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Norms Socialization and NAFTA's Side
Accord on Labor

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Abstract

This paper examines whether one process of norms socialization for human rights can be applied to labor rights socialization. Using Mexico's responses to the cases filed against Mexico under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation as evidence, the paper examines whether the labor side accord has pushed Mexico to adopt international labor rights practices, and thus whether norms socialization can account for Mexico's greater enforcement of domestic labor protection. The paper suggests that even when labor accords are weak, transnational labor activism can generate a secondary effect in pushing states towards accepting international norms, which can result in strengthening labor protections domestically.

Resumen

En este trabajo se examina si el proceso de socialización de las normas de los derechos humanos se puede también aplicar en el área de los derechos laborales. Usando las respuestas de México a las demandas presentadas en su contra bajo el marco del Acuerdo de Cooperación Laboral de América del Norte como prueba, se examina si el acuerdo paralelo ha llevado a México a la adopción de las normas internacionales sobre las prácticas y políticas laborales, y por lo tanto si esta socialización puede responder por una mayor observancia de México al nivel doméstico de la protección de los trabajadores. El documento sugiere que aun cuando los acuerdos de trabajo son débiles, el activismo transnacional puede generar un efecto secundario de empujar los estados hacia la aceptación de las normas internacionales, lo cual puede resultar en el fortalecimiento de la protección laboral dentro de los países.

Introduction

In *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (1999), Risse, Ropp and Sikkink investigate the effect of international human rights norms on domestic policies and practices. By applying a five stage “spiral model” of norms socialization to six comparative country experiences, these authors describe a common process by which international norms are passed to domestic levels of governance, and ultimately adopted by states. In this model, transnational advocates, domestic groups and states interact to persuade states to change their human rights practices, encouraging them to instead to accept and act in concordance with accepted international standards of behavior. Risse and Sikkink set the initial stage of the model where a repressive situation within a country forces a weak domestic opposition group to look outside of the state for international allies, who then bring external pressure on that state to respond to the demands of the domestic groups (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999: 22; Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 12).¹ From this initial stage, discursive interaction between violator states and transnational advocates pushes the targeted state towards eventually accepting international norms around human rights practices and institutionalizing their prescriptions. Along the way, argument, discourse and persuasion mark the five stage process by which norms are internalized, and state’s behavior is gradually modified.

These authors note that the model can be extended theoretically to describe norms socialization within other issue areas (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999: 238). The process of norms adoption among states should thus be similar for labor rights as because similar norms and regimes exist for their protection; indeed labor rights are considered second generation, “positive” human rights.² In taking the Risse and Sikkink spiral model for human rights change and conceptualizing it for labor rights enforcement, I follow the prescriptions of the model to assess whether it can also help us interpret whether Mexico is currently becoming socialized by the international community towards adopting internationally recognized labor rights standards and practices.

¹ Where the earlier “boomerang model” from Keck and Sikkink’s 1998 book describes advocacy on behalf of domestic political opposition groups, the spiral model is written to illustrate the pattern of state socialization around human rights specifically.

² Because of the importance of labor practices for trade and economic development, human rights and labor rights have developed under separate laws and legal precedents, and are enforced through different processes and mechanisms under different jurisdictions at regional, international, and domestic levels. Nonetheless, there is overlap. The right to work is part of the UN’s Economic and Social Charter as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Universal Declaration also mentions fair wages, favorable working conditions, and the right to form trade unions as human rights in Articles 23 and 24. Slavery is specifically prohibited in the UDHR, and proscriptions on forced labor and child labor clearly cross into human rights areas such as the right to bodily integrity.

The evidence is drawn from an examination of Mexico's experience with the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), the labor side accord of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Under the labor side agreement, partner states must enforce their labor laws or face formal complaint proceedings and possible trade sanctions. Transnational advocacy networks used the citizen complaint mechanisms to expose labor rights violations in Mexico (Graubart, 2009), giving recurrent violations of the right to freedom of association a prominent place not just the public debate over NAFTA, but also in the Mexico-US binational relationship. The spiral model helps interpret whether the NAALC complaint mechanism was effective in helping to generate changes to Mexico's labor rights policies and practices by describing the internal transformation towards norms acceptance that takes place in Mexico in the face of transnational pressure. Can the case filings, and the spotlight on Mexican labor practices that followed, account for Mexico's attempts to improve labor law enforcement, promote respect for freedom of association, and reassess its health and safety standards?

Focusing on Mexico's experience with the NAALC follows Risse, Ropp and Sikkink's pattern of applying the model to "least likely cases", where long-standing rejection of intervention in its internal affairs makes Mexico potentially resistant to international criticism (Baer and Weintraub, 1994; Domínguez and Fernando de Castro, 2009). Also, fifteen years have passed since Congress approved fast-track legislation that allowed for the opening of trade negotiations, and which precipitated the formation of the anti-NAFTA labor rights advocacy network. This time span makes it possible to determine how the socialization process has evolved over time, indicating where Mexico might be located in the spiral stages of the model.

The paper begins by presenting theoretical explanations for norms diffusion among states. I then describe Risse and Sikkink's spiral model of norms socialization and suggest how it might be expanded to explain norms acceptance and political change for labor rights. After presenting the evolution of a transnational advocacy network around non-trade issues within NAFTA, I apply the model to Mexico's experience with the NAFTA labor dispute resolution mechanisms to trace how the resolutions of some selected cases pushed Mexico to improve its labor rights policies and practices. A final section assesses how well the model explains the Mexican case, and by extension, suggests whether the model can explain norms socialization for issues other than human rights. Though the spiral model provides a framework for assessing how deeply states may internalize norms, the paper argues that it does not accurately isolate the causal mechanisms by which Mexico began to make institutional changes in terms of its labor rights practices, even though Mexico's efforts to improve labor rights enforcement domestically does suggest that Mexico is on the path of norms socialization.

Norms, State Identities, and Political Change

The study of norms socialization as an explanation for state behavior comes out of the inadequacies of neoliberal and neorealist perspectives in explaining the full range of state behavior in the international system (Finnemore, 1996; Kowert and Legro, 1996). Neorealists and neoliberals anticipate that states behave predictably under similar structural constraints and systemic conditions in the international system. However, states facing similar pressures and similar constraints respond differently to those pressures, thereby creating a puzzle for both theoretical strands (Kowert and Legro, 1996). Constructivists argue that there is an important role for ideas, rather than material interests, in explaining this puzzle. Where the constraints of the international system determine states interests for the rational approaches, states also create endogenous preferences and generate their own goals and incentives, with corresponding actions to reach those goals (Kowert and Legro, 1996; Wendt, 1999). These internal preferences guide states towards choosing policies that fulfill those goals (Finnemore, 1996).

Norms in international relations are commonly described as the shared expectations of behavior for a given state identity (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996). Norms are constitutive in that they define and determine which state identities, goals and practices are legitimate in the international system (Kowert and Legro, 1996: 453; Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996: 54). Norms are also regulative in that they set out the rules of behavior for states, determining the accepted social roles and actions of these states (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996; Kowert and Legro, 1996). Together, norms establish the expectations about who the legitimate actors will be in the international system, as well as what kinds of actions they will take (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996). Norms then can guide states towards choosing policies that signal the preferred state identity to other states (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996: 52). As such, state identities stand to reflect state interests.

Recent research suggests that states are acutely aware of how they are perceived by other states, and will shape their behavior in order to reflect an image more in line with international values (Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler, 1998; Finnemore, 1996; Gurowitz, 1999; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Price, 1998; Price and Tannewald, 1996; Hafner-Burton, 2008). If states are sensitive to their international image, states can be taught to change their preferences to become more in line with international standards (Finnemore, 1996). This forces states to pursue goals based not just on state interests, but also on how state actions may be perceived by others (Price and Tannewald, 1996; Price, 1998). In this chain of consequences, norms can be instrumental in changing state behavior, by making states aware first of how they are

perceived in the community of states, and then prescribing the behavior that would give states a more favorable image.

The evolution of internal preferences and concomitant state identity theoretically causes policy change within states, but often advocacy for behavior change is the driving force for real transformation (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1999).³ Transnational advocacy networks serve as the messengers between states and the international system, and between domestic and international actors, in transmitting information about norms and norms compliance from one level to another. Transnational advocacy networks serve three purposes: they provide information on rights violations in the target state; they legitimate the claims of opposition groups within the state, thus strengthening those claims; and they challenge norm-violating states to change their behavior (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1998: 5). International advocates promote behavior changes by providing information to states about more acceptable policy choices, and by politicizing issues that should be addressed by changes in state behavior (Price, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Joppke, 1998; Haas, 1989). Advocates then encourage some state identities and not others by creating in and out groups, treating states that continue to break norms as problem states, and treating states that accept and practice shared norms as full members of the international community (Kowert and Legro, 1996; Price, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Hafner Burton, 2008).

Information exchange is at the core of transnational advocacy. With privileged access to on-the-ground sources, networks are able to generate politically useful information from within states, interpret the issues at hand, and then persuade others to act in accordance with values shared by network members. By showing states how their behavior is perceived by international audiences, pressure from networks adds an external impulse on states to change policies.

The Five Stage Spiral Model

The five stage “spiral model” of norms socialization (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999) illustrates this process by which transnational advocates, domestic groups and states interact to persuade governments to act in concordance with international human rights norms. Norms become internalized and institutionalized by states over five distinct periods:

³ These networks are different than other associations that operate in multiple states because they are formed around “principled ideas”, ideas that assign normative values of right and wrong or just and unjust to state actions and outcomes (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 1).

Initial Stage: Repression

The first stage of the model is marked by political repression. Like in the “boomerang” described by Keck and Sikkink (1998), a repressive human rights situation within a country forces a weak domestic opposition group to look outside of the state for international allies, including non-state actors, international organizations, and other states. Channels from the inside are blocked either because domestic opposition is too weak to successfully press its own agenda, or because the repressive nature of the political context keeps them from doing so. Only once a transnational advocacy network gathers information about conditions within the state can it characterize that state as a norms violator to the international community (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999: 22). These allies then bring pressure from the international community on that state to modify its behavior (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999: 22; Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 12).

Stage Two: Denial

In the second stage, the transnational advocacy network that forms takes information about a situation within the targeted country to international forums. Advocacy groups then convince norm-abiding states to join in pressuring the violator, to show the offending state that their actions are outside of the realm of accepted state behavior (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999: 23). Targeted states react to the claims made by the transnational advocacy network by first denying the validity of the claim, and second, by questioning the legitimacy of the network participants and other states to interfere in their internal affairs (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999: 22). Risse and Sikkink note that denial reflects the early stages of the process of socialization because states would not need to justify their actions if they were impermeable to socialization or criticism by other states (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999: 23).

Stage Three: Tactical Concessions

The third stage of the model predicts that the target state will answer to transnational pressure by making “cosmetic changes” meant to deflect criticism, while continuing to violate the norm. In the early part of Stage Three, states may reply to network pressure from an instrumental or strategic position, effecting behavioral changes merely to deflect international criticism, not because they have accepted the norm (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999: 25). States may move no further in the process. However, as states make minor reforms, the process creates its own mechanism for further liberalization. The opening that occurs as states relax repression only serves

to make space for domestic groups to regroup and push towards a in a position where they must ultimately respond with deeper reforms (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999: 26). As states face pressure for change simultaneously “from above” and “from below,” (Brysk, 1993) continued pressure, international scrutiny, and domestic political mobilization can cause states to re-evaluate their intransigence, and may ultimately precipitate genuine norms adoption in the next stage.

Stage Four: Prescriptive Status

According to the model, states move towards norm institutionalization at the fourth stage. At this point in the socialization process, states change their behavior less from strategic positioning and more from true norm adoption and compliance (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999). The discursive process of responding to transnational networks, important international organizations and other states means that governments can no longer ignore criticism, and in the give and take of debate, states begin to accept the norm and change their behavior. The authors determine that states’ actions at this point signal when states have entered this stage, including the ratification of international conventions, the creation of new federal laws, or the implementation of new mechanisms for domestic compliance (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999). For labor rights, this stage is more difficult to identify because states may have previously signed the major international labor rights conventions that signal their commitment to those standards.

The major issue in the protection of labor rights is not that regulations are weak, but rather that states choose not to enforce them (Collingsworth 2002). Recent work on human rights compliance consistently finds that the ratification of international human rights conventions more often leads to increased violations within states than prior to ratification suggesting that states sign international agreements without intending to comply with their regulations (Hill, 2009; Hathaway, Oona, 2002; Camp Keith, 1999). How then would we know that states are entering a phase of norms adoption for this issue?

States could signal commitment by signing regional agreements that promote labor rights protections and provide for their enforcement, like the NAFTA side agreement and other bilateral and unilateral trade agreements with social clauses.⁴ However, to know whether these commitments are sincere, states would need to also demonstrate compliance at the domestic level, whether through the development of new labor practices and procedures, the expansion of inspection capacities, or the implementation of new programs to address specific issues such as child labor, for example.

⁴ See for example Hafner Burton, 2009.

Additional enforcement mechanisms must still be matched by discursive consistency, in that the state engages in dialogue with critics over its practices, and does not modify its responses according to the audience.

Stage Five: Rule-Consistent Behavior

The authors describe this final stage of the model as the point at which states accept the validity of the norm, and work towards implementing it at all levels (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999). Norm compliance becomes habitual practice; state behaviors reflect the norm. Pressures from below and from above continue, allowing for even implementation of new practices that uphold the norm. Eventually, the norm is backed by the rule of law, which suggests that institutionalization is nearly complete. Again, in the area of labor rights, one could note norms compliance by mapping the discourse of government officials and whether or not they reference the norm, but also by noting whether labor rights practices have improved over time.

Transnational Advocacy Networks and the NAFTA Negotiation

When the US Trade Representative revealed that the United States intended to seek a trade accord with Mexico and Canada, US labor reacted to the announcement immediately and negatively. Expanding the trade accord already in place with Canada to include Mexico might pull US jobs to Mexico, as the 1965 Border Industrialization program had done. US labor participated in the creation of a network of organizations that would work to shift the debate on NAFTA and derail the agreement. Environmentalists, human rights groups, faith-based and community-based organizations also joined the network forming in the spring of 1991, calling itself the Mobilization on Development, Trade, Labor and the Environment (Mayer, 1998: 70). Key network participants, including the International Labor Education and Research Fund, Greenpeace, the United Auto Workers, the AFL-CIO, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Family Farm Coalition, and others convoked a forum on the impact of NAFTA on labor, agriculture and the environment (Mayer, 1998: 76). They determined that they would first concentrate their efforts around blocking President Bush's effort to seek Congressional authorization to negotiate the agreement.

In Canada, opposition to free trade was already entrenched. They saw NAFTA as an extension of the CUSFTA, which they had bitterly opposed. For Canadian workers, closer ties to the US would accelerate competition, and Canadian jobs would be lost to US workers. The Canadian Labor Congress insisted that the FTA that it had to be opposed on all fronts (Robinson, 2002: 123). However, Quebec's National Union Confederation (CSN) shared the more moderate approach taken by US unions, and hoped to influence the terms of

the agreement (Robinson, 2002: 124). Meanwhile, the national Pro-Canada Network, an NGO that led the fight against the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), reformed as the Action Canada Network, and began to resurrect total opposition to NAFTA in Canada.

In Mexico, the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) supported the ruling party's efforts in promoting the trade agreement, so the Authentic Workers' Front (FAT), took charge of representing rank-and-file union opposition to the agreement. The Mexican Action Network on Free Trade (RMALC), an umbrella group composed of nearly 100 independent labor, campesino and indigenous organizations, environmental groups, and citizen's associations, emerged to lead opposition from civil society. They began to hold public forums on the impending negative impacts of NAFTA on Mexico (RMALC, 2003).

Once these groups formulated domestic strategies, they began to find ways to work together so that by 1992, the initial activist network in each state became took on transnational organizational forms. NGOs in all three countries developed the daily contacts needed to develop a common action plan and set targets to influence NAFTA (Cook, 1997: 519). These groups were crucial in providing information to citizens and lawmakers about the content of the agreement and likely impacts of free trade on the economy, society and culture of each of the nations involved. Groups in Mexico began to reach out to Mexican immigrants in the US around labor rights and human rights in their home country, while others lobbied the US Congress as to the impacts of NAFTA on Mexico, even organizing site visits for legislators (Cook, 1997: 519). A groundswell of opposition to the trade agreement had been mobilized in all three countries.

The network eventually influenced members of Congress to condition presidential negotiating authority ("Fast Track" authority) on the inclusion of a social clause. Democratic Senators asked for parallel accords on labor and the environment that would harmonize protections for all three nations, and that included a dispute resolution mechanism that had the power to punish with sanctions any violations of the new, encompassing labor standards (Lowe, 1997). In order to gain the votes required to pass fast track, the Bush administration accepted this action plan. The Administration was thus committed formally to "expanded US-Mexico labor cooperation" and "an expanded program of environmental cooperation" as part of the negotiations (Mayer, 1998: 90). Democratic votes thus secured, fast-track authority passed in May of 1991.

As the NAFTA negotiations drew to a close, meetings over the labor side agreement and environmental cooperation clause began.⁵ Even though the national labor confederations were invited to participate in the negotiation

⁵ Because the CTM supported the government's position on NAFTA and Mexico was wary of the side agreements in general, it did not participate in the discussions of the labor clause.

process, the NAALC was less comprehensive than either US labor or the Congressional coalitions wanted.⁶ Instead of developing new regional labor standards, the labor side agreement only obliges the three nations to "effectively enforce" their own national labor laws (Compa, 1997; ILRF, 1995). Critics saw the agreement as diluting domestic laws further by developing three categories of resolution for different issues. While trade sanctions were possible only in the cases of minimum wage, child labor and health and safety cases, violations of collective rights, such as the freedom of association and right to strike, were subject only to consultations (Compa, 1997; ILRF, 1995).

The transnational network that had formed to derail the passage of NAFTA found that the new dispute resolution process included in both side accords gave them a new focus on where to build upon the relationships they had forged during the anti-NAFTA campaigns.⁷ Rather than dissipate the opposition, the passage of NAFTA instead reinvigorated the labor rights groups, as the new dispute resolution mechanism then provided a political opportunity to test whether the side accord would adequately enforce the labor rights principles included in the agreement (Kay, 2005; Stillerman, 2003). As such, they began to collaborate on ways to build and submit the cases that would test the resolve of the NAFTA panels in promoting labor rights protections in North America.

Labor Side Agreement Arbitration

Under the labor arbitration process, any citizen or group can file a complaint with the National Administrative Office (NAO), the offices NAFTA established for each state to manage the arbitration process, regarding the target state's performance on labor law enforcement.⁸ The NAO then determines whether they should review the complain further. If the US NAO choose to review the case, a public hearing is held involving interested parties that reviews the complaint, discusses the allegations within, and attempts to both corroborate worker's claims, and determine whether state's actions in the case were consistent with domestic labor laws. Finally, the NAO makes a public report on how issues raised in the case should be addressed.

NAO offices can suggest three types of redress. For health and safety violations, the full range of remedies is available, including Ministerial

⁶ Hafner-Burton (2009) provides a convincing account of the political tradeoffs that were necessary to pass the agreement in the US, and how these compromises in turn weakened the content of the labor accord.

⁷ There are a wealth of case studies that argue that the NAFTA experience served as a catalyst for creating or renovating cross-border union linkages that I cannot treat here for space limitations. For more, see Cook (1997), Compa (2001), Hathaway (2002), Kay (2005), Stillerman (2003), Babson (2002), Williams (1999 and 2003), and Juárez Núñez (2002).

⁸ Graubart (2008) provides a full discussion of the institutions of the labor and environmental agreements and their enforcement mechanisms. The NAO in the US is now in charge of enforcing other labor clauses, and is called the OTAI (Office of Trade Agreement Implementation).

Consultations, public outreach programs, and fines and trade sanctions.⁹ Cases involving child labor, minimum wage disputes or health and safety violations are subject to dispute resolution, and if still unresolved, fines and trade sanctions (NAALC, 1993). Cases concerning “technical labor standards” such as forced labor, minimum employment standards, discrimination, workers’ compensation, or protection of migrants are limited to consultation and expert evaluation (NAALC, 1993). Collective labor rights, including freedom of association, the right to organize, the right to strike, and collective bargaining are afforded the least redress- these cases are exempt from all but Ministerial Consultations.

Through 2009, 37 petitions listing labor code violations had been filed under the side agreement, mostly against Mexico, and mainly with the US NAO, and often by the same non-governmental organizations, labor rights advocates, human rights groups and labor unions that were at the forefront of the effort to derail the trade agreement. Table 1 presents descriptive information about the cases that were ultimately accepted for review by the tri-national labor arbitration boards. Of the 35 petitions where a ruling was issued on whether or not to review (two cases are pending), 25, or 71% of petitions filed were accepted for review. As the table illustrates, freedom of association emerged as a principal complaint registered in most of the NAO submissions (18 total), but especially among the cases filed against Mexico.¹⁰ Eight petitions concern health and safety violations, either exclusively or as part of a range of issues. Six petitions cite the labor rights of migrant workers in the US.¹¹

⁹ Ministerial Consultations result in official pronouncements on how the case might be resolved, including tri-national working groups and binding agreements. Under certain circumstances, Ministers can move to take a Ministerial Council Special Session for stronger resolution measures (NAALC, 1993).

¹⁰ Of the other submissions filed against Mexico, one dealt with pregnancy testing in the maquiladoras, another with the use of child labor, one addressed health and safety standards exclusively, one was resolved independently without review, and two submissions were declined for review by the NAO (US Department of Labor, n.d.)

¹¹ Three cases, the 1997 ITAPSA case, the 1998 INS case, and the 2003 Puebla case, were filed simultaneously in two NAO offices for two independent reviews, and these are included in this study as separate cases.

TABLE 1: NAALC CASES ACCEPTED FOR FORMAL NAO REVIEW, 1994-2009

CASE NAME	YEAR	TARGET STATE	LABOR ISSUES (#)
HONEYWELL/GE	1994	MEXICO	FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (6)
SONY	1994	MEXICO	
GE II	1994	MEXICO	
SPRINT	1995	USA	
MAXI-SWITCH	1996	MEXICO	
MC DONALD'S	1998	CANADA	
GE I	1994	MEXICO	FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND HEALTH AND SAFETY (10)
ITAPSA (USA)	1997	MEXICO	
HAN YOUNG I	1997	MEXICO	
APPLE GROWERS	1998	USA	
SOLEC	1998	USA	
ITAPSA (CAN)	1998	MEXICO	
TAESA	1999	MEXICO	
PUEBLA (USA)	2003	MEXICO	
PUEBLA CAN	2003	MEXICO	
HIDALGO	2005	MEXICO	
DE COSTER EGG	1998	USA	FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND RIGHTS OF MIGRANT WORKERS (2)
NORTH CAROLINA	2003	USA	
SUTSP	1996	MEXICO	HEALTH AND SAFETY (3)
HAN YOUNG II	1997	MEXICO	
AUTO TRIM	2000	MEXICO	
YALE/INS (USA)	1998	USA	RIGHTS OF MIGRANT WORKERS (2)
H2B VISA WORKERS	2005	USA	
NY STATE	2001	USA	WORKERS' COMPENSATION (1)
GENDER	1997	MEXICO	DISCRIMINATION (1)

The concentration of cases around freedom of association issues reflects the political rivalry between independent unions and unions associated with the corporatist system in Mexico. Entrenched interests in limiting independent unionization among Mexico's labor elite may have increased in recent decades. The loss of economic resources to support political patronage after the economic crises of the late 1980s and early 1990s has contributed to the decline of PRI political dominance nationally (Shirk and Edmonds-Poli 2009). With fewer resources, the party is increasingly less able to provide material benefits and government subsidies to its clients, including corporatist unions.¹² As political pluralism evolves, PRI unions are under increased pressure to play the historical role as a mass base for the party, loyal voter bloc, and supporter of government initiatives, but with fewer material and political resources nationally to offer in exchange for party loyalty. The CTM

¹² While the CTM was still able to maintain political representation (Murillo, 2001), the declining electoral fortunes of the PRI over time means even that channel of power is in jeopardy. Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s the CTM held around 90 of the seats awarded to the PRI, by 2000 they never held more than 19 (Shirk and Edmonds-Poli, 2009).

unions are thus unwilling to allow independent unions to gain ground in areas where they maintain monolithic control over contracts, partly to maintain what remains of the political base of party power locally, but also to maintain the party's fortunes more broadly.

In these cases, violation of the right to association in Mexico most often stems from disputes over union registration procedures. The best tool at the state's disposal for limiting independent unionization is control over the administration of the local labor boards that regulate the labor relations system.¹³ As tri-partite structures, the state labor board is composed of three members, including a Government representative that serves as the President, a representative from the business sector, and a representative from organized labor, each appointed by the Governor (Curtis and Gutiérrez, 1994). The labor representative is nearly always chosen from the ranks of the most influential union confederation, which in the Mexican context almost always results in union representation from the corporatist ranks. This arrangement can have two effects. First, with government directly influencing the selection of the three representatives to the boards, executive branch interests can potentially guide the outcomes of board arbitration (Sanner Ruhnke, 1995). Second, the selection of the union representative generates conflicts of interest at the board. Given the historical ties between labor and the PRI, political conditions are generally unfavorable for independent unions seeking resolution at the board, allowing the government to maintain control over unions in the state. Workers organizing for union representation outside of the corporatist system are often thwarted by state agents at the local labor board, who at times have colluded with management to deny unions registration as legal entities.

Mexico's response in the NAALC

The Mexican authorities often responded to the charges of freedom of association violations through the channels presented by the NAALC process. The governments of the United States and Mexico, and sometimes Canada, have at times agreed to detailed action plans to discuss the labor issues that underline the cases that come through the NAALC process. To date, Ministers of Labor have signed seven Ministerial Agreements that commit them to cooperative activities to educate the public or each other about the technical aspects of labor rights regulation and enforcement in each state. Since 1995, the governments of Mexico and the United States have signed agreements reiterating their commitment to freedom of association, first as part of the

¹³ The jurisdiction of the labor board system is divided between State and Federal level boards according to industrial sector (Curtis and Gutierrez Kirchner, 1994). At the state level, there are also conciliation boards that serve as mediators only, and Special Boards for claims around specific industries, such as for construction workers' claims.

resolution of the Sony case, then again in 1996 for the Sprint case, in 1997 for the SUTSP case, and most recently in 2000 for the ITAPSA and Han Young cases.

Once the NAALC process exposed the harassment of independent unionists at the hand of government officials, the Mexican government did become more responsive to the pressure to democratize union politics. The 1997 ITAPSA case provides an example. Through the course of the NAALC petitions on freedom of association in Mexico, time and again petitions reveal that union rivalries have been exacerbated by the use of protection contracts. ITAPSA was another such case that featured the difficulties of registering an independent union in Mexico. Eventually signed by 65 groups in the US, Mexico and Canada (by far the greatest number of sponsors for any case) the ITAPSA petitions were filed in both the US and Canada. Though the case formally ended in Ministerial Consultations (as is the limit for freedom of association cases), as part of the resolution of the case, Mexico signed a Ministerial Agreement in which it agreed to promote the public registry of collective contracts. In turn, the Mexican Labor Ministry (STPS) then developed two websites for the contract registry. One allows the public access to union registration documents.¹⁴ The other is a searchable database of collective contracts with information on who holds bargaining rights within individual factories, and in some cases, with access to copies of the registration paperwork and organizational statutes.¹⁵

Sometimes, the Mexican authorities also went beyond the mandate of the NAALC process to respond to the violations. Officials at times mandated new union elections, or recognized opposition victories even before NAO hearings were complete and pronouncements were handed down (Compa, 2001). The Maxi-Switch case is one example. Workers who tried to form an independent union were denied legal registration at the labor board. When the case went to the NAALC and a public hearing was mandated, the Mexican Government intervened to settle the complaint, awarding registration to the independent union to avoid holding the hearing (U.S. Department of Labor, 1997). On April 16, two days before the hearing was to take place in Washington, the US NAO approved the request to withdraw the petition, as the labor dispute had "ended favorably" with the recognition of the independent union (Borderlines 1997).

Han Young provides another example. After the local labor board in Tijuana refused to certify the results of an election where an independent union won enough votes to take control of the collective contract and spearhead contract negotiations, the Attorney General's office intervened, issuing writs of *amparo* to suspend the board's ruling (Williams, 2003). This prompted the union and its supporters to file a NAALC case on freedom of

¹⁴ <http://registrodeasociaciones.stps.gob.mx/regaso/consultaregasociaciones.asp>. Accessed March 1, 2010.

¹⁵ http://contratoscolectivos.stps.gob.mx/RegAso/legal_contratos.asp. Accessed March 1, 2010.

association, which was accepted for review in late 1997. At that point, the federal government pressured the local board to negotiate with the union, Han Young management and the representatives of the rival CROC union to mediate a settlement, which included a revocation of the NAALC case in exchange for official recognition of the dissident union, and side payments to the leadership of the CROC (U.S. Department of Labor, 1997).

These cases are extraordinary in that they feature resolutions that are not representative of the NAALC cases on the whole —which more often end in Ministerial Consultations that go no further. However, these resolutions are significant in that they show that the Mexican authorities were not just responsive to the resolutions mandated by the NAALC process, but also made arrangements to resolve cases outside of the official channels. This is especially interesting because under the side agreement, freedom of association cases have the fewest avenues for redress. Case resolution for freedom of association issues is limited to Ministerial Consultations, yet it is these cases that often had the most dramatic resolutions outside of the NAALC institutional structure.

Has Mexico institutionalized norms socialization?

If Mexico is moving towards giving labor rights norms prescriptive status, as predicted by the model, how do we know when norms might be institutionalized, or whether these deeper reforms are not still an instrumental response to ongoing transnational pressures? The process of filing cases, and the formal channels by which cases are scrutinized in public forums, have thrown the problems of violation of freedom of association in Mexico into high relief. As such, the Mexican government, through the conduct of local labor board representatives, has been implicated in thwarting independent unionization in a number of NAALC cases. While Mexico went to great pains to project a sanitized image during the negotiation of NAFTA to influence public opinion of Mexico in the United States, the government was seen as actively attempting to derail democratic tendencies within the Mexican labor movement in the cases that were brought forward.

As such, transnational advocates used the NAALC process to complicate Mexico's efforts to create the image of an emerging liberal democracy. If the states most susceptible to transnational persuasion are the newly democratic states and those in transition, as these states are the most eager to establish democratic legitimacy in the international system (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 8), the discussion suggests that Mexico would be especially susceptible to moral pressure for change on labor rights practices given its demonstrated interest in creating and maintaining a democratic image during the late 1990s through changes in human rights policy (Covarrubias Velasco, 1999; Alejandre, 1995; Negrín, 2008). This disjuncture between actions and discourse drew Mexico

officials into a dialogue about labor rights enforcement through their participation in the NAALC. Further, filing a case conferred legitimacy on local Mexican groups, because when they were backed by transnational advocates, they became more important actors within Mexico (Kay, 2005; Graubart, 2008). As such, the Mexican government could no longer ignore the efforts by domestic groups to gain their attention and discuss these issues (Graubart, 2008; Hertel, 2006a). Because local advocates were now legitimated by the NAO as having important complaints, they become important actors in policy process.

This process in turn shifted the political dynamics within Mexico so that independent unions and their supporters gained access to policymakers, and were able to better lobby for reform. Once advocates gained an opening into that dialogue from within Mexico, they were then able to use the NAALC process to compel the Mexican government to explain the inability of the labor board system to provide impartial decisions, and answer for their acquiescence to violations of the right to freedom of association, effectively pushing the government to address labor rights issues (Graubart, 2008). For example, the promise by the Mexican Minister of Labor to promote the public union registry in an NAO Joint Declaration changed the debate on labor reform in Mexico in ways that favored the independent labor movement (Graubart, 2008). Whereas discussion of labor reform had always previously been an internal matter conducted among the STPS policy elites, the CTM, and the Mexican business peak association Coparmex, now the UNT was invited to participate in the policy discussions (Zapata, 2006; Graubart, 2008).¹⁶ Citing the 1997 Joint Declaration and Mexico's stated intention to promote the secret ballot, labor lawyers were able to extract a commitment from the government to include freedom of association in any policy agenda around labor reform (Graubart, 2008).

As these political dynamics unfolded domestically and over time, local labor advocates were able to contribute to policy dialogue and lobby for important reforms even after the NAALC review process had ended. That Mexico undertook additional reforms outside of the NAALC mandates also suggest that Mexico has at least begun to institutionalize labor rights norms and their prescriptions. For example, the health and safety regulations were streamlined and modernized in 1998 (U.S. Department of State, 1999). The Mexican government created "special issues offices" under the labor secretariat to investigate child labor, women in the workforce, and the needs of disabled workers in 1998 (U.S. Department of State, 1999). A separate office for equality and gender issues was created in 1999 (U.S. Department of State, 2000). Further, the Federal Labor Board in Mexico City started to employ secret ballots consistently by 2002 (Hathaway, 2002a), and there is

¹⁶ Interview, the Mexican NAO, Mexico City, Mexico, July 16, 2006.

some evidence to suggest that local labor boards are allowing the use of the secret ballot more readily (Maquila Solidarity Network, 2002).

Can these resolution patterns be explained as evidence of Mexico's evolving norms socialization? In a few cases, Mexico's experience with the NAFTA side labor accord precipitated pressure on Mexico "from above" that complemented domestic calls for labor reform, and that the resulting interaction through the NAALC process promoted institutional changes in labor regulation within Mexico. However, the spiral model tells us that these changes may reflect norm adoption and Mexico's newfound acceptance of labor rights norms, or may only represent attempts to deflect criticism, and that in turn, labor rights enforcement in Mexico will not have improved in any meaningful way. However, some evidence suggests that Mexico's response to the charges levied in the case filings reflects norms acceptance, not merely an instrumental response to international criticism. One way to measure the process of norms socialization independently from the model prescriptions is to identify if the actions that signal norms adherence in the international arena are met with improvements domestically. If Mexico is internalizing labor rights norms, these effects would be shown most likely in attempts to address enforcement issues, the area where Mexico was most vulnerable to international criticism, and where Mexico most needed to improve its labor rights record.¹⁷

In fact, since the NAALC process began, Mexico has made important improvements in improving labor rights enforcement. For example, Mexico has increased the availability of resources for inspection continuously since NAFTA. Though detailed budget information is not available prior to 2000, Franco Hijuelos (2001: 321) notes that from 1993 to 1996, the inspection budget increased by 250%. Further, a new emphasis on the importance of inspection is reflected in the increase from 2000 to 2001, when funding assigned to the General Directive of Federal Inspection department increased 10 fold, and remained at that level through 2009.¹⁸ With the increase in the budget occurred a parallel increase in inspection capacity. Though there were nearly a third fewer inspectors after a departmental reorganization in 2000/2001, 3023 more workplaces were inspected in 2001 than in 2000 (Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión Social, 2007a). What is interesting is that this trend continued for most of the 2000s, where ever fewer inspectors visited more factories each year. Third, the number of inspector positions authorized by the federal government also increased. At the end of 2007, an additional 100 inspectors were authorized for the Directorate, and in 2009, the number of inspector positions authorized increased again to a total of 349 (Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión Social, 2009). By the first quarter of 2009, 15,432 workplaces had been inspected, an increase of 58% for the same period in

¹⁷ Interview, Mexican NAO, July 2006.

¹⁸ Author estimation derived from Mexican federal budget data, on file.

2008 (Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión Social, 2007a). While Mexico's inspection capacity remains low compared to other Latin American states (Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión Social 2007b), these data lend evidence to the assertion that Mexico's is actively increasing its workplace inspection capacity.

There have been additional improvements in other areas as well. Eleven additional labor arbitration boards were opened in 1998, to foment greater citizen access to labor tribunals (U.S. Department of State, 1999). Though obviously the labor board system is evidently part of the problem of securing collective rights, most of the responsibility of the labor board in practice is to mediate disputes between workers and management over individual rights, such as wage disputes and illegal firings. For this reason, increased access to the labor board system is seen here as a positive measure. This data gives support to the idea that since NAFTA has come into play, Mexico has made some effort to demonstrate respect for labor rights by increasing its domestic capacity to promote labor policies and practices that protect such rights. That these efforts have supplemented the improvements undertaken by Mexico within the context of the NAALC agreement, yet go beyond those commitments, and have occurred at the domestic level in ways independent from transnational pressures, also suggests that Mexico's attempts to improve its labor rights record indicates that Mexico is indeed acceding to labor rights socialization.

Assessment of the Spiral Model and the Mexican Case

How well does the spiral model account for improvements in labor rights enforcement in Mexico?

Network Emergence

The mechanism by which the actors begin to interact in the spiral model —by actors from within the targeted state, under the context of repression— may accurately identify how transnational partnerships begin in human rights cases, but they ultimately fail to describe cross-border organization for labor rights issues. According to the model, we should expect that some event pulls advocacy groups and domestic opposition together to work towards changing states' behavior. Though the authors specify that it is within the context of repression by which advocates draw attention to a state, but the Mexican case shows that this is not the only path by which transnational advocacy networks form. The interaction may also be set in motion when transnational advocacy networks search out a situation with which to press or illustrate their own political or social agenda, finding allies within a country without any major initiative taken by social actors within the violating country.

The act that precipitates transnational advocacy in this story is the announcement of the trade accord. Once the three nations announced their plans to negotiate an agreement, US activists and their counterparts in Canada and Mexico mobilized, and then later combined forces to attempt to influence the course of debate. The transnational advocacy network that eventually became active in Mexico did not focus on Mexico due to outreach by Mexican critics of NAFTA so much as labor, human rights, environmental groups and others in the US took advantage of the historical political opportunity NAFTA provided to press a political agenda (Stillerman, 2003).

This pattern is not new to transnational advocacy networks, to labor rights, or to Mexico. For example, some scholars have documented how an international human rights network was focused on Mexico in the late 1980s, but were able to only after Mexico became more open to third country involvement in its internal affairs (Sikkink, 1993; Anaya, 2009). In effect, transnational human rights advocacy groups chose to focus their efforts on Mexico when an opportunity to do so arose.¹⁹

The NAFTA negotiation over the side agreements underlines that transnational advocacy groups chose to focus on Mexico to press their agendas only after US labor opened up the possibility for a link to non-trade issues. This suggests that the primary causal mechanism of transnational involvement might be reversed for labor rights: actors within the US approached Mexican NAFTA critics only after the fast track initiative was passed in the US and opposition to NAFTA became more widespread in all three countries. Political opportunities for advocate network involvement in Mexico came from US overtures, not from Mexican unionists reaching out to American or Canadian allies. Therefore, the starting point of the model might be less rigidly specified to include other forms of interaction between domestic groups and transnational advocates, and downplay of the presence of repression, since it is this convergence –however precipitated– that brings all actors into the model.

Also, the context of repression described by the spiral model is different in this first stage for the labor rights context. Although ongoing state interference in union registration procedures has been endemic in Mexico, the level of political repression of unionists is generally lower in Mexico than in other states in the region, and the level of labor rights violation is also significantly lower than the level of human rights violations. Simply put, repression is not a major factor in this labor story, either in the transnational network or in the case filings. The repressive context in particular is specified to fit with the human rights framework that the model claims to explain. In the Mexican case it is not clear that repression is a necessary condition to set

¹⁹ Other prominent examples include the Kimi campaign in Honduras and the tactics of the National Labor Campaign's name-and-shame techniques that were the hallmark of the anti-sweat shop campaigns of the early 1990s. See Armbruster-Sandoval (2003) for the Honduran case, and Ross (1997) for some NLC cases.

the socialization process in motion, even if the Mexican experience shows the same initial interaction between domestic groups, international groups and transnational actors that are at the heart of the model. Though extreme violation of workers rights could include repressive periods, in other area issues such as environmental rights, anti-fascism, or women's rights, political repression may be largely absent, yet the process of norms diffusion may be similar (True and Mintrom, 2001; Checkel, 1999; Keck and Sikkink, 1998).

In sum, the events that precipitated transnational advocacy around labor rights in the NAFTA case were created early by US groups, not within Mexico, and not due to especially repressive acts, but simply when a political opportunity to become involved in Mexico presented itself to such networks. As such, the emergence of transnational advocacy in Mexico around labor issues does not follow the predictions of the spiral model here.

Transnational Pressures

After the transnational networks formed, they mobilized against NAFTA in part by criticizing Mexican labor practices and lack of respect for the rule of law so as to question in the US as to whether Mexico should be rewarded for poor democratic performance with a trade deal. According to the model, states react to transnational pressure first by denying the charges and international interference in its domestic affairs. However, as the network built its case against Mexico's labor rights record, the Salinas government did not deny that enforcement of Mexican labor law needed to improve. Nor did Mexico reject that the transnational advocates pushing these issues had overstepped national sovereignty, as the second stage of the model would predict. Rather, the Mexican government was responsive to the claims made by such groups, and began to make reforms in order to address these concerns. For example, Salinas answered concerns from the US on Mexico's weak environmental statutes by revising environmental legislation and taking on "strongly visible measures" to address recurring violations (Cook, 1997: 521). Concerns about drug trafficking, corruption and human rights violations were answered with a purge of the judicial police, increased drug interdiction efforts, and the appointment of a human rights advocate to the office of Attorney General (Cook, 1997: 521).

The fact that Mexico never denied abuses, but took the opportunity to change some of those practices doesn't concern the authors, who claim that as long as a mobilization phase takes place, government responses to transnational pressure can vary.²⁰ Therefore, in contrast to the model, which predicts a denial stage, Mexico in effect moved directly to signaling its commitment to working with the US and Canada on the trade agreement by becoming "uncharacteristically responsive" to the suggestions made by its

²⁰ Other states had also skipped denial stages, including Chile and Tunisia.

critics in those countries (Cook, 1997: 520). The authors note that variance in state response is most important in conditioning whether or not full mobilization of the transnational action network and domestic opposition group then ensues (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999: 243). If this mobilization occurs and pushes the state towards the third stage, whether the state denied the charges or responded to them positively may only condition the extent to which states then adopt norms, but it is essentially less relevant to the model.

However, the path dependence of the model makes this explanation theoretically unsatisfying. On one hand, the authors note that in talking about the abuses, states are then pushed into making reforms to deflect further criticism, pushing the socialization process into motion (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1998). On the other, the authors essentially allow for alternative paths to norms socialization where discourse matters less in persuading states to accept norms, but the effects are similar. If both paths are relevant, the model should relax the assumption that it is path dependent, and allow for multiple causality to explain when states may move further along in the socialization process.

Norms Socialization

Though the Mexican case does not accurately reflect the initial stages, Mexico more closely follows the model in stages three and four. The Salinas and Zedillo administrations did begin to make some cosmetic reforms. In negotiating NAFTA, Mexico used these reforms to signal their willingness to resolve some superficial problems, but never attempted the full scale weeding out of political corruption that allowed some of these problems to emerge. The fact that labor rights were excluded from these early reforms is telling in that entrenched interests within organized labor opposed any large-scale labor reforms, as they had in previous years (Zapata, 2006).

Fundamental labor rights are written into federal labor law, and Mexico has signed most of the fundamental ILO labor rights conventions, but enforcement is perennially weak in Mexico. The NAALC process provided a potential second, enforceable layer of labor rights commitment in Mexico. Transnational networks used the arbitration process as a potential area for leverage, and they used it to pressure Mexico into norms compliance. Because Mexico became more sensitive to its reputation once it signed the trade agreement, the work of transnational actors was somewhat effective in promoting political change.

According to the spiral model, it is engaging in dialogue with norms-violating states that pushes those states from the denial stage to the reform stage along the process of norms socialization. Here too, what was formerly pressure on Mexico from NGOs and domestic stakeholders (Brysk's "pressure from below") is supplemented through the NAALC process with additional pressure by Mexico's trading partners ("pressure from above"). In turn, this

dynamic pushes Mexico to respond with institutional reforms and changes in practices. Some case resolutions showed that at first, local officials stepped in to allow independent unionization to resolve specific cases. However, consistent pressure through the arbitration process pushed Mexico into deeper reforms and eventually, more autonomous efforts. Once Mexico began to make small changes, a deeper commitment to labor rights enforcement seems to have followed. Not only was Mexico pressured to improve plant-level relations, but the NAALC process pushed Mexico into some institutional changes, thus narrowing the gap between Mexico's enforcement standards and those of the other two nations.

Although a number of reforms were made under pressure in the NAALC hearings, Mexico made some additional reforms separate from the NAALC outcomes, and increased its inspection capacity, suggesting that Mexico is moving towards a greater institutionalization of labor rights protections, as predicted in the prescriptions stage, Stage Four. These reforms are deeper and more substantive than the earliest reforms made at the beginning on the NAFTA negotiation, showing that Mexico is on the way to promoting better practices, not to deflect criticism, but possibly because they are reevaluating their own compliance with the terms of the side labor agreement. Yet, there is still much more progress to be made, and some backsliding on the right to freedom of association in more recent cases implies that Mexico has not yet reached the institutionalization stage of the model.

The first instance where an independent union won representation in an open election and was granted collective bargaining rights without interference either from the official unions or from the firm occurred in September of 2001 (U.S. Department of State, 2002). A number of independent unions have gained registration since then. Continued effort in more even enforcement of labor law and an end to interference in independent organization would move Mexico closer to demonstrating institutionalization of labor rights protection.

Conclusions

The use of the NAALC process in all three countries has been instrumental in providing a forum to redress labor issues as well as improve labor standards within Mexico. Under the labor side agreement, the official state-party unions, who have long enjoyed their own sources of power within the government, are being challenged. Their political control is waning both owing to competition with independent unions and to wider democratization. The content of the cases filed against Mexico suggest that the Mexican government is unwilling or unable to protect freedom of association because a long-standing struggle between official unions and independent unions remains unresolved. The NAALC process gives independent unions leverage over employers who want to avoid a unionized workforce. The NAALC process is beginning to turn around the near monopoly the official unions held over collective bargaining, which can be interpreted as evidence of further progress towards norms institutionalization. It is most promising for workers where it provides an arena by which domestic forces can bring more fundamental problems with labor practices to light on an international stage.

While the spiral model estimates how deeply norms have taken hold by identifying an institutionalization process, the model ultimately fails to correctly identify the causal mechanisms under which norms acceptance takes place in this case. Mexico does not follow the initial stage closely and skips the second stage altogether, even if the reforms of labor rights policies and practices predicted by the third and fourth stages are sufficiently present. The model also emphasizes the roles of transnational actors in promoting political change. As the model describes, and the Mexican case shows, political change was made possible partially through the work of transnational actors, who pressured Mexico into making changes to its behavior. At first, the changes were superficial, but consistent efforts through the NAALC process pushed Mexico into deeper reforms and eventually, autonomous efforts. The core elements of the model —increased international scrutiny and transnational advocacy— can account for changes in Mexico's increased responsiveness to labor violations. However, discussion of Mexico's labor rights record during the NAFTA years analyzed here also suggests that Mexico has not fully accepted, or internalized international labor rights norms.

Finally, one of the major critiques of social pacts written into trade agreements, like the NAALC, is that the agreements are only as good as their enforcement mechanisms. Too often agreements lack "teeth" to punish violators or respond to grievances. While that critique stems from a normative position that the labor agreements are not useful if they do not make direct, firm level changes such as rehiring workers, or paying lost wages, the analysis for the NAALC cases shows that direct redress was possible, if limited. The

NAALC experience has led to institutional changes in Mexico, which could translate into greater protection for Mexican workers over the long term. The Mexican case also highlights that political opportunities for transnational advocacy was crucial to advancing more lasting reforms. In Mexico, it was the trade agreement that created a political opportunity for transnational advocacy around labor rights issues (Stillerman, 2003). In effect, the side agreement created opportunities for transnational advocates that set Mexico on a path to better labor rights enforcement, independent of how strong or how effective the agreement itself was in terms of sanctioning poor compliance. It is because of these spillover effects generated by international pressure that advocates might well continue to pursue labor rights protection through trade agreements as one additional path to improving labor rights enforcement.

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Novedades

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