Importante

Los Documentos de Trabajo del CIDE son una herramienta para fomentar la discusión entre las comunidades académicas. A partir de la difusión, en este formato, de los avances de investigación se busca que los autores puedan recibir comentarios y retroalimentación de sus pares nacionales e internacionales en un estado aún temprano de la investigación.

De acuerdo con esta práctica internacional congruente con el trabajo académico contemporáneo, muchos de estos documentos buscan convertirse posteriormente en una publicación formal, como libro, capítulo de libro o artículo en revista especializada.

AGOSTO 2013

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Executive Summary

The start of a new administration in Mexico is a propitious time to review the priorities and international strategies of the country in light of the views, concerns, and interests of Mexicans. In the fifth edition of the survey of *Mexico, the Americas, and the World*, carried out by the CIDE every two years since 2004, we have managed to refine our methodology and derive more accurate results on the preferences of citizens regarding foreign relations of Mexico and global governance. From the 2012-2013 survey, the following 15 central findings stand out:

1. **Mexican society demands a foreign policy that increases the prestige of Mexico in the world and contributes to improving the safety and wellbeing of its population.** From a citizen perspective, the main foreign policy goals should be, in order of priority, to promote Mexican culture, fight drug trafficking and organized crime, protect the environment, attract tourists, increase exports and defend the interests of Mexicans abroad. In this regard, there is a broad and stable consensus on which all the social sectors, political currents and regions of the country agree.

2. **Public Opinion “bets” everything on the soft power of Mexico.** The public and leaders favor instruments of soft power as the core of Mexico’s ability to influence, and they consider trade policy and cultural diplomacy to be the pillars of the projection and activity of Mexico in the world.

3. **The country looks upon the world with pessimism but completely rejects isolationism.** Mexicans perceive a world that has deteriorated in the last decade and show a growing concern for international threats. In spite of that, they are increasingly convinced that, in the face of global uncertainty, the best thing for Mexico is to actively participate in global affairs. Support for international activism has enjoyed rapid, sustained growth over the past six years, in spite of the environment of global economic turbulence and nationwide public insecurity.

4. **In 21st century, Mexican nationalism is not opposed to opening up to the world, with the exception of the oil sector.** Mexicans show strong and growing feelings of pride, identification with and attachment to their nationality, with Mexican nationality being the primary political community of identification and belonging. The high level of national pride is not opposed to cultural and economic

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1 The results of previous surveys can be consulted without cost online at http://mexicoyelmundo.cide.edu
openness, in such a way that support has increased for the dissemination of ideas from other countries in Mexico, globalization, free trade and foreign investment, with the sole exception being the oil sector.

5. **The lack of attention to, knowledge of, and contact with the world represents a glass ceiling for the international aspirations of Mexico.** Unlike leaders, a significant percentage of the general population shows no interest in global affairs; the average citizen has a limited and fragmented knowledge about issues, countries, organizations and international personalities, has never traveled outside of the country, and doesn't maintain direct contact with foreigners. Much of the exposure they have with the outside world is indirect, through family members, and concentrated on the United States.

6. **Social communication at the government level is insufficient in the international relations of the country.** Mexicans are unaware of who is responsible for foreign policy, and they are not informed of the main actions and diplomatic initiatives of Mexico, nor of how those actions relate to the rest of public policies.

7. **Aspiration towards international participation does not translate into a willingness to invest resources or assume responsibilities.** Mexicans believe that Mexico should participate more in global affairs, but without accepting the costs associated with such an aspiration. There is limited support for foreign initiatives involving joint decision-making, giving up sovereignty, investment of resources, or commitments, such as increasing diplomatic presence abroad or funding programs for cooperation in development in Central America.

8. **Mexican society lacks global perspective.** The public pays no attention to other regions and countries of the world beyond the Americas. Although they view European countries and the economic rise of China positively, relations with Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, Africa and the Middle East are of little priority. Though, for the first time, interest in leaders in the Asia-Pacific grew, tying the region with North America, this has been to the detriment of Europe. Thus, the vision of the Mexican people lags behind new global economic and political realities.

9. **Mexico sees itself as a regional actor but is ambivalent towards the North and the South.** The priorities, aspirations and identities of Mexicans are concentrated in North America and Latin America, but opinions are divided, almost equally, as to which should be the regional priority. While the main supranational identity is “Latin American,” the region of priority for the public is North America. Meanwhile, leaders are convinced that the priority must be Latin America, which results in
ambivalence when attempting to integrate both components into a national long-term strategy.

10. **Mexicans desire a special relationship with the United States, principally economic in nature, but open to cooperation in security and migration.** The anti-American feelings of Mexican nationalism have decreased: more Mexicans trust and admire the United States, consider it a development model for Mexico, and positively evaluate the actions of the U.S. abroad (with the exception of their policy towards Cuba). Furthermore, they highly rate the President, believe that vicinity with the U.S. brings more advantages than problems, aspire to a special relationship between both countries. Trade and investment are by far considered the most important aspects of the bilateral relationship, and, at the same time, the public are willing to accept American help in fighting drug trafficking and organized crime, even though it may imply certain concessions from Mexico.

11. **Mexicans look to Latin America with optimism, with no intention of leadership, and with an agenda of trade, finance and infrastructure integration.** The Mexican public is optimistic about the prospects of Mexico’s relationship with Latin America, they view Latin American integration with a vision more pragmatic than ideological, and they avoid the aspiration of having a regional leadership role. There is strong support for the free movement of goods and capital, and infrastructure projects that improve the physical interconnection between countries in the region; on the other hand, they are not as enthusiastic about plans for deeper integration such as the free movement of people, a monetary union, common foreign policy or the coordination of defense policies.

12. **In the hemispheric debate on drug control policy, Mexicans reject legalization and prefer preventative approaches to militarization.** The treatment of addicts and campaigns to prevent drug use are the preferred methods of Mexicans, followed by army participation in the fight against drug trafficking and the extradition of drug lords. By contrast, legalization is considered to be the worst possible action the government could take.

13. **The relationship with Central America is positive but there are red flags on the horizon.** The proximity with Central America represents more benefits for Mexicans than problems, and there is a positive view of the relationship with Guatemala, with emphasis placed on the economic and trade agenda rather than security issues. However, Central American countries and immigrants are among the least favored
by Mexicans, who are divided between establishing temporary work programs and toughening border controls.

14. **On issues of global governance, Mexicans sympathize with multilateralism but are reluctant to delegate authority and abide by joint decisions.** Issues such as nuclear proliferation, strengthening the multilateral architecture, cooperation in development, the defense of human rights and the promotion of democracy are of moderate or low priority. There is limited support for abiding by multilateral decisions that are inconvenient for Mexico, even though there is support for the participation of Mexico in UN Peacekeeping Operations, particularly those of a humanitarian nature.

15. **Leaders support opening trade negotiations with the brics, entering the tpp, and establishing financial regulation with “teeth.”** Emerging economies are seen as an opportunity niche that the country must take advantage of through trade integration. They positively assess the benefits the country has reaped through its network of free trade agreements and believe that trade agreements should contain environmental and labor obligations. In order to contain the risks of protectionism, the elite support greater financial regulation with “teeth” at the international level.
Resumen ejecutivo

El inicio de una nueva administración en México es un momento propicio para revisar las prioridades y estrategias internacionales del país a la luz de las visiones, preocupaciones e intereses de los mexicanos. A partir de la quinta edición de la encuesta México, las Américas y el Mundo, que cada dos años levanta el CIDE desde 2004, hemos logrado afinar nuestra metodología y derivar resultados cada vez más precisos de las preferencias ciudadanas sobre las relaciones internacionales de México y la gobernanza global. Del levantamiento 2012-2013, destacan los siguientes 15 hallazgos centrales:

1. **La sociedad mexicana demanda una política exterior que impulse el prestigio de México en el mundo y contribuya a mejorar las condiciones de seguridad y bienestar de su población.** Desde la perspectiva ciudadana las principales metas de política exterior deben ser, en orden de prioridad, promover la cultura mexicana, combatir el narcotráfico y el crimen organizado, proteger el medio ambiente, atraer turistas, fomentar la exportación y defender los intereses de los mexicanos en el exterior. Al respecto, existe un amplio y estable consenso en el que coinciden la totalidad de los sectores sociales, corrientes políticas y regiones del país.

2. **La opinión pública le “apuesta” todo al poder blando de México.** La población y los líderes privilegian los instrumentos del poder blando como el núcleo de la capacidad de influencia de México, y consideran que la política comercial y la diplomacia cultural deben ser los pilares de la proyección y la actividad internacional del país.

3. **El país mira con pesimismo al mundo pero rechaza por completo el aislacionismo.** Los mexicanos perciben un mundo que se ha deteriorado en la última década y muestran una preocupación creciente por las amenazas internacionales. A pesar de ello, están cada vez más convencidos de que, frente a la incertidumbre global, lo mejor para el país es tener una participación activa en los asuntos mundiales. El apoyo al activismo internacional ha crecido en forma rápida y sostenida en los últimos seis años, no obstante el entorno de turbulencia económica global y de inseguridad pública a escala nacional.

4. **En el México del siglo XXI, el nacionalismo no se opone a la apertura al mundo, salvo en el sector petrolero.** Los mexicanos muestran fuertes y crecientes sentimientos de orgullo, identificación y apego a su nacionalidad, siendo la nacionalidad mexicana la comunidad política primaria de identificación y pertenencia. El alto nivel de orgullo nacional no se contrapone a la apertura cultural y económica, con la sola excepción del sector petrolero, de tal forma que ha aumentado el apoyo a

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2 Los resultados de las encuestas anteriores pueden consultarse en forma gratuita en http://mexicoyelmundo.cide.edu
la difusión de ideas de otros países en México, la globalización, el libre comercio y la inversión extranjera.

5. **El déficit de atención, conocimiento y contacto con el mundo representa un techo de cristal para las aspiraciones internacionales de México.** A diferencia de los líderes, un porcentaje significativo de la población no muestra interés en los asuntos globales; el ciudadano promedio tiene un conocimiento limitado y fragmentado sobre temas, países, organismos y personalidades internacionales, nunca ha viajado fuera del país y tampoco mantiene contacto directo con extranjeros. Buena parte de la exposición que se tiene con el mundo es indirecta, mediante familiares, y se concentra en Estados Unidos.

6. **Resulta insuficiente la comunicación social a nivel gubernamental sobre las relaciones internacionales del país.** Los mexicanos desconocen quienes son los responsables de la política exterior, no están informados de las principales acciones e iniciativas diplomáticas de México, ni de cómo éstas se vinculan con el resto de las políticas públicas.

7. **La aspiración de participación internacional no se traduce en voluntad para invertir recursos y asumir responsabilidades.** Los mexicanos creen que México debe participar más en el mundo, pero sin aceptar los costos asociados a dicha aspiración. Hay apoyo limitado a iniciativas externas que impliquen decisiones conjuntas, cesión de soberanía, inversión de recursos o compromisos como aumentar las representaciones en el exterior o financiar programas de cooperación para el desarrollo en Centroamérica.

8. **La sociedad mexicana carece de perspectiva global.** La población no presta atención a otras regiones y países del mundo más allá del continente americano. Aunque valoran positivamente a los países europeos y el ascenso económico de China, las relaciones con Europa, Asia-Pacífico, África o Medio Oriente son poco prioritarias. Si bien, por primera ocasión, el interés de los líderes por Asia-Pacífico creció hasta empatar con Norteamérica, esto ha sido en detrimento de Europa. Así, la visión de los mexicanos está rezagada con respecto a las nuevas realidades políticas y económicas globales.

9. **México se ubica como actor regional, pero mira con ambivalencia al Norte y al Sur.** Las prioridades, aspiraciones e identidades de los mexicanos están concentradas en América del Norte y América Latina, pero las opiniones están divididas en proporciones casi iguales sobre cuál debe ser la prioridad regional. Si bien la principal identidad supranacional es “latinoamericana”, la región prioritaria para la población es Norteamérica. En tanto, los líderes consideran que la prioridad debe ser América Latina, lo
cual plantea una ambivalencia al momento de integrar ambos componentes en una estrategia nacional de largo plazo.

10. Con Estados Unidos, los mexicanos quieren una relación especial, primordialmente económica, pero abierta a la cooperación en seguridad y migración. Se diluyen los sentimientos antiestadounidenses del nacionalismo mexicano: más mexicanos confían y admiran a Estados Unidos, lo consideran un modelo de desarrollo para México y evalúan positivamente sus acciones en el mundo (con excepción de la política hacia Cuba). Además, califican altamente a su Presidente, creen que la vecindad implica más ventajas que problemas y aspiran a una relación especial entre ambos países. El comercio y la inversión son considerados, por mucho, como los aspectos más importantes de la relación bilateral, a la vez que existe disposición a aceptar la ayuda estadounidense en el combate al narcotráfico y la delincuencia organizada, aunque esto implique ciertas concesiones por parte de México.

11. Los mexicanos observan a América Latina con optimismo, sin intención de liderazgo y con una agenda de integración comercial, financiera y en infraestructura. El público mexicano es optimista con respecto a las perspectivas de la relación de México con América Latina, tienen una visión más pragmática que ideológica de la integración latinoamericana y rehúyen la pretensión de que su país desempeñe el papel de líder regional. Hay un fuerte apoyo a la libre circulación de bienes y capitales, y a los proyectos de infraestructura que mejoren la interconexión física entre los países de la región; en cambio, no hay entusiasmo por esquemas de integración más profundos como la libre movilidad de personas, la unión monetaria, la política exterior común o la coordinación de políticas de defensa.

12. En el debate hemisférico sobre políticas de control drogas, los mexicanos rechazan la legalization y prefieren los enfoques preventivos a la militarización. Dar tratamiento a los adictos y hacer campañas para prevenir el consumo de drogas son las medidas preferidas por los mexicanos, seguidas de la participación del ejército en el combate al narcotráfico y la extradición de capos. Por el contrario, la legalización se considera como la peor acción posible que el gobierno mexicano podría tomar.

13. La relación con Centroamérica es positiva pero existen focos rojos en el horizonte. La vecindad con Centroamérica representa para México más ventajas que problemas, y existe una opinión positiva de la relación con Guatemala, donde se enfatiza la agenda económica y comercial sobre los temas de seguridad. Sin embargo, los países y los inmigrantes centroamericanos se encuentran entre los menos apreciados
por los mexicanos, quienes están divididos entre establecer programas de trabajadores temporales o endurecer los controles fronterizos.

14. **En temas de gobernanza global, los mexicanos simpatizan con el multilateralismo pero se resisten a delegar autoridad y acatar decisiones conjuntas.** Temas como la proliferación nuclear, el fortalecimiento de la arquitectura multilateral, la cooperación para el desarrollo, la defensa de los derechos humanos y la promoción de la democracia son medianamente o poco prioritarios. Existe apoyo limitado a que México acate decisiones multilaterales que no sean de su conveniencia, aunque hay respaldo a la participación de México en Operaciones de Mantenimiento de la Paz de la ONU, en particular de carácter humanitario.

15. **Los líderes apoyan abrir negociaciones comerciales con los BRICS, el ingreso al TPP y la regulación financiera con “dientes”**. Las economías emergentes son percibidas como un nicho de oportunidad que el país debe aprovechar mediante la vinculación comercial. Hay una evaluación positiva sobre los beneficios que ha traído al país la red de tratados de libre comercio, y se considera que los acuerdos comerciales deben contener obligaciones ambientales y laborales. A fin de contener los riesgos del proteccionismo, la élite apoya una mayor regulación financiera con “dientes” en el ámbito internacional.
A report of the results of the fifth biennial national survey of leaders and the public in Mexico on foreign policy and international relations
http://mexicoyelmundo.cide.edu
MEXICO, THE AMERICAS, AND THE WORLD 2012-2013
Foreign Policy: Public Opinion and Leaders

Guadalupe Gonzalez Gonzalez
Jorge A. Schiavon
Gerardo Maldonado
Rodrigo Morales Castillo
David Crow

Center For Research And Teaching In Economics
International Studies Division

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CIDE is a center for research and higher education specialized in social sciences, governed by international standards of scientific quality, and funded with public resources. The mission of CIDE is to contribute to the development of Mexico through the creation of rigorous and relevant information and the formation of a new generation of leaders capable of working with creativity and responsibility in an open and competitive world. As an independent, plural institution, CIDE assumes no position on political matters. All statements, premises or opinions contained in any of its publications are the sole responsibility of its authors.

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Coauthors: Guadalupe Gonzalez Gonzalez, Jorge A. Schiavon, Gerardo Maldonado, Rodrigo Morales Castillo and David Crow, (CIDE).
Email: mexicoyelmundo@cide.edu

The Mexico, the Americas, and the World 2012-2013 Research Team
General Director and Lead Researcher: Guadalupe Gonzalez Gonzalez, CIDE
Executive Director and Lead Researcher: Jorge A. Schiavon, CIDE
Executive Secretary and Researcher: Rodrigo Morales Castillo, CIDE
Project Researchers: David Crow, Gerardo Maldonado, CIDE
Research Assistant: Alejandra Nava, CIDE
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FOREWORD

M
exico, the Americas, and the World is a research project of the Division of International Studies at the Center for Research and Teaching in Economics, dedicated to studying the social attitudes and political culture of Mexicans with respect to Foreign Policy and International Relations. Currently, the project has taken on a regional scope, consisting of a periodic biennial survey using representative samples of the national population and, in some countries, a group of leaders. It is a rigorous instrument to gather original and reliable information about opinions, attitudes, beliefs, interests, aspirations, feelings, social values and behaviors in regards to international issues.

This is one of a kind project, not only in Mexico but in the rest of Latin America as well, given that by focusing on social attitudes towards foreign affairs, it fills an information gap about the relationship between citizens and global governance. With a comprehensive approach, the project covers a wide range of topics (cultural, economic, political, social and security-related issues), of social groups (leaders and the general public) and geographic regions (the north, center and south of the country). It collects data on general perceptions, not on opinions of conjuncture.

One of the traits that distinguishes Mexico, the Americas, and the World from other academic research on social attitudes is that it allows simultaneous comparisons and cross tabulations at five levels: sub-national, among the different regions of the country (North, Center, South); national, between elites and the Mexican public as well as among different economic levels and socio-demographic variables; intra-elite, between government, political, business, academic, and social leaders; international, between the populations of different countries, and longitudinal, or across different biennial periods.

The main objective of this study is to help fill a void of empirical, objective and rigorous information in a strategic area for Mexico, where independent, reliable data is scarce or unfocused. That is, to gain precise knowledge of citizen perception on how the world works and how it should work in evaluating the degree of legitimacy of the institutions, rules and actors in the international system and government performance in foreign policy matters. Furthermore, this information provides inputs for academic research and both public and private decision-making.

The international reach of the study has varied. In 2004, the survey was carried out in two countries (the United States and Mexico); in 2006, in 6 (China, South Korea, United States, India, Japan and Mexico); in 2008, in 4 (Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Peru); in 2010 in 5 (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru); and, in this edition,
the study was carried out in Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico, effectively building a database of over 29 thousand interviews with people over the age of 18 in 11 countries.

The structure of the questionnaire covers a large range of global issues and is composed of 14 thematic areas: contact, interest, knowledge, identity, human rights and cultural politics, international security, international economy, multilateralism, migration, foreign policy, regional integration, relations with Latin America, relations with the United States, and relations with other countries and regions of the world.

The information is based on a conceptual framework that makes it possible to locate the attitudes and perceptions of the population and the leaders in four axes: the degree of openness towards the world (isolationism versus internationalism); the optic from which they observe international reality (realism versus idealism); the degree of inclination towards international cooperation (unilateralism versus multilateralism) and the way they align (a map of sympathies and antipathies).

In terms of disseminating the results, *Mexico, the Americas, and the World* reaches a wide audience: decision makers in Mexico and other countries at a public, private, social and international level, as well as academic institutions, researchers and students of social sciences. We hope that those to whom this exercise is directed use it as a key instrument in strategic decision making, public policy formation, governance, academic research and social communication in a global, changing world.

This report presents the main results of the fifth edition of the survey *Mexico, the Americas, and the World 2012-2013*, carried out from August 18th to September 20th 2012 for the general public and from June 16th to October 31th of the same year for leaders. The complete information and disaggregated data on the 29 socio-demographic variables and the 114 thematic questions included in the questionnaire, as well as the database in SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) format, are freely available and can be downloaded at: [http://mexicoyelmundo.cide.edu](http://mexicoyelmundo.cide.edu)
Mexico, the Americas, and the World is a nonprofit research project whose presence over nearly 10 years would not have been possible without the generosity of various public, private, national and international institutions.

We would like to thank the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE) for supporting this survey from the first edition and the Minister of Foreign Relations, José Antonio Meade, for continuing this collaboration. We would also like to express our appreciation to the previous Administration’s commitment, especially to Ambassador Emerita Patricia Espinosa Cantellano, Ambassador Maria de Lourdes Aranda Bezaury, Rogelio Granguillhome Morfín and Minister Counselor Jose Octavio Tripp Villanueva.

We are also thankful for the generous, sustained contribution of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the LXI Legislature of the Senate of the Republic of Mexico for helping carry out various editions of the survey, in particular to the then President, Senator Rosario Green Macias, and her work group, with special thanks to Marco Antonio Alcazar.

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It is important to note the generous support for the project by the Mexican Association of International Studies (AMEI); we are especially grateful for the dedication of their President, Dr. Jorge A. Schiavon Uriegas, and their General Secretary, Dr. Rafael Velazquez Flores.

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The survey was carried out in a rigorous manner thanks to the excellent team at Data-Opinion Publica y Mercados. DATA was in charge of the national survey and the survey of leaders, under the leadership of Pablo Paras and the effective technical coordination of Carlos Lopez Olmedo. We thank Adrianna Rico, Sergio Martinez and Moises Tapia for their excellent work as field work coordinators.

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The start of a new administration in Mexico is a propitious time to review the priorities and international strategies of the country in light of the views, concerns, and interests of Mexicans. In the fifth edition of the survey of *Mexico, the Americas, and the World*, carried out by the CIDE every two years since 2004, we have managed to refine our methodology and derive more accurate results on the preferences of citizens regarding foreign relations of Mexico and global governance. From the 2012-2013 survey, the following 15 central findings stand out:

1. **Mexican society demands a foreign policy that increases the prestige of Mexico in the world and contributes to improving the safety and wellbeing of its population.** From a citizen perspective, the main foreign policy goals should be, in order of priority, to promote Mexican culture, fight drug trafficking and organized crime, protect the environment, attract tourists, increase exports and defend the interests of Mexicans abroad. In this regard, there is a broad and stable consensus on which all the social sectors, political currents and regions of the country agree.

2. **Public Opinion “bets” everything on the soft power of Mexico.** The public and leaders favor instruments of soft power as the core of Mexico’s ability to influence, and they consider trade policy and cultural diplomacy to be the pillars of the projection and activity of Mexico in the world.

3. **The country looks upon the world with pessimism but completely rejects isolationism.** Mexicans perceive a world that has deteriorated in the last decade and show a growing concern for international threats. In spite of that, they are increasingly convinced that, in the face of global uncertainty, the best thing for Mexico is to actively participate in global affairs. Support for international activism has enjoyed rapid, sustained growth over the past six years, in spite of the environment of global economic turbulence and nationwide public insecurity.

4. **In 21st century, Mexican nationalism is not opposed to opening up to the world, with the exception of the oil sector.** Mexicans show strong and growing feelings of pride, identification with and attachment to their

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1. The results of previous surveys can be consulted without cost online at http://mexicoyelmundo.cide.edu
nationality, with Mexican nationality being the primary political community of identification and belonging. The high level of national pride is not opposed to cultural and economic openness, in such a way that support has increased for the dissemination of ideas from other countries in Mexico, globalization, free trade and foreign investment, with the sole exception being the oil sector.

5. The lack of attention to, knowledge of, and contact with the world represents a glass ceiling for the international aspirations of Mexico. Unlike leaders, a significant percentage of the general population shows no interest in global affairs; the average citizen has a limited and fragmented knowledge about issues, countries, organizations and international personalities, has never traveled outside of the country, and doesn't maintain direct contact with foreigners. Much of the exposure they have with the outside world is indirect, through family members, and concentrated on the United States.

6. Social communication at the government level is insufficient in the international relations of the country. Mexicans are unaware of who is responsible for foreign policy, and they are not informed of the main actions and diplomatic initiatives of Mexico, nor of how those actions relate to the rest of public policies.

7. Aspiration towards international participation does not translate into a willingness to invest resources or assume responsibilities. Mexicans believe that Mexico should participate more in global affairs, but without accepting the costs associated with such an aspiration. There is limited support for foreign initiatives involving joint decision-making, giving up sovereignty, investment of resources, or commitments, such as increasing diplomatic presence abroad or funding programs for cooperation in development in Central America.

8. Mexican society lacks global perspective. The public pays no attention to other regions and countries of the world beyond the Americas. Although they view European countries and the economic rise of China positively, relations with Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, Africa and the Middle East are of little priority. Though, for the first time, interest in leaders in the Asia-Pacific grew, tying the region with North America, this has been to the detriment of Europe. Thus, the vision of the Mexican people lags behind new global economic and political realities.

9. Mexico sees itself as a regional actor but is ambivalent towards the North and the South. The priorities, aspirations and identities of Mexicans are concentrated in North America and Latin America, but opinions are divided, almost equally, as to which should be the regional priority. While the main supranational identity is “Latin American,” the region of priority for the public is North America. Meanwhile, leaders are convinced that the priority must be Latin America, which results in ambivalence when attempting to integrate both components into a national long-term strategy.

10. Mexicans desire a special relationship with the United States, principally economic in nature, but open to cooperation in security and migration. The anti-American feelings of Mexican nationalism have decreased: more Mexicans trust and admire the United States, consider it a development model for Mexico, and positively evaluate the actions of the U.S. abroad (with the exception of their policy towards Cuba). Furthermore, they highly rate the President, believe that vicinity with the U.S. brings more advantages than problems, aspire to a special relationship between both countries. Trade and investment are by far considered the most important aspects of the bilateral relationship, and, at the same time, the public are willing to accept American help in fighting drug trafficking and organized crime, even though it may imply certain concessions from Mexico.
11. Mexicans look to Latin America with optimism, with no intention of leadership, and with an agenda of trade, finance and infrastructure integration. The Mexican public is optimistic about the prospects of Mexico’s relationship with Latin America, they view Latin American integration with a vision more pragmatic than ideological, and they avoid the aspiration of having a regional leadership role. There is strong support for the free movement of goods and capital and infrastructure projects that improve the physical interconnection between countries in the region; on the other hand, they are not as enthusiastic about plans for deeper integration such as the free movement of people, a monetary union, common foreign policy or the coordination of defense policies.

12. In the hemispheric debate on drug control policy, Mexicans reject legalization and prefer preventative approaches to militarization. The treatment of addicts and campaigns to prevent drug use are the preferred methods of Mexicans, followed by army participation in the fight against drug trafficking and the extradition of drug lords. By contrast, legalization is considered to be the worst possible action the government could take.

13. The relationship with Central America is positive but there are red flags on the horizon. The proximity with Central America represents more benefits for Mexicans than problems, and there is a positive view of the relationship with Guatemala, with emphasis placed on the economic and trade agenda rather than security issues. However, Central American countries and immigrants are among the least favored by Mexicans, who are divided between establishing temporary work programs and toughening border controls.

14. On issues of global governance, Mexicans sympathize with multilateralism but are reluctant to delegate authority and abide by joint decisions. Issues such as nuclear proliferation, strengthening the multilateral architecture, cooperation in development, the defense of human rights and the promotion of democracy are of moderate or low priority. There is limited support for abiding by multilateral decisions that are inconvenient for Mexico, even though there is support for the participation of Mexico in UN Peacekeeping Operations, particularly those of a humanitarian nature.

15. Leaders support opening trade negotiations with the BRICS, entering the TPP, and establishing financial regulation with “teeth.” Emerging economies are seen as an opportunity niche that the country must take advantage of through trade integration. They positively assess the benefits the country has reaped through its network of free trade agreements and believe that trade agreements should contain environmental and labor obligations. In order to contain the risks of protectionism, the elite support greater financial regulation with “teeth” at the international level.
Contact with, Interest in, and Knowledge about the World

• **Mexicans have a similar interest in national and international news**: 59% are very or somewhat interested in news about the national social and political situation, 56% in the foreign relations of Mexico, and 51% in finance and economy.

• **The public pays little attention to international affairs, but leaders are very attentive**: 53% report little or no general interest in international affairs, whereas 93% of leaders are very or somewhat interested.

• **A minority has direct contact with the world, and a large part of their international mobility involves residences abroad**: 76% of Mexicans have never traveled outside of the country, but 94% of leaders have at least once in their life. Of the 24% that have traveled at some point outside of the country, one of every 2 has lived abroad, mainly in the United States (88%) and for labor reasons (65%).

• **The main contact of Mexicans with the world is indirect via family networks of migrants**: 49% of those surveyed reported having relatives that live outside of the country, of which 34% are close family members (11 points higher than in 2010); one out of every five receive remittances, 19% maintain contact with foreigners in Mexico and 11% speak a foreign language.

• **Public knowledge of international issues is narrow and limiting**: 58% of the public correctly identified the acronym ONU (UN), 51% FIFA, 50% CNDH, 23% OEA (OAS), 21% SRE, and 13% FMI (IMF). Leaders have more knowledge on the subject: 94% identified OEA, 76% OMC (WTO), 61% OCDE (OECD), 41% APEC and 26%, CELAC. The average awareness of countries (74.4%) is greater than that of organizations (59.3%) and international leaders (55.6%).

• **Knowledge gaps regarding the Mexican Foreign Ministry suggest social communication problems**: Most people know the name of their governor (73%) and of the President of the United States (71%), but only a fifth correctly identify the acronym SRE and even less know the name of the Foreign Minister (5%), and that Mexico chaired the G-20 at the moment the survey was carried out (8%).
Nationalism and Identity

- The Mexican Nation is still the primary political community of identification and belonging: 64% of the public and 82% of the leaders identified primarily as Mexicans, before identifying locally (34 and 14%, respectively). For 39% of the population, national and sub-national identities aren’t exclusive, given that they identify nationally, as Mexican, and equally identify locally, as from their state.

- There is a high commitment to Mexican nationality: 52% of the population and 37% of leaders say that if they weren’t Mexican, they wouldn’t like any other nationality. American is the alternate identity most chosen by the public (14%), whereas the leaders chose Canadian more than any other nationality (9%).

- Mexicans consider themselves and their country as part of Latin America: the public (50%) and leaders (51%) essentially identify themselves as Latin American. The second most important identity is Cosmopolitan (27% of the public, 38% of leaders). There remains a low identification with both immediate geographic areas: North America (8% of the public, 7% of leaders) and Central America (7% and 2%, respectively). Those surveyed consider Mexico to be a more Latin American country than North American (48% of the public and 50% of leaders).

- A strong sense of national pride and high esteem of the importance and international reputation of Mexico was reaffirmed: large majorities of the public (85%) and leaders (86%) are very proud to be Mexican; both share the opinion that Mexico is very important on an international level (56% of the public, 46% of leaders), that it is more relevant today than a decade ago (65% of both groups) and that its image in the world is very or somewhat good (68% of the public, 57% of leaders).

- There exists cultural openness and receptivity to ideas and customs from abroad, but stubbornness when it comes to granting political rights to foreign nationals: 50% of the population and 92% of leaders consider the spread of ideas and customs from other countries in Mexico as a good thing. However, only a minority agreed that naturalized foreigners should be eligible to run for office as Senators or Congressman (20% of the public, 52% of the leaders) or President (13 and 29%, respectively).

- Individual pragmatism limits adherence to national sovereignty: 60% of Mexicans favor forming a single country with the United States if it means an increase in their quality of life. This pattern is repeated on a smaller scale when the hypothetical union is proposed with Central America (56% in favor).

- The public mainly associates nationalism with patriotic aspects, pride and national reputation, rather than civic actions or chauvinistic attitudes: For the public, being nationalist means, above all, respecting patriotic symbols (an average of 6.7 on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 being a very important action in order to be nationalist and 1 as not important), defend the country in the case of war (6.2) and supporting the national soccer team (5.6). Leaders, on the other hand, associate nationalism with paying taxes (6.6), defending the country in the case of war (6.5) and respecting patriotic symbols (6.1). The action least associated with nationalism is opposing the United States (4.1 for the public, 2.8 for leaders).

Perception of Security and the World

- Despite public pessimism about the global situation, there is a growing conviction that the best thing for the future of the country is to play an active international role: 68% of the public believe that the world is worse
today than a decade ago, and 49% believe it will be worse in 10 years. However, large majorities (72% of the public and 95% of leaders) believe that the best thing for the future of Mexico is to actively participate in global affairs, an increase of 16 percentage points from 2006. Investing resources to support such participation elicits less support: 39% of the public and 31% of leaders believe that Mexico should increase the number of Embassies and Consulates abroad.

- The perception remains that the greatest international threats are those that directly affect the security and well-being of people: drug trafficking and organized crime continue, since 2004, to be the greatest concern of the public (82%) and leaders (91%), followed by global warming (80% of the public, 82% of leaders), and the scarcity and high cost of food (79% of the public, 78% of leaders). The threats that are viewed with intermediate severity are terrorism, nuclear weapons, military spending, border conflicts, human rights violations and inequality among rich countries and poor countries. The majority don’t perceive either undocumented immigration (47% of the public, 36% of leaders), or the rise of China as a global power (37 and 17%, respectively) as grave threats.

- Mexicans are not in favor of the legalization of drugs, but they do prefer prevention and rehabilitation to military actions in the fight against drug trafficking: on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being not effective at all and 7 being very effective, the public and leaders agree that the most effective actions against drug trafficking and organized crime are treating addicts (6.1 in both groups) and drug-use prevention campaigns (5.9 for the public, 6.2 for leaders). The least effective option for the public is legalizing drug consumption (3.0), and for the leaders, permitting American troops on Mexican territory (2.1).

Multilateralism and Foreign Policy

- Foreign policy should focus on bettering the image of Mexico, improving the safety and well-being of the population and promoting economic development: The most important foreign policy objectives for the Mexican public are promoting Mexican culture (77%), fighting drug trafficking and organized crime (75%), protecting the environment (75%), attracting tourists (73%), increasing exports (73%) and protecting Mexicans who live abroad (70%). The least important objectives are promoting regional integration (50%), strengthening the UN (46%), helping spread democracy to other countries (43%) and strengthening the OAS (37%). Among leaders, the most important challenges are protecting the environment (91%), fighting drug trafficking and organized crime (90%) and protecting the interests of Mexicans abroad (90%).

- There is a marked preference for the use of soft power instruments to influence: The vast majority of the public is strongly or somewhat in favor of using cultural (90%), trade (89%), and diplomatic (76%) resources to increase the international influence of Mexico. Leaders agree categorically with the three (98% for trade and cultural resources, 97% for diplomatic resources). On the other hand, support for military resources as an instrument of foreign policy is much lower among the public (54%) and almost non-existent among leaders (15%). For both groups, commercial instruments are the most important (46% of the public, 42% of leaders).

- The evaluation of foreign policy improves, surpassing approval of other public policies. One out of every two Mexicans and 65% of leaders (an increase of 9 points from 2010) evaluate government performance in foreign affairs as very or somewhat favorable, putting it in second place behind approval for economic policy (54% of the public, 67% of leaders). The protection of Mexicans abroad is third best evaluated area of public policy by the public (50%) and leaders (59%).
• Public opinion supports the participation of Mexico in UN Peacekeeping Operations, provided they are humanitarin in nature and in areas with proven experience: 58% of the public and 52% of leaders support the participation of Mexico in PKO in general. However, while 46% of the public reject sending Mexican military peacekeepers to conflict zones, large majorities (89% of the public, 95% of leaders) are strongly in favor of sending military personnel to other countries to help in natural disaster response.

• The strong multilateral commitment of leaders contrasts with the low willingness of the public to accept the decisions and jurisdiction of multilateral organizations: leaders are convinced multilateralists, with 67% in favor of Mexico abiding by UN decisions even if they don’t approve of them. 78% believe that international courts can judge Mexican citizens. 79% accept the decisions of the WTO even though they aren’t favorable. 96.6% on average think that trade agreements should force countries to comply with environmental, labor and human rights standards. 73% are in favor of Mexico respecting the commitments undertaken at the last G-20 reunion, and 76% are in favor of strengthening the regulatory capacities of the G-20 Financial Stability Board. In contrast, 45% of the public are against Mexico abiding by UN decisions that they don’t agree with, 10 percentage points lower than in 2008. The issue of international court jurisdiction divides public opinion: 45% are in favor, and 41% against, international courts trying a Mexican accused of crimes against humanity, even though support increases to 52% if the accused is a politician or public official.

• The UN is the best known, most reliable and best evaluated international organization, but it isn’t a foreign policy priority: Average knowledge of the UN is high (84%), the majority of the people (53%) and leaders (81%) strongly or somewhat trust the institution, and it is the mostly highly evaluated organization (72 points by the public, 76 by leaders). The most poorly evaluated organization by both groups is ALBA (53). In spite of this, strengthening the UN is priority number 14 for the public, and 12 for leaders, on a list of 16 foreign policy objectives.

International Economy

• Strong support for economic liberalization, except for in the oil sector: 42% of the public believes economic globalization to be generally good for Mexico. 77% believe that foreign investment strongly or somewhat benefits the country. 72% consider free trade to be good for the economies of developed countries, 64% for the Mexican economy, 59% for their own standard of living, 52% for Mexican farmers, and 51% for the environment. The bastion of economic nationalism continues to be energy, in particular oil: 47% are against allowing foreign investment in the electricity sector, and 65% against foreign investment in the oil sector.

• For leaders, economic liberalization is a central component of economic development: 74% believe globalization, as well as foreign investment, is generally good for Mexico (90%). The majority think that free trade benefits the economies of developed countries (89%), their personal standard of living (77%), the Mexican economy (73%), the environment (51%) and Mexican farmers (47%). The country’s elite widely accept foreign investment in telecommunications (80%), media (76%), electricity (67%) and oil (59%).

• Leaders positively evaluate free trade agreements, and support signing new trade agreements with the BRICS and entering the TPP: 76% of leaders consider NAFTA to have been very or somewhat beneficial to the country. 68% believe the same about FTA EU-MX and 58% about the FTA with Japan. Furthermore, 87% favor Mexico signing free trade agreements with Brazil, India (76%), China (69%), South Africa (66%), and Russia (65%). Eight out of every 10 leaders somewhat or strongly agree with Mexico entering the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Migration

• **Even though the percentage of Mexicans with relatives outside of the country stayed the same, the number of homes with close family members abroad, and those that receive remittances, increased:** One of every two Mexicans has family abroad, and a third of those are family members who lived in their home, 11 points higher than in 2010. Furthermore, 20% of the homes reported receiving remittances, an increase of 8 points from 2010.

• **Even though emigration is viewed negatively, the percentage of people who would leave to live in another country, if they could, increased:** 51% of the public believe that emigration is bad for Mexico, 47% believe it is bad for communities, cities, and towns of origin, and 44% believe it is bad for the families of the emigrants. In comparison, 47% believe that the emigration of Mexicans is beneficial for the countries that receive them. However, the desire to emigrate increased from 37% in 2010 to 42%, with the principal destinations being the United States (59%) and Canada (9%).

• **In general, public opinion of immigration is good, but negative evaluations of the social contributions of immigrants slightly increased:** 61% of the public express a generally favorable opinion towards foreigners living in the country. Likewise, 74% strongly or somewhat agree that they contribute to the Mexican economy, and 7 out of 10 believe they bring innovative ideas. However, 51% agree that they weaken customs and traditions, 49% that they take jobs from Mexicans and 41% that they generate insecurity.

• **There is a preference for foreigners from certain countries and with certain characteristics:** The Americans (55%), the Chinese (53%) and the Spanish (51%) are among the foreigners most favored by the public. Argentines (42%), Colombians (38%) and Guatemalans (35%) have lower approval ratings. Furthermore, 85% believe that foreigners who come to Mexico should have a profession or trade that the country needs, and 65% say they should be highly skilled. Only 2 out of every 5 favor allowing poorly skilled immigrants to enter.

• **Mexicans continue to be willing to grant immigrants the same rights they demand for their compatriots abroad:** A large majority believes that Mexicans who live abroad have a right to public education (94%), to a job under the same conditions as a citizen of that country (92%), to bring their family to live with them (84%) and to vote in the country where they live (74%). Moreover, they are willing to grant the same rights to foreigners residing in Mexico, but with less intensity (91, 84, 84 and 61%, respectively).

• **Temporary work programs are the preferred public policy option when dealing with immigration or emigration:** 78% of the public and 82% of leaders agree that the government of Mexico should adopt temporary work programs as a response to undocumented immigration. In contrast, 70% of the public and 89% of the elite reject building walls along the border. Regarding emigration, the preferred options of the public are the negotiation of a temporary worker program with United States (30%) and the legalization of undocumented Mexicans living in the country (29%), while leaders prefer that the Mexican government invest in creating employment in areas of high emigration (46%).

Neighbors

• **The proximity to and relationship with the United States and Guatemala are perceived as important, in good condition and more of an advantage than a problem:** The public (74%) and leaders (97%) value the relationship
with the United States as very or somewhat important for Mexico. Furthermore, they consider the bilateral relationship to be good or very good (60% of the public, 68% of leaders), and that proximity with the U.S. represents more advantages than problems (57% of the public, 71% of leaders). The relationship with Guatemala is also valued as very or somewhat important, though less so by the public (50%) than by leaders (90%). Both groups consider the relationship with our southern neighbor to be good or very good (49% public, 57% leaders), and they share the same positive perception that the proximity with Central America is more advantageous than problematic (47% of the public, 65% of leaders), though to less of a degree than with the United States.

- **The agendas and priorities are different with each neighbor:** the public and leaders agree that trade and investment is the most important issue in the relationship with the United States (45 and 54%, respectively), followed by drug trafficking and organized crime for the public (18%) and migration for the elite (20%). While with Guatemala the most important aspect of the relationship for the public is also trade and investment (31%), leaders prioritize migration (31%). Both place border security (27% of the public and 28% of leaders) as the second most important issue.

- **There are differences of opinion about Americans and Guatemalans, as well as gaps in knowledge and evaluation of the Presidents of the United States and Guatemala:** 55% of the public maintain a good or very good opinion of Americans that live in Mexico, while 20% have a bad or very bad opinion. This result contrasts with the less positive view of Guatemalans (35% good or very good and 31% bad or very bad). There is an enormous recognition gap between President Barack Obama (80% on average) and Otto Perez (only 18%). The evaluation of Obama on behalf of the public (64 approval rate) and leaders (72) is greater than that of Perez Molina (49 and 57, respectively).

- **Most accept U.S. cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime even if it involves certain conditions:** 47% of the public and 68% of leaders are in favor of the United States providing financial aid to Mexico to combat drug trafficking and organized crime. 65% of the public would continue to accept U.S. help even if they oversee management of resources, and 46% firmly hold the same position even if it involves sending U.S. agents to operate in Mexico. Leaders agree that cooperation could involve the U.S. controlling funds (76%), but they reject the presence of agents in Mexico (62%).

**North American Relations**

- **Mexicans have a good opinion of the United States, and the country’s image has notably improved:** The United States is better evaluated out of a list of 23 countries, with 71 approval points by the public, almost 9 points more than in 2008. Leaders evaluated other countries more highly: Canada and Germany (both with 79 points), Japan (77) and Brazil (74), with the United States in fifth place (71). Between 2004 and 2012, there was a constant increase in positive feelings of trust and admiration towards the United States, 20 and 15 percentage points, respectively. Two out of every 5 Mexicans and 54% of leaders reported having feelings of trust, and 44% of the population and 59% of the elite felt admiration for the U.S.

- **The United States is considered to be the best development model for Mexico, with North America being both a regional priority and a priority for economic integration:** 40% of Mexicans identify the United States as the country that best serves as a development model for Mexico, an affirmation accepted by only 13% of leaders, who choose Brazil and Germany instead (31% each). 35% of the public believes that the most important region for Mexico is North America versus 29% that lean towards Latin America. For leaders, Latin America is the top
regional priority (32%), followed by North America and Asia (26% each). A third of both the public and leaders agree that integration with North America is an economic priority of Mexico, but more leaders prefer integration with Latin America (36%), which the public places in second place (28%).

- **The good image of the United States does not translate into a clear willingness to take joint decisions with the country, but it does lead to a desire for preferential treatment:** 54% of the population and 49% of leaders do not agree with Mexico making joint decisions with the United States if that implies accepting compromises they don’t like. However, 46% of the public and 55% of leaders prefer a special relationship with the United States to working with Canada to advance their joint interests opposite the Americans. A similar pattern can be found with Latin America: 45% of the public and 51% of leaders prefer a special relationship rather than Latin American consultation as a counterweight.

- **Mexicans positively value some American policies, but condemn their actions towards Cuba:** on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being very negative and 7 very positive, those surveyed favorably evaluated American policy promoting free trade, placing it first (with an average of 5.1 for the public and 4.7 for leaders), followed by their policy towards Mexico (5.1 and 4.3) and the fight against terrorism (5.1 and 4.0). However, they disapprove of their policies towards Cuba (3.8 and 2.3).

### Latin American Relations

- **Brazil is the most highly rated Latin American country, and it is perceived by leaders as a successful development model:** Brazil is the third best rated country by the public (with an average approval of 64 points) and the 4th among leaders (74 points). Furthermore, together with Germany, Brazil is considered as the best development model for Mexico by leaders (31%).

- **Hugo Chavez and Raul Castro are the lowest rated heads of state; Benedict XVI and Barack Obama, the highest:** Out of a list of 10 international personalities, the worst rating was given to the late Hugo Chavez (39 points in both groups) and Raul Castro (37 by the public, 44 by leaders). Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI (68) and President Obama (64) are the highest rated by the public, coming ahead of even former President Calderon (63). Leaders evaluated Obama (72), Dilma Roussef (69), Ban Ki-moon (68) and Benedict XVI (61) most highly, with Calderon (59) in fifth place.

- **Mexican leaders look to the South and the public to the North:** a relative majority of leaders (32%) chose Latin America as the region to which Mexico should pay the most attention, and 36% think Mexico should prioritize greater economic integration with the region. In contrast, the public thinks North America should be the priority among regions (35%), and that Mexico should push for greater economic integration with the same (32%).

- **The elite see Mexico as a regional leader; the public see it as “one among equals”:** support among the elite grew in favor of Mexico seeking to be the leader of Latin America (52%), even though 45% lean towards regional participation without ambitions of leadership. 71% agree that Mexico should allocate resources for the development of Central America, six points higher than in 2008. The public, on the other hand, prefers active participation without leadership (44%) to seeking regional leadership (38%), and they are divided with respect to Mexican cooperation in Central American development (49% in favor, 48% opposed).
• **Latin America is viewed with optimism, and it is estimated that relations with the region have improved:** 40% of the public and 73% of leaders believe Latin America is better than it was 10 years ago. Both agree that the relationship with the region has improved in the last decade (53% of the public, 60% of leaders).

• **The Latin American integration agenda is about economics and infrastructure; it is not political or social:** the public strongly or somewhat supports promoting an integration agenda primarily based on the construction of roads and bridges (79%), free flow of investments (77%) and free trade of goods and services (75%). The elite second this agenda with a greater intensity (94, 90 and 91% respectively). The least supported options are the creation of a common currency (48% are strongly or somewhat in favor), the formation of a Latin American army (45%) and the free flow of people (45%). Among leaders, the movement of people (51%), a common currency (33%) and a Latin American army (20%) were also the least supported options.

**Asia**

• **Asia enjoyed a substantial increase in the preferences of leaders:** Asia rose 10 percentage points as the region to which leaders believed Mexico should pay the most attention (26%). A similar percentage chose North America, and Europe fell in ratings (only 10% name it as a priority).

• **Asia is seen by Mexicans as a region of opportunity for the country, but not as a priority:** 47% of the public and 79% of leaders believe that the region is an opportunity for Mexico against 27% and 15%, respectively, that see it as a risk. However, only 4% of the public believe that Asia should be a regional priority for Mexico.

• **The economic rise of China and its influence in the world and in Mexico are positively appraised:** 46% of people and 3 out of every 5 leaders rated China’s growth as good for the world. Furthermore 49% of the public and 35% of the elite believe that the influence of China on Mexico is positive, while a minority of the public (19%) and leaders (22%) see it negatively.

**Relations with Europe**

• **Europe loses priority for Mexico:** 9% of the public and 10% of leaders chose Europe as the region of the world to which Mexico should most pay attention, a far third place behind North America (35%) and Latin America (29%) among the public. Leaders rate it fourth place, 16 points below Asia.

• **European countries have a very positive image in Mexico:** the public holds a very high opinion of Germany (64 points and third place in preference) and Spain (62 points and sixth place). The highest rated country by leaders was Germany (79). They placed Spain in ninth place with 64 points.

• **German investment is preferred, while Spanish investment is not:** for Mexican leaders, German investors are more trustworthy (24%), followed by those from Canada (16%), the United States and Japan (15%), Lebanon (6%), Spain and Brazil (5%), and, lastly, China (2%).
For Mexico, 2012 was an eminently political year, marked by the return of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) to the Presidency after 12 years of governance by the National Action Party (PAN). The intense electoral calendar set the rhythm for the national political context and a new redistribution of power in the country. Although public attention focused on federal elections for the Presidency and the complete renewal of the Senate and Congress, at the local level elections were held to elect 6 governors, the Head of Government of the Federal District, and 875 municipal authorities in 14 states. It was a highly competitive electoral process which, while not reaching the level of political polarization and disqualification of results seen in 2006, saw the candidates, political parties and campaigns quickly overwhelmed by the emergence of citizen movements in social networks that questioned the low quality of Mexican democracy, insufficient and uneven economic growth and the persistence of wide social inequalities.

The election results showed the absence of broad electoral majorities and the deep ideological plurality which characterizes Mexican society at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century. At the federal level, the national political map moved from the right towards the center and center left of the spectrum with a drop in electoral preferences for the PAN and the growth of both the PRI and the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). The candidate for the PRI, Enrique Pena Nieto, won the Presidency with 38.2% of the votes, 6.6 percentage points ahead of his closest competitor, the candidate for the leftist coalition, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, and 12.2 points ahead of the candidate for the PAN, Josefina Vazquez Mota. Despite the triumph of the Institutional Revolutionary Party in the presidential election, their position of relative majority in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, and their consolidation as a main local political force, having obtained 54% of municipal posts up for election for the sixth time since 1997, the party endorsed the formation of a Government without a legislative majority. The most telling sign of the growing plurality and political diversity in 2012 was the emergence of the student movement “Yo soy 132,” which used social networks to denounce the enormous political influence of the so-called “powers that be”, especially the two largest television networks.

Overall, the campaigns and the candidates paid little attention to the international agenda, and, unlike the Presidential elections of 2006, when Lopez Obrador was accused of receiving foreign support from then President of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, this time no foreign policy issues emerged as sources of political controversy or tools towards electoral ends. Nor were there major programmatic differences between the foreign policy platforms of the
INTRODUCTION

different parties, even though the PRD and the PRI criticized the diplomacy of the governing PAN, primarily for its “low profile and scarce results” and secondly for its “lack of independence from the United States”. Likewise, both groups emphasized the loss of international presence by Mexico and the deterioration of the image of the country abroad as a result of the insecurity at home.

In addition to the elections, the public security issues remained one of the principal axes of concern and attention for citizens and the media. In spite of official numbers from the federal government, state governments—indeed, of their political affiliation—, and several international organizations showing that the escalation of violence had begun to fall after several years on the rise, media coverage of criminal acts across the country continued to be status quo, along with demands from various sectors and social movements against impunity and in favor of recognizing the rights of victims. Therefore, it came as no surprise that a large part of the political-electoral debate of 2012 revolved around the need to revisit the security strategy undertaken during the six years President Felipe Calderon governed.

In regards to the national economic context, in 2012, Mexico maintained stable macroeconomic conditions—foreign reserves reached historic levels—, showing signs of resilience against an adverse external environment. Throughout the year, a high level of uncertainty and global turbulence prevailed as a result of worsening sovereign debt problems in the euro zone, a strong European recession, economic slowdown in the United States and the loss of dynamism in emerging markets. Although global economic activity showed a slower pace of growth in 2012 (3.1%) than in previous years (3.8% in 2011 and 5.1% in 2010), the Mexican economy continued its same positive trajectory of moderate growth (3.9%) as the year before. According to data from the World Bank and the National Institute for Statistics and Geography (INEGI), conditions of low inflation and moderate growth allowed for the creation of jobs in the formal sector, but with low and precarious wage ranges. The informal sector, in turn, continued to grow. On this point, the results of the survey Mexico, the Americas and the World show that, even with this hard data, around half of the population had a pessimistic reading of the evolution of the economic situation of the country in the last year.

In the field of international relations in Mexico, two events stand out that were the subject of extensive national media coverage: The first was the official visit of then Pope Benedict XVI to Mexico from the 23rd to the 25th of March. The second was the celebration of the Seventh G-20 Leaders Summit in Los Cabos, a few weeks before federal elections on July 1, 2012. It was a dialogue that transcended strictly governmental issues, in which parallel channels of interaction were opened between businessmen (Business 20), academia (Think 20), civil society (Civil 20), the labor sector (Labor 20) and young people (Youth 20). On this occasion, Mexico proposed a broad agenda that transcended the limits of technical discussion on possible reforms to the international financial system and covered environmental issues, trade protectionism and energy, among other things. There were other matters of a commercial nature such as the negotiations for the ratification of a free trade agreement with Peru, which, although they were the subject of minor public interest from mass media, had a certain impact on business and production sectors due to the open opposition of some groups from the private sector. The same can be said of the failure in negotiations of an eventual free trade agreement with Brazil, and the subsequent differences that resulted from the reversal of terms of a free trade agreement between the two in the automotive sector that, furthermore, gave way to a similar dispute with Argentina.

On the international level, several events may have had some impact on the perceptions and attitudes collected by the survey Mexico, the Americas and the World. First of all, the Olympics took place in London, and Mexico won the gold medal in soccer after winning the final against Brazil. Secondly, Hugo Chavez’s illness and the presidential elections in Venezuela also received some attention from the national media. Third, the problems of criminal violence south of the Mexican border, and the flow of Central American migrants who cross Mexico in search of the American dream, were also of national media interest.

Finally, in 2012 the Mexican electoral calendar coincided with presidential and legislative elections in the United States. During the first half of the year, primary elections were held, marked by an atmosphere of polarization and political tension. Migration was a subject of electoral debate, generating wide media coverage in Mexico. The Repub-
Republican Party openly campaigned in favor of the principal demands of its most conservative factions, demands such as increased border control and stricter visa requirements, deportation of undocumented immigrants, denial of health and education services to foreigners with no immigration papers and sanctions for those who employed them. Anti-immigration voices and movements also placed emphasis on the problem of criminal violence along the border with Mexico. Thus, the U.S. Presidential Elections helped expose the Achilles heel of Mexico's international image: insecurity. The electoral outcome in United States with the re-election of President Barack Obama, thanks, in part, to people of Hispanic origin, would end up finally paving the way for possible immigration reform in the country.

This report of the results of the fifth edition of the survey Mexico, the Americas and the World sounds out the social imaginary in the face of the greatest problems of the global agenda in light of the changing national and international circumstances described. This is a particularly interesting moment to study the link between the domestic and foreign politics of a country, due to the context of the end of a six-year administration and the beginning of a new government coinciding with a change of party in the Presidency. This report does not claim to be exhaustive, but rather draw attention to some key aspects of the relationship of Mexico with the world. It is organized into eight thematic chapters: Interest in and Contact with the World, Identity and Nationalism in México, International Threats and National Security, Opinions and Attitudes Towards Countries and Regions, Foreign Policy Instruments and Objectives, Multilateralism, International Economy, and, lastly, The Multiple Faces of Migration. It closes with a section of conclusions that highlights patterns of continuity and change in the international political culture of Mexicans from 2004 to 2012. We hope that the information contained here is useful for teachers, researchers, students, government officials and diplomats, as well as the public in general, interested in international relations and the foreign policy of Mexico.
CHAPTER 1
Interest in and Contact with the World

Interest in the International

How much attention do Mexicans give international issues compared to their interest in political, social and economic matters on the national agenda? Are citizens more interested in internal problems than what happens outside of the country? Is interest in the global reality similar throughout the country, or are there gaps between regions and distinct segments of Mexican society? These questions are even more important in the context of political transition in Mexico, for both academic and public policy reasons.

2012 was a year in which Presidential and Congressional electoral campaigns resulted in an open discussion of issues of interest to the public. The role of international relations in the campaigns was small and sporadic, given that foreign affairs was neither the subject of controversy nor a pivotal issue in the national political debate. This is a particularly appropriate moment to investigate to what extent the public’s attention is centered on domestic issues in an electoral period, overshadowing their interest in international affairs. Likewise, from a public policy point of view, the new administration faces the challenge of assessing how volatile or stable the agenda of public interest in international issues is, especially when the moment arrives to define the foreign policy agenda and reach agreements. This requires researching whether or not global problems are on citizens’ radar of interest.

The results of the survey shed light on these questions and confirm three findings of previous surveys. First of all, they show that no gap in citizen interest in national events and international events exists, nor is there a general inclination among the public that would lead them to give priority to national issues over international ones. Secondly, it is possible to distinguish the existence of both an interested and a disinterested public in Mexican society, and this difference reflects social and economic gaps that are primarily related to income and education levels and, to a lesser extent, to other variables such as place of residence and gender. Finally, there is a high level of stability in the level of citizen interest in public affairs and the thematic distribution of their interest.

As Figure 1.1 shows, the general public and leaders report very similar levels of interest in both domestic and international issues. When asked the direct question “How interested are you in news?” regarding various issues, 59% of the public said that they are very or somewhat interested in news about finance and economics, Mexico’s relations with other countries, and social and political conditions in Mexico? The order of the topics they were asked about changed throughout the survey to avoid order bias.  

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1 The question whose results are reported in this graph is the following: “When you follow the news, how interested are you in news about… finance and economics, Mexico’s relations with other countries, and social and political conditions in Mexico?”. The order of the topics they were asked about changed throughout the survey to avoid order bias.
about finance and economics. The same pattern is seen with leaders, albeit with markedly higher levels of interest, with a difference of around 40 percentage points, on all issues: 98% of leaders are interested in the national political and social conditions, 95% in Mexico’s relations with other countries and 91% in the economy. In addition to the interest gap between the general population and their leaders, the data also reveals differences marked by education level and income. Among Mexicans with a college education, the average general interest in the three issues they were asked about was 21 points higher than that of those who only had an elementary school education. In regards to the socio-economic level of the respondents, the interest in news about economic, political and international issues in the highest income group is ten percentage points higher than that among those with lower incomes.

It should be noted that no variations were observed in how much attention Mexicans pay to national and international issues on the public agenda, nor were there significant changes in how that attention was distributed among thematic areas. Interest in national, international and economic political news has remained virtually stable since 2010. Over the past two years, public interest in issues of national politics went from 54% to 59%, remained at 56% for international politics and went from 46 to 51% for economic issues, insignificant changes, considering the margin of error. This data timidly points to a slight upward trend from 2008 to 2012 in the proportion of Mexicans interested in all topics.

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4 In this fifth wave, the margin of error was ±2 for the general public and ±4.4 among the leaders.
Finally, with respect to the general level of interest in international affairs, the survey shows that the “uninterested” segments of the population are in the majority (53% reported having little or no interest) compared to “interested” circles (46% are very or somewhat interested). Therefore, it is possible to speak of an average level of international interest among the Mexican public. In contrast, the large majority of leaders are highly interested in global problems: 93% of the elite surveyed said they were very (68%) or somewhat (25%) interested in the issues mentioned.

When interest in international affairs is captured in general terms, social gaps due to education and income levels are more evident than when asking about interest in the news by issue: the better educated and those with higher income are markedly more interested in what happens in the world than those who have lower levels of education and income, with a difference of 26 and 12 percentage points, respectively. Furthermore, regional differences abound (48% of those who live in the Center of the country showed interest, 45% of those in the North and 40% of those in the South), and differences among genders as well (50% of men are interested in international issues compared to 43% of women) that are much less noticeable in the answers to the question about following news based on issues.

Level, Channel and Type of Contact with the World

Given that the average Mexican is moderately interested in international issues and holds no clear particular preference for national events over international events, one must ask exactly how in touch he or she is with the outside world and what their principal channels for staying informed and connected with what happens outside of the country are. It is likely that differences in attention to and interest in international affairs that exists among the public and leaders are related to the degree of exposure and contact that people have with the international reality. In order to gather information on the subject, the survey includes a set of questions about direct contact (trips and residencies abroad) and indirect contact (family abroad, relationship with foreigners in Mexico, use of cellular phone, use of internet and knowledge of foreign languages).

A first finding that emerges from analysis of the survey data is that direct avenues of contact with the exterior carry less weight than indirect mechanisms such as family and social networks. As Figure 1.2 shows, only a minority of Mexicans have ever left the country: one out of every 5 Mexicans report having traveled abroad at least once in their life. The average amount of trips abroad in a lifetime among the national adult population is 2.18. The gap in contact with the exterior between the general public and leaders is huge: 61% of leaders reported having traveled abroad more than 10 times, and the average amount of trips in a lifetime for the group was 41.6, almost 20 times higher than the national average.

Similarly, important regional differences are observed in the level of contact with the exterior. While a third of Mexicans that live in the North and 24% of those that live in the Center of the country have traveled outside of Mexico at least once in their life, the lowest level of contact abroad can be found in the South, with only 14% of the population having experienced international travel. It’s important to note that between 2004 and 2012, a general downward trend in international travel was seen that shows up for both leaders and the general public in all regions of the country. The only group to show an increase is the percentage of leaders that report having traveled abroad between one and ten times in their lives.

Another measurement of the level of contact and exposure to the outside world is the experience of having lived abroad. When this variable is measured, it is found that, even though the amount of trips abroad are relatively low, a significant proportion of those who leave the country report having lived abroad. Therefore, a large part of the international mobility of Mexicans is not of a transitory nature, nor can it be explained by short outings for tourism or vacations, but rather involves relatively longer time spent abroad.

3 The direct question was the following: “And, in general, how much are you interested in international affairs?”
Figure 1.3 illustrates this finding with precision. 50% of the population that reported taking trips abroad have lived outside of the country, whereas 49% have not. The United States is by far the main destination of Mexicans who have lived abroad at some point in their life (88%). This significant data reveals that half of the Mexicans that have had direct contact with the outside world have been exposed for relatively long periods to other social and cultural contexts, particularly the American way of life.

As for the motivation to leave and live abroad, work (65%) and family (27%) predominate over other factors. Schooling comes in third place (9%), escaping insecurity in fourth (3%), and, finally, natural disasters (2%). It should be noted that despite the escalation of criminal violence affecting many regions of the country in recent years, insecurity has not been an important reason to leave Mexico. Only 1% of leaders mentioned having left Mexico because of insecurity.

In regards to the multiple indirect channels through which Mexicans connect to the outside world, the survey reveals that they are even more important than the above direct channels. The principal routes linking Mexicans with the outside world are the family networks that result from migration. Nearly half of the public (49%) has relatives living outside of the country, 34% have a close family member in said situation, and a fifth receive remittances from abroad. While this data is discussed in detail in Chapter 8 of this report, it greatly reveals the importance of family and social networks as a means of contact with the outside.

On the other hand, the level of contact the Mexican public has with foreigners residing in the country is sig-
One out of every five surveyed reported having contact with foreigners living in Mexico. This means that the percentage of Mexicans who have contact with foreigners within the country is 30 percentage points less than the segment of the population with family contacts abroad. The indirect contact patterns of leaders are diametrically different from those of the general public; the large majority (84%) of them report having contact with foreigners in Mexico.

The marked differences between leaders and the public regarding the level, channel and type of contact with the world show up again when looking at the percentage of Mexicans that speak a foreign language: while 11% of the public speaks some foreign language (generally English), 76% of leaders report doing the same. Two other measures of indirect contact among the public are the use of cell phones (60%) and internet (32%). However, these indicators are insufficient given that they only suggest the technological possibilities the Mexican population has of receiving information from abroad and participating in transnational social networks. They do not measure if these indirect contact channels do indeed hold some weight nor do they gauge to what extent.

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**Figure 1.3. Contact with the Outside via Living Abroad**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Which Country?**

- United States: 88
- Germany: 2
- Spain: 1
- Guatemala: 1
- Cuba: 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Disaster</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The percentages of those who responded “Don’t know” and “No answer” are not included.
Knowledge about National and International Affairs

Exactly how informed and how well aware are Mexicans of international affairs? In order to investigate this question, the survey includes a set of eight questions that allow us to obtain information about the degree of knowledge and familiarity Mexicans have with relevant events and actors of national and international reality. The data reported in Figures 1.4 and 1.5 reveal 5 findings that are consistent with what past editions of this survey have found. First, Mexicans have a medium to low level of knowledge regarding both national and international issues. Secondly, they are more familiar with local subjects than national or international ones. Thirdly, the differences in the level of information and knowledge among Mexicans are very marked and primarily depend on the region where they live, their gender, age, education level and income. That is, the greater their income, education level, age and proximity to the northern border, the greater their international knowledge. Fourthly, leaders are much better informed than the public in general. Lastly, a slight variation in knowledge levels was observed over time.

As Figure 1.4 shows, the level of public knowledge of multilateral organizations and international non-governmental organizations varies significantly. Just over half (58%) of Mexicans correctly recognized the acronym in Spanish for the United Nations, ONU, making it the most known international institution in Mexico, followed closely by FIFA (International Federation of Association Football) in second place, with 51% of those surveyed correctly identifying the acronym. On the other hand, a much lower level of knowledge was observed with the other...
two international institutions respondents were asked about. Only 23% of those surveyed correctly identified the acronym in Spanish of the Organization of American States, OEA, which isn’t surprising given the low visibility of the organization in Mexico. What is striking is that so few Mexicans (13%) are familiar with the International Monetary Fund (its acronym in Spanish FMI) with the institution coming in last place.

Another fact worth highlighting is that public knowledge of Mexican institutions is similar to or notably less than that of international institutions. Half of the population correctly recognized the acronym of the National Commission on Human Rights, CNDH, and only 21% could identify the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE). This data reveals that the vast majority of citizens are not familiar with the government bodies in charge of conducting Mexico’s foreign policy. The regional and social gaps in acronym recognition by the public are significant in all cases. The large difference in public recognition of the UN is an illustrative example: 65% of those in the North recognized the acronym, compared to only 44% of those in the South. 63% of men recognized it, compared to 54% of women, and among those with a college education, 87% recognized it, whereas only 45% of those with basic education did.

Leaders make up the most informed group in the country, having specialized knowledge of international issues, even though they know some institutions much better than others: 94% correctly identify the initials of the OAS (71 percentage points higher than the public); 76% of the WTO; 61% of the OECD; 41% of APEC and 26% of the CELAC. It is probable that these differences reflect the age of the organizations.
Figure 1.5 shows another measure of public knowledge more general than the correct identification of acronyms. The large majority of those surveyed know the name of the governor of their State (73%) and a similar percentage know who the President of the United States is (71%). Public awareness of the Euro is 30 percentage points lower (43%), but it is still mid-level. In contrast, only a minority was aware that Mexico presided over the G-20 (8%) and only 5% knew the name of the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The large lack of public knowledge regarding the diplomatic actions of Mexico and the former Mexican Foreign Minister is striking, especially considering the media coverage given to the G-20 reunion celebrated in Los Cabos, Baja California Sur in June of 2012.\(^4\)

In order to measure the information and knowledge of Mexicans about international affairs, an awareness average was created for countries, personalities and organizations, with a five level scale: high, medium-high, medium, medium-low and low. This average reports the percentage of respondents that gave an opinion, be it favorable or unfavorable, about a list of countries, people and organizations, under the assumption that whoever

\(^4\) The survey was carried out shortly after the G-20 Reunion in Los Cabos, from August 18th to September 20th, 2012, for the general public, and from July 16th to October 31st for leaders.

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**Figure 1.6. Average of Public Knowledge of Countries, Political Figures and International Organizations\(^a\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Political Figures</th>
<th>International Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High 80-100%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Felipe Calderon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>Enrique Peña Nieto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Benedict XVI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Baruch Obama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country average</strong></td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>Hugo Chavez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Raul Castro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium-High 60-79%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leaders Average</strong></td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization Average</strong></td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>G20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ALBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium 40-59%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low 20-39%</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Ben Ki-moon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low 0-19%</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Dilma Rousseff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Mariano Rajoy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Otto Perez Molina</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Percentage of respondents who assigned a rating to their opinion of a list of 23 countries, 10 leaders and 9 international organizations on a scale of 0 to 100, with zero being a very unfavorable opinion, 100 a very favorable opinion and 50 neither favorable nor unfavorable.
did had a minimum knowledge about the actor in question. On the contrary, those who refused to express an opinion are assumed to not have sufficient information, just like those who reported not knowing the actor about which they were asked. Results are reported in Figure 1.6. It clearly shows that Mexicans manifest a higher average knowledge of countries (74.4%) than of organizations (59.3%) and international personalities (55.6%). Regarding the knowledge of countries, all countries fall into a category of awareness of medium-high or high. This means that at least 60% of those surveyed had enough information to give an opinion for each country named. With knowledge of national and international leaders, the differences are so marked that they fluctuate from high to low levels. Felipe Calderon (93%), Enrique Pena Nieto (89%), Benedict XVI (86%) and Barack Obama (80%) fall into a high category of awareness average. In a second category are Hugo Chavez with an average of 71%, followed at a distance of 11 points by Raul Castro (60%). The Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon, is located in the penultimate level with 21%. Those leaders least known by the Mexican public are Dilma Rousseff (19%), Mariano Rajoy (19%) and Otto Perez Molina (18%), precisely those with less time in office as functioning presidents of their respective countries. Regarding knowledge of international organizations, the awareness average ranges from high to medium. The most well-known organization is the UN (84%), followed by a second block of four organizations (NAFTA, OAS, IMF and the European Union) with a awareness average at the medium-high level (68, 63, 62 and 60%, respectively), but nearly 20 points lower on average than the UN. On the medium level are the G-20 (53%), Amnesty International (51%), MERCOSUR (50%) and ALBA (43%), all institutions founded more recently or whose geographic area of action is further away from Mexico •
CHAPTER 2
Identity and Nationalism in Mexico

Identity in Mexico

The way in which people understand and relate to the international situation may be, in part, the projection of their own collective identities and affinities. Sometimes feelings of national devotion and localism lead to defensiveness, intolerance or indifference to the outside world, but other times, they are the social foundation that facilitates the construction of cooperative agreements with other countries. From that perspective, the relevant questions are: What unites and what divides Mexicans as a nation in front of other countries and regions of the world? What constitutes the core of political solidarity and intersubjective identification of Mexicans: the nation or the hometown? How strong and how real is the national identity of Mexicans as an expression of social solidarity and shared destiny?

Of the data on the national and local identity profile of Mexicans reported in Figure 2.1, three general observations stand out. The first, for the majority of the public and leaders, the Mexican nation is the primary political community of identification and belonging. The second observation is that national identity not only prevails, it is significantly stronger than local or sub-national identity: 64% of the public identify more with Mexico as a nation as opposed to identifying with the state from which they come, whereas 34% identify primarily with their place of origin rather than with being from Mexico in general. Thirdly, it is observed that the relative weight of national identity has remained virtually stable since 2004, so there is no evidence that changes in the national context, like the economic crisis of 2008-2009 or the celebration of the Bicentennial of Independence or the Centennial of the Revolution, have had an effect on the feeling of national belonging. Instead, local or sub-national identity is more susceptible to changes in the national context, as indicated by changes in trend over the period from 2004 to 2008: the percentage of Mexicans who identified locally grew by 10 percentage points, while in the following four years, it decreased slightly (6 percentage points), reversing the initial trend.

The results show that, while national identity in Mexico is strong and dominates sub-national and local identities, it's far from homogenous, and the phrase “There is no single Mexico, but many” holds much truth. When analyzing regional data, notable differences are observed between the behavior and identity profile of Mexicans, above all between those in the South and those in the rest of the country. Unlike what happens in northern and central Mexico, in southern states local identity prevails (63%) over national (35%). This has been a historical constant since 2004, with the exception of the year of the Bicentennial, in which, on one occasion, the national identity in the South (51%) slightly overtook local identity (47%).
In the same way, the identities of the public and of those of the leaders are not homogenous. The national and sub-national identity profile of leaders is clearly different than that of the rest of the public in two ways. The first is that the national identity of leaders is significantly higher (18 points) than that of the public, while the minority segment of those who identify primarily with their state of origin (14%) is 20 percentage points lower. The second difference is that national identity among leaders is on the rise, with an increase of 18 percentage points between 2004 and 2012.

The above data does not allow the determination of to what extent the national identity of Mexicans is a space of self-identification, shared with their respective local identities. In order to investigate if identities are shared and to what degree one can identify with either, the question was posed in the following way to half of those surveyed: What do you most closely identify with: more Mexican than (gentilic of the state), as Mexican as (gentilic of the state) or more (gentilic of the state) than Mexican? As Figure 2.1 shows, at the level of the general population, national identity prevails over local identity: 43% of those surveyed identify more as Mexican than as a native of their state, whereas 16% identify more locally than nationally. However, the data also shows that for a large section of the Mexican population making up 39%, national and local identities are equally as important and are shared.

Now, another important dimension of the national identity of Mexicans has to do with how loyal they are...
to their nationality and how much they value it against other nationalities. In this edition, the survey collects new information that permits observation of devotion to nationality. The findings shown in Figure 2.2 indicate that Mexicans tend to be very nationalist, but not all to the same degree. Responding to the question, “If you were not Mexican, where would you like to be from?” the majority responded “none” (52%), indicating a relatively high level of loyalty to the Mexican nationality. This sense of nationality is stronger (by 10 or more points) among women, those over 50, those with lower income and those with less education. Unlike the public, with leaders national loyalty was nearly 15 points lower: 37% wouldn’t like being from any other country, while 55% would. Therefore, the identity profile of leaders is different than that of the public, as it combines a greater identification with the nation with less loyalty to nationality.

What are the nationalities that Mexicans would choose? Is there any preference for countries culturally similar to Mexico? With respect to the assessment of other nationalities, the data reveal a dispersion of preferences among Mexicans, though a certain inclination in favor of United States can be seen: 14% of the public say that if they weren’t Mexican, they would like to be American, 3% Spanish, 2% German, 2% Canadian and 14% from other countries. Among leaders, the primary preference is Canada (9%), with the United States and Spain coming in second place (7% for both) and, in third place, Germany (6%). Therefore, there is no inclination towards countries with a culture similar to that of Mexico.

What is the international outlook of the Mexican identity? With which regions of the world do they most identify? Do they see themselves as part of any geographical, cultural, economical, political or social area beyond national borders? What regional identity do they assign their country? From the data reported in Figure 2.3, it is possible to identify three main observations that are consistent with the findings of previous surveys. First, we see that in Mexico there are two relevant supranational identities: the majority identify as Latin American (50% of the public and 51% of leaders) with cosmopolitan being second in importance (27% of the public and 38% of
leaders fundamentally identify themselves as citizens of the world).

The second observation is that Mexicans don’t identify with either of the two immediate geographic areas with which they share a border: only 8% of the public and 7% of leaders feel they are North Americans, while those who identify as Central American are also a minority in both groups (7% of the public and 2% of leaders). This result is striking due to both the Mexico’s extensive physical borders with both regions and the intensity of cross-border economic and social ties, particularly with the United States. Finally, a downward trend is seen among Mexicans who identify as Latin American (12 points less than in 2006) along with a slight increase in a cosmopolitan identity (5 points higher). In this regard, it should be noted that both trends among the general public do not exist among leaders, where the prevailing identities (Latin American and cosmopolitan) have remained constant.

To what extent does the supranational identity of Mexicans on an individual level converge with the regional identity they assign to their country? When respondents are asked about the identity of Mexico as a country, two findings stand out that converge with those observed on an individual level: first, the Latin American identity prevails and, second, it has gradually fallen. According to the data in Figure 2.4, the majority of the public (48%) and leaders (50%) consider Mexico to be more Latin American than North American, while a minority (35% and 38%, respectively) feel their country to be more North American than Latin American. Likewise, from 2008 to 2012, a gradual decline was seen among leaders in the identification of Mexico as a Latin American country, with a drop in almost 12 percentage points, and

![Figure 2.3. Supranational Identity](image-url)

**Tell me, what do you most closely identify with...?**

(%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<td>50</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>51</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does not include percentages of “Depends”, Don’t know” and “No answer.”
a proportional increase in the identification of Mexico as a North American country. Thus, a slight distancing with Latin America in the mind of Mexicans was noticed.

The Dimensions and Meanings of Nationalism in Mexico

Nationalism, as the political ideology of the modern state, considers devotion, loyalty and the defense of the nation to be the basic nucleus of the framework of collective solidarity in complex societies. How nationalistic are Mexicans? What type of nationalism predominates in Mexico? What does nationalism mean to Mexicans? Given that nationalism is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon, with any measure of nationalism subject to controversy, it is best to approach it from different perspectives to allow for a precise observation of its diverse components.

A first approach to the phenomenon would be to investigate to what extent individuals value and are proud of their nationalism. As in previous surveys, this survey confirms the existence of a prevailing sense of national pride, widely spread throughout the general population and leaders. As Figure 2.5 shows, a large majority of the public (85%) and leaders (86%) are very proud to be Mexican. National pride is on the rise, increasing 13 percentage points from 2006 to 2012.

Given that nationalism is associated with the search for a national identity, another angle to observe would be the reputation a country has among its citizens. How do Mexicans view the place and position of Mexico in

Figure 2.4. Regional Identity in Mexico

Do you think that Mexico is a more North American than Latin American country or more Latin American than North American? (%)

Public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>More Latin American</th>
<th>More North American</th>
<th>Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>More Latin American</th>
<th>More North American</th>
<th>Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does not include percentages of “Don’t know” and “No answer”.

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Figure 2.5. Pride and the Importance and Internacional Reputation of Mexico

Internationally, how important is Mexico? (%)

Public

- Very: 56
- Somewhat: 32
- Little: 9
- Not: 1
- DK/NA: 2

Leaders

- Very: 46
- Somewhat: 44
- Little: 9
- Equally: 6
- More: 65
- Less: 29

How proud are you of being Mexican?

- Very proud: Public = 85%, Leaders = 86%
- Other options:
  - Somewhat
  - Little
  - Not
  - DK/NA

Internationally, do you think Mexico is more, less or equally important than 10 years? (%)

Public

- More: 65
- Equally: 15
- Less: 17
- DK/NA: 4

Leaders

- More: 65
- Equally: 6
- Less: 29
- DK/NA: 3

Do you think the image of Mexico in the world is...? (%)

Public

- Very good: 16
- Good: 52
- Bad: 8
- Very bad: 1
- Neither good nor bad: 20
- DK/NA: 2

Leaders

- Very good: 7
- Good: 50
- Bad: 20
- Neither good nor bad: 20
- DK/NA: 3
the global power structure? The survey results shown in Figure 2.5 reveal that Mexicans hold in high regards the importance and international reputation of their country. This positive image of Mexico in the world is consistent with the earlier data regarding the strength of national pride. First of all, most Mexicans (56%) consider their country to be very important on an international level, and one out of three believes it to have some importance in the world. Leaders are a bit more skeptical regarding the international importance of Mexico, and they are divided in their opinion: 46% qualify it as a very important and 44% qualify it as somewhat important. Secondly, an even larger majority of population and leaders (65% of each group) believe that, in the last 10 years, Mexico has grown in importance. This optimistic assessment of the place of Mexico in the world is more pronounced in sectors with higher incomes.

Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the majority of the population believes that Mexico has a good international reputation: 16% believe that the image of Mexico in the world is very good, 52% that it is good and 20% that it is neither good nor bad. There is more skepticism among leaders regarding the image of Mexico abroad: only 7% believe that it is very good, 50% that it is good, and 20% that it is neither good nor bad. One fifth of leaders show concern regarding Mexico’s image, as they consider it to be bad.

The cultural dimension of nationalism refers to the unwillingness to accept foreign customs, traditions and ideas that are associated with the mentality and way of being of other nations different or outside of their own. As Figure 2.6 shows, cultural nationalism is minimal, and Mexican society is more open today than it was eight years ago. One out of 3 Mexicans are cultural nationalists.

Figure 2.6. Ideas and Customs from Other Countries

Do you think it is good or bad to disseminate the ideas and customs of other countries in Mexico?

(% of “good”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
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<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does not include percentages of “Bad”, “Depends”, “Don’t know” and “No answer.”
that consider the spread of ideas and customs from other countries in Mexico to be bad; less than a fifth (17%) are ambivalent, and the majority (50%) believes exposure to other ways of thinking is a positive thing. It’s worth mentioning that the cultural openness of Mexicans appears to have peaked, given that levels of 50% have been constant for the last 3 surveys.

However, cultural openness is lower in certain sectors of society such as women, those over 50, people with lower income or those with less education. Leaders are considerably more open than the population in general, and the large majority (92%) positively views the spread of foreign ideas in Mexico. As with the population in general, there is a growing cultural openness on behalf of leaders, but this tendency is more pronounced and sustained among leaders. It’s worth noting that the increasing cultural openness of Mexicans is in tune with their preference for economic liberalism in trade and finance. As discussed in Chapter 7, Mexicans have a favorable opinion of free trade and foreign investment, and their economic nationalism is closely connected to the protection of oil as a symbol of sovereignty and national pride.

The second dimension of nationalism captured by the survey is political in nature and related to entry barriers and the incorporation of those who weren’t born Mexican into the national community. How likely are Mexicans to accept nationalized foreigners as citizens with full rights, equal to those born as Mexican citizens? In Figure 2.7, a strong opposition among the Mexican public can be seen towards nationalized foreigners serving as their political representatives, be it in Congress or in the Federal Executive branch. Only 1 of every 5 surveyed is in favor of a nationalized foreigner serving as a Senator or Congressman, and a small minority (13%) would allow them the right to be President. The refusal to grant the same
political rights enjoyed by citizens by birth to naturalized citizens is uniform across the entire social spectrum.

On the other hand, in other areas outside of politics, but with strong symbolic value for the “Mexican nation”, such as the national sport with the greatest following, the population is more open to the full incorporation of foreigners: the majority (54%) of those surveyed is in favor of a foreigner playing on the Mexican national soccer team. The strong political nationalism among the public contrasts with the greater openness on the part of leaders, who are in favor of nationalized foreigners being eligible to run for Congress (52%) and playing on the national soccer team (81%). However, a majority of leaders are also opposed to the idea that a nationalized Mexican be able to run for President (70% are against and 29% are in favor).

A third dimension of nationalism is sovereignty, understood as the adherence to the idea of maintaining the autonomy of the country as an independent State and sovereign political community. One way of measuring attachment to the idea of political sovereignty is to consider the willingness of citizens to cede it, allowing their country to join another if it results in economic benefits on an individual level. In Figure 2.8 the results of two hypothetical scenarios involving a transfer of sovereignty in return for welfare are reported: the eventual union of Mexico with the United States and with Central America.

**Figure 2.8. Union with Other Countries**

*How much would you agree to Mexico and [...] forming a single country, if this meant an improvement in your quality of life? Public (%)*

---

**United States-Mexico**

- Strongly in Favor: 30
- Somewhat in Favor: 30
- Strongly Against: 26
- Somewhat against: 11
- DK/NA: 3

**Central America-Mexico**

- Strongly in Favor: 20
- Somewhat in Favor: 36
- Strongly against: 23
- Somewhat against: 15
- DK/NA: 6

Does not include percentages of "Don't know" and "No answer".
The majority of Mexicans (60%) support the idea that Mexico and the United States form a single country if it brought them a better quality of life, even though just more than a third (37%) rejects it. The distribution of preferences for an eventual union with Central America, if it were to mean an improvement in the quality of life, is very similar: 56% are “in favor” and 38% “against.” Therefore, the inclination to cede sovereignty in favor of convenience seems to be indifferent to the characteristics of the counterpart, be it a country like the United States, much more powerful than Mexico but culturally distinct, or a group of small countries with an inferior level of economic development but a culture more similar to that of Mexico. It’s clear that economic wellbeing stands out as one of the major aspirations of Mexicans, more important even than sovereignty.

It is important to emphasize that, although the willingness to cede or share sovereignty for personal gain has grown in the last two years, it is not an attitude that is stable over time. From 2004 to 2012, a zigzag can be seen with alternating periods of rejection of (2004 and 2008) and support (2006, 2010 and 2012) for a political union with the United States in exchange for personal wellbeing. This data suggests that loyalty to the notion of sovereignty is contingent and points to the need to investigate if variations are the result of changes in the national economic situation or other factors.

Finally, nationalism as a social and historical construction of an “imaginary” political community has no single, homogenous or set definition for the diversity of citizens that form the same. Like any political ideology that defines a collective, inter-subjective space, the social...
meanings of nationalism aren’t evident. What does it mean to Mexicans to be nationalist? What kind of practice or behaviors do they associate with nationalism? To investigate this, those surveyed were asked to place a series of behaviors on a scale of 1 to 7, depending on how important they considered it to be in defining being nationalist. Figure 2.9 shows the responses of leaders and the public. In order of importance, for Mexicans being nationalist means, first of all, respecting National symbols (6.7), secondly, defending your country in the case of war (6.2), third, supporting the national soccer team (5.6), fourth, paying taxes (5.2), fifth, preferring Mexican music and film to foreign music and film (4.9), sixth, not buying foreign products (4.6), and, lastly, opposing the United States (4.1).

From the above, it should be noted that Mexicans understand nationalism primarily in terms of patriotism, pride and national reputation. The civic conception of nationalism is also present, though to a lesser extent, in the sense of a citizen’s commitment to their country and their willingness to comply with their tax obligations or defend the national community of which they are part. On the other hand, the chauvinist component of nationalism, rejecting anything foreign and believing anything national to be superior, is less significant for the Mexican public. A final important finding is that, despite the history of conflict and mistrust between the U.S. and Mexico, Mexican nationalism currently does not contain any anti-American or defensive bias as strong as would be expected of the dominant ideological tradition of the 20th century, the so-called “revolutionary nationalism” of the political regime that emerged from the Mexican Revolution.

For leaders, the meaning of nationalism is very different than for the general public, because they associate it primarily with its civic sense, even though patriotism is still present. From their perspective, to be a nationalist means, above all, paying taxes (6.6), secondly, defending the country in the case of war (6.5) and, thirdly, respecting patriotic symbols (6.1). The rest of the practices and behaviors about which they were asked are significantly less important in the way in which leaders understand nationalism: not buying foreign products (3.7), preferring Mexican music and movies (3.5), supporting the national soccer team (3.5) and opposing the United States (2.8).

It’s a concept of what it means to be nationalist that is not defensive, protectionist, anti-American or “patriotic.” In short, data from the survey questions the argument that Mexican nationalism, at the level of the average citizen or the elites, is characterized by a systematic opposition to the United States or a defensive attitude towards the outside world.
CHAPTER 3
International Threats and National Security

International Activism and Perception of the State of the World

Is there a relationship between the level of international activism preferred by Mexicans and their perception of the state of the world? If there were a pessimistic or negative perception about the direction in which the world is headed, what attitude would Mexicans adopt? Would they prefer a greater level of activism in order to have an influence on the solutions to global problems, or, on the contrary, would they want to distance themselves from the world in order to devote their efforts to addressing national issues?

According to the results of the survey, Mexicans believe that a false dilemma exists between international activism and attention to national problems. Therefore, they want Mexico to actively participate in global affairs and that said activism address the principal threats identified in the international system, focusing foreign policy actions as much on attention to and the solution of those problems as the promotion of the national security and wellbeing of Mexicans.

Therefore, as a result of an unfavorable external environment, coupled with the problems of insecurity and economic hardship in the country in recent years, Mexicans identify the main global threats as those that directly impact the national situation or their immediate reality. As a consequence, the world is not only a space that generates threats, but also a source of solutions to internal problems. Thus, even when a high and constant level of pessimism about the direction in which the world is heading exists, there is, at the same time, a growing support for active international participation by Mexico.

As Figure 3.1 shows, in retrospective terms, the large majority of Mexicans (68%) believe the world to be worse off today than ten years ago, while only 18% think it is better and 12% believe it to be the same. Looking to the future, almost twice as many Mexicans (49%) believe that the world will be worse in one decade than those who believe it will be better (24%), whereas 17% believe it will stay the same. It's important to note that the pessimism looking back has remained relatively constant among Mexicans during the last six years, but pessimism towards the future has fallen.

On the other hand, in 2012, 72% of the population and 95% of leaders preferred that the country actively participate in global affairs rather than distance itself from them; only 18% of the public and 2% of leaders chose the second option. It is worth noting that during the administration of President Calderon, while the level of pessimism remained relatively constant at levels of 66-68%, support for international activism increased by 16 percentage points between 2006 and 2012. In addition, as Figure 3.2 shows, support by Mexicans for active participation of the country in the world has grown substantially, gradually approaching the level of support shown by leaders, which is always higher than 90%.
International Threats

What major international threats do Mexicans identify? Is there a difference between the intensity and importance that leaders and the public in general give to each one of these threats? Do they change over time? In the 2012 edition of this survey, 15 possible international threats were chosen and respondents were asked to assign a security threat level to each one. In accordance with the atmosphere of constant pessimism, there is an elevated intensity in the perception of the seriousness of the threats, with no important changes from 2010. As Figure 3.3 shows, with practically all variables comparable to the previous edition of this survey (13 out of 15), the perception of threat severity varies more or less by three percentage points. Only in two cases, undocumented immigrants entering national territory and an increase in military spending, is there an increase of seven and four points, respectively. However, with leaders, the increase in perceived severity is considerably higher, increasing by six or more points for half a dozen threats: the entry of immigrants (+12 points) and increased military spending (+9 points), where they share the perception of the public, nuclear weapons (+9 points), epidemics (+8 points), international terrorism (+6 points), and food scarcity and high costs (+6 points). Interestingly, those threats with

Figure 3.1. The State of the World

*In general, do you believe that the world is better or worse than 10 years ago?*

**Public (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>The Same</th>
<th>Worse</th>
<th>DK/KA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**And, in 10 years, do you believe the world will be better or worse?**

**Public (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>The Same</th>
<th>Worse</th>
<th>DK/KA</th>
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<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Trajectory graphs do not include percentages of “Don’t know” and “No answer”.

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largest increases in perceived level of severity, excluding the last one, are all related to national or international security issues.

Looking at Figure 3.3, the first point that stands out is the continuity and consistency in responses on major international threats over time, both among the public and among leaders. Likewise, drug trafficking and organized crime has remained the most serious threat since the first survey (2004). Secondly, Mexicans identified as the most important international threats those that directly or indirectly affect their welfare or personal safety, reiterating the findings of previous studies. This means that global problems are interpreted according to their effects on the life and local and personal reality of the respondents.

Thus, the main international threats in 2012 are as follows: 1) drug trafficking and organized crime (82% of the public and 91% of leaders), 2) global warming (80% of the public and 82% of leaders, coinciding in placing it in second place), 3) scarcity and high cost of food (79% of the public, putting it in third place for them; 78% of leaders, making it fourth for them) and 4) global economic crisis (75% of the public, fifth, and 78% of leaders, fourth). A broad agreement exists among the public and leaders on major international threats, and each one of them is related to security or individual welfare.

Generally, threats related to traditional issues of international and national security, like terrorism, nuclear weapons, border conflicts and increases in military spending, are assigned an intermediate level of
severity, and they can be found in the middle of Figure 3.3. In this case, leaders and the public also agree in their perceptions, most notably: 1) international terrorism (71% of the public, ninth; 65% of leaders, eighth), 2) nuclear weapons (75% of the public, fifth; 60% of leaders, ninth), 3) increased military spending (56% of the public, 49% of leaders, twelfth place in both cases) and 4) border and territorial conflicts (61% of the public, eleventh place, 43% of leaders, thirteenth). In 2012, two new threats were added to the usual list: the violation of human rights in the world and inequality between rich and poor countries. Interestingly, there is a greater level of discrepancy in the responses of leaders and the public in general when it comes to these two threats, given that while the public consider them moderately severe (eight and tenth place, respectively), leaders identify them as being more relevant (second and sixth place).

Finally, the issues not perceived as grave threats are those related to irregular immigration and the rise of China as a world power, on which, yet again, the public and leaders agree. At the bottom of the list fall: 1) illegal immigration to Mexico (47% of the public and 36% of leaders, next to last place for both) and 2) the emergence of China as a world power (37% of the public and 17% of leaders, both putting it last place).

---

**Figure 3.3. Threats to the interests of Mexico in the next 10 years**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
<th>Change 2010-2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drug trafficking and organized crime</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Warming</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarcity and High Cost of Food</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Disasters</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Weapons</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Economic Crisis</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epidemics such as AIDS or Avian Influenza</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights Violations in the World</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Terrorism</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality between rich and poor countries</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border and Territorial Conflicts</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase of military spending</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Countries Making it Difficult for Immigrants to Enter</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Entry of Undocumented Immigrants into Mexican Territory</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of China as a World Power</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does not include the percentages of “Serious threat but not important”, “Unimportant threat”, “Not a threat”, “Do not know” and “No answer.”
Security and International Cooperation

From 2004 to 2012, the international threat identified as most important by Mexicans has been drug trafficking and organized crime, considered by large majorities of both the public (between 79 and 89%) and leaders (between 84 and 93%) to be very severe. Therefore, it is natural that Mexicans would want to strengthen their armed forces: 47% of the public believe that Mexico should increase the size of its military, while 39% prefer to maintain the current size and 9% to reduce it. This is particularly indicative, given that, as we will report in the following chapter, Mexicans believe there to be little probability of an armed conflict in Latin America: 29% think that there is a greater chance of armed conflict today than a decade ago, while 40% believe it is less likely. Furthermore, as we will see in Chapter 4, the percentage of those who see a greater possibility of regional conflict has fallen 13 points since 2010, when it stood at 42%. Thus, before a peaceful Latin American environment and deteriorating national security, Mexicans consider the national army more of an instrument to guarantee security at home rather than abroad.

Given the great importance of security, how willing are Mexicans to cooperate internationally, especially with the United States, even to the extent of making commitments that imply ceding a certain degree of sovereignty? As a result of the deterioration in terms of security in the last years of the Calderon administration, the number of people willing to receive financial help from the United States to combat drug trafficking and organized crime in Mexico is slightly higher (47%) than those against it (45%). However, the degree of willingness dropped 7 points from 2010, while opposition increased by 6 points. Meanwhile, most leaders (68%) would be in favor of receiving financial help from the US while 30% are against it.

Figure 3.4. U.S. Cooperation: Economic Aid against Drug Trafficking

Are you for or against Mexico’s receiving financial aid from the United States to fight drug-trafficking and organized crime?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Depends</th>
<th>In favor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public</strong></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leaders</strong></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And if in exchange, the United States asks to supervise the resources?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Depends</th>
<th>In favor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leaders</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And if in return the United States asks to send agents to operate inside the country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Depends</th>
<th>In favor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public</strong></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leaders</strong></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does not include percentages of “Don’t know”, and “No answer.”
When offered financial support from the United States, to what extent are Mexicans willing to pay the possible costs of this aid? On the one hand, as shown in Figure 3.4, of those who approve financial support for the war on drugs, 65% of the public and 76% of leaders would agree to allow the U.S. to monitor the use of these funds. This level of support has substantially grown since 2008, when the same question was asked, increasing by 21 points among leaders and 9 points among the public. Now, if in exchange for the transfer of U.S. economic aid, the country were to request sending agents to operate inside of Mexico, the levels of support drop among the public, with 46% in favor and 41% against, representing a decrease in support of 11 points since 2010. In the case of leaders, out of every three, two (62%) would be against and one (32%) would be in favor. This position has changed radically since 2008, when a majority (55%) was in favor and 33% against, implying a fall in support of 23 points in four years.

Finally, what actions do Mexicans consider to be more effective in resolving the problem of drug trafficking and organized crime in the country? Do they prefer more strict options like direct combat and penalization, or softer alternatives like prevention, treatment of addicts or even legalization? In order to gauge the preferences of Mexicans, they were asked to evaluate the effectiveness of half a dozen actions using a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is “not effective” and 7 is “very effective.” Interestingly, the public prefers, above all, softer measures like treating addicts (an average of 6.1 points) and drug-use prevention campaigns (5.9 points on average). In second place come more strict options like deploying the army to combat

---

**Figure 3.5. The Fight against Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime**

*How effective do you think would be the following actions in order to solve drug trafficking problem and organized crime? (Average*)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treating addicts</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realize campaigns to prevent drug consumption</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send the army to fight in the streets</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send drug traffickers for trial in the United States</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowing the entrance of U.S. troops</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legalizing drug consumption</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Based on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is “Not at all effective” and 7 is “Very effective.”*
drug trafficking in the streets (5.8), extraditing drug traffickers to be tried in the United States (4.6), and, right in the middle, allowing U.S. troops in national territory (4 points). The least preferred option, with 3 points, is legalizing drug use.

Leaders agree in their preference for soft measures like prevention campaigns (6.2 points) and treatment for addicts (6.1 points), followed by alternatives that imply a use of force, such as deploying the army to the streets (4.2) and the extradition of criminals (4.1). They place the option of legalization right in the middle of the scale, with four points, and outright reject the possibility of allowing U.S. troops to enter national territory (just 2.1 points). Thus, it reiterates the finding that the elite are more reluctant to accept direct military involvement of U.S. troops in the country to combat drug trafficking and organized crime, while the public, who are probably more helpless before the crisis of insecurity, is more pragmatic and willing to consider the alternative •
What are the attitudes, opinions and perceptions of Mexicans with respect to other countries and regions? Do they value or prefer some countries over others, or are there no relevant differences in their vision of the world? What assessment can be made of their relations with some of these countries? Are the perceptions and evaluations of the public similar to those of the leaders, or are there gaps and differences between the groups? Have these attitudes and opinions changed over time or have they remained stable? In order to answer these questions, this chapter is structured in five sections. In the first, we make a detailed review of the general assessments of countries, heads of government and international leaders to outline the most relevant likes and dislikes of Mexicans. The second deals with the assessment of Mexico’s relations with its major neighbors to the north and south of the border. In the next section, we discuss general and particular attitudes of Mexicans towards the United States. In the fourth, we turn our gaze towards Latin America, particularly the relations with Mexico and possibilities of integration. Finally, in the last part, we present results about Asia and China.

Sympathies and Antipathies: Appraisals and General Preferences

In order to measure the opinions Mexicans hold about 23 countries around the world, those surveyed were asked to assign each country a number on a scale of 0 to 100, with 100 expressing a very favorable opinion, 0 being a very unfavorable opinion and 50 being neutral (neither favorable of unfavorable). The results are shown in Figure 4.1, where the responses of both leaders and the public are arranged by each country’s average rating in descending order. In 2012 the country with the highest rating among the Mexican public was the United States, with an average of 71 points, while among the leaders, Canada and Germany shared the top spot, with 79 points each. Unlike earlier editions of the survey, this year the top position on the thermometer differed between the public and leaders. While Canada has held the top spot among leaders since 2004 (always closely followed by Germany), this is the second time it has lost that spot on the thermometer of the public. The recovery of the top spot by the United States among the public is also noteworthy, as it hasn’t come in first place or been ranked higher than Canada (an average of 69 points) since 2004. In spite of this difference, other results show certain similarities between the public and leaders in 2012.

Among the Mexican public, besides the United States and Canada, Brazil (64 points on average), Germany (64), Japan (63), China and Spain (both with 62 points) hold the highest positions. Among the elite, following Canada and Germany, the highest rated countries are Japan (77), Brazil (74), the United States (71), Chile (70) and China (69). On the other extreme of the thermometer, there are also interesting results. Contrary to what happens when
ranking the most favored country, both leaders and the public agreed when ranking the worst rated country: Iran (43 and 45 points on average, respectively). Among the public, in ascending order, the countries with the lowest average ratings are Israel (44), El Salvador (46), Peru (47), Ecuador (47), Venezuela and South Africa (48 for both). For leaders, the lowest ranked countries are Venezuela (46), El Salvador (48), Ecuador (50), Cuba (52), Israel and Guatemala (54 for both). Also, as shown in the graph, there are some countries which fall around the middle of the thermometers of the public and leaders, such as Argentina, Costa Rica, Colombia, Uruguay and, the farthest geographically: India and South Africa.

While a difference in order may exist, both leaders and the public share common opinions, favorable and unfavorable, regarding the countries of the world. On one hand, nations most appreciated by Mexicans are those in North America (Canada and United States) and the Asia-Pacific (China and Japan) and the leading countries of Europe and South America (Germany and Brazil, respectively). On the other hand, the nations least favored by the leaders and population of Mexico
are those located in the Middle East (Iran and Israel) and some in Latin America (Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru and Venezuela). Thus, it turns out that the countries that have won the high esteem of Mexicans are the ones with which historical, intense relationships exist and those that represent international cases of development, stability and economic growth. In contrast, the countries least favored by Mexicans are those that have been involved in international or regional conflicts. It would appear that Mexicans are receptive to cases of success and controversy, and establish their ratings likewise.

However, the thermometers not only provide information on the range of sympathies and antipathies of the Mexican public opinion, they also reveal some interesting differences. As can be seen, leaders tend to give higher ratings on average than the public: while the average of the former is 61.6 points that of the latter is 54.0 points. So there are significant gaps in the evaluations of the two groups, and the extreme cases. The most obvious example is Russia, where opinion is sharply divided: the leaders rate it 17 points higher than the public. Other similar cases are Germany, Chile (with 15 points separating both), Costa Rica and Japan (with a difference of 14 points in both cases). Other peculiarities in these tendencies are the United States, whose average is the same for both leaders and the public, and Venezuela, the only country the public rated two points higher than leaders.

Furthermore, when the 2012 results are compared with those of the previous 2010 edition, several important findings emerge. First, Mexicans are consistent in their views on countries: in the vast majority of cases the differences between the two years are no larger than two or three points. Second, that consistency notwithstanding, while the public in general increase their average ratings of nearly all countries (unlike what happened between 2008 and 2010), the leaders decreased their ratings for all countries (as has occurred since 2008). Lastly, there are some exceptional cases. In this regard, it is interesting that the countries whose rating among the public saw the largest increase are Cuba (with an increase of 6 percentage points from 2010 to 2012) and Guatemala (an increase of 4), two countries that were among the lowest ranked and are now among the medium ranked. For Mexican leaders, the countries that lost the most points were Brazil (5 percentage points from 2010 to 2012), Chile (6 points) and, quite surprisingly, Spain (which falls 9 points). While the first two countries remain among the countries most favored, Spain is now in the group of those with intermediate rankings. Leaders lowered their esteem for Spain in comparison to earlier surveys, and it is possible that it could be a consequence of the social and economic crisis in the European country.

Another way of determining the attitudes of Mexicans towards the world is to know their opinion on government leaders and personalities from other countries and international institutions. Thus, just as with countries, those surveyed were asked to assign 8 international leaders and 2 national leaders a numeric valuation using a scale of 0 to 100. The results can be seen in Figure 4.2. As can been seen on the thermometer, there are no exact alignments between the rankings of the public and those of Mexican leaders. In 2012, the personality that received the best rating among the public was former Pope Benedict XVI, with an average of 68 points, whereas with leaders it was the President of the United States, Barack Obama, the highest ranked head of government, with an average of 72 points. While President Obama comes in second place among the public (64 points), Pope Benedict comes in fourth among leaders (61 points). Thus, Barack Obama is the only leader to be among the top 3 highest rated personalities by both groups. Among the public, Felipe Calderon (with an average of 63 points) follows Benedict XVI and Barack Obama in third place, followed by the current Mexican President, Enrique Pena Nieto (54 points) in fourth. In contrast, among the leaders, following President Obama are Dilma Rousseff, president of Brazil (69 points), and Ban Ki-moon, the UN secretary general (68).

1 It is possible to verify this consistency in opinions, as the differences are within the margin of error by sample design in both surveys: +/- 2.0 with the public y +/- 4.4 with leaders.
2 At the time the survey was conducted, Calderon served as acting President and Peña Nieto as president-elect, following the federal elections of July 1, 2012.
Where the public and leaders do agree is in ranking the least favored government leaders: Raul Castro, President of Cuba (37 points among the public, 44 points among leaders) and Hugo Chavez, former president of Venezuela (39 points in both groups). Among the public, Mariano Rajoy, Prime Minister of Spain, is positioned slightly ahead of Castro and Chavez with 48 points), while Enrique Pena Nieto leads them among leaders with 51 points. While the data may not allow us to be sure if

Mexicans value more highly heads of government from the most esteemed countries (the only case being the United States, whose President is also in top positions), it does seem that the lowest ranking Presidents (Chavez and Castro) govern countries with unfavorable ratings (Venezuela and Cuba). Something similar occurs, albeit with more intermediate values, with Otto Perez Molina, President of Guatemala (an average of 49 points with the public and 57 with leaders).
As with the country evaluations, with political personalities leaders gave, on average, higher evaluations than did the public, even though there are cases where the differences are larger. On the one hand, Ban Ki-moon and Dilma Rousseff prove to be better valued by leaders than the public (the difference is 19 points more in the first case and 17 points in the second). On the other hand, Benedict XVI manages 7 points higher among the public than among leaders. The same thing happens with the former and the current President of Mexico, who receive lower ratings from leaders than from the public.

When 2012 data is compared to the 2010 survey, the results are relevant. First, the deceased Hugo Chavez grew in rating among the public (5 more points) and among leaders (3 more points) between 2010 and 2012. Second, the ranking of Raul Castro fell in both groups (by 5 points with the public and 4 points with leaders).

Third, even though there are no previous measures for the Presidents of Brazil and Spain, interestingly, their ranking is lower than that of their predecessors: Dilma Rousseff gets 12 and 14 points less among the public and leaders, respectively, than former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (the highest ranking government leader in both groups in 2010). Meanwhile, Mariano Rajoy is eight points lower with the public, and 12 points with leaders, than the former Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. This could be explained by the fact that both government leaders are not very well known among Mexicans. However, it could also suggest that, on one hand, President Rousseff has been unable to match the popularity of the former President Lula da Silva and, on the other that Prime Minister Rajoy is suffering from the international loss of prestige caused by Spanish crisis.

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**Figure 4.3. Role Models in Development**

**What country be the best development model for Mexico?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our own model</td>
<td>Our own model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK/NA</td>
<td>DK/NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

It is important to note that these results should be taken with caution, given that, as mentioned in Chapter 1, certain heads of government and international personalities are not very well known. Particularly, Ban Ki-Moon, Dilma Rousseff, Mariano Rajoy and Otto Perez Molina, who are only recognized by about 20% of the public surveyed.
With the purpose of extending the general panorama of the sympathies and antipathies of Mexicans towards the rest of the world, in the 2012 edition of the survey a new, more specific question was included: those surveyed were asked to choose among six countries, which would be the best development model for Mexico. The results are displayed in Figure 4.3. In Figure 4.3, it is clear that the preferences of leaders and the public are not the same. Four out of every ten Mexicans consider the United States to be the model to follow, and an important percentage (20%) believes that China is the better option. On the other hand, among leaders, a similar number of respondents chose Germany or Brazil (31% for both). These results are partially consistent with previous evaluation thermometers: The United States is the highest rated country among the public, and Germany among the leaders. Likewise, China and Brazil are among the countries most valued by leaders and the public. Even so, the differing evaluation of these countries compared to the others named in the question is large. Brazil is only preferred by 8% of the public and Germany by 5%. In addition, among the leaders, only 13% choose United States and 8% China. Curiously, the options to follow our own model of development or not choose any received very little support.

While the previous question shows that preference for specific countries differs between the public and Mexican leaders, do specific preferences for regions vary as well? In 2012 individuals were once again asked about which region of the world Mexico should pay the most attention to. As shown in Figure 4.4, regional preferences also differ among the public and leaders, although the differences are not great. On one hand, the relative majority of the public (35%) said that Mexico should pay more attention to North America; however a majority of leaders (32%) said that it should be Latin America. Even so, an important percentage of the public (29%) favor North America.

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Figure 4.4. Regional Preferences

*Tell me, what region of the world should Mexico pay more attention to? (%)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Public (%)</th>
<th>Leaders (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 Besides the four countries mentioned, the question included Spain and Venezuela as options. However, given that these results represented such small percentages, they were included in the category of “others” in Figure 4.3.
and a little more than a fourth of leaders (26%) prefer North America. These results are also consistent with the 2010 survey, two years ago the public also paid more attention to North America, followed by Latin America, whereas leaders preferred Latin America first, followed by North America second. This means that the majority of the public and leaders have consistent preferences well anchored in the Americas (both regions combined include 60% of responses). However, there is a significant variation from 2010 to 2012. As noted in Figure 4.4, one in four Mexican leaders (26%) points to Asia as the region to which Mexico must pay more attention. While this is important in itself, the interesting thing is that the preference for Asia grew 10 percentage points in the last two years, managing to reach the level of the U.S. Along with that, the results regarding Europe are troubling. As seen above, European countries receive very favorable opinions, especially Germany. However, only a small percentage of the public (9%) and leaders (10%) point to Europe as a priority area.

In short, the public and leaders show similar appraisal for countries and regions. They agree in their favorable opinions of North American and Asian Pacific countries and in their unfavorable opinions towards Middle Eastern and some Latin American countries, particularly those governed by controversial leaders, like Cuba, Ecuador and Venezuela. We also note that Europe, while maintaining positive reviews (except for the case of Spain), is not present as a priority in the preferences of Mexicans. Furthermore, these evaluations are consistent over time. However, when faced with questions that require a more concrete definition of preferences, relevant differences between the public and leaders begin to appear. On one hand, it is clear that the Mexican public is anchored in the Americas, with a clear preference for North America and high opinions of the U.S. and its president. On the other,
the leaders seem more pluralistic in their preferences: although they positively value North America, there are significant proportions that prefer to keep an eye on Latin America and, particularly, Asia.

Our Neighbors: Relations with the United States and Guatemala

Undoubtedly, for Mexicans, the U.S. is the backbone of Mexico’s relationship with the world. This is not surprising given the close economic, social, political and cultural ties between the two countries, which are conditioned by our proximity—we share one of the most extensive and intense borders in the world. Historically, this proximity to the north has eclipsed the relationship with the south, specifically Guatemala. However, it is equally important to study this relationship for the same reasons and consequences that inevitably tie us to the U.S. Given this, what are the attitudes and the evaluation of Mexicans toward its two largest neighbors? To that objective, the 2012 survey included a special series of questions to comparatively analyze the perception of Mexicans regarding relations with both countries.

First, both the public and leaders were asked to give a general opinion regarding the importance of Mexico’s relations with the United States and Guatemala. As Figure 4.5 shows, the public has a more divergent opinion of the importance of both countries than do the leaders. While 74% of the Mexican public consider the relationship with United States to be somewhat or very important, the relationship with Guatemala is considered important by 50% of the sample. In fact, 36% consider the relationship to be of little importance. In contrast, 97% of leaders believe Mexico’s relationship with the United States to be important, and 9 out of 10 (90%) consider the same

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### Figure 4.6. The Most Important Aspect of Relations with the United States and Guatemala

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>With the United</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and Investment</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug trafficking and organized Crime</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Security</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental and Natural Resources</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>With Guatemala</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and Investment</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Security</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug trafficking and organized Crime</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental and Natural Resources</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does not include the percentages of “Don’t know” and “No answer.”
of Guatemala, albeit with a difference in intensity. That is, while 84% of leaders believe that the relationship with the United States is “very important”, only 56% think the same about Guatemala. Therefore, it is possible to state in general terms that the relationship with the United States is more important for Mexicans than the relationship with Guatemala.

However, what aspect of these relationships do Mexicans consider most important? The answer to this question is reported in Figure 4.6. Here we see again that similarities and differences converge both between the two groups as well as in the aspects of the relationships. On one hand, the public and leaders estimate that the most important issue of the relationship with the United States is trade and investment (45% for the former and 54% for the latter). However, the second most important aspect for the general public is drug trafficking and organized crime (18%), while for leaders it is migration (20%). On the other hand, the most relevant aspect of the relationship with Guatemala is different among the two groups. About a third of the public said that the most important aspect of the relationship with their neighbor to the South is trade and investment (31%); whereas with leaders it is migration (31%). Interestingly, the public and leaders agree on the second and third most important issues regarding Guatemala: border security (27 and 28%, respectively), and drug trafficking and organized crime (16 and 21%, respectively).

So far we know that Mexico’s relations with its neighbors are important to its citizens, and we know in what ways they consider it most transcendental, but, how do they view the current state of this relationship, as good or bad? In Figure 4.7, we observe that both the public and leaders believe that the relationship with the United States is better than that with Guatemala. Among the public, 60% believe that the relationship with the Northern neighbor is good or very good, while 49% believe the same about the relationship with the Southern neighbor. Similarly, 68% of Mexico’s leaders believe that Mexico maintains a good relationship with the United States and slightly less (57%) say they have a similar relationship with Guatemala.

Finally, for Mexicans, what is the overall balance of Mexico’s relations with its neighbors? Respectively,
respondents were asked if they considered proximity to the United States and Central America—used here as an equivalent of Guatemala—was more of an advantage than a problem or more of a problem than an advantage. In principle, as shown in Figure 4.8, neither group, public nor leaders, considered these relationships to be more of a problem rather than an advantage. However, there are differences between the two neighbors. Proximity to the United States is considered more advantageous than problematic by a larger number of both public and leaders, than proximity with Central America. While the difference regarding the advantage of the United States compared to Guatemala is 10 percentage points (57% to 47%) among the public, among leaders it’s only six percentage points. In short, for Mexicans, both the public and leaders alike, the relationship with their northern neighbor (the U.S.) is more important, much better and more advantageous than the relationship with their southern neighbor (Guatemala). This is consistent with the results of the previous section: the United States is about 20 points higher on the thermometer of countries than Guatemala, and Barack Obama receives 15 more points than his Guatemalan counterpart, Otto Perez Molina. Furthermore, as confirmed, the public and leaders have different agendas in mind for both countries: for the public, relations with the United States and Guatemala are primarily defined by the economy (trade and investment), whereas for leaders the issue of migration is the most important part of the relationship with Guatemala.

Attitudes towards the United States

In order to understand general attitudes towards the United States, respondents were asked—as in previous surveys—to choose the word that best described their feelings towards the country: trust or distrust and...

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In this case, the question did not refer specifically to Guatemala, but rather to Central America as a whole. In previous surveys, the question was phrased the same way, and it was decided to continue the chronological sequence.
miration or disdain. The cumulative results of recent years are reported in Figure 4.9. The relevant results are that positive feelings toward the United States have maintained an upward trend since 2004, interrupted by a drop in 2008. In 2012, for the first time, the percentage of the public that trusted the United States was equal to that of those who felt distrust towards the country (40%). This is the highest level of confidence in the last 8 years (having increased 3 percentage points from 2010 and doubled since 2004), and the lowest level of distrust (having fallen 5 points with respect to 2010). Equally, in 2012, the feeling of admiration among the group reached its highest level (+4%) since the survey was begun, and disdain declined to 19%.

In the case of leaders, the results are very similar. In 2012, the feeling of trust towards the United States reached its highest level (54%), and, for the only time other than 2006, was proportionally higher than the percentage of those with feelings of distrust (38%). It is clear that, in this survey, there is a major transformation among leaders in their feelings towards their northern neighbor: confidence grew 11 percentage points with respect to the previous edition of the survey, and distrust fell 13 points. Moreover, admiration is also the sentiment of the majority (59%) among the elite, while disdain further drops to its lowest level (only 12%). While admiration may have only increased by 2 percentage points, contempt fell 8 points. Thus, in 2012, the United States mainly aroused
positive feelings among Mexicans, winning more trust and admiration among both groups.

So far the previous results have allowed us to gauge a set of general attitudes toward the United States; however, we need to explore more about specific attitudes of Mexicans towards the country. In order to address this point, the 2012 survey included questions about the actions of the United States in the world for the first time. Thus, respondents were asked to rate U.S. performance in different areas on a scale of 1-7, where 1 represents a “very negative” action and 7 a “very positive” one. As Figure 4.10 shows, the public and leaders in Mexico evaluate the actions of their northern neighbor similarly, but to different degrees: the public awards the country, on average, higher ratings than the leaders.

Both groups gave the highest average rating to “promoting free trade” (the public rates it on average 5.1 and leaders 4.7) and the lowest score was given to U.S. actions in Cuba (3.8 by the public and 2.3 by leaders). The second highest evaluated action is precisely United States policy towards Mexico (the public, 5.1, and leaders, 4.3), with the third highest being “fighting international terrorism” (5.1 for the public, 4.0 for leaders), and in fourth place is “the defense of democracy in the world” (4.9 for the public, 3.8 for leaders). Then, lower, are U.S. actions in Latin America (4.8 among the public and 3.7 among leaders), and, in second to last place, “sending military troops in conflict situations” (4.7 among the public, 3.7 among leaders). Therefore, it turns out that the public and leaders alike highly rate the United States as a global promoter of

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* Based on a scale from 1 to 7, being 1 “Very negative” and 7 “Very positive”.

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6 It is worth mentioning that, in order to facilitate the presentation of the results, the averages have been rounded. Therefore, it may seem that within the public there was a triple tie for first place, with 5.1. However, without rounding the results are as follows: the fight against international terrorism (5.11), promoting free trade (5.10) and policy towards Mexico (5.09).
free trade and the fight against global terrorism, but they rate U.S. actions in Cuba and in conflict situations poorly. Being so, are Mexicans willing to make joint decisions with the United States? The answer is no. As Figure 4.11 shows, a majority of Mexicans, both the public (54%) and leaders (49%) are against making joint decisions with the United States to resolve common problems if it entails taking on commitments that they weren’t in favor of. Only among leaders is there a clear division of opinions, as 45% are in favor, while among the public only a third (32%) would accept such a situation. Thus, despite the good opinions towards the United States, Mexicans set limits in their relationship with the country: they not only disapprove of its action in conflicts or in Cuba, they would also not be willing to make joint decisions that weren’t in tune with the country’s desires.7

Finally, despite the fact that Mexicans consider their relationship with the United States to be appropriate, and the dealings of the country with us to have been positive, it is fitting to look into their preferences regarding the type of relationship Mexico should maintain in order to defend its interests against its northern neighbor: one where we coordinate with another country or region or a preferential relationship not involving third parties? The answer lies in the second option: the majority of Mexicans prefer a preferential deal with the United States regard-

Figure 4.11. Joint Decisions with the United States

In order to solve common problems, Mexico should make decisions jointly with the United States, even if it assumes commitments it does not like (%)

Line graphs do not include the percentages of “Depends”, “Do not know” and “No answer”.

7 Another example of the limits of the relationship with the United States is reported in Chapter 3, when we talk specifically about possible cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking.
less of relations with Canada (their partner in NAFTA) or Latin America. As reported in Figure 4.12, 46% of the public opts for preferential treatment with United States independently from relations with Canada, while 45% also want preferential treatment independently from relations with Latin America. Only a little more than a third of the public thinks that Mexico should coordinate with Canada (35%) or Latin America (36%) to defend their interests against the United States. This result is quite similar among leaders: 55% of them would seek a preferential relationship without Canada and 51% would seek it without Latin America. The only difference with respect to the public is that among the leaders, a higher percentage (44%) would seek to coordinate with Latin America than with Canada (37%) to defend their common interests.

The above results provide a more specific overview of the attitudes towards the United States. In summary, for most Mexicans, the neighbor to the North is not only a highly appreciated, admired, and trustworthy country; it is also positively recognized as a global promoter of free trade and a global actor in the fight against terrorism. In addition, Mexicans not only consider the relationship to be good, important and advantageous, they also believe United States actions towards Mexico to be positive. Furthermore, they prefer to seek a preferential treatment in their relationship with their northern neighbor before coordinating with Canada or Latin American countries in the pursuit of common interests. However, there are some limits to these positive attitudes. Mexicans negatively evaluate the sending of U.S. military troops to resolve international conflicts and disapprove of U.S. policy toward Cuba. Opinion towards possible interventions in other countries is also compatible with the reluctance of Mexicans to make joint decisions with the United States that involve unfavorable commitments.
Attitudes towards Latin America

What is the assessment of relations with Latin America? In general, Mexicans are optimistic. Although Mexico is economically and geographically located in North America, its historical and cultural identification is closer to Latin America. As Figure 4.13 shows, a clear majority believe that Mexico’s relations with the region are better now than they were a decade ago: among the public 53% and among leaders, 60%. It must be said that, for a part of the public, rather than relations having worsened (as 18% believe), they have remained the same (according to 22% of respondents). On the other hand, only 10% of leaders believe that the relationship has not changed, and 30% believe that it has gotten worse. Comparison with previous survey results suggests that this optimism is also increasing: among the public, the percentage that believe relations have improved grew by four points, and among leaders it grew by seven.

This optimism towards Latin America is confirmed in another aspect: the expectation of fewer conflicts in the region. As seen in Figure 4.14, for most Mexicans, an armed conflict in Latin America is less likely now than it was 10 years ago: 40% of the public and, primarily, 75% of leaders believe this. In contrast, only 29% of the public and 19% of leaders think that there is a greater chance of conflict today. Comparison with 2010 survey results shows a remarkable finding: Mexicans are far more optimistic about the region than they were two years ago, especially leaders. As shown in the same graph, on one hand the percentage that believe conflict to be less likely grew 10 percentage points among the public and more than 20 points among leaders. On the other hand, those who believe it is more likely dropped 13 points among the public (having been the majority in 2010), and nearly 20 points among leaders.

Does this optimism translate into an aim for leadership in the region? It doesn’t appear so for all Mexicans. Figure
Figure 4.14. The Probability of Conflict in Latin America

Compared with 10 years ago, do you think that there is an increased or decreased probability of an armed conflict in Latin America?

(%)  
Less | The same | More
---|---|---
Public
2012 | 40 | 16 | 29
2010 | 30 | 16 | 42
Leaders
2012 | 75 | 5 | 19
2010 | 54 | 7 | 38

Does not include the percentages of "Dont’t know" and "No answer".

Figure 4.15. The Leadership of Mexico in Latin America

Which of the following statements is closest to what you think about Mexico’s role in Latin America?

(%)  
Mexican should seek to be a leader in the region
Mexico should participate along with other countries without trying to be a leader
Mexico should stay out of most efforts of Latin American countries

Public
2006 | 59 | 22 | 13
2008 | 46 | 41 | 9
2010 | 46 | 35 | 13
2012 | 44 | 38 | 9

Leaders
2006 | 75 | 23 | 1
2008 | 54 | 45 | 1
2010 | 50 | 47 | 2
2012 | 52 | 45 | 2

Does not include the percentages of "Dont’t know" and "No answer".
4.15 shows that the vocation of regional leadership is different among the public and leaders. Even though they are optimistic, a relative majority (44%) of the public prefer that Mexico participate with other countries without aiming to be a leader in the region, an opinion that has been consistent since 2008. On the other hand, most leaders (52%) believe that Mexico should seek leadership in the region. 2012 was the first time that this opinion garnered more support than participating without leadership, and support has been on the rise since 2006. These results are consistent with the regional preferences of both groups. Remember that leaders in 2012 have a more Latin American regional preference than the public (see Figure 4.4). Thus, the elite increasingly see in Latin America a land of opportunity (politically and economically) that Mexico should take advantage of.

A recurring debate in the region is greater integration among Latin American countries. Given this, to what degree do Mexicans support this process? With which countries would they like to integrate more? What actions are they willing to take to achieve integration? Figure 4.16 shows, again, that the preferences of the public and leaders are different. Although opinion is fairly divided among the Mexican public, a relative majority (32%) consider the economic priority of Mexico to be integration with North America, while 28% thinks that this integration should occur with Latin America. In fact, 2012 is the first year that a similar percentage (29%) thinks Mexico should integrate with both. As can be seen in this graph, Latin American priority has been in decline since 2008. In contrast, this Latin American option has remained relatively stable among leaders during the same period. The most significant change in 2012 is that the amount of leaders giving priority to economic integration with North America fell by 5 points, landing at 33%, compared to 36% who prefer integration with North America.

**Figure 4.16. Economic Priorities of Regional Integration**

*In your opinion, what do you think Mexico’s economic priority should be? (%)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrate with North America</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrate with Latin America</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrate with both</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does not include the percentages of “Other”, “Don’t know” and “No answer”.


Latin America. Once again, the finding underscored at the beginning of this chapter is confirmed: the Mexican public maintains a clear preference for North America, and Mexican leaders turn out to be more favorable towards Latin America.

Finally, what kind of integration do Mexicans prefer with Latin America? The results to this question are reported in Figure 4.17. The first finding worth noting is that the preferences of the public and leaders are alike in order, although there are differences between the degree of favor expressed by leaders, as it is usually higher than that assigned by the public, with some exceptions. The action managing to obtain the most support is building roads and bridges to connect the region (79% of the public and 94% of leaders). This is followed by allowing the free flow of investment (77% of the public and 90% of leaders) and the free flow of goods and services (75% of the public, 91% of leaders). In a smaller proportion, albeit still a minority, Mexicans are in favor of the creation of Latin American parliament or congress to propose common laws, coming in fourth place with similar percentages among both the public and leaders (58 and 57%, respectively), and, in fifth place, having a shared, region wide foreign policy (56% of the public, 67% of leaders). Then, there are some actions that Mexicans don’t support as a majority, and that, curiously, the public supports more than leaders. On one hand, only 48% of the public and 33% of leaders are in favor of creating a common Latin American currency. On the other, 45% of the public and a mere 20% of leaders are in favor of forming a Latin American army. Finally, allowing the free movement of people in the region with no border controls is also supported by 45% of the public, while a larger majority of leaders (51%) are also in favor.

As in previous editions of the survey, the various types of regional integration receive different levels of...
support. First, material and trade integration in the region (through infrastructure, investment, goods and services) is consistently supported by a majority of Mexicans: more than 70% of the public and 90% of leaders. Second, political and institutional integration receives much less, more varied support: a common parliament and shared foreign policy are better appreciated (by nearly 50% of the public and 60% of leaders) than the creation of a common currency or a Latin American army. Finally, social integration, such as the movement of people, divides the support of both the public and leaders (both approximately 50% in favor).

In short, Mexicans are optimistic about Latin America: most believe that relations with the region are better now than they were 10 years ago and that there is less likelihood of a conflict occurring in the region. Furthermore, this optimism has grown considerably over the last two years. However, only among leaders does this translate into a desire for leadership in the region, as the public prefers that Mexico cooperate without aiming to be a leader. In this sense, Mexican leaders consolidate a more Latin American vocation than the public. With respect to the regional integration of Latin America, Mexicans are mostly in favor of a material and trade unification process, but they are divided in regards to political and institutional integration, and less in favor of actions that would allow Latin Americans to move freely about the region.

**Attitudes towards Asia and China**

Finally, to complete the panorama of attitudes towards the world, there is a region, and a particular country, that require special attention. As we reported at the beginning of this chapter, Mexicans more highly value countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, an important percentage of the public regard China as a development model, and a large percentage of leaders believe more attention should be paid to Asia. Thus, do Mexicans consider this region to be an opportunity or a risk for Mexico? Predictably, as shown in the Figure 4.18, the majority of leaders (79%) believe that Asian countries are an opportunity for Mexico. In this regard, the public is more reserved.
Only a relative majority (47%) see the continent as an opportunity; in fact, there are more than one quarter (27%) that, on the other hand, deem it a danger.

While the region may not generally be perceived as a risk, what do Mexicans think about China’s economic growth? Figure 4.19 shows the results of this question over time. In accordance with the findings of the previous paragraph, a majority of Mexican leaders (60%) believe that China’s economy growing as large as that of the U.S. would be positive for the world. In this regard, the Mexican public is less optimistic: only 46% share the positive view of such a large Chinese economy. Even so, as can be seen in the same graph, in 2012 favorable public opinion regarding China grew six percentage points with regards to 2010 and unfavorable opinion fell seven points. Curiously, a similar amount of public and leaders (30%) view the economic growth of this Asian country negatively.

Finally, for good or for bad, it is a fact that China’s development in the last decade has made it a global economic power with a growing worldwide influence. Mexico is no exception. So, what perceptions do Mexicans have of Chinese influence in their country? Unlike the results discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the influence of China is viewed more positively by the public than by leaders. As shown in the Figure 4.20, nearly half the public (49%) mark the influence of China in Mexico as “very positive” or “positive.” On the other hand, a greater proportion of leaders (43%) think that this influence is neither positive nor negative, while 35% view it positively. In general, only one in every five respondents among the public and leaders rate the influence of the Asian country as “negative” or “very negative.”

In summary, the finding at the beginning of this chapter that leaders are the only ones paying more attention

Figure 4.19. The Economic Growth of China

In your opinion, if the Chinese economy grows to the point of being as big as the US economy, do you think that this would be positive or negative for the world? (%)

Positive | Equally positive and negative | Negative
---|---|---

Public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Equally positive and negative</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Leaders

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Equally positive and negative</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<td>2011</td>
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<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Does not include the percentages of “Don’t know” and “No answer.”
to Asian countries is consistent with more particular attitudes towards the region: they widely consider these countries to be an opportunity for Mexico, and a clear majority also thinks that China’s economic growth may be a good thing for the world. Yet only a third of leaders view Chinese influence in the country positively. However, the Mexican public is more moderate in viewing Asia as an opportunity or perceiving its economic growth as positive, even though the influence of this country itself in Mexico is viewed favorably.

Figure 4.20. The Influence of China in Mexico

In general terms, how do you rate China’s influence in Mexico? (%)

Public

Positive 49

Negative 19

Neither Positive nor Negative 25

Leaders

Positive 35

Negative 22

Neither Positive nor Negative 43

Positive is the sum of “Very positive” and “Positive”; Negative is the sum of “Very negative” and “Negative.”
CHAPTER 5

Foreign Policy Instruments and Objectives

The Importance of Mexico in the World

What do Mexicans think about the power and capabilities of their country on a global scale? In order to learn about their perceptions of national relevance in the world, respondents were asked on how important Mexico is on the global stage. Generally, as can be seen in Chapter 2, Mexicans hold a positive view of their country, as the vast majority of the population (88%) and leaders (90%) consider Mexico to be somewhat or very important internationally, while only 10% of the public and 9% of the elite believe it to lack relevance (little or none). Furthermore, respondents were asked to evaluate if Mexico is more or less important on a global level than it was a decade ago. Two thirds of the leaders and public (65% in both cases) believe the country to be more important today than 10 years ago.

Now, in terms of international perception, even with the deterioration in security in the country and the negative image of Mexico projected by international media, Mexicans believe that the image of the country abroad is more positive than negative. The majority of the population (68%) consider it to be “very good” (16%) or “good” (52%), and the elite, although in smaller measure (57%), would agree with this assessment, either “very good” (7%) or “good” (50%). On the other hand, a fifth of the public and leaders (20% in both cases) consider it to be “neither good nor bad.” Only 9% of the population and 23% of the elite think it is “bad” or “very bad.”

Thus, there is evidence to support the idea that Mexicans believe their country is important and has a good image in the world, which allows it to act in the international arena. The following section will discuss the objectives and priorities of foreign policy in which these capabilities could be used.

Foreign Policy Objectives and Priorities

What are the objectives and priorities of foreign policy for Mexicans? In order to gauge national preferences in the area of foreign policy, Mexicans were asked to rate the importance of 16 foreign policy actions. First, it is worth mentioning that, as with what was observed in the case of threats when results were compared to 2010, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the level of importance given to these objectives by the public has remained relatively constant, with a variation of around three percentage points in 12 of the 16 proposed actions. Only in four cases are there significant changes in the degree of importance given: help improve the standard of living in less developed countries (+8 points), prevent nuclear proliferation (+5 points), attract foreign investment (-5 points), and promote regional integration (-7 points). Second, once
again mirroring findings with global threats, a substantive increase was seen in the importance given by leaders to foreign policy goals, with an increase of four or more points for 10 of the 16 policies. The largest increases (8 or more points) occurred with the following objectives: prevent nuclear proliferation and combat international terrorism (+12 points for both), protect and promote human rights in other countries (+11 points), promote democracy in other countries (+9 points), and protect borders and strengthen the OAS (+8 points each). Thirdly, it should be noted that the importance given by leaders to these objectives is considerably higher than that given by the population, since, on average, 75.1% consider these actions to be very important, compared to the 61.2% of the population that shares this view.

With the aim of establishing levels of priority in foreign policy objectives, the objectives were grouped into three categories depending on the level of importance Mexicans gave them: 1) of high priority, considered as very important by more than two-thirds or 65% of the population; 2) of intermediate priority, considered very important by between 50 and 65% (half and two-thirds) of the public, and 3) of low priority, where less than 50% (half) of the public believes that they are very relevant.

From Figure 5.1, several interesting readings emerge. First, a great consistency and continuity in the importance
given by both the public and leaders to the foreign policy objectives of Mexico can be seen over time compared to the 2010 and earlier surveys, replicating findings with global threats. Second, consistent with the perception of global threats, Mexicans believe that the highest goals or priorities of foreign policy should be those that have a positive impact on economic welfare or safety, as well as national prestige. This means that both people and leaders perceive foreign policy to be a public policy instrument capable of improving national conditions in economic, social, safety and environmental terms. Third, there is an important relationship and coherence between the international concerns (threats) and priorities (objectives) of Mexicans, who find in foreign policy actions a tool to address and resolve the threats and challenges of the world, with the goal of bettering the living conditions of themselves and their community. In short, foreign policy is considered an optimal instrument of public policy to solve principal internal problems and promote national development.

In 2012, Mexicans consider the following foreign policy objectives of high priority: 1) promoting Mexican culture (77% of the public, first place on their list of priorities, and 87% of leaders, fourth place on their list); 2) combating drug trafficking and organized crime (75% of the public, and 90% of leaders, second place for both); 3) protecting the environment (75% of the public, second place; 91% of leaders, first place); 4) attract tourists (73% of the public, fourth place, and 84% of leaders, sixth place); 5) marketing Mexican products in other countries (73% of the public, and 87% of leaders, fourth for both); 6) protecting the interests of Mexicans abroad (70% of the public, sixth place, and 90% of leaders, second place); and 7) bringing foreign investment to Mexico (66% of the public, seventh place, and 84% of leaders, sixth place). As evidenced, there is complete agreement between the public and elites on the seven most important foreign policy priorities, although both groups put them in a slightly different order. These objectives are directly or indirectly related with influencing in the enhancement of the well-being, safety and prestige of Mexicans through a foreign policy that promotes an agenda focused on generating benefits in economic terms of public and human security.

As in previous surveys and completely consistent with findings regarding perceived threats, the objectives of intermediate importance are related to the traditional topics of national and international security (protection of borders, combating terrorism and preventing nuclear proliferation) and international economics (promoting regional integration and cooperation for development). Thus, intermediate-priority objectives are: 1) protecting land and sea borders (63% of the public and 77% of leaders, both eighth place); 2) combating international terrorism (61% of the public, ninth, and 71% of leaders, tenth); 3) protecting and promoting human rights (60% of the public, tenth place, and 64% of leaders, thirteenth place); 4) preventing nuclear proliferation (59% of the public, eleventh place, and 72% of leaders, ninth place); 5) promoting international cooperation to improve the standard of living in less developed countries (51% of the public, twelfth place, and 58% of leaders, fifteenth); and 6) promoting regional integration (50% of the public, thirteenth place, and 71% of leaders, tenth). Again, there is an affinity between the public and leaders in their perception of intermediate priorities, which are directly related to safety issues or economics in the international system, relatively more distant from everyday reality and the welfare of the people.

Finally, and again consistent with past surveys, the objectives that are considered of low priority are those related to the strengthening of international organizations (the UN and the OAS) and the international common good (promotion of democracy), which seem remote from—probably outside of—national, local, and immediate personal realities. The foreign policy objectives of low priority are: 1) strengthening the UN (46% of the public, fourteenth place, 70% of leaders, twelfth), 2) helping spread democracy to other countries (43% of the public, fifteenth place, 44% of leaders, sixteenth place) and 3) strengthening the OAS (37% of the public, sixteenth place, and 61% of leaders, fourteenth place). Thus, for Mexicans, issues related to strengthening international institutions and the global promotion of values are among the lowest of foreign policy priorities.

Lastly, it is important to note that no significant differences are observed in the preferences of the population.
and leaders surveyed when you compare information on the importance attached to foreign policy objectives with socio-demographic characteristics (geographical area, age, gender, education level, income, ideology, party identification, etc.). Thus, there is broad consensus across Mexican public opinion on concerns (threats) and foreign policy priorities (goals), where both leaders and the public agree on the threatening aspects of the world and the foreign policy actions of priority to address these concerns. There is also a large majority consensus in both groups for an active foreign policy, but with national or local targets to promote welfare and safety, and increase the external prestige of Mexico. Such an overwhelming degree of consistency and consensus among Mexicans could be interpreted as a clear mandate for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government agencies active internationally on the major priorities that Mexico’s foreign policy should emphasize, execute and obtain.

**Foreign Policy Instruments**

It is a fact that Mexicans want an active foreign policy that meets their preferences in terms of priorities. Being so, what external policy instruments do they consider most appropriate for achieving these priorities: the implementation of actions and strategies of “hard” power (military), “intermediate” power (commercial and economic) or “soft” power (diplomatic and cultural)? Fully consistent with the type of international threats and foreign policy priorities they identify, Mexicans prefer soft power and intermediate power policies over hard power. This is also consistent with the geostrategic and economic situation of Mexico in the world: it is a rising power with regional influence (in Central America and the Caribbean, and to a lesser extent South America) that not only shares a border with the United States, the global hegemony, but is also under its security umbrella. This is compounded by having signed a wide range of free trade agreements, including NAFTA, as a result of the trade liberalization and structural reform processes undertaken since the late 1980s.

As shown in Figure 5.2, in order to increase the influence of Mexico in the world, Mexicans are widely in favor of the use of cultural, commercial and diplomatic instruments. The support levels (“strongly agree” and “somewhat agree”) are practically unanimous among leaders, 98% of whom support trade and cultural instruments, while 97% support diplomacy, with the predominant response being “strongly agree” (90, 87 and 86%, respectively). The vast majority of the public also supports the use of these instruments, with 90% approving the use of cultural resources, 89% commercial and 76% diplomatic. The use of hard power, the military, is totally rejected by leaders (84% would “somewhat” or “strongly disagree” with its use), while the public is divided on the issue (54% would be in favor and 40% not, while 6% did not provide an opinion).

When respondents were asked which of the previously mentioned instruments they felt was the most important in increasing the presence of Mexico in the world, the public and leaders agreed. In descending order, by importance, the elite prefer commercial instruments (42%), followed by cultural (31%) and diplomatic (26%) tools, leaving the military last (1%). The public has the same order of priorities, but with slightly different percentages: commercial (46%), cultural (25%), diplomatic (15%) and military (9%).

**Foreign Policy Evaluation**

How do Mexicans evaluate the performance of the Mexican government in foreign policy matters? In general, the evaluation of the elite is very favorable, with 65% “very” or “somewhat” in agreement with its execution, representing an increase of 9 points with respect to 2010. Moreover, the policy of protecting Mexicans abroad also scored positively: 59% of the leaders reported “very much” or “somewhat agreeing” with it. Furthermore, foreign policy and the defense of Mexicans abroad are the second and third highest rated policies, after economic policy (67% in favor), and exceeding by far policies of public security (45% in favor), fighting
The public also positively evaluates foreign policy and the protection of Mexicans abroad (50% agree with both), although their order of preferences varies by the fact that, for them, the government performed better in matters of education (55% in favor), followed by economic policy (54%). Following international policies (foreign and protection), come public safety (49% in favor) and combating poverty (45%).

Noteworthy is the little variation in policy evaluation by the population (10 points between the best and worst rated policies) in contrast with the 33-point difference in the assessments made by leaders. As mentioned in Chapter 1, only 21% of the public knows what the acronym SRE stands for (the acronym in Spanish for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 5% know the name of the Foreign Minister, and 8% answered correctly that Mexico was the country that chaired the G20 in 2012. In this sense, a great challenge lies ahead for the Mexican Foreign Ministry: to carry out a comprehensive information and communication effort explaining what it is and what foreign policy is for. On the other hand, as a result of their higher levels of education or more direct contact with those responsible for designing and implementing public policies, it seems that the elite have a greater critical and discerning capacity than the public when it comes to evaluating government performance.

The good evaluation of international policies leads to the execution of a more active foreign policy that favors...
commercial, cultural and diplomatic resources, and promotes solutions to major perceived threats. This can be achieved by emphasizing the foreign policy objectives identified by those surveyed that generate economic benefits and international prestige, thus positively influencing the safety and well being of Mexicans.

**Investment in Foreign Policy**

Summing up, Mexicans consider their country a major player in the world and aspire to an active participation in international affairs. Furthermore, a broad consensus exists about the objectives of foreign policy, prioritizing those actions that contribute to national development and benefit the population. In addition, there is a great consensus on the use of commercial, cultural, and diplomatic instruments to achieve them. Finally, the government’s international policies, both foreign policy and the protection of nationals abroad, were positively evaluated. Thus, the question is: to what degree are Mexicans willing to invest financial resources and management in order to produce more and better foreign policy?

In order to ascertain the interest of investing budgetary resources in international matters, respondents were asked if they believed Mexico should increase, maintain or reduce its number of embassies and consulates in the world. As shown in *Figure 5.3*, the public is divided between maintaining (40%) and increasing (39%) the number of diplomatic and consular representations abroad, with a small minority who want reductions (12%). Leaders seem to be more satisfied with the current level of representation, since the majority (54%) prefer to maintain, rather than increase (31%) or decrease (11%) the number. It is noteworthy that the elite have substantially changed their position in the last two years, because in 2010, 44% wanted to reduce rather than increase (33%) or keep (17%) such representations. In this case, despite the positive evaluation and importance given to international activity, it is necessary to build greater consensus on the importance of allocating budgetary resources to international areas, if a more active foreign policy, one that directly influences development and the security of people •

---

**Figure 5.3. Representation of Mexico Abroad**

*Do you think Mexico should increase, maintain or reduce the number of embassies and consulates abroad? (%)*

**Public**
- Increase: 39%
- Maintain: 40%
- Reduce: 12%
- DK/NA: 10%

**Leaders**
- Increase: 31%
- Maintain: 54%
- Reduce: 11%
- DK/NA: 4%
Convenient Multilateralism

Despite the continued pessimism regarding the course of the world present among Mexicans over the last years, the growing view that Mexico should play an active role in world affairs has not been undermined, with support having grown 15 percentage points since 2004, as pointed out in Chapter 3. Facing this national aspiration, an area where that proactive inclination becomes clear is multilateralism; this is particularly relevant because of the fact that, traditionally, Mexican foreign policy has found fertile ground for the development of its international activity.

From 2004-2012, there was an increase of 10 points in support for Mexico’s participation in United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (PKO), through either military or police forces, with approval increasing from 48 to 58% (with an average over the five surveys of 54.8% supporting it against 33.2% who think that it’s better that Mexico leave this type of activity to other countries). Adherence to this proposal is not as strong among leaders, as Figure 6.1 shows, with support not only relatively lower (52% in 2012), but refusal to cooperate in peacekeeping missions is 15 percentage points higher than among the public (45% versus 30%). Thus, the gap between approval and disapproval of participating in United Nations peacekeeping forces is large among the public (28 percentage points) and small among leaders (only seven points).

From 2004-2012, average agreement among leaders is 49.4% and average disagreement is 45.8%, with the latter increasing from 35 to 45% over the period, peaking in 2008 when it reached 59%.

However, it is important to note that support for PKOs is contingent on the nature of the activities in which Mexican forces would participate. When it is explained to respondents that peacekeeping missions involve UN member countries sending military forces to conflict zones, a majority of 46% disapprove of collaboration in such operations while 37% approve (12% consider that it depends on the situation). However, the opposite is true when asked if Mexico should send troops to other countries to help in case of natural disasters, where nine out of 10 Mexicans (89%) and 95% of the leaders responded that they “strongly” or “somewhat agree”.

Furthermore, within the United Nations, in the unlikely event that a new seat opens to represent Latin America as a whole on the Security Council, the desire for an active foreign policy is clear: both the public and leaders overwhelmingly believe that Mexico should occupy it (64 and 73%, respectively). Only 16% of the population and 20% of the elite believe that the seat would belong to Brazil. Moreover, within the International Monetary Fund, 67% of leaders agree that Mexico should have a more active participation by increasing its contributions, in order to gain more voting power in the agency’s decisions.
However, this demand for increased international activity contrasts with a low willingness among Mexicans to incur obligations of a supranational character. When asked if Mexico must accept the decisions of the United Nations, even if they aren’t favorable, in order to solve international problems, the majority of the public is against the idea (45%) while 36% consider that Mexico must abide by them. It should be noted that the gap between the two positions has been reduced to just nine percentage points, as in 2008 there was a difference of up to 22 points. From the first time this question was asked (2004) to the present survey, those opposed make up 43.2% on average against 38.6% who are in favor. Meanwhile, leaders have a very different opinion: 67% considered that Mexico should subject itself to United Nations decisions, while 28% do not believe it convenient.

For the first time since 2008, there are more Mexicans who agree that a conational accused of a crime against humanity that hasn’t been tried in Mexico could be tried by an international court (45% for, 41% against). In retrospect, no significant changes are observed with respect to previous editions of the survey, as public opinion...
appears to be rather divided among those in favor and those against. Meanwhile, this division doesn’t exist among leaders, who overwhelmingly agree (78%) that international courts can prosecute Mexicans. In order to “break” this impasse, this time we decided to investigate what the opinion of respondents would be if, instead of a common, ordinary Mexican, it was a politician or official that had been accused of crimes against humanity.

Figure 6.2 captures this change of +7 percentage points in consent and the gap between those in favor and those against, only four percentage points when dealing with a common Mexican and 17 percentage points when it is a Mexican politician or official.

In economics and finance, the acquiescence of the leaders to obey supranational decisions also reaches very high levels, which shows a strong multilateral consciousness. 79% believe that if a country was to carry a dispute with Mexico before the World Trade Organization, and the body ruled against Mexico, that it would be best to abide by the ruling. In complete harmony with this high perception of respect is the belief that a signatory of an international trade agreement is required to comply with minimum international standards in protecting the environment (97%), labor rights (97%) and human rights (96%). Also, a large majority of leaders consider it important to strengthen the G-20 in order to increase its capacity for financial regulation, while, at the same time, they support compliance with the trade decisions adopted during its last meeting. Leaders are also in favor of the G-20 Financial Stability Board setting minimum
### Figure 6.3. Willingness of Leaders to accept Supranational Decisions

The World Trade Organization was established, among other things, to resolve trade disputes between countries.

*In your opinion, if a country presents a complaint on Mexico before the World Trade Organization, and they make decision against Mexico, should Mexico abide by their decision or not?*

**Leaders (%)**

- **Abide by the decisions of the WTO**
  - Should not: 10
  - Should: 79

*Tell me, when countries are part of international trade agreements, do you believe that they should or should not be obligated to meet the minimum international standards regarding…?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Should not</th>
<th>Should</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental protection</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor rights protection</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights protection</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*At the last meeting of the G20 it was agreed to renew the compromise of the members countries to not apply trade protectionist measures until 2014, even if they have economic difficulties. Do you believe Mexico should abide this commitment or not?*

**G20 Agreement (%)**

- **In Favor**: 73
- **Against**: 24

*The G20 established the Financial Stability Board as the responsible organism to maintain the financial stability in the world. Are you in favor or against with this board having the right to…*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>In Favor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establish minimum regulations to the national financial institutions</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand and monitor compliance with these requirements to all countries</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impose sanctions if countries do not comply</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does not include the percentages of “Don’t know” and “No answer”.
Figure 6.4. Evaluation of International Organizations

And on the same scale of 0 to 100, with 0 being very unfavorable feelings, 100 being very favorable and 50 being neither a favorable nor unfavorable feelings, what are your feelings of the following international organizations?
(Average)

**PUBLIC**
- UN 72°
- OAS 63°
- IMF 63°
- NAFTA 63°
- Amnesty International 63°
- European Union 60°
- MERCOSUR 58°
- G20 58°
- ALBA 53°

**LEADERS**
- UN 76°
- Amnesty International 76°
- European Union 73°
- OAS 68°
- IMF 66°
- NAFTA 66°
- G20 65°
- MERCOSUR 63°
- ALBA 53°

**AVERAGES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Organizations (9)</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries (23)</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Figures (10)</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Public**

**Leaders**
regulations for national financial institutions (78%), enforcing and monitoring compliance with those financial regulations in all countries (78%) and having the ability to impose sanctions when countries do not comply (72%). Finally, 73% of leaders think that Mexico should respect the commitment made at the last G-20 meeting to not impose protectionist measures in international trade until 2014, even when facing economic difficulties. As shown in Figure 6.3, throughout their answers, leaders expressed complete willingness to subject themselves to supranational decisions, given that in no case did disapproval exceed 25%, while 83.8% on average approve.

**Evaluation and Perception of International Organizations**

As discussed in Chapter 1, the UN is not only the most well known international organization for Mexicans (58% correctly identify its acronym, compared to 23 and 13% who identify the OAS and the IMF, respectively), it is also the one they trust the most (53% of the public and 81% of leaders report somewhat or very much trusting the organization). At the same time, for both the public and leaders, the UN is the highest rated international organization out of a list of 9, as shown in Figure 6.4. On a scale of 0-100, where 0 is very unfavorable and 100 is

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1 Among the leaders there is a high percentage of knowledge of the acronyms OEA (94%), OMC (76%) and OCDE (61%), but significant lack of knowledge of APEC and CELAC (59% and 74%, respectively, could not give a definition of these acronyms).
very favorable, the United Nations obtained an average score of 72 points among the public and 76 among leaders, sharing the top spot with Amnesty International. In descending order, based on the ratings of the public, come OAS (OEA in Spanish, 63), IMF (FMI in Spanish, 63), NAFTA (TLCAN in Spanish, 63), Amnesty International (63), the European Union (60), MERCOSUR (58), the G-20 (58) and ALBA (53). While, among leaders, following the UN and Amnesty International, the highest evaluated international bodies are the European Union (73), the OAS (68), IMF (66), NAFTA (66), the G20 (65), MERCOSUR (63) and ALBA (53). In general, Mexicans have a favorable perception of international organizations, since, altogether, the average evaluation of the public is 61.4 points and that of leaders 67.3, which is higher than the average rating of countries (53.9 and 61.6, respectively) and political leaders (52.3 and 57.5, respectively).

It is noteworthy that within the public there is a close relationship between knowledge and evaluation: the higher the knowledge of any determined organization, the higher the rating given. For example, ALBA is the least known international body among the public and, at the same time, the worse evaluated on the list. On the opposite side is the United Nations: the best known and the highest rated on the list. Figure 6.5, based on the awareness average results for international organizations developed in the first chapter, shows this positive correlation, with awareness as the independent variable and the evaluation as the dependent variable.

United Nations: Contrasts

Despite the positive evaluation and knowledge of and confidence in the UN among the public and leaders, these results do not translate into awarding it high priority on the scale of Mexican foreign policy objectives. In the previous chapter we mentioned that strengthening the United Nations ranks fourteenth among the public and twelfth among leaders out of a total of 16 goals considered in the survey. Keeping in mind that the average importance given on this list of objectives is 61.2% for the public and 75.1% for leaders, strengthening the UN is 16 percentage points below the average for the former, and five percentage points among the latter (46 and 70% consider this goal “very important”). It is essential to consider as well that, despite the positive image of the United Nations, 67% of Mexicans and 72% of their leaders “very much” or “somewhat agree” with the statement that international organizations such as these, generally follow the dictates imposed on them by developed countries, without taking into account the interests of poor countries. This could explain, to some extent, the tendency for prioritizing sovereignty over supranational issues.

Even when the UN should use force in certain situations, the agency does not lose its broad approval among Mexicans, since a high percentage considers the organism to be important in preserving the peace and security of the world in various ways: preventing serious human rights violations such as genocide (78%), preventing countries from supporting terrorist groups (72%), preventing countries from acquiring nuclear weapons (71%), defending a country that has been attacked by another (69%) and restoring by force a democratic government that has been overthrown (57%).

---

2 As can be expected, leaders have a much superior level of awareness than the public: as a group they achieve a 95.6% awareness average of international organizations, while the public manages 59.3%. Therefore, there is little statistical significance in the knowledge-evaluation relationship among the Mexican elite, even though it suffices to point out that ALBA is the least known organization among leaders (24% don’t know it) and also the most poorly evaluated one.

3 The OAS ranks sixteenth among the public (37%) and fourteenth among leaders (61%), 24.2 and 14.1 percentage points below their respective averages, being a foreign policy objective with a low perception of priority.
CHAPTER 7
International Economy

Liberalism or Protectionism: a Resolved Debate?

Nearly three decades after the adoption of an open economic policy as a model for national development, the debate between liberalism and protectionism in the country is practically settled in general terms, with the balance tilted in favor of the former in spite of the recurring economic and financial crises that took place during this period. The results of the 2012 survey shed light on the path taken by Mexican public opinion in favor of economic openness, although some caveats exist regarding the extent to which foreign investment is desirable in sensitive sectors such as energy. For the leaders of the country, there is no debate: economic liberalization is the central axis of development of the country. Thus, while leaders unanimously agree on openness in trade and finance, among the public a positive balance exists, albeit with important reservations that are slightly sharpened by socio-demographic characteristics.

Since 2004 we have measured the perception of globalization among the public and the leaders, by defining it simply as greater contact between our economy and other economies in the world. ¹ During this period of time, there has been an increase of eight percentage points (from 34 to 42%) in public opinion with regard to the idea that globalization is generally good, expanding the gap between those who think that it is usually bad (from 3 to 12 percentage points). Thus, on average, the acceptance of globalization in this longitudinal measurement is 39.6% versus 28.8% who perceive it negatively, and 15.8 percent of people who consider it neither good nor bad. Leaders are much stronger in their convictions on globalization, given that from 2004 to 2012, on average, a wide gap of 64 percentage points exists among those who believe that globalization is generally good (76.4%) and those who believe it is generally bad (12.4%). However, as can be seen in Figure 7.1, the distance between both positions has shortened, from 86 to 56 percent, even though in 2012 support remains very high (74% believe it is generally good for Mexico).

While foreign investment may be controversial in some sectors of the Mexican economy, as we will detail

¹ For this edition, we did an experiment by dividing the sample of the general public in half. One half was asked the question with the traditional phrasing already mentioned, and the other was given more information to determine if there was an important variation between opinions in both samples. The phrasing with more information was the following: “Globalization, understood as greater contact between our economy and other economies in the world, has both advantages (for example, greater supply and cheaper prices) and disadvantages (e.g., greater vulnerability to international crises). Do you think that greater contact between our economy and other global economies, known as globalization, is generally good or generally bad? However, no significant variations were found in the two samples, given that any differences were inside the margin of sampling error. With traditional phrasing, results were 42% "generally good" and 30% "generally bad," while when given more information the results were 41 and 28%, respectively.
below, in general terms Mexicans see it as very positive for the country. In this regard, 77% of the public and 90% of leaders believe that foreign investment benefits “a lot” (36 and 68%, respectively) or “somewhat” (41 and 22%), versus only 21% of the public and 9% of the elite who believe that it benefits “little” (15 and 7%, respectively) or “nothing” (6 and 2%) in Mexico.2 When analyzing for temporary fluctuations since this question was first raised in 2008, we found no substantive changes, as the average approval of foreign investment in Mexico, in general terms, is 75.3% (38% “very much” and 37.3% “somewhat”) among the public and 90.6% among leaders (67.6% “very much” and 23% “somewhat”).

Another important side of Mexican economic liberalization has been the transition from a protectionist economy to one that promotes free trade; this, according to Mexicans, has been positive overall. Figure 7.2 lists in descending order the opinions of both the public and leaders concerning who benefits the most from free trade. A high percentage of people (72%) believe that developed countries benefit more, with nine out of every 10 leaders (89%) agreeing. Notwithstanding this view, it is clear

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2 With this question, we also carried out the same experiment as with globalization. Half the sample were asked the question as it has been phrased since 2008, and the other half were asked in the following way: “Foreign investment in Mexico also has advantages (e.g. new jobs and technology) and disadvantages (for example, the closure of some Mexican companies and profits that will go to other countries). With this in mind, how much do you believe that foreign investment benefits Mexico?” Once again, the opinion of Mexicans did not vary very much. In the sample where the traditional question was asked, the results were 35% “a lot,” 41% “somewhat,” 15% “little” and 6% “not at all,” whereas when asked a question with more information, the results were 25% “a lot,” 46% “somewhat,” 18% “little” and 6% “not at all.”
that, after three decades of trade liberalization, most of the public and leaders positively evaluate the effects of free trade on the country. 64% of Mexicans and 73% of leaders believe that free trade is good for the Mexican economy, while 59% of the former and 77% of the latter believe that it is good for the living standards of the people. Furthermore, although with lower levels of approval, 52% of public and 47% of leaders agree that free trade is good for Mexican agriculture and 51% in both groups believe it to be good for the environment.\footnote{In this series of questions we also carried out the exercise of dividing the sample in half and phrasing each question differently to see what reactions would arise. Once again, the differences were not important in scrutinizing the results. The question with most information was, “Free trade also brings advantages (eg, new markets for Mexican products) and disadvantages (eg, increased competition from foreign products). With this in mind, do you think that free trade is good or bad for...” Favorable results for free trade in different areas followed this order: developed countries 72% when asked the traditional question and 70% when given more information; the Mexican economy, 64 and 61%, the standard of living for people like you, 59% and 56%; Mexican agriculture, 52% of both; and the environment, 51% and 52.
}

These results roughly provide us with the coordinates to locate economic openness within the Mexican collective ideology; i.e., how accepting Mexicans are of globalization, foreign investment and free trade.
However, they do not reveal information about the degree of this acceptance and its distribution among the population. Figure 7.3 summarizes the level of support among Mexicans for economic liberalization in our country, with four categories that measure this degree of support. The first category is high openness, which includes all respondents that believe globalization to be generally good, that foreign investment benefits a lot or somewhat, and that free trade is good for the Mexican economy. The second category is intermediate openness, including three subcategories of agreement, with those who answered two of the three above-mentioned questions positively (acceptance of foreign investment and trade, globalization and foreign investment, or trade and globalization). The third category is low openness, grouping the respondents who only answered one of the three questions affirmatively. Lastly, there is the no openness category, with those who rejected any benefits of globalization, foreign investment and free trade for the Mexican economy. Thus, 64.6% represent the circle of economic liberalization, with high (29.2%) and intermediate (35.4%) openness. 23.5% only support one aspect of the economic liberalization, and 11.9% outright reject all three. In relation to the previous survey, no significant changes are found, except for a small drop in high openness and a small increase in no openness.

While this suggests the existence of a widely spread idea among Mexicans that economic liberalization is beneficial for the country as a whole, there are some reluctance and nuances worth noting. Table 7.1 summarizes socio-demographic particularities. Although strong support for economic liberalization in Mexico stands out in all segments (geographical, gender, age, education, partisan and ideological), the largest reservations are in the south

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 7.3. Economic Openness</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public (%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Openness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness to Foreign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness to Globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Foreign Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open to trade and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open to Foreign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>16.1</td>
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<td>Open to Trade</td>
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<td>5.3</td>
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<td>Open to Globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Openness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Intermediate Openness 35.4%

Low Openness 23.5%

Note: The total of intermediate openness and low openness do not add up due to rounding.
### Table 7.1. Economic Openness: Socio-demographic profile (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Openness</th>
<th>Intermediate Openness</th>
<th>Low Openness</th>
<th>No Openness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>38.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>22.9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 to 29</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 49</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 +</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without education</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary School</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle School</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independ</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN members</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI members</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD members</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-Left</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-Right</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of the country (low openness and no openness make up 50.7% of the population), among women (37.8%), those over 50 (37.8%), those who have not completed elementary school (62.8%), independents (40.3%), followed by those who affiliate with the PRD (39.7%) and those who ideologically are located in the center (33.9%) and on the left (33.4%). In contrast, those most open to economic liberalization live in the north (high and intermediate openness make up 72.4%), are male (67.1%), are between 18 and 29 years (67.4%), and have completed high school (68.6%), followed by those who completed middle school (67.7%), are affiliated with the PAN (71.8%) and are in the center-right of the ideological scale (77.1%).

Despite the consensus on economic liberalization, there are still productive sectors that have a highly symbolic nature in Mexican public opinion that are banned to foreign investment. To the direct question of whether or not the Mexican government should allow foreigners to invest in telephony and media such as television and newspapers, most people agree that the government should allow it (58 and 54%, respectively), while a minority of 37 and 40% think such a concession should not be made for foreign capital.

There is greater reluctance in the sectors of electricity and the production, exploration and distribution of oil. In the former, for the first time since the question was asked, 56% were in favor and 44% against.

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**Figure 7.4. Foreign Investment by Sector**

*In your opinion, should the Mexican government permit foreigners to invest in...? (% of “yes”)*

![Graph showing foreign investment by sector](image)

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4 A small sample of the population was asked using the phrase “communication media” to see if a significant variation existed, but no changes were seen: 56% were in favor and 39% against.

5 A small sample of the population was asked using the phrase “oil” to see if a significant variation existed, but no changes were seen: the majority were against (64%) with 32% in favor.
asked (2006), there are more people who believe that investment in electricity should be allowed (48%) than those who don’t (47%). From 2006 to 2012, the opinion of Mexicans on the issue has varied, because, although on average more people have been against (56%) than in favor (39.5%) of allowing foreign investment in this sector, the percentage of those against it has dropped 21 points (68 to 47%), while at the same time the number of those who approve of allowing foreign investors to participate in the sector has increased (from 27 to 48%).

Without a doubt, the bastion of economic nationalism remains the oil sector. In the five surveys carried out, this sector has consistently presented the lowest level of openness to foreign investment; with, on average 68.2% refusing, and 27.5% believing the Government should allow it. As shown in Figure 7.4, it is the sector where the least support for opening up to foreign investment exists, almost 17 percentage points below the openness average of 2012 (47.8%).

The case with leaders is quite the opposite. Support for foreign investment in these sectors is: 80% in telephony, 76% in media, 67% in electricity and 59% in oil. i.e., leaders, on average, approve of foreign investment in these sectors by nearly 23 percentage points more than the public. However, it must be noted that, as Figure 7.4 shows, approval of investment in the oil sector has fallen 17 points, with rejection increasing 25 points since 2004.

### Evaluation of Trade Policy by Leaders

Foreign trade has been the centerpiece of Mexican economic liberalization for more than two decades, with 12 free trade agreements and nine Economic Complementation Agreements and agreements of partial scope at the core. Although leaders broadly agree on the benefits this policy has brought to the overall Mexican economy, the vast majority believe that Mexico already has a wide network of trade agreements and that it should concentrate more on those (71%) rather than sign new ones, an option supported by only 24%.

When questioned about how much the trade agreements with North America, the European Union and Japan have benefitted the country, on average 67.4% agree that these agreements have favored Mexico “a lot” (27.7%) or “somewhat” (39.7%). As shown in Figure 7.5, NAFTA is the highest rated at 76% (48% “a lot” and 28% “somewhat”), followed by the FTA EU-Mex at 68%
(20% “a lot” and 48% “somewhat”) and finally, by the trade agreement with Japan at 58% (15% “a lot” and 43% “somewhat”). This positive assessment of the benefits of NAFTA is reaffirmed by the majority (77%) who think that Mexico should seek to broaden and deepen this treaty, even if it means taking on new commitments, compared to 17% who opt for maintaining the trade agreement as is, with current costs and benefits.

For Mexico, the increasingly protagonistic role played by emerging economies presents the challenge of finding strategies to build commercial links with them. Is there a consensus among leaders to try and broaden the range of free trade agreements with these countries? To probe the opinions of leaders, they were asked about the possibility of Mexico signing a free trade agreement with the BRICS. As Figure 7.6 shows, the greatest support for signing a trade agreement is with Brazil, where 52% “strongly agree” with Mexico signing an agreement with the country, and 35% “somewhat agree” (87% in total). India follows with 33% responding “strongly agree” and 43% “somewhat agree” (76% in total), and China with 32% “strongly agree” and 37% “somewhat agree” (69%). At the end fall South Africa with 25% “strongly agree” and 41% “somewhat agree” (66%) and Russia with 24% “strongly agree” and 41% “somewhat agree” (65%).

Finally, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP, for short), currently the most important trade negotiation process our country is involved in, enjoys extensive support among leaders. According to the results of the survey, eight out of 10 agree “a lot” (34%) or “somewhat” (46%) with the country joining the TPP •
CHAPTER 8

The Multiple Faces of Migration

The 2012-2013 edition of Mexico, the Americas and the World continues to emphasize migration in order to follow up on the evolution of the phenomenon through an integrated approach. The study tries to gather information to help determine and compare the different pieces of the puzzle (emigration, transmigration and immigration) and the different angles of the problem (social, economic and political).

Some of the most significant findings of this edition are the increase in the percentage of respondents who reported receiving remittances and having a family member abroad and the slight increase in willingness to emigrate to another country, which contrasts with a more negative assessment, compared with that reported in 2010, of the effects of emigration on families. The general openness towards foreigners is maintained, but the proportion of the population asserting that foreigners residing in Mexico take jobs from Mexicans and threaten national traditions grew. Mexicans are willing to grant immigrants some of the same social rights they demand for their countrymen abroad (education and family reunification), although they are reluctant when it comes to granting employment equity and the right to vote to foreigners living in Mexico. Finally, the stance of Mexicans against undocumented immigration slightly softened, since they prefer implementing a temporary workers program over more drastic measures, such as deportation.

Contact with the Phenomenon of Migration

What kind of contact do Mexicans have with migration? To answer this question, Mexico, the Americas, and the World sought to measure level of contact through various indicators such as having relatives in another country, receiving remittances, having lived outside of Mexico or maintaining contact with foreigners living in the country. The results show that types of contact vary considerably.

In spite of the decrease in migration between Mexico and the United States, the results of this survey show that certain factors remain the same, such as the percentage of Mexican families outside of Mexico, and there is even an increase in people reporting receiving remittances and having close relatives in another country. As shown in Figure 8.1, 49% report having a family member living abroad and a third (34%) have relatives

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1 During the first term of the administration of President Barack Obama, deportations reached historical levels, placing them at, since 2009, an average of 400,000 deportations a year (Pew Hispanic Center, “As Deportation Rise to Record Levels, Most Latinos Oppose Obama’s Policy”, December 28, 2011, p.11). Similarly, the Pew Hispanic Center reported that, after four decades of migration between the two countries, net migration flows had reached zero (Pew Hispanic Center, “Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero—and Perhaps Less”, April 23, 2012, p.6. http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/04/Mexican-migrants-report_final.pdf).
who had lived in the home of the respondent now living in another country. It should be noted that, compared to 2010, this percentage increased by 11 points, that is, more households report having a close relative living abroad.

In the same way, it is very important to note the increase in the proportion of households that report receiving remittances from abroad. In 2010, only 12% reported receiving such an income, while in 2012 the percentage increased to 20%. This trend coincides with official data on an increase in remittances nationally.\(^2\)

Finally, of those who claimed to have traveled outside of Mexico on at least one occasion (24%) in their life, half reported having lived in another country. This means that, among all respondents, nearly 13% reported having migrated abroad at some point in their lives. The main reason for having migrated was work (65%), and the country of destination the United States (88%). On the other hand, only a minority (19%) report having some sort of relationship with foreigners living in Mexico.

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Attitudes towards Emigration

Mexico, the Americas, and the World found mixed feelings among respondents regarding the emigration of Mexicans to other countries. On the one hand, the number of Mexicans willing to live in another country increased with respect to previous editions. On the other hand, and unlike in 2010, the majority of Mexicans hold a negative assessment of migration and the effects that it has on the homes of migrants, their communities and the country itself.

The percentage of Mexicans who were willing to “go live in another country” if they could, rose from 37% in 2010 to 42% in 2012 (see Figure 8.2). At the same time, the percentage willing to enter another country without documents dramatically declines from 30% in 2010 to 14% in 2012, a decrease of over 50%. The recovery of the U.S. economy would be an incentive to emigrate to the country, while the record number of deportations carried out by the Obama administration could discourage people from emigrating without permission.

As noted in 2010, the most common potential destinations for those willing to emigrate are still the United States (59%), Canada (9%) and Spain (6%). The order of preferences is the same as in 2010, but there was a slight decrease in percentage for the United States (preferred by 62% in 2010) and Canada (13%). This, coupled with an increase in the category of “others,” warns of a possible diversification of emigration intentions among Mexicans. An expansion in the reasons why Mexicans would emigrate was also found: while work is the main motive, the percentage of people willing to seek employment in another country (55%) is less than the percentage (65%, as shown above) of people who report having already

Figure 8.2. Intent to Emigrate*

* Questions
  a. If you could, would you go to live outside Mexico?
  b. Would you be willing to go live to another country without documents?
lived in another country for business reasons. Given the growth of violence in recent years, it is not surprising that insecurity (18%) is second, followed by the desire to know other places and cultures (10%) and the search for a better quality of life (7%). Family reunification (2%) and studies (2%) are other reasons given to live abroad.

For their part, the percentage of leaders willing to leave to live in another country is similar to that of the public in general, 38%, and the first three possible destination countries are the same: the United States (27%), Canada (15%) and Spain (9%), even though the percentage of leaders who prefer the United States, just as in 2010, is much smaller than that of the public. As in the previous editions, the sectors of leaders most likely to emigrate are civil servants (55% would live abroad) and entrepreneurs (45%). Mexicans who hold elected political office and those working in the social sector are more reluctant to live abroad (33 and 34%, respectively), while those working in academia and journalism occupy an intermediate position (36%).

While a high percentage of Mexicans may appear willing to live abroad, the evaluation of migration is, paradoxically, more negative than positive. This contrasts with the data from 2010 when opinion towards migration was rather ambivalent, with the balance leaning slightly to the positive side. As shown in the Figure 8.3, in 2012, 44% brand migration as “bad” for the families of immigrants (compared to 41% in 2010), 47% as “bad” for their community, town or city of origin (38% in 2010) and 51% as “bad” for Mexico (44% in 2010). The contrast with 2010 results is pronounced. In the previous edition, in two of the three evaluations, the majority held favorable
opinions towards migration, and in the third (effects on the country), opinion was divided equally between “good” and “bad”. In 2012, overall opinion turned negative. 39% judged migration as good for the families of migrants (net balance of -5%), 35% for the communities of origin (-12%) and 35% for the country (-16%). Furthermore, the percentage of people who believe emigration to be “good” for “the country they go to” fell from 57% in 2010 to 47% in 2012.

It is worth mentioning that, when it comes to emigration, the opinions of leaders are of a different nature than those of the public. In the previous survey, leaders viewed emigration as being negative for homes, communities and the country. Unlike the general public, in 2012 leaders softened their assessment of emigration (with respect to 2010), though it is still mostly viewed as unfavorable. In this regard, 47% of leaders rate migration as “bad” for communities of migrants (compared to 52% in 2010) and 52% as “bad” for Mexico (compared with 57% in 2010). With the effects of emigration on households, this percentage has remained virtually unchanged: 42% rate it as “bad” compared to 41% in 2010, while an overwhelming majority of leaders reported believing that immigration is “good” for destination countries in both 2012 (74%) and 2010 (76%).

Opinions towards Immigrants

To find out the opinions of Mexicans on foreign immigrants in Mexico, several of the questions asked in 2010 were repeated regarding feelings towards foreigners in general and towards specific groups of immigrants, the contributions they have made (and harm they may have caused) and the characteristics respondents viewed as desirable among the immigrant population. Although stability prevails between 2010 and 2012, the most notable difference, perhaps, is that more respondents have subscribed to derogatory statements about the social deterioration caused by immigration.

In general, the attitude towards foreigners is equally hospitable. 53% believe that the number of foreigners is either “about right” (26% in 2012, compared to 24% in 2010) or that foreigners are “too few” (27% compared with 29% in 2010). Only 29% say there are “too many” (32% in 2010), while 18% did not know or did not answer. Most respondents (61%) have a generally favorable opinion of “foreigners living in Mexico” (7% “very good” and 54% “good”), almost the same as in 2010 (63%). Meanwhile, 22% are neutral (“neither good nor bad”, 22% in 2010) and 14% view them unfavorably (12% “bad” and 2% “very poor”), two points more than in the previous survey. In 2012, Mexicans positively valued the presence of foreign residents in Mexico in some categories, ratifying positive statements about their contribution to Mexican society and rejecting some of the negative attributes, but not all of them (see Figure 8.4). The majority (74%) of respondents “strongly” (30%) or “somewhat agree” (44%) that immigrants “contribute to the Mexican economy” (compared with 22% who disagreed), and 70% think that they “bring innovative ideas” (24% “strongly” and 46% “somewhat agree”, compared with 23% who disagreed). On the other hand, the majority of Mexicans (54%) reject the allegation that foreign residents in Mexico “generate insecurity” (33% “somewhat” and 21% “strongly disagree”, compared with 41% who agreed with the statement). However, unlike 2010, opinion on the allegation that foreigners “take jobs away from Mexicans” is divided equally, with 49% in general agreement (31% “somewhat” and 18% “strongly”) with 49% in general disagreement (again, 31% “somewhat” and 18% “strongly”). In 2010, 54% were in general disagreement and 41% in general agreement. Also, while in 2010 respondents showed a slight disagreement with the statement that foreign immigrants “weaken our traditions and customs” (48% disagree with 47% in general agreement), in 2012 a negative shift in opinion was seen: 51% agreed (32% “somewhat” and 19% “strongly agree” and 46% generally disagreed.

Overall, then, foreign immigrants in Mexico continue receiving a warm welcome, although slightly less favorable in some respects in 2012. However, respondents vary their level of acceptance of foreigners residing in the country according to the personal attributes they have (education, job training, etc.) and their national origin. Of the four requirements they would ask of those who wished to live in Mexico, and those which the survey
Figure 8.4. Attitudes towards Foreigners

In general how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding foreigners living in Mexico? Foreigners who live in Mexico...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to the Mexican economy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bring innovative ideas</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weaken our traditions and customs</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take jobs away from Mexicans</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate insecurity</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does not include the percentages of “Don’t know” and “No answer”.

Figure 8.5. Desirable Characteristics in Immigrants

In your opinion, how important should each of the following aspects be in allowing a foreigner to come live in Mexico?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public (%)</th>
<th>Not important</th>
<th>A little Important</th>
<th>Somewhat Important</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have a trade or profession that Mexico needs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a good educational level</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Come from a country with a culture similar to our own</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have money</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does not include the percentages of “Don’t know” and “No answer”.
asked about (professional training, level of education, cultural affinity and economic solvency), all are seen as important (see Figure 8.5). However, a clear hierarchy is observed that, furthermore, corresponds with 2010 data.

In first place, 85% believe that in order to “allow a foreigner to come live in Mexico” it is important that the immigrant “have a profession or trade that Mexico needs” (48% very important and 37% somewhat important). In an experiment carried out for the first time in 2012, half of the survey sample was asked “How much would you agree or disagree with Mexico authorizing the entrance of high-qualified foreigners to live and work here?”, and the other half was asked the same question regarding “low qualified” foreigners. The difference between the answers to the two questions shows that, consequent to the above, Mexicans emphasize working capacity as a desirable quality in immigrants: 65% either “strongly” (27%) or “somewhat agree” (38%) to permit immigration of the highly skilled (vs. 19% in general disagreement), but only 41% favors allowing low skilled workers to enter (10% “strongly” and 31% “somewhat agree,” with the same 41% disagreeing and 16% reporting “neither agreeing nor disagreeing”).

Education comes in a close second to aptitude and job readiness as a requirement to allow entry to a potential immigrant. The majority (82%) believe it is important (43% “very” and 39% “somewhat important”) that a potential immigrant “have a good educational level.” However, the level of demand falls significantly for the two remaining attributes. A more meager majority demand that those who wish to live in Mexico, “come from a country with a culture similar to our own” (68%, with 32% believing it to be “very” important and 36% “somewhat important”) and “have money” (67%, 36% “very important” and 31% “somewhat important”). Not only does the relative order of priorities closely resemble the results in 2010, but the proportion of those surveyed that valued each characteristic do as well (86% a profession that Mexico needs, 81% a good level of education, 67% cultural similarity and 65% have money).

Given that a significant majority of Mexican immigrants believe it to be important that immigrants share, to some extent, their cultural identity, it may be surprising that they rated immigrants from different cultures better than immigrants from more similar cultures. Just as in 2010, the first three spots are taken by Americans, Chinese and Spanish immigrants. As shown in Figure 8.6, 55% have a favorable view of Americans (48% “good” and 7% “very good”), a number virtually unchanged since 2010 (56%). The Americans are followed by the Chinese (53%, with 48% “good” and 5% “very good”) and Spanish (51%, with 45% “good” and 6% “very good”), reversing their order compared to 2010, although the differences between the two surveys are quite meager.

Opinions towards immigrants from the four Latin American countries the survey asked about followed the same pattern as in 2010: in all cases, although the net balance (good opinions minus bad opinions) has been favorable, the favorable opinions do not reach an absolute majority. The order of Latin American countries remains the same as in the previous survey: Cubans (44% favorable opinions with 40% “good” and 4% “very good”, compared with 45% in 2010), Argentina (42% in favor, with 39% “good” and 3% “very good”, 45% in favor in 2010), Colombia (38% favorable with 35% “good” and 3% “very good”, 39% in 2010) and, finally, Guatemalans (35% favorable with 33% “good” and 2% “very good”, 36% in 2010). However, the view towards Central American immigrants in general is quite favorable, 58%, with 49% “good” and 9% “very good.

The Rights of Migrants in Mexico and Other Countries

In order to know what rights Mexicans ask for their countrymen abroad and what rights they allow foreigners living in Mexico, identical questions were used to analyze the level of support for the rights that they demand and those they are willing to grant.

The results in Figure 8.7 show that there is no significant difference between Mexicans and foreigners when awarding the rights to “have access to public education” and “bring their family to live with them.” Both rights are supported by ample majorities. Of those surveyed, 94% are in favor of Mexicans having the right to education, and

The Rights of Migrants in Mexico and Other Countries

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The results in Figure 8.7 show that there is no significant difference between Mexicans and foreigners when awarding the rights to “have access to public education” and “bring their family to live with them.” Both rights are supported by ample majorities. Of those surveyed, 94% are in favor of Mexicans having the right to education, and
91% are in favor of giving that right to foreigners. In the case of the right to family reunification, both Mexicans and foreigners enjoy the same level of support (84%).

Where differences do exist is with the right to “get a job under the same conditions as Mexicans citizens” and “vote in their country of residence.” In the first case, 92% are in favor of Mexicans enjoying this equality of conditions, while for foreigners, support falls to 84%. The recognition of political rights is lower. With regard to the right to vote, 74% supported the right being granted to Mexicans abroad, and only 61% support allowing foreigners who reside in Mexico to exercise the right to vote. In short, while large majorities recognize the rights of migrants, support for the rights of foreigners in Mexico is less, in all cases, than the support for the rights of Mexicans abroad.

Public Policy Actions and the Role of Government

Once the attitudes and opinions of the Mexican population regarding migration have been explored, it is important to know their positions regarding the actions they believe the Mexican government should carry out in this area. It should be noted that Mexico is not only a country of emigration, but also a country receiving immigra-
tion and a country of transmigration. This last category in particular has transformed the outlook on migration in the country and become an issue of priority for much of civil society, government and media in Mexico and in other countries in the region.

Figure 8.8 summarizes the measures that the Mexican Government could take to address the phenomenon of undocumented migration. The preferences of the public are in the following order: 78% are in favor of having temporary worker programs (a combination of strongly and somewhat in favor), 69% are in favor of increased border control, 57% believe migrants should be deported, 50% are in favor of allowing them to enter without obstacles, and, lastly, only 26% support building a wall along the borders. The opinions of leaders also follow the same order, but with distinct levels of support. There is more support for temporary programs (82%) and increased border control (73%), as well as less support for building walls (12%). In 2010, the most supported measures were the most restrictive: increasing border control and deportation. By 2012, both leaders and the public favored as their first option the creation of temporary worker programs as a way to regulate undocumented migration.

Now, what do Mexicans believe the priority of the government should be in dealing with Mexican emigration? As Figure 8.9 shows, the public supports “negotiate a temporary worker program” (30%) as a first measure, that “the United States government legalize undocumented migrants” (29%).
mented Mexicans” (29%) as a second, followed by “invest resources to create jobs in home communities “ (20%) and, finally, “give legal protection to migrants” (17%). This contrasts with the perception of leaders: 46% believe the most important priority to be the investment of resources to communities of origin. The increase from 8 to 16% in those who support giving legal protection to migrants also stands out, as it is twice the support registered in 2010.

In 2010, the paradox that existed between the more restrictive measures that Mexicans preferred to deal with undocumented migration (increased border controls and deportations) and the more flexible measures it sought for its countrymen in the United States (the legalization of their immigration status) was noted. In 2012, this tendency was not repeated. On the contrary, as much for migration in Mexico as for migration in the United States, the negotiation of temporary worker programs was the measure that most Mexicans supported.

Regarding the actions that other countries could carry out to solve the migration problem, 53% of the population consider “rich countries making it difficult for immigrants to enter” to be a very grave threat, but it comes in thirteenth place on a list of worries. Among the leaders, this threat occupies twelfth place, even though a drop of
7 points with respect to 2010 was registered (falling from 57% in 2010 to 50% in 2012, see Chapter 3).

In terms of foreign policy priorities and objectives, of those surveyed, 70% believe that “protecting the interests of Mexicans in other countries” should be a very important objective for foreign policy, placing it in sixth place. Leaders have a stronger position, given that 90% consider it to be a very relevant objective, placing it second place right next to fighting drug trafficking and organized crime (see Chapter 5). On the other hand, when asked how they would qualify the performance of government policy in the protection of Mexicans abroad, public opinion is divided, 50% say they strongly or somewhat agree with the same. Among leaders there is a slight improvement in their assessment, compared with 2010, as the percentage in favor grew from 52 to 59%.

From the above analysis it can be concluded that, in general, Mexicans support a more active policy in the defense of the interests, welfare and integrity of their compatriots abroad. On the other hand, they favor less restrictive measures for the management of migration flows and agree on the need for temporary work schemes in the United States and Mexico •

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**Figure 8.9. Government Priorities on Mexican Emigration**

_Regarding the issue of migration, tell me, what should the Mexican government’s priority be? (\%)_  

- **Negotiate a temporary worker program**:  
  - Public: 30 \%  
  - Leaders: 23 \%  

- **Get the U.S. government to legalize undocumented Mexicans**:  
  - Public: 29 \%  
  - Leaders: 13 \%  

- **Invest resources to create jobs**:  
  - Public: 20 \%  
  - Leaders: 46 \%  

- **Give legal protection to migrants**:  
  - Public: 17 \%  
  - Leaders: 16 \%  

Does not include the percentages of “Don’t know” and “No answer”.
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CULTURE OF MEXICANS: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES

The analysis of the results of the fifth edition of the survey Mexico, the Americas and the World 2012-2013, leads to a set of general conclusions about the preferences of Mexicans standing before the global stage in the second decade of the 21st century, with implications for the design and instrumentation of foreign policy for the new administration sworn into office the 1st of December 2012. Furthermore, the time series of comparable data for 2004-2012 allows for the identification of elements of continuity, stability and change in the attitudes, perceptions and demands of the society and Mexican leaders regarding the insertion of Mexico into the world and the agenda of global problems. What traits characterize the international political culture of the country? Towards where are the citizens’ visions of the world moving? What are the bases of support and social obstacles to overcome to make Mexico an actor with global projection and responsibility?

A first conclusion is that, in today’s Mexico, it is more appropriate to speak of an attentive and an inattentive public than of a society segmented between parochial majorities focused on national affairs and a cosmopolitan minority focused on the international. The entirety of surveys show that only a part of Mexicans pay attention to the news, and their interest in national issues is very similar to their interest in international issues, with both moving in the same direction. During this period, the fact that Mexico today is more attentive, and that the interested publics are growing, stand out. In the last six years, general public interest in issues on the national and international agenda grew in a gradual and sustained manner. In particular, 2012 was a year in which Mexicans were more attentive to all kinds of news, perhaps as a result of the wide media coverage of election campaigns and the active mobilization of social networks.

The second constant found was that the direct contact of Mexicans with the exterior is limited, as is their knowledge of the world. Few people travel outside of the country, speak other languages or have personal or professional relationships with foreigners that live in Mexico. For the majority of the population, the most common way of connecting with the world is indirectly, through contacts with family living abroad. The importance of transnational social networks of migrants and their high concentration in the United States are two factors that affect the type of international information that spreads in Mexico and, thus, the lens through which the country reads and understands the world. The consequences are different. This absence of direct contact leads to the lack of public knowledge regarding the world being widespread, while the weight of indirect contacts implies that the average citizen tends
to be better informed and more attentive to what occurs in the United States than elsewhere. On the other hand, the community and family character of many of the international links of Mexicans leads them to value the cultural traditions and “ways of being” of their own idiosyncrasies and nature as Mexicans, distancing them from Americans and at the same time, bringing them closer to and more in tune with Latin American countries. So in the international political culture of Mexicans, the material realities that result from geography, trade and social interaction do not converge with the map of cultural identities.

The third characteristic of the international political culture of Mexicans in the 21st century is that it combines a strengthening of nationalism with an increasing openness to the world, especially in matters of an economic and cultural nature. Both trends have remained steady over the past eight years, in spite of large fluctuations and changes in the national and international context. In Mexico today, feelings of identity, pride, importance and national reputation are maintained at high levels in most sectors of the population and regions of the country, with the exception of the southern and southeastern states, where localisms are greatly rooted. Mexicans tend to associate nationalism primarily with patriotic attitudes, such as respect for national symbols and support for the national soccer team, and secondarily, with civic responsibilities, such as defending the country and paying taxes, but linking it much less frequently to attitudes of rejection of foreign things or of the United States. While most Mexicans view the spread of foreign ideas and customs positively, it should be noted that one out of every three consider it to be bad for the country, and, since 2008, the percentage of those who are culturally open stabilized at approximately half of the public.

The time series also confirms the favorable trend towards economic liberalization in the country. A majority among both the public and leaders support globalization, foreign investment and free trade, although there is reluctance among the public to foreign investment in sectors such as electricity (although opinion has been changing for the better in the last six years) and oil. Leaders have doubts regarding economic liberalization, and they see the trade liberalization of Mexico as very positive for the country’s development. In addition, they rate the free trade agreements already in place as satisfactory and endorse the signing of new agreements with emerging powers as well as full involvement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Other findings confirm that in the Mexico of today, nationalism and openness to the world coexist without problem. There is evidence that this coexistence may be rooted in an ingrained pragmatism among Mexicans, who are willing, in certain circumstances, to cede sovereignty for individual well-being and safety. One indicator of this is the broad openness of the public to a hypothetical union between Mexico and its immediate neighbors, the United States and Central America, in the event that it would generate a better quality of life. Another indication is the willingness to accept financial support from United States in security matters to fight against drug trafficking even if it entails external supervision of the use of these resources. However, the pragmatism also has limits: facing the dilemma of accepting cooperation with the United States in exchange for allowing U.S. agents to operate in Mexico, the public is divided in opinion and leaders are opposed.

In spite of the coexistence of nationalism and openness, it is important to underscore that clear limits are observed. In those situations or issues in which the population doesn’t perceive any tangible economic benefits and no security interests are at play, traditional nationalism of a defensive nature strongly prevails over pragmatism. Thus, some symbolic aspects of Mexican nationalism that establish boundaries to the acceptance of foreign influence or help are in force. One of them is the refusal to grant full citizenship rights to Mexicans who are not citizens by birth, in particular, the little support for the possibility that naturalized citizens be able to run for publicly elected office. Other symbolic boundaries are the refusal to allow entry of foreign capital into the oil sector and a certain unwillingness to delegate and abide by the authority of multilateral agencies.

Fourthly, the Mexican international political culture is characterized by a remarkable degree of consensus regarding foreign policy objectives and instruments, despite the broad social, economic and regional gaps that divide the public among themselves, and with respect to their leaders, on other issues. There is a high and consistent level
of coherence between the concerns of citizens and their preferences with regard to the level of international activity of Mexico and foreign policy objectives and instruments. For Mexicans, there is a false dilemma between activism in the global arena and attending to the country’s problems: they want Mexico to actively participate in the international arena in a way that helps address main global threats, where foreign policy is a mechanism to resolve them and promote the development, well-being and security of the nation. From the point of view of the citizens, the major international threats facing the country are precisely those they consider able to directly affect their safety and personal well-being, while they dismiss global problems more removed from their reality.

In terms of foreign policy priorities, there is a wide coherence and continuity over time: the highest foreign policy priorities are those that favorably affect the economic welfare and security of the population, and national prestige. Thus, foreign policy is perceived as a useful public policy tool to address national problems and promote development. Again, those issues related to security and the global economy relatively distant from the daily lives of respondents are assigned an intermediate importance, while those issues of lowest priority are the ones related to strengthening international organizations and international welfare.

Without doubt, the forcefulness in consensus and coherence of the society as a whole, with no registered socio-demographic differences (region, age, gender, level of education, income, ideology, party preference, among others) in the importance attached to foreign policy objectives, can be taken as a mandate for the SRE and other government agencies with authority on international issues on the major foreign policy priorities that should be raised, implemented and achieved. Respondents also prefer soft and intermediate power over hard power instruments, which is why they strongly agree on using cultural, commercial and diplomatic instruments before using military power. Furthermore, evaluation by public opinion of foreign policy is very favorable: half of the public and two out of every three leaders strongly or somewhat agree with current implementation. This positive evaluation supports the implementation of a more active foreign policy, one that uses trade, cultural and diplomatic instruments to generate economic benefits and international prestige and improve the safety and well-being of Mexicans.

The fifth characteristic of Mexican social construct regarding the world concerns the way they identify regionally and the international coalitions they would consider. The results suggest that Mexico, despite public consensus at a macro-level regarding the concerns, objectives and instruments described in the previous section, has trouble clearly placing itself on the international stage of the 21st century. In this respect, we found that, on one hand, there is narrow-mindedness, and, on the other, ambivalence and divergent views on which region should be the priority for the country and exactly how wide it’s international scope should be. Mexican society is strongly anchored in the Americas, is ambivalent towards the North and South of their geopolitical space, and lacks a global vision that connects it to the Atlantic and the Pacific. When they look to the outside, the Mexican population and leaders have preferences well entrenched in the Americas, albeit with different perspectives: while the public is very uniform in their predilection toward North America (especially to the United States), leaders are more plural in their visions and show a more Latin American disposition.

Mexicans have very different attitudes towards and agendas with their neighbors to the north and south. In 2012, positive attitudes toward the United States grew. The neighbor to the North is not only the most valued by the public and the highest rated by leaders, its President, Barack Obama, also enjoys the highest levels of esteem of Mexicans among international personalities. In addition, for both the public and for leaders, the United States is perceived as a country that is increasingly reliable and more admirable and with whom relations are good, very important and advantageous, especially in economic matters. This does not prevent Mexicans from evaluating the role of the United States both positively and negatively. In contrast, Guatemala and its President receive less favorable ratings among Mexicans. In addition, relations with the neighbor to the South are less good, less important, and less advantageous, and focused not only on trade but also on migration.
CONCLUSIONS

Mexicans are optimistic regarding Latin America: they consider their relationship with the region to have improved in the past decade and the probability of a conflict happening to have decreased. Furthermore, they broadly support trade and infrastructural integration in the region. Likewise, among leaders a strong opinion exists that Mexico should assume a leadership role in Latin America. However, these attitudes have certain limits. On one hand, there are countries and heads of government in the region that provoke unfavorable opinions among Mexicans (such as Cuba and Venezuela). On the other, political-institutional and social aspects of regional integration receive markedly less support.

In sixth place, social aspirations in international affairs are not backed up by a clear willingness to invest resources, assume costs or acquire responsibilities on a global scale. There is no clear support for opening more embassies in places where Mexico has a very limited presence or channeling resources into cooperation programs for development in Central America. Multilateralism is where the limits to turning the proactive inclination of Mexicans into initiatives and effective, long-term diplomatic actions is most clearly demonstrated: Mexicans do not believe that the strengthening of the most valued international bodies, such as the UN, is a very important goal in the scale of priorities of Mexican foreign policy.

Citizen support for the possibility of Mexico becoming an actor with greater global responsibility tends to be superficial and conditional. The majority of Mexicans support Mexico sending military or police forces, if the UN asks them to collaborate. However, cooperation in such peacekeeping missions does not enjoy majority support when it comes to sending Mexican peacekeepers into conflict zones, but support is strong when the nature of the mission is to help in cases of natural disasters. Although there is consensus on the need for a more active participation by Mexico in the international arena, for example through multilateralism, there is no clear desire among Mexicans to abide by multilateral decisions that are not pleasing to Mexico nor delegate supranational authority to international authorities. However, there is a very strong multilateral commitment among leaders, who want Mexico to obey the rules of the international game even though they may not necessarily be convenient for the country.

Regarding attitudes towards different aspects of migration, elements of continuity and change are noted in the 2012 edition of the survey. The relatively high acceptance of foreign immigrants in Mexico remains stable. This acceptance has been greater of foreigners not from Latin American countries (Americans, Chinese and Spanish) than those from culturally similar countries. Preferences for certain features in potential immigrants are the same: they should, above all, have professions and trades that are useful for Mexico and be highly skilled.

One of the changes in this area is the perceptions of the effects of emigration and immigration. For the public, migration increasingly involves more costs than benefits for Mexico, communities and families of origin. In spite of this, the desire to leave and live abroad has increased, even though there is a great aversion to the risk of doing so without proper documentation. Mexicans tend to seek solutions to the issue of emigration bilaterally instead of in the field of public policies at the domestic level. Solutions are expected to come, first from negotiation with the United States regarding legalization and the establishment of temporary worker programs and, secondly, from government actions to generate jobs. Negative opinions on immigration also increased: a greater proportion believe that foreigner take jobs from the national workforce and deteriorate traditional culture. Despite this, the number of people in favor of less restrictive policies to confront the problem of illegal immigration grew, but control policies continue to enjoy substantial support.

In short, the panorama of the Mexican social imaginary before the world is complex and diverse. Leaders are faced with the enormous challenge of modernizing the country’s international strategies to reflect new global realities in a constant dialogue with citizen preferences. Thus, the results of the five editions of the survey Mexico, the Americas and the World can and should serve as an essential tool for adapting the international policies of Mexico to new realities and national demands, following the opinion of the public and leaders in a constantly changing world.
Notes on Methodology for the Public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodological Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target Population</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexicans 18 years of age or older, living within the national territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sample Size</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,400 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data Collection Method</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Face-to-face interviews conducted in the respondent’s private home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sampling Error</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+/- 2.0% for the entire sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Survey Date</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 18th to September 20th, 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Universe:** A survey applied on a national level using a probabilistically representative sample that allows for the generation of estimations applicable to the totality of the population of interest, composed of Mexicans 18 years of age and older, residing within any entity in national territory at the time the survey was carried out.

**Sampling Frame:** The electoral sections defined by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) for all of its forms for the entire country with updated data from the last federal election (2012).

**Sampling Method:** A multistage sampling method was utilized. In each of its three stages a randomized selection process was done for each of the sampling units.

For the first stage of the selection, the Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) were ordered by regions and states corresponding to the electoral sections. In the second stage, the Secondary Sampling Units (SSUs) were selected corresponding to blocks within each electoral section, and the last stage of the sample corresponded to individual households.
The initial ordering of the elements of the sampling frame guarantees a selection probability proportional to size (pps), which leads to more representative results. The sample is probabilistic, and thus can be used to make inferences from the results about the target population as a whole.

**Sample Size and Margin of Error:** In accordance with the objective of this study, a sufficient sample size was established to allow for analysis of the results at both national and regional levels. As with previous rounds, the survey required samples at both national and regional levels, stratified by northern border states and states in the southeast of the country. The following table describes the territorial distribution of the sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territorial Distribution of the Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the Country</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Due to security issues, three sample points in the state of Tamaulipas were replaced (the passage between Mante a Reynosa, Tula and Ciudad Victoria), in Ciudad Madero and Tampico

The size of the national sample as well as that for each region, along with the margin of error for estimations, is the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
<th>Theoretical Margin of Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>+/- 2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>+/- 3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-Southeast</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>+/- 4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the Country</td>
<td>1,190</td>
<td>+/- 2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Sample</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>+/- 2.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total number of interviews completed was 2,400. The distribution of interviews was 1,800 cases based on electoral sections of the entire country, with an additional sample of 400 cases just from the sections that make up the North, which when added to the 330 in the national sample, resulted in a total of 730 cases from the domain. Another oversample of 200 cases from the electoral sections that make up the South and Southeast domain was added to those already included in the national sample from this domain, reaching a total of 480 cases. Finally, of the 1,800 cases of the national sample, 500 cases were subtracted from the states of the North and South and Southeast to make up the 1,190 cases in the “rest of the country” domain.
The sample, in turn, was also divided for application of the two versions of the existing questionnaire, with each including 1,200 cases.

Fieldwork and Dates: The interviews were carried out from the 18th of August to the 20th of September, 2012. All interviews were administered “face to face” in selected homes, to one resident of each household and, therefore, part of that home. The selection of this person was done in a random manner with a final adjustment of quotas, using the population distribution by sex and age resulting from the 2010 Census of Population and Households of the INEGI as a parameter.

A previously structured questionnaire applied by qualified professionals was used to collect data. The approximate duration of each survey was 35 minutes. Seventy data collectors, 12 supervisors, 12 data entry operators, an analyst and a project director participated in the fieldwork.

Data Processing: The processing and preliminary presentation of the data took place from September 24th to October 15th, 2012. All data collected was processed using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) software.
Notes on Methodology for Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodological Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target Population</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sample Size</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data Collection Method</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sampling Error</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Survey Date</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**General Description:** To complement and compare the results of the general population, the study administered a version of the previously structured questionnaire to a sample of Mexican leaders.

**Universe:** The defined category of Mexican leaders includes people with managerial or administrative positions that participate directly in decision-making in their professional sector or field of activity.

**Selection Method:** The method used to select the sample of leaders is based on the following definition and classification of five groups or key sectors:

1. **Government Sector:** high-level public officials from Federal Ministries, state governments, parastatal entities, and decentralized bodies.
2. **Political Sector:** governors, legislators and leaders of political parties;
3. **Private sector and entrepreneurs:** lists from different sources (Expansion and Executive Connection, among others) with data on the leaders of the most important Mexican firms in the country;
4. **Mass Media and Academia Sector**: key leaders from newspapers, magazines, newswires, radio stations and television stations with national reach; members of the National Researchers System (SNI) of Area 5 (social sciences), and directors of international relations departments at public and private universities.

5. **Social, Civic and Non-Profit Sector**: representatives of religious groups, unions, professional organizations, and relevant non-governmental organizations.

**Sampling Method**: Once the category structure for each sector (institutions and positions) was defined, a directory of 4,000 leaders distributed was constructed among the different desired profiles. They were sent written invitations to participate in the survey. The process of selecting the sample was randomized, considering each one of the groups described above as strata. The interviews were conducted according to the order and sorting of each individual. The sample selection process was a simple random sampling, where each of the groups described above was considered a stratum. The interviews were conducted according to the order in which each person came in the drawing.

**Sample Size and Margin of Error**: The size of the sample was 535 cases, with a margin of error of +/- 4.4, with a 95% confidence level. The distribution of those interviewed was as shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Media and Academia</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social, Civic and Non-Profit</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>535</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fieldwork and Dates**: The interviews were conducted by telephone from July 16th to October 31st, 2012, by a professional and qualified team with experience in carrying out this type of high-level interviews. Eighteen interviewers, 2 supervisors, 12 data entry operators, an analyst and a project manager participated in the interviews. The approximate time of each interview survey was 45 minutes.

**Data Processing**: Data processing and the elaboration of reports took place from November 5 to November 16, 2012. In the estimates resulting from the database every sector of Mexican leaders is already weighted. All data collected was processed using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) software.

The questionnaires and support cards used in both the surveys of the public and leaders, as well as the databases and descriptive tables, are available for free on the project website: http://mexicoyelmundo.cide.edu •
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALBA</td>
<td>Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CELAC</td>
<td>Community of Latin American and Caribbean States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCGA</td>
<td>Chicago Council on Global Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDEC</td>
<td>Center for Economic Research and Teaching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDH</td>
<td>National Human Rights Commission (Mexico)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMEXI</td>
<td>Mexican Council on Foreign Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEI</td>
<td>Division of International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK/NA</td>
<td>Don’t Know/No Answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIFA</td>
<td>International Federation of Association Football</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTA EU-MX</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement between Mexico and the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20</td>
<td>Group of Twenty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFE</td>
<td>Federal Electoral Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INEIGI</td>
<td>National Institute of Geography and Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITAM</td>
<td>Mexico Autonomous Institute of Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Southern Common Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>National Action Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>Democratic Revolution Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>Revolutionary Institutional Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSU</td>
<td>Primary Sampling Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNI</td>
<td>National System of Investigators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRE</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Mexico)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSU</td>
<td>Secondary Sampling Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPP</td>
<td>Trans-Pacific Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSU</td>
<td>Tertiary Sampling Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>The United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>The United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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