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The Origins of Mexico's Municipal Usos y
Costumbres Regimes: Supporting Local Political
Participation or Local Authoritarian Control?

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Abstract

Despite Mexico's shift to nationally competitive politics, the majority of the nation's subnational governments have experienced little to no political change. This study seeks to contribute to our understanding of subnational authoritarian survival amidst national democratization through analysis of political trends in multiple subnational entities in Mexico. This study builds on research highlighting the importance of subnational political, economic and social factors in explaining the survival of subnational authoritarian rule. Specifically, it analyzes how subnational leaders in a single state, the state of Oaxaca, managed local and national pressures for and against the perpetuation of hegemonic party rule in their region.

Although some scholars have claimed that the decision to change municipal electoral systems in the 1990s was made in an effort to minimize opposition gains, others argue that these electoral systems were a response to local demands for political liberalization.

Statistical analysis demonstrates that both local and national pressures were at work, and that state leaders used municipal electoral codes to manage both.

Resumen

A pesar de que México dio un giro a una política nacional competitiva, la mayoría de los gobiernos estatales han experimentado un cambio político mínimo o nulo. El presente estudio pretende contribuir a la comprensión de la sobrevivencia del autoritarismo a nivel subnacional en medio del proceso de democratización nacional, mediante un análisis de tendencias políticas en varias entidades subnacionales en México. Este estudio se basa en investigación que resalta la importancia de los factores políticos, económicos y sociales a nivel subnacional en la explicación de la supervivencia del control autoritario en dicho nivel. Específicamente, se analiza cómo los líderes subnacionales en un solo estado, en este caso el estado de Oaxaca, manejaron las presiones locales y nacionales en favor y en contra de la perpetuación del gobierno del partido hegemónico en su región. A pesar de que algunos académicos han afirmado que la decisión de cambiar el sistema electoral municipal durante los años noventa fue hecha con el objetivo de minimizar las ganancias de la oposición, otros argumentan que esos sistemas electorales fueron una respuesta a las demandas locales para la liberalización política. El análisis estadístico demuestra que presiones tanto nacionales como locales estaban en acción y que los líderes estatales utilizaron los códigos electorales municipales para administrar ambos tipos de presiones.

Introduction

During much of the 20th century, Mexico was known for the hegemonic rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Hegemonic rule, however, began to break down in the 1980s when opposition groups began to challenge this party's control over national government. The PRI was seriously challenged in presidential elections in the late 1980s, lost control over congress late in the following decade, and then the presidency in 2000. Today, Mexico's national level politics is highly competitive, with three main parties, the PRI, the historic National Action Party (PAN), and newer Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) regularly vying for presidential control and congressional seats. The nation also counts on numerous minority parties that pop up and disappear with each electoral cycle, speaking to the growing pluralism of Mexican politics.

Despite Mexico's shift to competitive politics at the national level, an equivalent process of subnational democratization has not fully taken place in this federal system. This is somewhat paradoxical given that the earliest challenges to the PRI came in municipal and state elections, particularly in a few regions in the northern part of the country. Although many states and municipal governments have experienced important electoral turnover to opposition parties and even minority political groups since the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, the majority of the nation's subnational governments have experienced little to no electoral or political change. Rather, the PRI remains firmly entrenched in over half of municipal and most state political systems, with scholars and political commentators alike frequently reporting that many state and municipal governments controlled by the PRI sometimes find their electoral processes tainted by traditional fraud, intimidation, and clientelist politics that were so critical in maintaining PRI national control during the heyday of this party's hegemonic rule. This has led many scholars to conclude that, at best, subnational democratization in Mexico has been uneven, if at least moving in the right direction; at worst it has all but stagnated and may suffer from future reversions.

This study seeks to contribute to our understanding of the process of subnational democratization in Mexico through an analysis of the democratic experience in multiple subnational entities in this federal system. Rather than conducting a nationwide analysis of all subnational state level governments, however, the study focuses on a single state in Mexico, the state of Oaxaca, but takes the level of analysis to the municipality. Oaxaca, one of Mexico's 31 states, is known for being a traditional stronghold of the PRI during the country's transition to nationally competitive politics beginning in the 1990s. Although the PRI began to suffer national electoral losses in the late 1980s, it remained the unchallenged custodian of Oaxacan state politics until the mid

2000s when it narrowly won the 2004 gubernatorial race. It was not until July 2006 that the PRI finally lost control over this state government when it lost the gubernatorial race, although it remains an important player at the municipal level.

Oaxaca's longtime state level PRI rule and its recent state government transition to the opposition National Action Party (PAN) –Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) alliance— however, masks surprising variation in the pace and extent of partisan turnover among its 570 municipalities. Indeed, Oaxaca's municipalities also provide interesting variation in formal electoral laws. Oaxaca was the only state in Mexico that undertook formal measures in the 1990s to allow its municipal governments to deviate from the municipal electoral system and structure normally used throughout the nation. Specifically, changes in Oaxaca's municipal electoral codes in the 1990s gave these governments the freedom to eliminate national political parties from local political processes and to choose new mechanisms for electing local leaders that differ considerably from conventional electoral systems. This system, called *Usos y Costumbres* (UyC) or Uses and Customs, is currently used in 418 out of 570 Oaxacan municipalities.

Rather than examining the effect of municipal electoral code changes on subnational democratization in Oaxaca, however, this study analyzes why municipalities chose to adopt these regimes in the first place and whether this decision was based on efforts to speed up or stifle democratization. The Oaxacan state government promoted the UyC municipal electoral reform at a time when it faced competing political pressures. On one hand, a growing number of local leaders, often claiming to represent the state's large and diverse indigenous population, were pressuring state officials to recognize variation in local political traditions in order to reduce the level of state level PRI intrusion into municipal affairs. This pressure came on the heels of changes made by the federal government to its Constitution (1917) in 1992 to acknowledge the nation's multiethnic character, kicking off state-level debates over forms of indigenous representation. On the other hand, the state PRI also faced strong pressures from national party leaders and the PRI controlled federal government to maintain its hold over state and municipal political power, and thus to forestall any municipal or state political liberalization that threatened to undermine national PRI rule.

These competing pressures have led to different conclusions about the reasons underlying the decision to push for municipal electoral reform in the first place, and distinguishing between these possible explanations is the point of focus of this study. Reflecting local pressures on state PRI rule, some scholars argue that UyC systems adoption was designed to appease local leaders by formalizing traditional forms of local governance. The goal was to augment local, some say indigenous, level participation in local politics, and in so doing promote local social stability and public security. Municipal

electoral system reforms recognizing local forms of governance would thus have allowed local leaders to strengthen autonomy from state PRI rule, implying political liberalization. In contrast, others argue that municipal UyC electoral changes were pushed on municipalities by the PRI-controlled state government or adopted by local leaders in collusion with state officials for the purpose of engineering a continuation of municipal PRI control. Changing the municipal rules of the game would reduce the ability of opposition parties to influence local politics, helping local leaders to engineer majorities for the PRI that could help to strengthen state PRI rule.

The goal of this study is thus to discern whether the Oaxacan state government and its municipal leaders were engaged in fomenting political liberalization or safeguarding authoritarian PRI rule. To this end, this study analyses the social and political terrain leading up to the municipal electoral system changes in the mid-1990s. Finding that local social pressures, like indigenous identities recognition or social conflict, explain UyC adoption by municipal governments would support contentions that UyC reforms were implemented in order to appease local citizens and their leaders in an effort to promote local political participation, a form of political liberalization away from the PRI. Finding that political concerns like declining PRI support explain UyC adoption would support contentions that state and municipal leaders colluded to find ways to engineer a continuation of municipal and thus state PRI control.

The study proceeds like so: First, it opens with a discussion of the national and subnational forces at play in Mexico during Oaxaca's decision to allow municipal level electoral system change. Second, the study covers the literature on subnational authoritarianism and democratization in Oaxaca and in other nations experiencing similar political trends. The third section presents a series of testable hypotheses for each of the main arguments about the reasons underlying the decision to undertake municipal electoral system change in Oaxaca. This section is followed by a statistical analysis of the factors setting the stage for UyC or PP adoption. The final section concludes.

1. Oaxacan Politics Amidst National and Subnational Democratization

During much of the 20th century, Mexico was known for the hegemonic rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Between 1946 and 1976, the PRI averaged 86% total national votes in presidential elections and 83% in Chamber of Deputies elections [Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE)]. However, beginning in the 1980s, two parties, the newly formed Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) and the long established Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), began to challenge the PRI. A former PRI member Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano (who later formed the PRD) competed for the presidency in 1988, winning 30.9% votes. In 1997, the PRI lost control over congress, when the PRD and PAN increased their seat shares in the Chamber of Deputies. In 2000, Vicente Fox Quesada (PAN) won the presidency with 43.4% support compared to the PRI candidate's 36.9%. The PAN enjoyed another victory in 2006 when its candidate, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, won 35.9% votes compared to Andrés Manuel López Obrador's (PRD) 35.3%. PRI candidate Roberto Madrazo Pintado came in third with 22.3%.

Despite the dramatic rise in national level political competition in Mexico, the PRI has remained the country's principal political force at the state and municipal level in this federal system. After dominating all subnational governments throughout most of the 20th century, the party began to lose elections at the municipal and state level in the 1980s and 1990s. Even so, in mid-2000 the PRI still controlled 17 out of 31 states, compared to the PAN's nine and the PRD's five (The Federal District was controlled by the PRD at this time). The party also controlled just over 50% of the nation's 2,440 municipalities. By early 2010, just ahead of another round of 12 gubernatorial races scheduled for July 2010, the PRI controlled 19 out of 31 state governors and 62% of municipal governments. Given the PRI's strong showing in 2009 midterm congressional elections, this proportion of local political control is unlikely to change much in July 2010.

Subnational electoral data also show that the PRI has been able to regain some states it had once lost, although the party has also never faced serious challenges in most of those states that it currently controls. In fact, as of early 2010, the PRI had never lost gubernatorial elections in 13 of the nation's 31 states, demonstrating that nearly half of Mexican states have never experienced electoral turnover, despite national political change. Meanwhile, the PRI has regained control over numerous other state governments that it had once lost in recent years, thereby helping it to shore up its strong subnational position. Similar patterns have emerged at the municipal level as well.

Despite ongoing subnational PRI hegemony, many of subnational PRI strongholds have felt pressure over the years for some kind of political

change, even if they have not always succumbed. Oaxaca is no exception: student, teacher, worker, and peasant associations challenged the legitimacy of the PRI in the state in an ongoing and often coordinated way beginning in the late 1960s (Anaya, 2006). Specifically, beginning in the late 1960s and triggered in large part by the federal governmental crackdown against the student strike in Mexico City in 1968, student organizations, various labor associations, and peasant groups began to organize to defend their interests, becoming active in each other's struggles and later forming alliances to facilitate cooperation in pressuring the government on a variety of themes, including respect for increased local political autonomy and democratization (Bustamante *et al.*, 1978; Foweraker and Craig, 1990; Anaya, 2006). Confrontations in the mid 1970s between these groups and the state government and those groups that supported it often resulted in violence.

Much of these groups' original activities occurred in urban areas but they also spread to rural regions as well. Peasant groups angered by rising problems in the agricultural sector and ongoing state domination of local politics demanded land and engaged in land invasions in the mid-1970s, leading the Oaxacan government to clamp down on and engage in outright repression in order to regain social control (Anaya, 2006). Even with repression, however, student and peasant groups, in particular, continued to organize in the late 1970s and 1980s to defend their interests against the state government. In the 1980s, teacher associations joined the mix to challenge the federal teachers' union and through this PRI rule (Cook, 1990; Foweraker and Craig, 1990).

Indigenous groups also organized during this period, placing additional pressure on subnational PRI hegemony in Oaxaca. In Oaxaca, most indigenous peoples tend also to be peasants, while most peasants also tend to be indigenous (Anaya, 2006). However, not all peasant organizations promoted indigenous issues. Even so, groups did emerge in Oaxaca, beginning in the 1960s and culminating in the 1980s, that merged peasant and rural demands with specifically indigenous ones (Reina, 1988; Barbas and Bartolomé, 1999). In addition to fighting over control over natural resources, better agricultural sector working conditions, and land rights, they also campaigned for better local public services, an end to state governmental intrusion into local political affairs, and local democratization (Mejía and Sarmiento, 1987). Some of these groups thus directly confronted local PRI control, either pressuring for more local autonomy for indigenous groups, indigenous rights, and respect for indigenous culture, or for outright recognition for traditional forms of local governance in the form of UyC (Anaya, 2006).

Student, worker, peasant, and indigenous group demands for local autonomy were responding to years of state governmental intrusion into their affairs. During the period of national PRI hegemony, Oaxacan municipal leaders, especially in rural and highly indigenous regions, had frequently flouted PRI rule by selecting municipal officials using more traditional

mechanisms but registering them as “PRI” winners for the sake of formal electoral results. In response, the Oaxaca state legislature would often remove municipal officials, replacing them with interim ones more to their liking (Anaya, 2006; Eisenstadt, 2007). Frustrated with these replacements, candidates from indigenous associations and other opposition groups and parties began to protest state decisions in the late 1970s, with many municipalities experiencing post-election conflicts that often resulted in citizen deaths in the years after (Eisenstadt, 2007). By the early 1990s, when pressure from indigenous and other opposition groups within Oaxaca had grown to new heights, well over 10% of Oaxacan municipalities experienced violent post-election conflicts (Eisenstadt, 2007).

Despite ongoing opposition organization against state and municipal PRI rule and rising indigenous group demands, Oaxacan state officials did little in the 1970s and 1980s to address these concerns or at least coopt their leaders into the PRI. Rather, governors in the late 1970s and early 1980s repressed mobilizations (López, 1986; Martínez, 1990; Bailón, 1999). In the late 1980s, however, Governor Heladio Ramírez López (1986-1992) took strides to reduce the level social and political conflict in the state. To this end, he allowed greater local autonomy to local PRI leaders to conduct their affairs, as well as also sought to include a more multicultural rhetoric into his language to appease indigenous groups (Anaya, 2006). Even so, little in the way of policy change came of these efforts and opposition activities against the PRI continued.

Indeed, little changed, even after the Mexican government took the decision in 1990 to ratify Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization (ILO), or took the decision two years later to alter the Constitution (1917) to recognize the multicultural heritage of the country as well (Anaya, 2006). Although federal and state constitutional changes kicked-off state-level debates over indigenous representation (Anaya, 2005), nothing came of these debates until 1994 and the rise of armed Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) insurgency movement in the nearby state of Chiapas (Anaya, 2005). On 1 January 1994, a group of armed insurgents in Chiapas raided a series of towns and villages, burning police stations, municipal offices, and army barracks. The armed insurgency was short-lived, as the Mexican military stepped in the next day, but the Zapatista leaders evaded capture, and continued to make demands on the Mexican federal government, including allowing for local indigenous autonomy and political liberalization away from the PRI.

The EZLN struck a sympathetic chord with Oaxaca’s indigenous organizations, many of which expressed outright sympathy for the Zapatistas and their cause (Anaya, 2005, 2006). Oaxacan governmental officials felt the implications of the Chiapas movement on the potential for ramping up local mobilizations against the state. Fearing a spread of this major public security

problem to Oaxaca that could undermine not just social but political stability in the state, Governor Diódoro Carrasco Altamirano (1992-1998) immediately moved to discuss a host of political measures to prevent social instability (Anaya, 2006). This was soon followed by municipal level electoral reforms to recognize traditional forms of governance.

Interestingly, Oaxaca was the only state to change its municipal electoral codes in the aftermath of the 1992 federal constitutional reforms and many state level constitutional changes following from this. In mid 1995, with reforms undertaken in 1997, the Oaxacan government legally recognized local community practices to govern local political affairs that had been used for decades (Recondo, 2001; Anaya, 2006). The new system was called the “Usos y Costumbres” (UyC) or the “Uses and Customs” system. When the state government first approved the introduction of UyC systems in mid 1995, 412 out of Oaxaca’s 570 municipalities chose to adopt it; by 1997 the total number of UyC municipalities had increased to 418 (Servicios para una Educación Alternativa, 2006).

1.1. Oaxaca’s Municipal Institutional Arrangements

Mexico is constitutionally federal, divided into states and municipalities. Mexico’s 31 states and the Federal District have constitutions, elected executives, and unicameral legislatures. States, but not the Federal District, are subdivided into 2,440 municipalities. The structure of municipal government is outlined in the 1917 Constitution and includes a mayor (*alcalde*), city council, whose members are called *regidores*, and a local attorney general (*síndico*). The size of municipal councils is up to states but usually depends on population.

Although states determine rules for electing municipal governments, most Mexican municipalities tend to elect their governments in the same way: mayors are usually elected by plurality from a single, municipal district, and municipal councilors elected from closed party lists on ballots fused with mayoral ones, with a complex allocation formula guaranteeing winning mayoral candidates a majority of seats on city councils (Acedo, 2003). Candidates for elected municipal offices are selected and presented by political parties that have been formally recognized by the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE) and thus have met restrictive national registration guidelines.¹ The secret ballot is used for casting votes, while all men and women eighteen years and older are eligible to vote in municipal (state and federal) elections. Scholars of Mexican politics refer to this combination of political party-based

¹ Aspiring parties must present evidence of 0.13% of total registered voter membership that is distributed across 51% of the Mexican states (each state having at least 3,000 members), or across 51% of 500 federal district (each district showing at least 300 members). Parties winning less than 2.0% of national votes in a federal election lose registration.

electoral processes, secret ballots, and universal suffrage as the “Political Parties” (PP) system.

Municipalities using the “Usos y Costumbres” (UyC) system must follow the municipal governmental structure as outlined in the constitution: they must select a mayor, municipal council, and a *síndico*. However, UyC rules used to determine suffrage and candidate eligibility, candidate selection, and ballot structure and voting mechanisms can diverge from the PP system in important ways. UyC governments do not formally allow political parties to select or present candidates, although considerable anecdotal evidence suggests that parties still retain some influence in UyC municipalities (Recondo, 2001; Eisenstadt, 2007).

Most UyC regimes revolve around a central decision-making body. Sometimes this takes the form of an elder’s council, sometimes the form of a public *Asamblea General Comunal* (AGC) or General Communal Assembly (Guerra, 2000; Eisenstadt, 2007). The elders’ council or AGC is usually the municipality’s highest level of political authority, with its decisions/rulings then adopted by the municipal government. Two things characterize these decision-making bodies. First, they are charged with running all candidate selection and municipal voting. Second, formal participation in them is limited. Elders’ councils are comprised of age-eligible citizens and can be closed-door events. The AGC is organized around a public meeting whose recognized participants, either in the form of its leaders or its voters, varies by community. The AGC is usually comprised of a *mesa de debates* or a debate group that runs the meeting, all elections held in the meeting, and records its decisions/rulings. The *mesa* is usually comprised of a president, secretary, and several note-takers.

UyC regimes vary in their requisites for who is eligible to be selected for elders’ council or AGC positions, with the field most often restricted by sex, age, marital status, residency requirements, and satisfactory participation in the *cargo* and *tequio* system. The *cargo* system requires citizens to hold a variety of formal positions in the community and the *tequio* system service on short-term community projects. Both mechanisms trace their roots to the Catholic Church in this region and are designed to help contribute to the community’s political, economic, and social life. Service requirements range by municipality, with eligibility limited by age, marital status, and residency requirements.

Candidates for municipal offices are recommended by the elders’ council or AGC. Candidates must also meet certain sex, age, marital status, residency, and *cargo/tequio* service requirements. Sometimes community groups, like peasant or neighborhood associations or police forces, also have the right to name candidates who have complied with minimum requirements. Municipal elections run through the elders’ council or AGC, which can use a variety of voting mechanisms, ranging from secret individual ballots to

mechanisms using publicly cast votes by individuals or groups. Ballots can also be cast according to simultaneous or sequential procedures.

2. Oaxaca and the Scholarly Debate about Subnational Democratization

As noted above, the Oaxacan state government undertook municipal electoral system reform at a time when it confronted two significant but competing pressures on state and local politics. On the one hand, state PRI leaders faced a serious crisis of legitimacy among various social groups, indigenous movements, and local political leaders that threatened to undermine social stability and public security, as it had in the nearby state of Chiapas. Social tensions thus led the government to consider ways to placate local activists and leaders frustrated with a lack of attention to their issues of concern, as well as state government and PRI intrusion into their political affairs (Velázquez, 2000; Anaya, 2005). Usos y Costumbre recognition would allow local communities long used to different cultural heritages and thus modes of local decision-making and governance needed autonomy from state rule to see to their affairs (Velázquez, 2000; Anaya, 2005).

As such, UyC would facilitate participation and inclusion in Oaxaca's multicultural society, something that could facilitate subnational democratization down the line as well (Velázquez, 2000; Anaya, 2005).² The introduction of UyC systems would also be critical to reducing post-electoral conflict (Anaya, 2005; Manaus *et al.*, 2005; Eisenstadt, 2007). As such, the government undertook municipal level reform and the introduction of UyC regimes in response to local pressure for political liberalization, pressures that were highest in rural and indigenous regions due to their history with local forms of governance and traditions distinct from other areas.

On the other hand, state and municipal PRI rulers are also said to have faced rising national pressures to thwart subnational movements for local political liberalization of any kind as they foretold an end to PRI political control. These political pressures should have led state officials to seek to find ways to placate local activists and thus maintain social stability in the near-term but in a way that would allow the party to engineer continued PRI political control in the medium term. These systems were thus either pushed on municipalities by the state government or adopted by local leaders aligned with the PRI as a means for sidestepping modes of governance that could support democratization. Along these lines, scholars have made strong cases

² However, allowing local leaders more autonomy to conduct their affairs away from the intrusion of the Oaxacan state government did not necessarily mean a transition to subnational democratic rule but rather a transition away from PRI dominance, that could be replaced by some other form of local authoritarian rule. Either way, the introduction of UyC systems would have led to a form of political liberalization away from the PRI, something that would appease local leaders intent upon shoring up local autonomy.

that the PRI chose to implement UyC systems in many Oaxacan municipalities in order to preserve political control, specifically through the formal elimination of opposition party activities in these areas that could lead to democratizing trends (Guerra, 2000; Recondo, 2001, 2002; Elizarrarás, 2002; Anaya, 2006).

In particular, it has been argued that several widely used UyC institutions work against democratization in that they purposefully narrow the level of community participation in local political affairs and isolate the community from outside political trends (Fox, 1994; Gibson, 2005). For example, UyC systems often restrict suffrage or candidate eligibility by sex, age, residency, or community service performance reducing the pool of potential voters, and they also often rely on public rather than private ballots. Such practices raise the level of control and influence that incumbent municipal leaders exert over participants in local politics, something that facilitates the management of election outcomes (Fox, 1994). These practices also centralize the discussion of community issues among a few local leaders (Gibson, 2005). The elimination of political parties from UyC regimes also limits the scope of political debate as prospective candidates find it difficult to organize against the incumbent government or citizens do not gain access to opposing views. Without parties organizing political discourse, citizens are relatively less informed and interested in politics at higher levels. As such, the government should have pushed UyC regimes on those areas most under PRI control in order to preserve party bastions, while allowing those regions already facing intense opposition to continue to democratize away from the PRI with little or no statewide effect.

The scholarly literature on subnational authoritarianism and democratization loosely reflects the debate about the Oaxacan case. On the one hand, scholars point to the bottom-up forces often at play in encouraging higher levels of government to adopt political reforms. On the other, many scholars point to the top-down forces that can lead leaders to make decisions that can either facilitate or undermine local authoritarian rule. In terms of bottom-up forces, scholars suggest a variety of social, political, and legal factors that can promote or undermine subnational authoritarian rule. Some scholars highlight the role of local social movements and political opposition in fomenting an acceptance of political change by higher levels of government (Cornelius *et al.*, 1999).

However other scholars shy away from focusing on the activities of social and political players and take a more structural approach, highlighting how local governments' inability to enforce the rule of law supports local authoritarianism, whereas more effective rule of law enforcement aids in democratic transitions (O'Donnell, 1993). Similarly, Fox argues that local leaders able to undercut guarantees of universal suffrage and the secret ballot through illegal actions are best able to maintain authoritarian control

(Fox, 1994). In contrast, those facing strict oversight into such activities will find they are more easily challenged for control. Scholars have also argued that subnational authoritarianism is a conservative phenomenon, with rural areas more prone to it than urban ones (Fox, 1994; O'Donnell, 1993). Regions far from the nation's capital, or major urban centers, are said to suffer from ineffective government, corrupt bureaucracy, and arbitrary law enforcement and create opportunities for local hegemony. Gibson argues that state leaders able to restrict national interference in local affairs, also through usually illegal practices, are best able to protect their positions (Gibson, 2005). Those that are unable to isolate their communities from national political affairs, discussions, and actors will find stronger democratic forces at play.

In terms of top-down forces supporting anti-democratic subnational rule, formal electoral engineering in favor of large parties has been said to help local authoritarian leaders remain in power (Gibson, 2005). In contrast, electoral laws that do not favor large parties can pave the way for political challenges to local authoritarians, and facilitate local democratization. Similarly, malapportionment of local regions in the federal government has been suggested as a factor in translating rural conservative biases into local hegemonic control, while a more fair distribution of seats favors political access and democracy (Samuels and Snyder, 2001; Gibson, 2005). The decentralization of national fiscal resources to local governmental resources might help keep local authoritarian leaders in power (Hagopian, 1992, 1996; Samuels and Abrucio, 2000). In contrast, more transparent use of local funds can help opposition groups take to task and thus compete with local authoritarian rulers, fomenting democracy. Scholars argue that national politicians can find subnational authoritarian leaders convenient electoral and legislative coalition partners, as well as useful in managing local security and social stability, undermining their incentive to push for local democratic reform, even amidst national democratization (Fox, 1994; Hagopian, 1996; Gibson, 1997, 2005; Cornelius *et al.*, 1999; Gibson and Calvo, 2000).

Placed in light of the Oaxacan experience, the literature on subnational democratization and authoritarianism supports divergent contentions about the reasons that might underlie Oaxacan municipal reform. On the one hand, municipal reform could have been the product of bottom-up social and political demands, as outlined by some scholars of Oaxacan politics, emanating from rural and indigenous groups and opposition leaders, with the Oaxacan government eager to address these concerns in order to avoid social conflict. On the other, Oaxacan municipal reform could have been taken with national political pressures in mind, with the intent to preserve both local and thus national authoritarian rule. Either way, what is important to note is that regardless of the ultimate structure of UyC systems and their eventual effects on state PRI control, the intentionality of the original decision is still up for debate. The remainder of this chapter tests these divergent arguments in

order to understand the motivations underlying the Oaxacan state government.

3. Arguments about Oaxacan Electoral Reform and their Testable Hypotheses

The Oaxaca-focused and larger scholarly debate about subnational authoritarian rule highlight two distinct lines of reasoning that could be used to explain the decision by Oaxacan state authorities in the 1990s to undertake municipal electoral reform. One school of thought highlights the role of bottom-up factors in promoting change, the other highlights the top-down incentives undergirding municipal reform. These two basic explanations can be used to produce testable hypotheses that we can be validated empirically.

If bottom-up social and political concerns were the primary motivating factor behind the decision to promote municipal reform, then we should expect that certain key social and political variables would explain the decision to adopt UyC over PP regimes. That is, those municipalities facing greater social demands for political change should be more likely to adopt UyC systems over PP ones, either at the behest of state authorities or at the request of local leaders. This leads to the following more specific testable hypotheses:

H1a: The greater the traditional forms of rule in the municipality, the more likely that it will adopt UyC systems over PP ones.

H1b: The higher the level of social conflict in the municipality, the more likely that it will adopt UyC systems over PP ones.

H1c: The lower the level of PRI support in the municipality, the more likely that it will adopt UyC systems over PP ones.

Hypothesis 1a addresses relationship between traditional forms of rule and the need for formal recognition of UyC regimes to govern them. If indigenous groups have a greater tendency either to rely on alternative forms of governance, to be rallied by indigenous leaders, and to resent PRI intrusion into their affairs, then state Oaxacan officials should have encouraged municipalities counting on greater indigenous populations to adopt UyC systems. It could also be that some localities became accustomed to alternative, non-indigenous forms of rule over time, depending on their proximity to the state government. If this is the case, then rural localities, those peppered with ejido lands, or those with smaller populations would be more prone to have introduced alternative informal forms of governance over the years, and thus resent state and local PRI intrusion into their affairs as well. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that although some communities

experienced the mobilization of indigenous groups, rural culture and the nature of land tenure were also important factors that affected local political governance.³ Either way, according to this line of thought, state officials would have believed that allowing UyC in these areas would work to the benefit of social stability and public security.

Hypothesis 1b addresses the relationship between social conflict and the interest of state and local leaders in promoting municipal reform. In this case, higher rates of post-electoral conflict or other types of local social instability would lead state level Oaxacan officials, and local leaders, to promote municipal reform in these areas. Specifically, those municipalities with higher social problems and conflict should be more likely to see the adoption of UyC systems, either at the behest of state officials or at the request of local ones. Again, the goal would be to find ways to placate local leaders and their communities and resolve social points of conflict and resentment attributable to political intrusion into their affairs.

Hypothesis 1c addresses the relationship between political opposition and the interest of the state to allow political reform to give municipalities more autonomy from the state government. The promise of the ability to eliminate political parties and thus ongoing PRI control over municipal affairs should have been attractive to the state government attempting to cool local leaders as well as to local political leaders frustrated with ongoing state PRI intrusion into their affairs.

In contrast to the bottom-up motivations outlined above, top-down political engineering might have been the primary motivation underlying Oaxacan state officials' decision to undertake municipal electoral reform. Specifically, national and state level PRI leaders might have feared a loss of political control, motivating them to implement reforms that would allow the easier manipulation of local politics and the perpetuation of local leaders aligned with the PRI in municipal offices. As such, they should have been concerned with maintaining political control over areas they already dominated, even if they had to accept a loss of control in others. Social concerns, like the level of indigenous population, alternative forms of traditional rule, and social conflict, would have played little role in their decision-making process. If political engineering motivated municipal electoral reform, then the following testable hypotheses should find empirical support:

³ Interestingly, this might seem to contrast quite dramatically with scholars highlighting the role of rural factors in promoting the survival of subnational authoritarian rule. However, it might be that rural culture promotes an interest in autonomy from higher levels of government, and this autonomy could be used for either reasons of political liberalization or ongoing subnational authoritarian rule. Either way, according to this argument, state authorities in Oaxaca would have been pressured by rural municipalities to respect their autonomy in handling local matters, with the state government hoping that doing so would resolve local political points of conflict.

H2a: Traditional forms of rule in the municipality have no bearing on the decision to adopt UyC systems over PP ones.

H2b: The level of social conflict in the municipality has no bearing on the decision to adopt UyC systems over PP ones.

H2c: The greater the level of PRI support in the municipality, the more likely that it will adopt UyC systems over PP ones.

Given that social concerns were not the primary motivating factor behind top-down decision-making processes, they should have no effect on the choice between UyC and PP systems. The Oaxacan state and the state PRI, however, would find it politically expedient to undertake measures to forestall opposition party encroachment in areas where the party was still strong. Those regions already facing significant opposition gains would be harder to manipulate politically through electoral engineering, leaving the government to reduce its efforts in these municipalities and focus on maintaining stronghold support.

3.1. Statistical Analysis

The two competing arguments explaining the adoption of UyC and their testable hypotheses are evaluated statistically using logistic regression analysis, given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable: the choice of UyC or PP regimes. The dependent variable is measured as the presence of UyC institutions in 1995. To record whether a municipality adopted a UyC system or not, I created a dummy variable coded 1 for UyC system and 0 for PP system [Gobierno del Estado de Oaxaca, 2006; Instituto Electoral Estatal de Oaxaca (IEEO), 2006; Servicios para una Educación Alternativa, 2006].

The principal independent variables of interest include the level of indigenous population, the level of urbanization, the municipal population size, the importance of ejido lands to the local community, and the presence of post-electoral conflicts. The level of indigenous population was calculated as (indigenous language speakers over five years of age) / (population over five years of age) [Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) 2006]. In Mexico, municipalities are categorized as rural if their population is less than 2,500. The variable measuring the level of urbanization was measured as 1 if the population was lower than 2,500 and 0 if greater than 2,500. The importance of ejido lands to the local community is calculated as the (number of people living on ejidos)/(total population) (INEGI, 2006). The presence of post-electoral conflicts is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the municipality suffered from conflicts in 1992, after municipal elections, and 0 if it did not. Data for this variable was generously provided by Todd Eistenstadt.

The principal political independent variables of interest include the level support for the PRI prior to 1995, changes in PRI support prior to 1995, the

level of PRI winning margins prior to 1995, and the effective number of parties prior to 1995 [Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE) 2006]. I use the municipal level data for the 1991 and 1994 federal deputy elections to build these variables. Given that prior to the formal adoption of UyC systems municipal leaders, even those from groups opposing the PRI, were chosen through informal mechanisms and supported with fictitious electoral results, municipal level data is not a trustworthy indicator of PRI support in any municipality.⁴ PRI support is calculated as (number of votes cast for PRI)/(total votes cast). The change in PRI support in the run-up to the 1995 municipal reforms is calculated as (PRI support in 1994)-(PRI support in 1991). The electoral margins won by the PRI are calculated as (number of votes won by the PRI/total votes cast)-(the number of votes won by the second-place party/total votes cast). The effective number of parties is calculated as $1/(\text{sum of each party's percent party support squared})$.

I also include a series of control variables that have been linked to authoritarian rule, including municipal spending capacity, economic and educational levels, municipal religious composition, municipal migration intensity, and electoral abstention. Municipal spending per capita is (total pesos spent per year)/(total population). Poverty and income are measured as (dwellings with non-earth flooring)/(total dwellings) and (citizens over age 12 earning less than one minimum wage)/(all economically citizens over age 12). Illiteracy rates (citizens unable to read/citizens over age five) measure education levels. Religious makeup is measured as (citizens affiliated with the Catholic Church)/(population over five years of age). [Consejo Nacional de Población (CONAPO) ; IFE, 2006; INEGI, 2006]. A control variable for the officially recorded 1990 municipal population was also included (INEGI).

Table 1 presents results for the tests of the competing arguments and their testable hypotheses outlined above, using data from the 1991 federal deputy elections by municipality. Let us begin with discussion of the effect of socio-demographic forces on the adoption of UyC systems, tested in each of the Models 1 through 4. The bottom-up argument predicts that municipal socio-demographic features that emphasize the presence of incentives for local traditional rule and isolation will encourage UyC system adoption. In contrast, the top-down political engineering argument predicts that socio-demographic conditions will do little to affect the decision to impose/adopt UyC regimes. The results in Table 1 lend some support to the bottom-up approach to understanding municipal political reform in Oaxaca. As shown, communities with higher levels of indigenous language speakers were more likely to adopt UyC systems, as demonstrated by the positive coefficient, significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. Likewise, the percent share of the population living on ejido lands was also positive and significant at the $p < 0.05$ level.

⁴ State electoral data by municipality were not available at the time of database construction.

Whether a municipality was rural or not also affected UyC adoption, with rural municipalities more likely to adopt UyC systems than more urban ones. This variable was significant at the $p < 0.01$ level.

The models also test hypotheses about the role and presence of other bottom-up and top-down partisan factors in encouraging UyC adoption.⁵ According to the bottom-up hypothesis, lower levels of PRI support in a municipality should lead state and local leaders to adopt UyC systems. As PRI rule weakens, and opposition groups rise against them, calls for local autonomy from local leaders should grow as well, leading the state or municipal leaders to seek to support it through the adoption of UyC systems. In contrast, the top-down approach predicts that ongoing PRI rule would raise the incentive for UyC adoption, as state and municipal leaders seek to hedge their positions against opposition party encroachments into local politics. Models 1 through 4 include different measures of PRI support to determine their effects on UyC adoption.

Specifically, Model 1 includes a variable measuring the percent share of PRI support. The positive and significant ($p < 0.01$) coefficient shows that municipalities were more likely to adopt UyC systems when PRI support was higher, not lower and thus not in line with bottom-up arguments but rather with the top-down approach. Whether the PRI came in first place or not in 1991 deputy elections also affected UyC adoption decisions, with this variable also positive and significant ($p < 0.1$), again supporting the top-down assessment of Oaxacan municipal reform. The PRI's margin of victory (or loss) in the 1991 deputy elections also had a positive and significant ($p < 0.01$) effect on the chances for UyC adoption, also supporting political engineering interpretations of Oaxacan politics. Greater PRI margins raised the chances of UyC adoption, with this variable significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. Interestingly, however, the effective number of parties—a measure of the strength of the opposition to the PRI—was not significant.

Table 2 repeats the analysis using 1994 federal deputy electoral data. As shown, all socio-demographic variables remain positive and significant, supporting the bottom-up argument about Oaxacan municipal reform. However, the results for the political variables appear more mixed. All of the political variables except change in PRI support between 1991 and 1994 in federal deputy races showed no effects on UyC adoption decisions. This variable, change in PRI support, was negative and significant. Municipalities with declining PRI support were more likely to adopt UyC systems. This variable was negative and significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. Although these more mixed results might suggest only weak support for the top-down approach over the bottom-up explanation, that the variable measuring change in PRI support was negative and significant was key. Those municipalities with

⁵ The high multicollinearity between the various measures of PRI support required putting them in separate regressions.

higher traditional levels of PRI support were more likely to adopt UyC systems (as shown in Table 1), with those facing electoral losses in 1994 the most likely to switch regimes (as shown in Table 2).

The PRI was already suffering a relative weakening in Oaxaca in the mid 1990s. As shown in Graphs 1, 2 and 3, the PRI fared well in most federal, state, and municipal races in the 1980s, only to see their fortunes decline dramatically in the mid-1990s around the time of UyC reform. Specifically, federal elections for the Chamber of Deputies held in 1994, as well as the early August 1995 state legislative elections, foretold another poor PRI showing in the October 1995 municipal elections that would for the first time use the UyC vs. PP distinction.⁶ UyC legislation was approved in late August 1995, just ahead of the municipal races. Indeed, it was the expectation of this poor showing that encouraged the quick passage of the municipal electoral reforms. However, rather than basing its decision to implement UyC or PP systems at the municipal level based on mid-1990s electoral results, state and municipal PRI party leaders likely considered a longer time frame. They hoped that current trends on some municipalities against the PRI could be reversed and returned to their former condition, say, to that of the late 1980s or early 1990s. As a result, rather than base their decisions on mid-1990s electoral results, they looked to the early 1990s to make their decisions about UyC regimes.

The statistical analysis in Table 2 thus supports this contention. As PRI support declined, the Oaxacan government and state and municipal PRI leaders were more inclined to adopt UyC systems, rather than the reverse. In other words, those municipalities facing declines in support but having traditionally favored PRI rule were more likely to see the adoption of UyC regimes. Political leaders thus sought to engineer a return to PRI hegemony in municipal government. Hypothesis 2c should thus be changed to say

H2c.2: The greater the level of TRADITIONAL PRI support in the municipality, the more likely that it will adopt UyC systems over PP ones.

The presence of post-electoral social conflicts in the municipality was also significant (at the $p < 0.01$ level). However, surprisingly, the sign was negative. Rather than leading to the adoption of UyC systems, post electoral conflicts led municipalities to preserve PP ones. This finding goes against bottom-up arguments that suppose that mayors facing greater conflict in their localities would have more leverage against state officials in demanding political liberalization. It also contradicts the top-down hypothesis about how social conflict should not affect the decision by state officials to engage in electoral engineering, as they should be motivated primarily by partisan concerns. Although additional information is needed to test this argument, it could be

⁶ Municipal elections held in 1995 and later only include data for PP systems.

that both municipal and state leaders may have felt that implementing UyC systems only works amidst pliant populations.

Conclusions

Taken together, the socio-demographic and political results in Tables 1 and 2 present mixed support for both arguments and their testable hypotheses. On the one hand, the results appear to lend support for the bottom-up socio-demographic argument that traditional forms of governance portend the adoption of UyC regimes. With the exception of the post-electoral conflict variable, the other core socio-demographic variables demonstrated the correct sign and significance for supporting this argument. That is, more indigenous rural areas used to communal organizational structures were more likely to adopt UyC regimes. On the other hand, the results appear to show strong support for some aspects of the argument that top-down political engineering came into play. Those municipalities with traditionally greater PRI control were more likely to adopt UyC regimes, especially if PRI rule was under threat. The political variables demonstrated the correct sign and significance to support this argument.

The statistical results thus suggest that both socio-demographic and political criteria may have been considered when adopting UyC regimes. This suggests a more interactive decision-making process than the ones traditionally outlined, with smaller, more rural, and indigenous municipalities traditionally favoring PRI rule most likely to adopt UyC regimes, especially if PRI support was on the wane and they were relatively free from the chance of political conflict turning violent.

This conclusion makes sense. Municipal and state leaders in Oaxaca were simultaneously concerned about potential problems in social instability caused by growing and ongoing experiences with local mobilization against the PRI and the state government, as well as maintaining PRI rule. As a result, it is perhaps expecting too much that they would be able to take their decisions in a vacuum. Rather, it is more logical to expect that they would consider the ramifications of both bottom-up and top-down forces, and seek a means for addressing both. The adoption of UyC regimes thus may have been taken with both goals in mind: placating local activists and leaders who engaged in peaceful demonstrations against the government, while hoping that UyC systems would eventually work in favor of the PRI down the line. Those municipalities where conflict escalated into violence, however, were less likely to be granted more political autonomy for fear that it would foment outright rebellion. The shift to UyC regimes was only undertaken where law and order could be maintained.

Calls for local political liberalization and increased local autonomy away from state PRI and governmental intrusion into municipal affairs did not necessarily mean that these leaders were promoting a move to subnational democratization. Rather, many of these leaders could merely have been

seeking a means for running local business and politics on their own, unfettered by the PRI. Indeed, the very nature of UyC systems, in that they exclude political parties—both PRI and opposition—from local contests as well as reorganize the reigns of power—some say in an anti-democratic way—suggest that they could be used to placate local authoritarians just as much as local democrats (Benton forthcoming). Indeed, findings that show that UyC systems helped the PRI maintain support, but also helped any first place party maintain large margins, supports contentions that local leaders promoting the implementation of UyC regimes may have been doing so for their own, self-interested, authoritarian political purposes rather than in an effort to support local democratization (Benton forthcoming). Indeed, that local leaders facing political violence did not oversee transitions to UyC systems supports this conclusion. Rather than fomenting political liberalization, UyC regimes were just as much a tool of local political control as state political control, with local leaders only finding them worth implementing among pliant populations. Otherwise, better to let the state take some responsibility for local affairs.

Local forces that retard subnational democratization have been shown to affect national political behavior. Scholars have shown that not only do UyC institutions help local leaders maintain control over local political affairs, they also help them manage the ways in which citizens participate in national politics. Local leaders able to control local political participation and the ways in which votes are cast should be better able to exert influence over whether and how voters participate in national electoral processes. To the extent that local leaders influence voting outcomes in national elections in their districts, they can continue to carry important political sway over the national politicians they support (Benton forthcoming). This underscores the impression sometimes held by scholars and pundits that although Mexico holds nowadays very competitive national and sometimes state level elections, its politicians continue to remain somewhat unresponsive to citizen demands.

TABLE 1: THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL VARIABLES ON MUNICIPAL REFORM, 1991

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4
INDIGENOUS LANGUAGE SPEAKERS, 1990	1.325*** (0.395)	1.551*** (0.383)	1.218*** (0.400)	1.542*** (0.387)
EJIDO POPULATION, 1990	2.153** (0.975)	2.149** (0.967)	2.172** (0.997)	2.243** (0.966)
RURAL MUNICIPALITY, 1990	0.919*** (0.309)	0.978*** (0.309)	0.978*** (0.315)	0.942*** (0.306)
MUNICIPAL POPULATION, 1990	-0.000153*** (3.76E-05)	-0.000170*** (3.79E-05)	-0.000146*** (3.72E-05)	-0.000167*** (3.83E-05)
ILLITERACY RATE, 1990	-1.802 (1.561)	-2.690* (1.483)	-1.169 (1.592)	-2.825* (1.506)
WAGE, 1990	1.173 (2.138)	2.061 (2.102)	0.694 (2.165)	1.900 (2.122)
MIGRATION, 1990	-0.113** (0.0547)	-0.116** (0.0543)	-0.108* (0.0558)	-0.123** (0.0538)
CATHOLIC POPULATION, 1990	-0.0230 (1.385)	0.0184 (1.345)	-0.145 (1.419)	-0.0431 (1.341)
CONFLICTS, 1992	-2.053*** (0.351)	-2.059*** (0.348)	-1.996*** (0.357)	-2.057*** (0.349)
MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA, 1990	0.00229 (0.00253)	0.00218 (0.00248)	0.00218 (0.00250)	0.00227 (0.00251)
PRI DEPUTY SUPPORT, 1991	2.021*** (0.662)			
PRI DEPUTY WIN, 1991		1.046* (0.549)		
PRI DEPUTY MARGIN, 1991			1.878*** (0.427)	
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES, 1991				-0.0794 (0.190)
CONSTANT	-0.267 (1.464)	0.140 (1.468)	0.129 (1.436)	1.369 (1.362)
LR CHI2 (11)	232.37	226.47	243.11	223.17
PROB > CHI2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
PSEUDO R2	0.3453	0.3365	0.3613	0.3316
OBSERVATIONS	570	570	570	570


Note: dependent variable is UyC 1995. Standard errors below coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE 2: THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL VARIABLES ON MUNICIPAL REFORM, 1994


	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4	MODEL 5
INDIGENOUS LANGUAGE SPEAKERS, 1990	1.550*** (0.382)	1.617*** (0.387)	1.598*** (0.385)	1.193*** (0.395)	1.563*** (0.381)
EJIDO POPULATION, 1990	2.177** (0.965)	2.303** (0.976)	2.338** (0.984)	1.779* (0.949)	2.136** (0.961)
RURAL MUNICIPALITY, 1990	0.936*** (0.318)	0.921*** (0.317)	0.912*** (0.317)	0.974*** (0.321)	0.951*** (0.318)
MUNICIPAL POPULATION, 1990	-0.000170*** (3.79E-05)	-0.000171*** (3.79E-05)	-0.000168*** (3.79E-05)	-0.000161*** (3.72E-05)	-0.000172*** (3.83E-05)
ILLITERACY RATE, 1990	-2.993** (1.471)	-2.892* (1.477)	2.879* (1.481)	-2.056 (1.514)	-2.972** (1.475)
WAGE, 1990	2.024 (2.096)	1.912 (2.093)	1.839 (2.098)	1.610 (2.108)	2.137 (2.100)
MIGRATION, 1990	-0.119** (0.0538)	-0.120** (0.0538)	-0.117** (0.0538)	-0.114** (0.0550)	-0.114** (0.0541)
CATHOLIC POPULATION, 1990	-0.129 (1.350)	0.00501 (1.347)	0.0443 (1.356)	-0.708 (1.371)	-0.0572 (1.341)
CONFLICTS, 1992	-2.068*** (0.349)	-2.075*** (0.348)	-2.041*** (0.348)	-2.113*** (0.356)	-2.065*** (0.348)
MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA, 1993	0.00103 (0.00263)	0.000776 (0.00261)	0.000766 (0.00263)	0.00154 (0.00269)	0.00102 (0.00260)
PRI DEPUTY SUPPORT, 1994	-0.183 (0.679)				
PRI DEPUTY WIN, 1994		0.290 (0.300)			
PRI DEPUTY MARGIN, 1994			0.313 (0.359)		
CHANGE IN PRI SUPPORT, 1991-94				-2.324*** (0.713)	
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES, 1994					-0.197 (0.195)
CONSTANT	1.435 (1.442)	0.960 (1.376)	1.066 (1.362)	1.482 (1.346)	1.687 (1.392)
LR CHI2 (11)	221.99	222.84	222.67	233.27	222.94
PROB > CHI2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
PSEUDO R2	0.3299	0.3312	0.3309	0.3467	0.3313
OBSERVATIONS	570	570	570	570	570

Note: dependent variable is UyC 1995. Standard errors below coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


GRAPH 1



GRAPH 2



GRAPH 3



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