups should have a high level of influence on foreign policy formulation. The survey asked both the public and leaders to give an opinion on the level of influence that the president, congress, public opinion, business community and non-governmental organizations should have concerning foreign policy on a scale of 0 to 10. There is agreement between leaders and the public that the president should have the most influence in defining foreign policy (8.9 leaders and 8.6 public). For the public, the president is followed by public opinion (8.4) and then the congress (8). The position of these two groups is inverted among leaders. Congress scores an 8.7 among leaders and public opinion scores a 7.9. Both the public and leaders think that the business community and non-governmental organizations should have the least influence. A growing demand for public participation in foreign policy is notable in the increasingly high level of influence that both the public and leaders see for public opinion's role in foreign policy.



### Present administration performance in foreign policy

*Do you agree or disagree with the Mexican government's performance concerning foreign policy?*



#### *Fewer threats are seen as very serious compared with four years ago*

Mexicans rate threats emanating from outside of the country as less serious than they did four years ago. In 2008, the survey asked Mexicans about 16 possible threats to their country. Of these threats, seven were asked about in the 2004 survey and 10 were asked about in the 2006 survey; seven of these threats were asked about in both 2004 and 2006. The other six possible threats are included for the first time in the 2008 survey.

Although most Mexicans believe that the situation in the world is worse now than it was 10 years ago, the perception of the seriousness

of threats emanating from outside of Mexico is lower now than it was four years ago. For all of the threats that were asked about in both the 2008 survey and previous surveys, the perception of the seriousness of the threats declined among the public. This is not the case for leaders who assess higher the seriousness of four threats than they did in previous surveys.

In 2004, 86% of those polled regarded the world's economic crises as a serious threat to Mexico; in July 2008 (before the current international financial crisis became evident to Mexicans) 69% believe that world economic crisis is a serious threat to Mexico. The same occurred with international terrorism. International



terrorism is also perceived as a less serious threat than it was in 2004: 81% of Mexicans saw it as a serious threat in 2004, but just 63% say the same in 2008. The share of Mexicans who say that nuclear weapons are a serious threat fell to 64% in 2008 from 86% in 2004. A similar downward trend was reported in the perception that China becoming a world power is a serious threat to Mexico, with a drop from 48% in 2004 to 32% in 2008; violent and ethnic conflicts fell from 60% to 37% between 2004 and 2008 in Mexicans' perception of it as a serious threat. Even the tightening of immigration policy in the United States as a grave threat to Mexico decreased from 66% to 51% over the past four years. For all of these potential threats there are decreases of 15 to 25 percentage points compared with the previous surveys. Even in the case of drug-trafficking and organized crime, which continues to be the threat that the largest share of Mexicans believe is serious, the share of Mexicans who see it as a grave threat declined 10 percentage points, from 89% to 79%. Leaders did not downgrade the seriousness of this threat. The share of leaders that say that drug-trafficking and organized crime is a serious threat to Mexico rose from 84% to 88% between 2004 and 2008.

The only potential threats asked about in the 2008 and previous surveys that Mexicans did not consider less serious in 2008 than they had in the past are global warming and epidemics like AIDS, although Mexicans' opinions on global warming varies more (79% in 2004, 70% in 2006 and 77% in 2008) than opinions on epidemics (77% in 2006 and 75% in 2008).

Of the nine threats discussed so far, there are four cases in which the leaders' perceptions

reported an opposite (increasing rather than decreasing) trend over the past four years compared with the public: world economic crises increased as a serious threat from 42% to 69% among leaders, the United States' immigration policy climbed from 57% to 66%, global warming was up from 65% to 81%, and organized crime and drug-trafficking ticked up from 84% to 88% among Mexico's leaders.

The 16 potential threats asked about in 2008 are grouped into three categories based on the share of the public that considers that potential threat as serious. The first category includes the potential threats considered serious by more than 70% of the public, the second category includes the potential threats cited by between 50% and 70% of Mexicans and the third category includes the potential threats cited by fewer than 50% of Mexicans.

The first category includes: drug-trafficking and organized crime (public 79% and leaders 88%); global warming (public 77% and leaders 81%); epidemics like AIDS (public 75%, leaders 45%); global poverty (public 73%, leaders 75%) and the shortage and high price of food (public 73%, leaders 77%). The threat perception of the public and leaders coincide for four of the five potential threats in this category. A greater share of leaders than of the public considers four of these threats as serious. A striking exception is epidemics like AIDS in which the share of the public that says this is a serious threat is 30 percentage points higher than the share of leaders who say epidemics like AIDS are a serious threat. Poverty and food shortages, a potential threat introduced for the first time in the 2008 survey, entered the group that the greatest share of Mexicans (>70%) consider as a serious threat to Mexico. Both the



### Most serious international threats

Threat	Public	Rank	Leaders	Rank
Drug-trafficking and organized crime	79%	1	88%	1
Global warming of the earth	77%	2	81%	2
Epidemics like AIDS	75%	3	45%	8
Poverty in the world	73%	4	75%	4
Shortages and high price of foods	73%	4	77%	3
The world's economic crises	69%	6	69%	5
Nuclear weapons	69%	6	37%	10
International terrorism	63%	8	53%	7
Immigration policies in the US	51%	9	66%	6
Border conflicts and territorial disputes	49%	10	37%	10
Guerillas	46%	11	30%	14
Cutoffs in the power supply	43%	12	40%	9
Violent conflicts (ethnic or religious)	37%	13	31%	13
Illegal immigrants	37%	13	18%	16
Populist leaders	37%	13	36%	12
China as a world power	32%	16	20%	15



public and leaders agree on the seriousness of this threat perhaps reflecting a common understanding of deep-rooted national and international problems in food security.

The second group (with a 50% to 70% share of public considering the phenomena as a serious threat) includes: world economic crises (public 69%, leaders 69%); nuclear weapons (public 64%, leaders 37%); international terrorism (public 63%, leaders 53%), and immigration policy in the United States (public 51%, leaders 66%).

World economic crisis is the only potential threat for which equal shares (69%) of both the public and leaders consider it a serious threat. For potential threats such as international terrorism and nuclear weapons the share of leaders that consider it a serious threat is lower, especially for nuclear weapons where the difference in the share of the public and leaders is 27 percentage points fewer for leaders than for the public.

There is also a noticeable decline in the perception of international terrorism as a serious threat compared with the share of the public and leaders that believed this was a serious threat in 2004 and 2006. International terrorism had been among the potential threats perceived to be serious by the largest share of the public and leaders. Now, international terrorism ranks 8<sup>th</sup> for the public and 7<sup>th</sup> for leaders in the share that considers it as a serious threat to Mexico. The largest gap in the perception by leaders and public is for U.S. immigration policy. Among leaders, 66% believe that it is a serious threat to Mexico. Among the public, 51% see U.S. immigration policy as a serious threat to their country.

Finally, there are seven potential threats in the third category (considered a serious threat by

fewer than 50% of the public). The highest level of agreement between leaders and the public for threats in this category is for cuts in electric power supply (public 43%, leaders 40%), populist leaders (public 37%, leaders 36%) and violent ethnic or religious conflicts (public 37%, leaders 31%). Sizeable differences in public and leader perceptions are noted for the four other potential threats. There is a difference of 12 points between the public (49%) and leaders (37%) for border conflicts and territorial disputes. There is also a notable gap in the perception of illegal immigrants as a threat, with a difference of 19 points between the public and leaders, and the guerrillas, with 16 points (public 46%, leaders 30%). For the leaders, this issue goes to the bottom of the list (with 18%) while it stays at position 14 for the population (with 37%).

Interesting factors are identified if the results of 2008 and 2006 are compared. On one hand, in all the interviewees the perception of guerrillas as a serious threat decreased significantly: in the case of the leaders it fell from 26% to 18% and in the population from 50% to 37%. It was also noted that in 2006 there was a major difference by regions (North 52%, South 44% and Center 51%), in which the southerners (theoretically the most affected) declared less concern; for 2008 the perception inverted and leveled out by regions (North 36%, South 38% and Center 36%).

### *Active but selective foreign policy*

Most Mexicans would prefer Mexico to participate actively in global affairs (69%) than to stand aside from active involvement (20%). The



## Active participation in world affairs

*In your opinion, what is best for Mexico's future: to actively participate in world affairs or to stand aside in world affairs?*

	Active participation	Stand aside	Neither (spontaneous)	DK/NA	Total
Leaders	93%	4%	3%	0%	100%

Public	69%	20%	6%	4%	100%
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### By education

None	58%	26%	4%	12%	100%
Basic	65%	23%	6%	6%	100%
Medium	74%	17%	6%	2%	100%
Professional	82%	11%	5%	2%	100%

### By income

Enough	80%	16%	3%	1%	100%
Just enough	73%	16%	7%	3%	100%
Not enough	65%	23%	6%	5%	100%
Very difficult	62%	23%	5%	9%	100%

preference for active participation increased by 13 points compared with 2006. The isolationist option decreased by 10 percentage points compared to the share in 2006 that preferred the Mexico stand aside from global affairs. This

increase in activism is greatest in the Center (where it climbed from 55% to 70%) and in the South (from 53% to 65%). Mexicans' preferences for involvement in the world vary depending on levels of education and income. They do not vary



depending on party preferences. The higher the level of education and the better the individual economic situation of Mexicans is, the more likely they are to prefer that Mexico takes an active role in global affairs. Leaders have a strong preference (93%) for Mexico's active participation, as they did in previous surveys. However, this preference for an active role for Mexico is greater among supporters of the PAN and PRI (both with 97%) than among the PRD followers (80%).

One way of determining whether public opinion does in fact support a greater involvement in world affairs is by analyzing how many resources they believe should be invested in building Mexico's presence abroad. Many Mexicans say that they want their government to invest more resources in expanding Mexico's presence in foreign countries, even in countries far removed from Mexicans everyday concerns, such as increasing the number of embassies and consulates in Africa. Both the public (40%) and the leaders (43%) believe that the number of embassies should increase, while 37% and 46%, respectively, say that their government should keep the same number of embassies and consulates in Africa as it now has. Small shares of the public (10%) and leaders (5%) think the number of embassies in Africa should be reduced. More educated Mexicans and Mexicans with a better economic situation are more likely than Mexicans with lower levels of education and income to believe that their country should keep the number of embassies and consulates in Africa as it is rather than increase or decrease the number of embassies and consulates. Neither region of residence nor party preferences appears to influence perception on this issue. Among leaders,

PAN supporters (57%) were more in favor of maintaining the number of embassies, followed by the PRI (47%) and the PRD (42%).

Mexicans not only want their country to have an active role in world affairs, they also have clear priorities for Mexico's foreign policy. The foreign policy objectives that the greatest share of Mexicans want their country to prioritize are those that directly relate to their material wellbeing, their physical security, and their national pride reflected in Mexican culture. Five foreign policy objectives are included in the first category of objectives (more than 70% of the public consider them very important): the fight against drug-trafficking and organized crime (public 81%, leaders 91%); protecting Mexican interests abroad (public 76%, leaders 85%); protecting the environment (public 76%, leaders 94%); promoting Mexican culture (public 73%, leaders 77%) and promoting exports of Mexican products (public 71%, leaders 85%). For all of these objectives, a greater share of leaders than members of the public says that they should be very important foreign policy objectives.

There is a clear coincidence in the share of the public and leaders that see drug-trafficking and organized crime as a serious potential threat and as a very important foreign policy objective. The largest share of the public consider drug-trafficking as a serious threat and as a very important foreign policy objective. For leaders, drug trafficking and organized crime is in second place, after environmental protection, in terms of the share that considers it a very important foreign policy objective. Environmental protection is the foreign policy objective that the third largest share of the public considers as very important.



Protecting Mexicans abroad is in second place for the public in terms of the share that consider it a very important foreign policy objective.

The share of the public that considers the 15 options as very important foreign policy objectives illustrates the public's clear priority for *tough* security objectives, as well as some economic and social objectives. The five objectives that imply multilateralism, promotion of democracy and support for less developed countries occupy the last places.

In terms of security, the most important issue is drug-trafficking, which is the top priority for the public (81%) and is second for leaders (91%); this is followed by defending land and sea borders (public 65%, leaders 69%), the fight against terrorism (public 61%, leaders 58%) and the prevention of nuclear arms proliferation (public 56%, leaders 59%).

Economic issues as very important foreign policy objectives follow in terms of the share of Mexicans that consider them very important. The promotion of Mexican products abroad, which was ranked second in 2004, is in fifth place for the public. Leaders, compared with the population, give greater importance to economic matters: promoting Mexican products abroad (public 71%, leaders 85%), attracting foreign investment (public 62%, leaders 78%), attracting tourists (public 62%, leaders 74%) and promoting regional integration (public 52%, leaders 70%). The difference between the share of leaders that consider these objectives as very important and share of the public that also considers them as such ranges between 12 and 18 percentage points. Leaders give much more importance than the public does to objectives

that imply interaction with the outside world. This difference may be explained by leaders' greater familiarity with globalization. Protecting Mexicans abroad continues to be one of the five most important priorities for Mexican foreign policy for both the public (76%) and leaders (85%).

The objectives that have to do with the promotion of values are in the third category. Support for the promotion of democracy in other countries, which was one of the main foreign policy objectives of the previous president, Vicente Fox, does not appear to have permeated the public mind. It is in second- to last place by the public (37%) and the last place by leaders (27%) in terms of the share of the public and leaders that consider the objective as a very important foreign policy priority.

Illustrating the low level of importance given to the promotion of democratic values as a foreign policy objective, Mexicans say that they do not want their country to take direct action when there are violations of human rights in other countries. The preference of most Mexicans was to call on organizations like the UN to condemn these violations (41%), compared with the option of Mexico breaking off diplomatic relations with the offending country (17%) or not getting involved in the internal affairs of other states (33%). A greater share of leaders prefer indirect action than support direct action: 70% favor promoting action by the UN and just 2% support breaking diplomatic relations.

Mexican opinions are coherent regarding the threats perceived and the objectives to be given priority. For example, 86% of those who consider drug-trafficking and organized crime a



## Most important foreign policy objectives

*How important should each of the following objectives be for Mexican foreign policy?*

Objectives	Public	Rank	Leaders	Rank
Fighting drug-trafficking and organized crime	81%	1	91%	2
Protecting Mexicans abroad	76%	2	85%	3
Protecting the environment	76%	2	94%	1
Promoting Mexican culture	73%	4	77%	6
Promoting Mexican products	71%	5	85%	3
Protecting the borders	65%	6	69%	9
Attracting foreign investment	62%	7	78%	5
Attracting tourists	62%	7	74%	7
Fighting terrorism	61%	9	58%	11
Preventing nuclear weapons	56%	10	59%	10
Promoting regional integration	52%	11	70%	8
Supporting less developed countries	47%	12	58%	11
Strengthening the UN	42%	13	58%	11
Helping spread democracy to other countries	37%	14	27%	15
Strengthening the OAS	31%	15	49%	14



very serious threat say that fighting it is a very important objective of foreign policy. 85% of Mexicans that believe that global warming is a very serious threat and 82% of Mexicans that believe world poverty is a serious threat also say that fighting them are a very important objectives. For nuclear weapons, 77% of those who see them as a serious threat also say that controlling them should be a very important objective for Mexico's foreign policy. Similarly, 75% of those who consider international terrorism to be a serious threat say fighting it should be a very important policy objective. There is less coherence regarding immigration controls: 43% of those who are concerned about the inflow of illegal immigrants into Mexico believe that protecting the land and sea borders is a very important objective.

### ***Who should be in charge of world order and how? Between multilateralism and multi-polarity***

Mexicans prefer a multi-polar world where a number of countries exercise leadership in world affairs. They also voice support for multilateralism through international organizations such as the United Nations and its Security Council. Nevertheless, Mexicans' commitment to multilateralism is limited by their conditioned willingness, based on circumstances and costs, to have their country's autonomy restricted by multilateral organizations.

Mexicans' preference for a multi-polar power distribution in the world can be seen in the positive opinion Mexicans have of China's economic growth. Leaders disagree with the

public on this; they believe that China's economic growth relative to that of the United States is detrimental to the world. 46% of the public sees China's economic growth as a positive event for the world, 59% of leaders see it as negative. Among the public, the higher the education level and the better the personal financial situation, the more positive the perception of China's economic growth.

Mexicans in the North (51%) give China's rise the most positive rating, compared with Mexicans in the Center (47%) and the South (38%). The South was the only place where perceptions remained constant. Among leaders, those who align with the PRD (68%) are more likely to see China's rise as a negative than leaders who support the PAN (60%) or the PRI (56%).

Both leader and public opinion on China's rise has reversed since 2006. Two years ago, 67% of leaders thought it was positive for the Chinese economy to grow until it reached the size of the United States economy and 22% thought it was negative. Now, 25% of leaders say that this is positive. Among the public over the same period, the positive view of a stronger Chinese economy increased from 33% to 46% and the negative view dropped from 38% to 29%. The Mexican public approves of China's economic growth, Mexican leaders do not.

Mexicans do not have much confidence in the world's major powers. Nevertheless, the public's positive or negative perceptions about the five nations that are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and which can veto important decisions regarding international security vary considerably according to the respondent's region of residence. Mexicans



have very positive opinions of the European and Asian nations that have some clout in the world's economy. Their opinions are not as positive toward the countries with which they have more cultural affinity, such as those in Latin America. The public also has a special fondness for the UN.


When asked which of the five countries that are permanent members of the UN Security Council inspires the least confidence in maintaining world peace, there was a resounding lack of confidence in the United States. 58% of leaders say that they have the least confidence in United States to maintain world peace. Distrust is lower (44%) among the Mexican public, but it is also the country in which the public would have the least confidence to maintain peace. Russia was second, with 17% of the public saying that they have no confidence in it to maintain peace in the world.

There is little confidence in the super powers. When asked about the level of confidence in the countries with more capacity to influence peacekeeping worldwide, none of the Security Council member countries was considered reliable. The largest share of the public name France as the country that inspires the most confidence (23%) and 41% of leaders agree. Both the public (21%) and the leaders (11%) put the United States behind France in terms of the share that considers each country as the one that invites the most confidence to maintain international peace. The United States is above France in terms of confidence (27% and 20%, among the public and leaders) only among Mexicans living in the north of the country. China received more confidence from the public (16%) than from the leaders (4%), but less than


### Countries that generate most confidence for keeping peace

*Which of the following countries do you feel could best keep world peace?*


China




United States




France




Great Britain



Russia



None







### Countries that generate least confidence for keeping peace

Which of the following countries do you feel would be the worst to keep world peace?


China




United States




France




Great Britain



Russia



None



France (19% public and 41% leaders) and more than the United Kingdom (4% public and 11% leaders).

It is surprising how little trust leaders have in the United States as a guardian of international security compared with the confidence vested in France. There are no data available in previous Mexico and the World surveys to assess whether there has been an increase or decline in confidence in the United States over the past four years, but other international surveys show that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have tarnished the prestige of the United States as a champion for international security.

Mexicans want multilateral organizations to have the capacity to act and impose sanctions in international security matters. When asked whether the UN Security Council should have the right to authorize the use of military force to avoid grave violations of human rights, such as mass-murder, 70% of the public was in favor and just 21% rejected the idea. However, the public's support drops to 59% and its opposition rises to 28% when the issue is the authorization to use force to reinstall a democratic government..

Mexicans are more willing than they were in previous surveys for their country to assume greater international responsibilities, and bear the economic, political and human costs of these greater involvements; six out of ten Mexicans now say that Mexico should participate in UN peacekeeping operations. An equal share (59%) of leaders say that Mexico should not participate in these activities. Public support for Mexico's participation in UN peacekeeping missions rose from 49% to 60% since 2006. Leader support dropped from 49% to 35% over the same period.



Leaders' opinions coincide with the official position of the Mexican military, which in principle oppose any type of Mexican participation in military operations outside of Mexican territory. The one exception to this position was Mexico's participation in ONUSAL in the early 1990s. In this mission, Mexico sent a contingent of 100 police officers to El Salvador to help restructure its police corps after the signing of peace agreements between the Salvadoran government and anti-government guerrillas.


The degree of activism and unilateral commitment is one of the major issues in the public debate on the direction of Mexico's foreign policy. The central issue in this debate is whether Mexico should participate in the UN Security Council. Mexico's leaders want their country to

seek a new term as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Seven in ten leaders say that they would very much or somewhat agree to Mexico's seeking a new term on the Security Council.

When asked who should represent Latin America in the Security Council if a new seat is opened for the region, most of the leaders (61%) and the public (65%) agreed that Mexico should be Latin America's representative. They also agreed that Brazil should be the second choice and placed Argentina in third place. This response illustrates the importance Mexicans give their own country compared with other countries, such as Brazil, that have been more active in international security affairs over the past two decades.

### UN peacekeeping

*If the UN asked member countries to collaborate in sending a military or police peacekeeping force, commonly known as the blue helmets, to some part of the world, what do you think Mexico should do: participate in peace force or leave activities like these to other countries?*





## Chapter 3. Mexico between two Americas

### *Selective affinities*

What do Mexicans think about other countries? On a scale of 0 to 100, where 100 represents a very favorable opinion, 50 implies neutrality and 0 is a very unfavorable opinion, Mexicans have the highest level of affinity for Canada (public 71 points; leaders 84), compared with other countries asked about in the survey. Mexican's affinity for the United States has dropped 12 points and 6 positions compared with the level in 2006. The United States now ranks at the same level as the average for Latin American countries. The change in favorable opinion toward the United States since 2004 is remarkable. The United States was tied with Japan for first place with an average rating of 68, in 2004. Canada was in third place with an average rating of 65 points, in 2004. In 2006, Canada was in first place (75 points) and the United States was second (74 points). By 2008, the United States has dropped to seventh place with 62 points.

After Canada, the best-positioned countries are Spain (public 66 points; leaders 76), Germany (public 65 points; leaders 80), China (public 65 points; leaders 70) and Japan (public 64 points; leaders 79), thus occupying the second to the fifth place respectively for the population and the 5<sup>th</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> places in the opinion of the leaders.

Other distant countries are well considered by the population and the leaders: Australia (60 and

73 points), South Korea (55 and 64 points) and India (53 and 69 points). The countries rated the worst by the public are Venezuela (with 47 points) and Iran (46 points). Leaders also had somewhat unfavorable opinions about Venezuela and Iran (with 49 and 46 points, respectively).


Favorable feelings for Cuba have also declined since 2006, but feelings for the rest of Latin America are relatively unchanged over the same period. Mexicans' affinity for different Latin American countries varies greatly from country to country, as in previous surveys. The first country from the region to appear on the Mexicans' list of favorable feelings is Brazil, ranked fifth with 64 points (leaders' favorable feelings toward Brazil also place the country in the fifth position on the leaders' list with 76 points). Brazil is followed by Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Guatemala in the 8<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup>, 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> places, with 60, 58, 51 and 51 points. Leaders have higher affinities for Latin America in absolute terms (Argentina, 63 points; Chile, 76; Colombia, 61; Guatemala, 58). There are no major differences with the public in relative terms, with the exception of Chile toward which leaders feel more favorably. Four of the countries with the lowest rating, under 50 points, are Latin American (El Salvador, 50; Peru, 49; Cuba, 48 and Venezuela, 47), only exceeded by Iran with 46 points. In relative terms, the positioning of Latin American countries is not very different




### Country's affinities thermometers

Now I would like you to rate your opinion of some countries; 0 means a very unfavorable opinion, 100 is a very favorable opinion and 50 is neither favorable nor unfavorable. You can use any number from 0 to 100; the higher the number, the more favorable your opinion about the country. If you have no opinion or if you have not heard of the country, please say so.

#### National



#### Leaders





from 2006, when these countries also occupied the lower positions in the list of affinities. The most important exceptions are Brazil and Cuba: the former climbed five places and 7 points, while the latter fell eight places and 11 points.

Mexicans have a low level of sympathy for neighboring countries in comparison with remote countries like China, Japan, India or Australia, about which little is known and with which contact is minimal or inexistent. As regards Latin American countries, those for which Mexicans have the most affinity (Argentina, Brazil and Chile) are the most distant, while the closest nations are ranked the lowest. None of the Central American countries viewed very favorably by the public or leaders.

Mexicans' feelings towards other countries appear to reflect a recognition of economic success (developed nations of North America, Europe, Asia and Oceania, or new, very dynamic economies like China and India) more than sympathy for countries that are more like Mexico in economic and cultural terms (Latin America, particularly Central America).

Part of the assessment of a country is determined by evaluations of its leaders, specifically its Presidents or Prime Ministers. For example, Felipe Calderón is associated with Mexico, Hugo Chávez with Venezuela and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero with Spain. The survey asked Mexicans to give an opinion about North- and Hispano-American leaders. The results strengthened the conclusions on the perceptions held by Mexicans regarding other countries. Among the public, the least-known heads of state are Cristina Fernández (84% unknown) in Argentina, Álvaro Colom (82%) in Guatemala, and Alan García (81%) in Peru. The

best known are the Mexican Felipe Calderón (6% unknown), George Bush in the USA (15%), and the Venezuelan Hugo Chávez (26%). For leaders, the least known leaders are Álvaro Colom (36%) and Cristina Fernández (19%), but the level of ignorance does not exceed 9% in any other case. This evidences the vast knowledge gap between the elites and the population.


There is significant variation in ratings for different leaders, among those who know them. For the public, the three highest-rated leaders are Felipe Calderón (68 points), the Brazilian Luis Inacio Lula de Silva (60) and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (61). In contrast, the worst rated are Cuban Raúl Castro (47), George W. Bush (45) and Hugo Chávez (36). For leaders, the ones with the highest rating are Lula da Silva (78), the Chilean Michelle Bachelet (78) and Calderón (67). The lowest rating coincides with the public: Chávez (36) and Bush (45).




### Leader's affinities thermometer

I am now going to ask you to rate some political leaders. You can use any number from 0 to 100; the higher the number, the more favorable your opinion about the leader. If you have no opinion or if you have not heard of the leader, please say so.

#### National



#### Leaders





### ***Grading the relationships: friends, partners, rivals or threats***

The survey also asked Mexicans to categorize their country's relations with other countries in terms of whether they believe the countries are friends, partners, rivals or threats. Mexicans characterize their country's relations as that of friends for all but two of the countries asked about in the survey (Argentina, 57%; Brazil, 58%; Chile, 58%; Colombia, 47%; Cuba, 47%; Guatemala, 56%, Peru, 59%; Venezuela, 46%).

The first exception is Canada where there is a tie between those who consider the two countries to be *friends* and those who see them as *partners*. This relationship has changed somewhat from that which prevailed in 2006 when the *partner* (48%) category dominated over *friends* (43%). Leaders consider the relationship between Mexico and Canada to be as partners (73%).

The second exception is the United States for which the option *partners* (51%) is more common than *friends* (28%) for the public. Party allegiance influences how Mexicans characterize relations between their country and the United States: 31% of the PRI supporters say the United States is a friend, followed by 26% for the PAN and 26% for the PRD. The PAN followers (56%) mostly see the United States as a *partner*, followed by the PRD (51%). There is a positive relationship between the level of education and the share that say *partner* best characterizes the relationship between Mexico and the United States: 59% of college graduates characterize the relationship as *partners* and 39% of those with no studies say the same. There is a negative relationship, however, between the level of education and considering

the two countries as *friends*: 32% of those without studies see the United States as a *friend* of their country compared with 23% of those with a college degree. Leaders are more emphatic in labeling the relationship as *partners*: 78% consider the two countries to be *partners* and 13% say the countries are *friends*.

The results from the affinity question on favorable feelings and the characterization of Mexico's relationship with various countries make clear that affinity does not necessarily imply a strategic relationship. The share of the public that chooses the *friend* category is highest for Peru (59%), Chile (58%), and Argentina (57%), while the share that choose the *partner* category is highest for the United States (51%), Canada (44%), and Japan (34%). The table on the next page shows a similar pattern in leader opinion, seeing Peru (76%), Guatemala (72%), and Argentina (69%) as *friends* and the United States (78%), Canada (73%), and Japan (61%) as *partners*.

Although there are some differences among the public about which countries should be classified as a *friend* or *partner*, there are many fewer differences among Mexicans about which countries' relationships with Mexico should be categorized as *rivals* or *threats*. According to the public, the rivals are Venezuela (13%), Cuba (12%), and Colombia (10%). And the threats are Venezuela (28%), Colombia (10%), Cuba and the United States (each with 8%).

For leaders, there is also a coincidence between *threats* and *rivals*. The most important rivals are China (25%), Venezuela (13%), and Brazil (10%); while the threats are Venezuela (28%), China (17%), and Cuba (10%). It could therefore be said that the differences reported almost constantly



## Public's perception of relationship with other countries

*How would you describe Mexico's relationship with the following countries ... friendly, partners, rivals or a threat?*

Country	Friends	Rank	Partners	Rank	Rivals	Rank	Threat	Rank
Argentina	57%	4	25%	8	4%	6	2%	8
Brazil	58%	2	28%	6	3%	9	1%	9
Canada	44%	9	44%	2	3%	9	1%	9
Chile	58%	2	28%	6	3%	9	1%	9
China	39%	11	33%	4	9%	3	7%	5
Colombia	47%	7	22%	11	9%	3	10%	2
Cuba	47%	7	21%	12	12%	2	8%	3
Guatemala	56%	5	23%	9	4%	6	4%	6
Japan	44%	9	34%	3	4%	6	4%	6
Peru	59%	1	23%	9	3%	9	1%	9
Spain	54%	6	32%	5	3%	9	1%	9
U.S.A.	28%	13	51%	1	7%	5	8%	3
Venezuela	36%	12	19%	13	13%	1	28%	1



## Leaders perception of relationship with other countries

*How would you describe Mexico's relationship with the following countries ... friendly, partners, rivals or a threat?*

Country	Friends	Rank	Partners	Rank	Rivals	Rank	Threat	Rank
Argentina	69%	3	25%	9	3%	8	1%	7
Brazil	49%	7	38%	6	10%	3	1%	7
Canada	26%	11	73%	2	1%	10	0%	11
Chile	58%	5	40%	5	1%	10	1%	7
China	26%	11	30%	7	25%	1	17%	2
Colombia	57%	6	27%	8	5%	5	8%	4
Cuba	61%	4	19%	11	6%	4	10%	3
Guatemala	72%	2	25%	9	1%	10	0%	11
Japan	32%	10	61%	3	4%	6	1%	7
Peru	76%	1	19%	11	1%	10	0%	11
Spain	47%	8	48%	4	2%	9	2%	6
U.S.A.	13%	13	78%	1	4%	6	5%	5
Venezuela	36%	9	19%	11	13%	2	28%	1



between the public and the elites are not found when comparing the perceptions of *friends* and *partners* or *rivals* and *threats*. Both the public and the elites know how to differentiate between *friendship* and *partnership*, as well as *rivalry* and *threat*.

### ***Anchored in the continent: between North America and Latin America***

The intensity of Mexico's relations within the Americas is much stronger than its relations with the rest of the world and Mexicans and leaders agree that this is where their country should place its attention. For both the public and leaders, the regions of the world that deserve Mexico's attention are Latin America (37% and 33%), and North America (30% and 28%). Europe (10% and 14%), Africa (5% and 1%), Asia (3% and 15%), and Oceania (1% and 0%) are in more distant places and Mexico's economic, political and diplomatic activity is much less active in these regions than in the Americas. Mexicans do not want their country to increase its attention towards these more distant regions.

Mexico is geographically and economically in North America (more than two thirds of the country's trade and financial flow takes place within this region), but historically, geopolitically and culturally, it has much more in common with Latin America. In the last two decades and with the enactment of the *North American Free Trade Agreement* (NAFTA) in 1994, Mexicans are confronting a dilemma in defining whether their country is North American or Latin American, or whether Mexico somehow could be both types of Americans. This dilemma reflects Mexican

uncertainty about where their country should focus its energies. There seems to be a belief that the relationship with North America, specifically with the United States, has gone as far as it can go. This belief may be attributed to the stagnation in the regional integration process, the finalization of the NAFTA tariff reduction scheme and the increased weight of security within US foreign policy in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.

Given this situation and the inability to visualize other options beyond the hemisphere, Mexicans perceive approaching and integrating with Latin America, in order to avoid isolation at a regional level and to further Mexico's insertion into the world, as the better option. In terms of regional identity, cultural matters clearly outweigh economic matters: 58% of the public and 62% of the leaders believe that Mexico is more Latin American than North American; 28% of the public and 23% of the leaders think otherwise and only 6% and 8% of both, respectively, think they are simultaneously North American and Latin American. Congruent with its geographic location, the public living in the South say Mexico is more Latin American (70%) than do Mexicans living in the North (47%). Within the leaders, 77% of PRD supporters regard Mexico as part of Latin America, compared with 66% for the PRI and 64% for the PAN.

The vast majority believe that in the future, economic integration with Latin America will increase (73%) as will integration with North America (71%). Leaders feel more strongly towards Latin America (89%) than towards North America (85%). Mexicans who live in the South have changed their predictions about integration since 2006, when 49% thought there would be greater economic integration with North America



in the future. Now, 70% of the public in the South foresee greater economic integration with Latin America. Leaders are a bit more intense in their beliefs regarding Latin America (89%) than North America (85%). When the answers are crossed by gender, education, age or party affiliation, there are no major differences.

Mexicans divide on where they want their country to focus its attention in pursuing greater integration, though as noted above they believe that it will proceed in both North and Latin America. The country divides into thirds on the region Mexico should give priority to for integration: 35% of the population and 37% of the leaders prefer to integrate with Latin America, while 30% of the public and 27% of the elites prefer North America. Finally, 22% of the population and 31% of the leaders think that there should be more integration with both regions.

These percentages are not uniformly distributed. Consistent with geographic location, the strongest preference of Mexicans living in the North (36%) is integration with North America, while in the South (45%) Mexicans opt for integration with Latin America. There is also a very clear party bias. Most of those who identify with the PAN (47%) chose integration with North America, whereas 77% of PRD supporters prefer Latin America. PRI followers are distributed almost equally over the three options: 32% lean towards North America, 28% for Latin America and 33% for both at once.

Differences among leaders are even more evident. Many PAN followers (47%) and PRI supporters (32%) prefer integration with North America. PRD stalwarts, however, opt for Latin America (77%).


People who work in the government (47%)

also opt for North America and the business community for both (41%), whereas the politicians (43%), communication media and academics (45%), as well as NGO and unions (51%) prefer integration with Latin America.


### Mexico: North American or Latin American

*Do you think that Mexico is more North American than Latin American or more Latin American than North American?*


More North American



More Latin American



Both





### Limits on association with the United States

Mexicans have ambivalent feelings towards the United States. As noted in the previous chapter, the United States is the only country that an overwhelming majority of Mexicans consider a *partner* and not a *friend*. In this regard, the reactions of Mexicans to their northern neighbor are essentially pragmatic, recognizing intense economic relations and believing that these relations will be even more intense in the future. However, many Mexicans do believe that the integration process with the USA is coming to an end.

In 2006 most Mexicans thought that proximity to the United States was more of an advantage


for the country (public 52%, leaders 85%) than a problem (39% and 13% respectively.) Skepticism increased in 2008, with slightly more people seeing it as a problem than an advantage (46% against 45% while identification as a problem climbed from 13% to 26% among the leaders.

Mexicans in the North are more likely to say that proximity to the United States is an advantage (64%). Mexicans in the South (47%) and in the Center (51%) are more likely to say that their country's proximity to the United States is a problem. The perception of proximity being an advantage fell 8 percentage points in the North and 9 in the Center between 2006 and 2008.

Fewer Mexicans (45%) than in 2006 (54%) strongly or somewhat agree that *Mexico and the United States should form a single country, if this*

### Being US neighbor, advantage or problem

*What is more in line with what you think: for Mexico, being a neighbor of the United States is more of an advantage than a problem or more of a problem than an advantage?*





meant an improvement in their standard of living. The survey also asked part of the respondents the same question, leaving out the condition of an improvement in their standard of living. In this case even fewer Mexicans (36%) would agree with the union. Among those who disagreed (61%), the survey asked them to reconsider such a union with the condition that of an improved standard of living. 35% of his group changed their minds and 59% continued to reject integration.


The Mexico - United States relationship is imbued with a distrust that has increased substantially in recent years, among both the public and leaders. Distrust of the United States rose from 43% in 2004 to 53% in 2006 and to 61% in 2008 among the public. Such distrust increased from 41% in 2006 to 64% in 2008 among leaders.

Regional differences in distrust of the United States are noteworthy. The further from the northern border, the higher the distrust of the U.S. 45% of Mexicans in the North distrust the United States, 62% of Mexicans in the Center do not trust the U.S. and 72% of the public in the South feel the same way. Distrust is highest among PRD supporters (65%). PRI (31%) and PAN (20%) supporters are less likely than PRD supporters (65%) to distrust the United States.

Mexicans' nationalism takes on new forms when they face issues that have a direct impact on their security. 49% of the population and 33% of leaders are willing to allow U.S. agents to participate with Mexican agents in securing Mexico's airports, ports and borders in order to fight drug-trafficking, while 58% of the

### Feelings towards the US: Trust/Distrust

Which of the following words best describes your feelings about the United States?





public and 76% of leaders approve of Mexican criminals being extradited to the United States to be tried for crimes committed in that country.

With the same pragmatism mediating their nationalist distrust of the United States, 55% of the public and 70% of leaders support receiving financial aid from the United States

to fight drug-trafficking and organized crime. Interestingly, if the United States wanted to supervise the spending of these financial resources, a minority of the population and leaders who were in favor of the aid would be against the supervision (30% and 33%, respectively).

### Public



### Leaders

*Which of the following words best describes your feelings about the United States?*

*Which of the following words best describes your feelings about the United States?*



Trust

Trust





Distrust

Distrust



Indifference (spontaneous)

Indifference (spontaneous)





In the relationship of partners with the United States, NAFTA plays a key role, although there is a clear worsening of what this implies in the Mexican national imagination. Slightly more than a third of the public (67%) considers that parts of the treaty should be renegotiated; particularly those chapters that deal with agriculture. 72% of the leaders also favor renegotiation. Education is a key influence in supporting renegotiation: the higher the level of schooling, the greater the support for renegotiation. 72% of Mexicans who have no studies favor a revision, while 84% of those with a college degree favor renegotiation.

Distrust of the United States makes cooperation between Mexico and the United States problematic. However, Mexicans want their country to cooperate with the U.S. On a scale from 0 to 10 (where 0 means working alone and 10 implies working closely with the United States), Mexicans, on average, believe there is a level of cooperation with the United States of 6; leaders rate the level of cooperation one point higher, with an average of 7. Mexicans who identify with the PAN and the PRI show greater willingness to cooperate with the United States (6.2) than do PRD supporters or those who do not identify with any party, both of which give cooperation an average score of 5.7.

There is a positive association between evaluations of the country's current economic situation compared with economic conditions a year earlier: the better the economic situation, the greater the likelihood to rate higher cooperation with the United States.

One of the implications of cooperation between the two countries is that, on occasions, joint decisions must be made in order to solve common

problems, which implies compromises that do not completely satisfy either of the parties. Mexicans are strongly against (61%) their country assuming undesirable consequences as a result of cooperating with the northern neighbor, while 24% would agree to do so. This disagreement climbed compared with 2006 when 42% were in favor of said joint decisions and 31% were against them. By contrast, leaders are more likely to agree with Mexican cooperating with the United States in joint decision making (46%) than to disagree (42%).

Party affinities influence acceptance of joint decision making between Mexico and the United States. 28% of those who identify with the PRI agree, compared with 26% for the PAN and 14% in the PRD. Surprisingly, there is a negative association between education and agreement with joint decision making: Mexicans with the highest educational levels are more likely than those with lower levels of education to disagree with Mexico making joint decisions with the United States if this implies assuming unsatisfactory commitments.

Energy is an issue for which Mexicans leave no space for pragmatic negotiation with the United States. A large majority of the public (67%) would be against an agreement between Mexico and the United States to permit US investment in Mexico's oil sector. Leaders are more divided, with 39% in favor and 49% against. The recurrent regional gap between the North on one hand and the Center and South on the other is noteworthy: disagreement in the North is 55%. By contrast, the share of Mexicans who disagree with a deal that would permit U.S. investment in Mexico's oil sector jumps to 70% in the Center and 71% in the South.



The rejection of US investment in the oil industry is so intense that those who stated they were against this investment were asked to reconsider their opinions if the United States furnished financing for Mexico's economic development: 69% of the population and 72% of the leaders maintained their positions, compared with 19% and 13%, respectively, who modified them. Once again regional differences in opinion are notable: 27% of Mexicans in the North compared with 18% of those in the Center and 12% of Mexicans in the South changed their opinion.

They were also asked if they would change their preferences if, in exchange, the United States allowed Mexicans to work freely in the country: 45% of the public and 54% of leaders reiterated their position, 39% of the public and 23% of leaders changed their mind. The regional difference in opinion reappears: 43% of Mexicans in the North changed their mind as did 33% of those in the South.

Regarding the issue of emigration, in 2008 the survey divided the sample into two groups; those who had a general intention to emigrate and those who intended to emigrate to the United States. As mentioned in the first chapter, 40% of Mexico's population would emigrate if possible. 32% of the inhabitants in the South would do so, while 42% and 39% of the population in the Center and North of the country say they would leave their country if they could.

Younger Mexicans are more likely than older Mexicans to say they would emigrate if they could. Among Mexicans ages 18 to 29, 51% would emigrate. 40% of those ages 30 to 39 would emigrate if they could, 37% of those ages

40 to 49 would leave if they could and 25% of Mexicans ages 50 to 59, and an equal share of people over 60 would leave the country if they could. About half of those who would emigrate (52%) say they would go to the United States and 13% say they would go to Canada.

One-third of the Mexican population would move to the United States if they could. This percentage has been stable over time (34% in 2008, compared with 33% in 2006 and 2004). The inhabitants of the North are more likely to say they would emigrate (42% in 2006 and 37% in 2008), while the people in the South are still the most reluctant to go (30% in 2006 and 25% in 2008). There is a relationship that is similar to age in the particular case of the United States: the younger are more willing to emigrate: 41% of the group between 18 and 29 would go, compared with 35% of the 30 to 39 group and 34% for those between 40 and 49, 33% in the group from 50 to 59 and 18% in the over-60 group.




### Go to live to the U.S.


*If you could, would you live in the USA or not?*

### By education


Yes




Yes



No




No




### By age

Yes



No







## Go to live outside of Mexico

*If you could, would you live outside Mexico?*

Yes




No




## By education

Yes




No




## By age

Yes



No



For both questions, general desire to emigrate and specific desire to emigrate to the United States, Mexicans with an affinity for the PAN are most likely to say they would leave their country if they could. Mexicans with an affinity for the PRI are least likely to say they would leave. For the general question on desire to emigrate without a country being specified, supporters of the PRI (31%) are less likely to say that they would emigrate than are those who support the PAN (41%) or PRD (40%). For the specific case of emigration to the United States, PAN supporters (38%) are more likely than PRI (31%) or PRD (35%) supporters to say they would emigrate if they could.



### *The limits of friendship with Latin America*

In recent years, a combination of factors led Mexico's diplomacy to drift away from Latin America. Mexico's integration process with the other countries of North America, as a result of NAFTA, significantly reduced the relative importance of Latin American nations for Mexico. The leftward ideological shift in the region's most important countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela) created a greater distance between the center-right PAN governments of Mexico and the center-left and left governments in Latin America. Also, the United States' lack of attention to the region and the economic crises of the Southern Cone opened up a power vacuum in South America. The renewed international activism of the Brazil's center-left government, led by Lula da Silva, has largely filled this vacuum. All of these phenomena resulted in an increased distance between Latin America and Mexico along with a rise in the relative influence of Brazil in the region.

The government of Felipe Calderón established the reinsertion of Mexico in Latin America as one of its foreign policy priorities to counter Mexico's increasing separation from Latin America. The government decided to make diplomatic, political and economic investments to reposition Mexico in the region and reduce the risk of Mexico being cut off from this region. As president-elect, Calderón's first trip abroad was to Latin America and in the first two years of his government, he has received official visits from the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Chile,

Colombia, Paraguay and Uruguay. These travels reflect the reestablishment of Mexico's ties with the leading nations in the region.

Mexicans have noted these diplomatic changes. Both the public and leaders believe that Mexico's relations with Latin America are better than they were 10 years ago (52% in both the public and leaders) and that these relations will be even better over the next 10 years (55% of the public and 80% of the leaders). More Mexicans want their country to pay greater attention to Latin America (37% of the public and 33% of the leaders) than to other regions (North America, 30% of the public and 28% of the leaders; Europe, 10% of the public and 14% of the leaders).

However, Mexicans do not share a consistent vision on the appropriate role for Mexico in Latin America. 46% of the public and 54% of leaders say that their country should participate with the other countries in Latin America without trying to take on a leadership role in the region while 41% of the public and 45% of leaders believe that Mexico should exercise regional leadership. Support for Mexico taking on a leadership role in the region increased since 2006, climbing from 22% to 41% among the public and from 23% to 45% among leaders.

Mexicans living in different parts of the country have different visions for Mexico's future participation in Latin America. The largest share of the public (46%) in the North prefers that Mexico take on a leadership role in Latin America. By contrast, Mexicans who live in the center of the country (49%) prefer that Mexico participates without seeking to be a leader. Most Mexicans who support the PRI (47%) and PRD (45%) opt for cooperative participation, while



slight majority of PAN followers (47% against 44%) prefer leadership over cooperation.


Among leaders, PAN and PRI supporters (61% and 62%, respectively) want Mexico to assume a leadership role, compared with 37% and 38%, respectively, that support coordinated participation in Latin America. By contrast, 71% of leaders who support the PRD prefer cooperation and 29% want a leadership role for their country. Both the majority in the government sector (57%) and business community (51%) would prefer Mexico to play the role of leader. Most of the politicians (53%), communication media and academics (64%), as well as the NGO and unions (65%), however, seek cooperation in the region.

The largest share of Mexicans (22%) believes that their country has been the most influential country in the region over the last decade. Brazil follows Mexico in the share of Mexicans (18%) that believe it has been the most influential country in the region. Leaders disagree with the public. They believe that Brazil (64%) has been the most influential country in Latin America over the past ten years, followed by Chile (15%) and then Mexico (9%).

Mexicans who have higher levels of education are more likely than Mexicans with lower levels of education to recognize Brazil as the regional leader. Among leaders, 67% of the PRD supporters say that Brazil is the most influential country,

### Role of Mexico in Latin America

*Which of the following statements is closest to what you think Mexico's role in Latin America should be?*





compared with 59% for PRI followers and 57% for the PAN supporters. Leaders who support the PAN (17%) are more likely than leaders who support the PRI (7%) or PRD (3%) to say that Mexico is the most influential country in Latin America.

The Mexican public and leaders also disagree about which country will be most influential in Latin America over the coming 10 years. The largest share of the public (28%) says that Mexico will be the most influential country, followed by a 15% share that identifies Brazil and 12% that pick Argentina as the most influential country. The largest share of leaders (54%) continues to pick Brazil as the country that will be most influential in Latin America over the coming decade. However, a greater share (28%) thinks that Mexico will be the most influential country over the coming decade than think this about Mexico's role over the previous ten years, as noted above. Mexicans that live in the North (33%) are more likely than Mexicans that live in the South (23%) to say that Mexico will be the most influential country in Latin America over the next 10 years. Mexicans with more education are more likely than Mexicans with less education to name Brazil as the likely regional leader over the next 10 years. Leaders are also divided by party affinity on this question: equal shares (44%) of PAN supporters name Brazil and Mexico, PRI supporters choose Brazil (43%), above Mexico (37%), those who are close to the PRD are seven times more likely to name Brazil (71%) than Mexico (10%) as the country that is most likely to be the regional leader in Latin America over the next 10 years. By sectors within the elites, most of the government goes for Mexico (46%) over Brazil (44%), while the politicians (46%), businesspersons (51%),


communication media and academics (81%), plus the NGO and the unions (49%) opt for Brazil.

The public and leaders disagree about the likelihood of conflict in the region; 41% of the public say armed conflict is likely in Latin America and 57% of leaders say it is not. In the event of an armed conflict in Latin America, a variety of actors could try to settle it including: the UN, OAS, a group of countries in the region, the United States or a group of nations from outside the region. There is an evident difference of opinion between the public and leaders on which actor should try to settle such conflict. While the public say that such conflict should be settled by the UN (60%) and a group of countries of the region (11%), followed by the OAS; leaders are very divided: 35% say it should be the OAS, 34% say it should be the UN and 23% say it should be a group of countries within the region. Neither the public nor leaders believe that the United States or a group of countries from outside the region should intervene to settle conflict between countries in Latin America.

Mexicans with a higher level of education are more likely to name the OAS as an actor that should solve conflicts in the Americas. Among leaders, the largest share of those who support the PAN (49%) choose the OAS to settle regional problems, while the largest shares of leaders who support the PRI (43%) and the PRD (32%) choose the UN. Additionally, most of the government sector (47%) and the NGO and unions (29%) prefer the OAS, whereas the majority of the politicians (43%), businesspersons (42%), communication media and academic (36%) choose the UN.


## Most influential country in the region in the last ten years

Which Latin American country has been the most influential in the region over the last 10 years?



## Most influential country in the region in the next ten years

Which Latin American country will be the most influential in the region in the next 10 years?





The public and leaders agree on which country has generated the most conflict in the region over the past 10 years and which country will be responsible for the most conflict over the next 10 years: Venezuela in both cases. However, leader opinion on this is much stronger than among the public. While 23% of the public views Venezuela as the source of most conflict over the past 10 years and 24% believe that it will be the source of the most conflict over the next 10 years, 67% of leaders identify Venezuela as the most conflict-prone country in the past and 60% say it will be the most conflict-prone country in the future.

Historically, Mexico has considered Central America as a natural sphere of influence for its diplomacy. Generally speaking, the level of Mexico's influence over the region has depended directly on its willingness to invest resources in the area and inversely on the strategic importance assigned by the United States to the region. Given these relationships, the survey measures Mexicans' willingness to invest resources in Central America. In general, the public is not very willing to channel economic resources to develop the economies of Central American nations (15% very much in favor, 27% somewhat), while leader do think that Mexico should make such investments (28% very much in favor, 37% somewhat in favor).

Mexican opinions about Central American immigrants are very divided. 41% of the public have a very or somewhat favorable opinion of Central American immigrants in Mexico while 48% have very or somewhat unfavorable opinions of immigrants from Central America. Leaders also divide on their opinions of Central American immigrants: 46% have very or

somewhat favorable opinions and 49% have very or somewhat unfavorable opinions.


Mexicans living in the South (35%) are less likely than Mexicans living in the Center (42%) or North (46%) to have favorable opinions on Central American immigrants. In order to solve the problem of illegal Central American immigrants in Mexico, both the public (45%) and leaders (59%) prefer the establishment of a temporary workers program rather than setting up controls on the southern border, such as a border patrol (public 36%, leaders 29%). It should be noted that the decrease in the share of the public that supports border controls has fallen since 2006 when 51% of the public and 38% of leaders said they preferred that option.

In summary, there is a very clear Latin Americanism in the preferences of Mexicans, extolling the role Mexico could play in the region. Nevertheless, in general there is reluctance to make commitments among the leaders and the public, as can be seen in the case of economic aid for the Central American economies. There are signs in the preferences of Mexicans of Mexico gradually shifting its attention to Latin America, as a result of what is perceived as a slowdown in the regional integration program with the North. The reinsertion of Mexico into the region could be used to balance the bilateral relationship with the United States and to reach a regional consensus on hemispheric and global issues. If this is the case, when Mexico finds the delicate balance between its two regional identities it may then, eventually, act as an interlocutor between Latin America and North America. To do this, it will be necessary to reduce the enormous gaps between the country's geographic regions, between leaders and the public and also between segments of the leaders.




### Opinion regarding undocumented Central Americans

What is your general impression of Central Americans who migrate to Mexico: is it very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable?



### Helping Central America's economies to develop

Bearing in mind the current economic situation in the country, to what extent do you think Mexico should channel economic funds to developing the economies of Central American countries?





## Conclusions: What unites and separates Mexicans

The most important results of the third *Mexico and the World* survey can be grouped by observable changes in the mood of national public opinion faced with an uncertain national and international panorama.

Mexicans have lost interest in the world: self-absorption, pessimism and distrust predominate, particularly concerning relations with the United States, the accomplishments of NAFTA and the possibilities of a more in-depth integration with North America.

As a result of the above, Mexico seems to be flirting with the possibility of getting closer to and integrating more with Latin America, a region with which it has always had more affinity. Nevertheless, there does not appear to be a consensus on the role Mexico should play in the region. Nor is there consensus on the best way for Mexico to integrate with the region. There is no strong desire among leaders and both leaders and the public have ambivalent attitudes toward countries in the region. There also is no consensus to economically support Central America. It is clear, however, that Mexicans regard a rapprochement with Latin America as a more desirable, though not necessarily more feasible option, than integration with North America.

Additionally, relations with more distant regions, especially Europe and Asia, are not seen as viable short-term options even though

Mexicans have quite favorable opinions about these countries.

There are growing differences in opinion among Mexicans, as confirmed in this third survey: first, between the public and the leaders; second, between the regions of the country where the distancing of South is particularly noticeable; third, among the leaders, who are more ideologically polarized than the population, with clear differences between the traditional leaders (government officers, the business community and politicians) and the emerging group of leaders (social leaders, academics and the mass media) becoming evident; and fourth and finally, there are marked differences between the younger and more educated Mexicans compared with older Mexicans and those with less formal education.

There are many Mexicos in terms of public opinion and foreign policy: leaders and the public, North and South, young and old, traditional and emerging leaders, those who are more ideologically in line with the PRI and PAN versus PRD supporters and Mexicans with high or low levels of education. In general terms, the former tend to be more internationalist, realist, multilateral and pragmatic, while the latter seem to be more isolationist, idealist, unilateral and traditional.

The above is particularly clear in Mexican nationalism, which clearly still exists but is undergoing a thorough transformation. While the



symbolic elements of nationalism remain (national pride, defending oil and territorial sovereignty), the younger and more educated segments of the public, Mexicans living in the northern part of the country and leaders who wield political and economic power are more open to accepting the referents of a more global and interconnected world.

In short, the *Mexico, the Americas and the World* survey offers *hard*, methodologically sound, rigorous and representative data that are useful for a better understanding of the opinions, perceptions and values of Mexicans regarding international relations and foreign policy.

This study gives the reader a clearer view of how Mexicans see the world and of their fears and aspirations in the global context. This study describes a fearful and fragmented Mexico, which on one hand takes refuge in itself, and on the other, seeks a timid insertion in the world without much clarity, strategy or consensus. To solve this problem, government policies must be designed and executed to reduce, qualify or order the large differences of opinion found in the different political, economic, regional and generational segments of contemporary Mexico.

## Public Methodological Note

Technical sheet	
<b>Technical sheet population</b>	Mexicans, 18 or older, residing in any state in national territory
<b>Sample size</b>	2400 persons
<b>Data Collection technique</b>	Personal "face-to-face" interviews in private homes
<b>Sample error</b>	+/-2.0 for data referring to the entire sample
<b>Survey date</b>	August 14 to September 6, 2008

A representative sample of the national population (only 18 or older and residing anywhere in the Mexican Republic) of 2400 interviewees was used.

The size of the sample made it possible to analyze the results at both a national and regional level. This, the stratification of results by region was as follows:

1. Northern region: Baja California, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Sonora and Tamaulipas.
2. Southern region: Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco and Yucatán.
3. Central region: Aguascalientes, Baja California Sur, Colima, Distrito Federal (Mexico City), Durango, Estado de México (State of Mexico), Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Michoacán, Morelos, Nayarit, Puebla, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Tlaxcala, Veracruz and Zacatecas.

The size of the sample and the errors are distributed as follows:

Domain	Sample size	Theoretical margin of error
North	730	+/- 3.7
South	480	+/- 4.5
Center	1180	+/- 2.9
National (entire sample)	2400	+/- 2.0



The electoral sections of the country according to the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) were considered as the reference sample structure and the updated data from the last federal election (2006) were incorporated. The electoral sections were the Primary Sampling Units (PSU) for the multiphase sampling model. As a first selection stage, the PSU were ordered by regions and states in terms of the number of voters registered in each one, to later generate a *commencement seed* at random to generate the first conglomerate of PSU. After this, a systematic criterion was applied to generate the other conglomerates until obtaining all the commencement points necessary to complete the sample required. Ten interviews were made in each PSU selected. In the second phase of the sampling, 2 blocks (*manzanas*) of each electoral section were chosen; these blocks were the Secondary Sampling Units (SSU). The number of interviews carried out in each SSU varied, depending on geographical conditions and urban distribution. The rural percentage in the sample was 27.8%, that is, commencement points (640 interviews).

The SSU were chosen systematically, in terms of household densities in each block of the neighborhood, colonia and community where the interviews were held. In order to capture the variety of opinions within an interview zone, an effort was made to ensure that the SSU selected were sufficiently far apart within the PSU (electoral sections). The third phase of the sampling was the selection of households of tertiary sampling units (TSU); each TSU was selected by following a systematic method in terms of the household density of each SSU

(block). A single person who satisfied the sampling requirements (18 or older and residing at the domicile) was polled in each TSU. These people were chosen at random with a final quota adjustment and a population distribution parameter by gender and age as a result of the II INEGI Housing and Population Census in 2005.

The interviews were applied from August 14 to September 6, 2008. All the interviews were applied face-to-face in the households selected during the sampling process. There was only one interview per household selected. The average interview application time was 30 minutes.

Some 38 survey takers, 10 field work supervisors, 6 coders, 8 entry clerks, 2 analysts and a project supervisor were involved in the interview process.

The coding, entry and processing of the information was carried out from September 1 to 30, 2008. The resulting estimates of the database are adjusted by gender and age, while taking the results of the INEGI Census of 2005 as a parameter. The results at a nationwide level are adjusted by the population weight of each regional stratus.



## Leaders Methodological Note

Technical sheet	
<b>Target population</b>	Mexican leaders with managerial or administrative positions in five sectors: politics, government, academic-university and communication media, private and labor-social.
<b>Sample size</b>	338 individuals
<b>Data Collection technique</b>	Telephone interviews
<b>Sample error</b>	+/-5.4 for data referring to the entire sample
<b>Survey date</b>	July 8 to September 1, 2008

leaders to whom the *'Mexico, the Americas and the World 2008'* was applied. The leaders' category includes people in positions of command or leadership directly involved in decision making in the professional sector or industry.

For the study, the leaders were classified into the following five key groups or sectors:

1. Political: governors, secretaries of State, legislators and political party leaders
2. Business: owners, presidents, vice presidents and managing directors of the most important Mexican companies listed by different sources from the private sector (Expansion and the Executive Connection directory);
3. Social sector: directors and presidents of non-governmental organizations, trade unions general secretaries, representatives of religious groups and members of professional organizations in the sector of foreign policy.
4. Social sector: directors and presidents of non-governmental organizations, trade unions general secretaries, representatives of religious groups and members of professional organizations in the sector of foreign policy.

### *General Description*

This section explains the parameters and the method of selecting the sample of Mexicans



The distribution of interviews is indicated in the second column of the table. The third column shows the weights of the weighted sample in question:

Type	Survey	Adjustment
Government	84	67
Politics	61	68
The business community	61	68
Mass media and academics	61	68
NGO, unions, religious leaders	71	67
TOTAL	338	338

Some 1477 invitations were sent to participate in the survey and 4475 phone calls were made to obtain 338 effective interviews. The sampling margin of error for the survey of the elites is +/- 5.4%, considering a confidence level of 95%.

### *Field work*


Most of the interviews were made by phone and only some of them were face-to-face (at the request of some of the leaders). The interviews were made over a period from July 8 to September 1, 2008 and 10 survey takers, 2 supervisors, 2 entry clerks, 2 coders and 1 analyst and a project supervisor were involved in the process.

### *Information processing*


The coding, entry and processing of the information were carried out from September 20 to October 2, 2008. The resulting estimates of the database are already adjusted by each sector on Mexican leaders.

## Sociodemographic characteristics


Gender table




Party sympathy table



Age table




Region table



Education table



Family income table





## MEXICO, THE AMERICAS AND THE WORLD 2008

<b>Acrónimo</b>	<b>Significado</b>
<b>AIDS</b>	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
<b>CIDE</b>	Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
<b>CCGA</b>	Chicago Council on Global Affairs
<b>COMEXI</b>	Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales
<b>DK/NA</b>	Don't know/Not Answer
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FARC</b>	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
<b>FIFA</b>	International Federation of Football Association
<b>ICJ</b>	International Court of Justice
<b>IFE</b>	Federal Electoral Institute
<b>INEGI</b>	National Institute of Geography and Statistics
<b>ITAM</b>	Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México
<b>MERCOSUR</b>	Southern Common Market
<b>MFA</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>NAFTA</b>	North American Free Trade Agreement
<b>NGO</b>	Non Governmental Organization
<b>OAS</b>	Organization of American States
<b>ONUSAL</b>	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
<b>PAN</b>	National Action Party
<b>PRD</b>	Democratic Revolution Party
<b>PRI</b>	Revolutionary Institutional Party
<b>PSU</b>	Primary Sampling Units
<b>PVEM</b>	Mexican Green Party
<b>SNI</b>	National System of Researchers
<b>SPP</b>	Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America
<b>SSU</b>	Secondary Sampling Units
<b>TSU</b>	Tertiary Sampling Units
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>USA</b>	United States of America
<b>WTO</b>	World Trade Organization



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