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## The Americas and the World

Foreign policy and public opinion in  
Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Peru 2008

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## Executive Summary

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*The most outstanding results of the first The Americas and the World survey refer to the following 9 points of divergence and convergence that are evidenced in public opinion in the four participating Latin American countries when faced with a changing and uncertain international panorama in 2008:*

1. **Gaps and shortcomings in knowledge about, interest in and contact with the world:** *knowledge about and interest in international affairs is highest in Colombia and Chile, followed by Peru and finally Mexico. Chile, however, is the country with the least direct contact with the outside because fewer people have relatives living abroad and receive remittances.*
2. **There is no common national identity for the four countries:** *although a Latin American identity stands out in Mexico and Colombia, Peru is more Andean and Chile is South American.*
3. **Rejection of foreigners in elected positions:** *despite a degree of openness to the cultural influence of other countries, the people polled were against extending political rights to naturalized foreigners or people with dual nationality.*
4. **Coincidence in pessimism and threats:** *pessimism towards the world characterizes the people of the four countries, who all identify threats directly related to a person's wellbeing or security as the major issue. Chile and Colombia, however, feel more threatened than Peru and Mexico.*
5. **Internationalism, cooperation and multilateralism:** *they are all more international than isolationist and they favor limited activism in the international sphere, where there is a consensus in the countries' priorities. They also prefer cooperation and multilateral action to leadership and unilateral or bilateral action.*
6. **The assessment of government performance in various fields of public politics varies substantially from one country to another:** *the levels of satisfaction with the governments vary widely. Criticism and dissatisfaction are higher in Peru and Mexico than in Colombia and Chile.*
7. **Ambivalent multilateralism:** *although there are some expressions of nationalism in these four countries, they do agree on the use of force by*

*the United Nations Security Council, which is the international organization with the highest rating of them all.*

- 8. Trade and investment are rated higher than globalization:** *international trade and foreign investment are seen in a positive light in all the countries, albeit with varying intensity, with Chile being the country most in favor. Nevertheless, globalization is more popular in Chile and Peru than in Colombia and Mexico.*
- 9. Optimism and rapprochement with Latin America:** *there is widespread optimism regarding the situation in Latin America and the relationships between the countries; all of them, except Peru, agree that the region should be given more attention. Although there is no consensus on the influence of each country in the region or who should represent it in the Security Council, Brazil always comes to the forefront. There is a consensus in rating the regional leaders and on the most problematic country in the region, Venezuela, and on the most conflict-free countries, Brazil and Mexico.*
- 10. All of them, excluding Colombia, distrust the United States and trust China, but Asia is not a priority for any of them:** *the United States is regarded as the friendliest partner and China's economic growth is positively appraised. Except for Peru, none of the countries chose Asia as one of the top three regions that deserve attention.*

## Resumen ejecutivo

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Los resultados más destacables del primer levantamiento de la encuesta Las Américas y el Mundo se refieren a los siguientes 10 puntos de divergencia y convergencia observados en el ánimo de la opinión pública frente al cambiante e incierto panorama internacional de 2008 en los cuatro países latinoamericanos participantes:

1. **Brechas y desfases entre conocimiento, interés y contacto con el mundo:** el conocimiento e interés en asuntos internacionales es más alto en Colombia y Chile, seguido por Perú y, finalmente, por México. Sin embargo, Chile es donde menos contacto directo se tiene con el exterior, pues un número menor de personas tiene familiares en el extranjero y recibe remesas.
2. **No existe una identidad internacional común para los cuatro países:** mientras que en México y Colombia destaca la identidad latinoamericana, en Perú se acentúa la andina y en Chile la sudamericana.
3. **Existe un rechazo hacia los extranjeros en cargos de elección popular:** aunque prevalece la apertura sobre la influencia cultural de otros países, hay un rechazo de los encuestados a otorgar derechos políticos a extranjeros nacionalizados o con doble nacionalidad.
4. **Coincidencia en pesimismo y amenazas:** el pesimismo respecto al mundo caracteriza a los ciudadanos de los cuatro países, que coinciden en identificar como las principales amenazas aquellas directamente relacionadas con el bienestar y la seguridad de las personas. No obstante, Chile y Colombia se sienten mucho más amenazados que Perú y México.
5. **Internacionalismo, cooperación y multilateralismo:** todos son más internacionalistas que aislacionistas y se inclinan por un activismo acotado en la esfera internacional, donde existe un consenso en las prioridades de los países. Asimismo, prefieren la cooperación y la acción multilateral al liderazgo y al unilateralismo o bilateralismo.
6. **La evaluación del desempeño gubernamental en distintos ámbitos de política pública varía sustancialmente para cada país:** los niveles de satisfacción con sus gobiernos son muy distintos. Las críticas y la insatisfacción son mayores en Perú y México que en Colombia y Chile.

7. **Multilateralismo ambivalente:** pese a que existen algunas expresiones de nacionalismo en estos cuatro países, existe concordancia en aprobar el uso de la fuerza por el Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas, siendo este organismo internacional el mejor evaluado en todos los casos.
8. **Comercio e inversión mejor evaluados que la globalización:** el comercio internacional y la inversión extranjera son vistos de manera positiva por todos los países, aunque con distintas intensidades, siendo Chile el mayor partidario. No obstante, la globalización es mejor percibida por chilenos y peruanos que por colombianos y mexicanos.
9. **Optimismo y acercamiento con América Latina:** optimismo generalizado en cuanto a la situación de América Latina y a las relaciones entre sus países; todos, salvo Perú, coinciden en que se preste más atención a dicha región. Aunque no hay consenso sobre la influencia que ejerce cada país en la región, ni sobre quién debiera representarla en el Consejo de Seguridad, Brasil siempre ocupa un lugar prominente. Hay un consenso sobre las valoraciones de los líderes regionales, así como sobre el país más conflictivo en la región, Venezuela, y los menos conflictivos, Brasil y México.
10. **Todos, menos Colombia, desconfían de Estados Unidos y confían en China, pero ninguno tiene a Asia como prioridad:** Estados Unidos es visto como socio más que amigo y el crecimiento económico de China se percibe como un hecho positivo. En ningún caso, salvo Perú, se elige a Asia como una de las tres primeras regiones a las cuales habría que prestar más atención.

# THE AMERICAS AND THE WORLD

FOREIGN POLICY AND PUBLIC OPINION  
IN COLOMBIA, CHILE, MEXICO AND PERU 2008

<http://mexicoyelmundo.cide.edu>

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### *Chile*

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kind invitation to participate in the project entitled *The Americas and the World 2008. Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Peru*. We would especially like to thank the Head Researcher of the project, Professor Guadalupe González and her team.

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## Foreword

*The Americas and the World 2008* is a research project carried out by a network of academic institutions in the Americas which studies public opinion in the region's countries concerning foreign policy and international relations. The project consists of a periodic survey designed to gather basic information on the opinions, attitudes, perceptions and values of the citizens in various Latin American nations. This year, the survey was held in four countries: Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Peru. A survey using a representative sample of the national population will be made every two years in these countries, with the rest of Latin America being gradually incorporated in later surveys.

The institutions which took part in the first joint survey are: in Mexico, CIDE through the International Studies Division; in Peru, the Institute of Public Opinion of the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Peru; in Colombia, the Universidad de los Andes through its Department of Political Science and its School of Government; and in Chile, the Institute of Political Science of the Pontificia Universidad Católica and the Institute of International Studies of the Universidad de Chile. These centers, departments and institutions all contributed with the methodology and helped in designing the study, running the survey and analyzing the data.

*The Americas and the World 2008* is a unique project in Latin America because it focuses on the analysis of social attitudes to international issues, it has an integral approach that covers a wide range of subjects (cultural, economic, political, social, security) and it collects data on general perceptions, not opinions on current situations.

One of the distinguishing features of *The Americas and the World 2008* is its use of a comparative and flexible approach that permits simultaneous comparisons and cross tabulations at four levels: *sub-national*, between different regions of each country; *national* by economic strata and socio-demographic variables; *international*, between the populations of different countries and *longitudinal*, between biennial periods.

The central purpose of the study is to make an accurate and objective contribution to filling a vacuum of empirical information which exists in an area that is of strategic importance for the region and where independent and reliable data are scarce and dispersed. Having accurate knowledge about the public's perceptions about how the world works and how it should work is an indispensable instrument when assessing, from a social point of view, the degree of legitimacy of each country's institutions, the rules and actors of the international system and the government's performance concerning foreign policy, in



addition to providing material for academic research and both public and private decision making.

The world is currently facing a critical moment in hemispheric relations and the restructuring of alliances among the countries of the region. This can be attributed, among other things, to reemerging debates around alternative regional integration schemes as a result of the disenchantment with the Washington Consensus, the arrival of center-left and far-left or populist governments with plans to amend the constitution, disappointment with democracy because of institutional weakness and the problems concerning governability and public insecurity in many countries in the region. Furthermore, there has been growing competition among emerging powers, rivalries among leaders and rising tension with the United States, where, additionally, there has been a change of government. The purpose of the project is therefore to furnish both the governments and non-governmental organizations, the mass media and civil society with information to help identify areas of possible cooperation and horizontal interaction among the countries where the survey is fielded. It also tries to intensify transnational academic and professional ties in Latin America to provide mutual knowledge and understanding, support and continuity for governmental rapprochement efforts among various countries.

The questionnaire is divided into 10 subject areas: *Interest, Contact, Knowledge, Identity, Confidence and Security, Country's Role and Foreign Policy, Rules of the International Game, Relations with Latin America, Relations with North America and with Other Countries and Regions of the World.*

A conceptual framework has been developed to systematically analyze and interpret the results of the study for a variety of subject areas, thus making it possible to map the attitudes and perceptions of the general public on four axes: the degree of openness to the outside world (isolationism versus internationalism), the way in which the international reality is observed (realism versus idealism), the degree of willingness to cooperate (unilateralism versus multilateralism) and types of alignments (sympathies and antipathies).

*The Americas and the World 2008* project seeks to reach a broad audience with its results: decision makers in Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru and the rest of Latin America and the United States at a public, private, social and international level, as well as academic institutions, researchers and students of social sciences not only in the Americas, but also in the rest of the world. The project research team hopes that the readers of this report will use the survey data and analyses as a key instrument in their strategic decision making, drafting public policies, government management, academic research and social communication in a globalized and changing world.

This report presents the most noteworthy results of the first *The Americas and the World 2008* survey. It describes and analyzes the political values and attitudes of the Colombian, Chilean, Mexican and Peruvian populations regarding each country's international behavior, as well as the impact of international factors like globalization and the internationalization of the rules governing the public's cultural policy.

The complete dataset, in SPSS format, survey questionnaires and results for the 53 subject





questions asked identically in Mexico and Colombia, of which 46 were asked in Chile and 41 in Peru, plus the 11 socio-demographic questions are publicly available in English and Spanish, free of charge at <http://mexicoyelmundo.cide.edu>.





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- 10. All of them, excluding Colombia, distrust the United States and trust China, but Asia is not a priority for any of them:** the United States is regarded more as a partner than a friend and China's economic growth is positively appraised. Except for Peru, none of the countries chose Asia as one of the top three regions that deserve attention.



## Summary of results 2008

### Comparative Report Colombia-Chile-Mexico-Peru

#### *Interest, contact and knowledge*

- **Interest in international affairs varies:** it is high in Colombia and Chile where 80% and 74%, respectively, are very or somewhat interested in the news about their relations with other countries, but it is lower in Peru (63%) and Mexico (52%).
- **Few people travel abroad:** 68% of Mexicans and 71% of Colombians and Chileans have never left the country.
- **Many people have relatives living abroad, except in Chile:** 56% of Mexicans, 64% of Peruvians and 61% of Colombians, compared with 36% of Chileans have relatives residing abroad.
- **High emigration and remittance levels, except in Chile:** 29% of Mexicans, 28% of Colombians and 22% of Peruvians have close relatives living abroad, but only 9% of the Chileans. 15% of the population in Mexico, Peru and Colombia receive remittances from abroad, against 2% of Chileans.
- **The level of knowledge varies, with Mexico at the bottom:** 63% and 58% of the population in Colombia, 62% and 54% of the people

in Peru and 60% and 69% of the Chileans, respectively, know the meaning of OAS and FIFA. In Mexico, the figures are 24% and 44%, respectively. Between 61% to 63% of the populations of the four countries know the meaning of UN. Between 65% and 80% of Colombians know the euro and the name of the president of the United States, respectively. The level of knowledge in Mexico is lower; 42% and 67%, respectively.

#### *Identity and nationalism*

- **High levels of national pride and identity over local identity in Mexico and Colombia:** 83% of Mexicans and 90% of Colombians are proud of their countries and 59% and 56%, respectively, identify more with the national than the local identity. These questions were not asked in Chile or Peru.
- **Wide variety and fragmentation in regional identities:** In Mexico, 55% feel *Latin American*, 24% *citizens of the world*, 7% *North American* and 6% *Central American*; in Peru, 27% consider themselves *Andean*, 25% *Latin American*, 23% *citizens of the world* and 21% *South American*; in Colombia, 43% see themselves as *Latin American*, 27% *citizens*



*of the world* and 21% *South American* and in Chile, 36% are *South American*, 31% *Latin American* and 29% *citizens of the world*.

levels of rejection are towards Central and South Americans and the highest are for Asians and North Americans.

- **There are varying opinions about the influence of foreign cultures:** 60% of Peruvians, 50% of Mexicans, 44% of Chileans and 41% of Colombians approve of the dissemination of foreign ideas and customs in their countries.
- **Majorities in all four countries agree that naturalized foreigners should not be given the same rights as native-born citizens:** 79% in Mexico, 73% in Colombia, 70% in Chile and 67% in Peru do not approve of naturalized foreigners being elected to the congress or senate of their countries.
- **In all four countries majorities reject the notion of giving the same political rights as the rest of the population to persons with dual nationality:** the data concerning disagreement with a person with dual nationality being elected president or to the lower or upper house of their country are, respectively, 84% and 80% in Mexico, 78% and 71% in Colombia, 81% and 74% in Chile and 80% and 74% in Peru.
- **They all agree that foreign workers should not be allowed into the country without work permits:** regardless of the regions of origin (North America, Central America, South America or Asia), the levels of rejection oscillate between 71% and 78% in Mexico, 64% and 77% in Peru, 74% and 85% in Colombia and 77% to 80% in Chile. The lowest

### *Threats, confidence and security*

- **Pessimism regarding the world:** 66% of Mexicans and Peruvians, 59% of Colombians and 60% of Chileans think that the world is worse today than it was 10 years ago, while 58% of Mexicans, 50% of Peruvians, 52% of Colombians and 54% of Chileans think it will be worse in 10 years.
- **Similar global threats:** the four countries agree on the most serious threats: drug-trafficking and organized crime, global warming, global poverty, high prices and shortages of food and epidemics like AIDS. They also agree on the least serious threats: the emergence of China as a world power, as well as populist leaders. The traditional subjects of international security (nuclear arms and international terrorism) appear half way through the list in all cases.
- **The perception of threats and objectives shows that the world is seen from a national perspective:** The most serious threats are those directly related to social wellbeing that affect internal governability and an individual's security. Multilateral issues are ranked low in terms of priority and subjects that undermine a person's wellbeing are important in the objectives.
- **Varying intensity of the importance of threats and foreign policy goals:** Chile and



Colombia take the threats more seriously and give more importance to foreign policy goals. They are followed by Peru, and to a lesser extent, Mexico.

### *International role and foreign policy goals*

- **More internationalist than isolationist, with variations for each country:** 81% of Peruvians and 80% of Chileans think that their country should actively participate in global issues, compared with 75% of Colombians and 69% of Mexicans.
- **Limited inclination towards international activism without increased presence in distant regions like Africa:** 40% of Mexicans, and 39% of Chileans and Colombians favor an increase in the number of embassies in Africa. There are similar opinions on keeping the current number.
- **Variations in willingness to take on regional leadership roles; higher in Chile and Mexico:** 39% of Chileans and 41% of Mexicans believe that their country should be a leader of Latin America, while 32% of Colombians and 30% of Peruvians share this opinion. In Chile opinion is divided and most would rather see active regional participation without being the leader: 58% in Peru, 53% in Colombia, 46% in Mexico and 50% in Chile.
- **Broad consensus in foreign policy priorities:** The four countries agree on the 5 most important foreign policy goals: fighting drug-trafficking and organized crime, protecting the environment, protecting the interests of citizens in other countries, promoting the sales of national products abroad and protecting land and sea borders. There is also agreement on the least important goals: strengthening the OAS, boosting the UN and helping spread democracy to other countries.
- **The international importance given to each country varies, but there is agreement that it has increased compared with 10 years ago:** 58% of Colombians and 52% of Mexicans believe that their country is very important, as against 27% and 40% of Peruvians and Chileans, respectively. They all agree that their country is more important than 10 years ago (Mexico, 64%; Peru, 70%; Colombia, 78%; Chile, 88%) and that it will be more important in the next decade (Mexico, 66%; Peru, 68%; Colombia, 74%; Chile, 80%).
- **They share a more favorable attitude towards multilateral than bilateral action:** 50% in Peru, 49% in Chile, 45% in Colombia and 41% in Mexico think their country should promote multilateral organizations to penalize countries where human rights are not respected. There are minorities that favor severing diplomatic relations (19% in Chile, 18% in Peru, 17% in Mexico and 13% in Colombia).
- **Similar percentages prefer non-intervention in the case of human rights violations:** 37% in Colombia, 33% in Mexico, 29% in Chile



and 25% in Peru think their country should not meddle in the internal affairs of countries where human rights are not respected.

- **Perception of government performance in foreign policy varies:** 71% in Colombia and 57% in Chile strongly or somewhat agree with the performance of their governments in foreign policy; only 45% of Mexicans and 49% of Peruvians think the same.
- **The assessment of government performance in other fields of public policy varies:** Colombians consistently tend to give their government a high rating in all fields of public policy (economy, public security and education) while Peruvians give the lowest.

### *Multilateralism: rules, actors and organizations*

- **Varying degrees of support for the use of force by the Security Council:** 70% approval in Mexico, 63% in Peru, 65% in Colombia and 81% in Chile when trying to avoid genocide and 56%, 52%, 48% and 68%, respectively, when trying to reinstate a democratically elected government that has been overthrown.
- **Not much faith in multilateral decisions and supremacy of national laws over international law:** 55% in Mexico, 46% in Peru and 45% in Colombia disagree that their countries should accept UN resolutions to solve problems if they do not like them. Only in Chile the majority (64%) favor accepting UN

resolutions. They all agree that national laws should be above international treaties (Mexico 67%; Peru 56%; Colombia 53%; Chile 52%).

- **The willingness to let international courts try nationals varies:** most Colombians (56%) and Chileans (52%) agree that the fellow-citizens who commit crimes against humanity should be tried by an international court, while there is majority disagreement in Peru (50%) and Mexico (47%).
- **Positive assessment of international and regional organizations:** the UN is the organization that enjoys most popular support in all cases (78% in Mexico, 71% in Colombia and 60% in Chile and Peru), followed by the OAS, except in Chile, where it is third after Mercosur.

### *Globalization and the international economic agenda*

- **Varying opinions on the benefits of globalization:** 77% in Chile and 62% in Peru think that it is generally good, while just 48% in Colombia and 38% in Mexico share this opinion.
- **Significant majorities believe that foreign investment is positive, but with varying degrees of intensity:** 70% in Mexico and Peru, 83% in Colombia and 90% in Chile believe that foreign investment is very or somewhat beneficial for the country.





- **International trade is viewed favorably, particularly in Chile:** 61%, 55% and 59% in Mexico, respectively, think that it is beneficial for the country's economy, their own standard of living and for the country's workers. In Peru, the figures are 67%, 61%, 64%; in Colombia, 49%, 54% and 42%; and in Chile 83%, 72% and 69%. They all agree that free trade is less beneficial for the environment: Mexico (47%), Peru (45%), Colombia (35%) and Chile (53%).

### *Visions about Latin America*

- **Optimism regarding Latin America, albeit with varying degrees of intensity:** 42% Mexico, 51% in Peru, 48% in Colombia and 67% in Chile think that Latin America is better now than 10 years ago. 43% in Mexico, 54% in Peru, 45% in Colombia and 61% in Chile think that it will be better in the next decade.
- **Consensus on improving relations with other countries of the region, but at differing levels:** 52% Mexico, 66% in Peru, 41% in Colombia and 84% in Chile think that their country's relations with Latin America are better now than 10 years ago. 55% in Mexico, 65% in Peru, 55% in Colombia and 75% in Chile think that they will be better in the next decade.
- **There is no consensus on who should represent Latin America in the UNSC:** Colombians (34%) and Chileans (45%) say that Brazil should take the possible new seat to represent the region in the Security Council.

Mexicans (65%) think that it should be Mexico and the Peruvians (51%) opt for Argentina. Brazil is second for Mexicans and Peruvians (11% and 21%) and Mexico is the second choice for Chileans and Colombians (19 and 21%).

- **Little consensus and strong nationalism regarding the most influential country in the region:** Mexicans (28%), Colombians (23%) and Chileans (29%) think that their own country will be the most influential in Latin America over the next 10 years. Peruvians think it will be Brazil (25%), which is the second choice for Mexico (15%), Colombia (20%) and Chile (20%). Mexicans (22%) and Chileans (22%) think that their country was the most influential in the region in the last decade, while the Colombians mention Venezuela (29%) and the Peruvians cite Chile (24%). They all put Brazil in second place: Mexico (18%), Peru (22%), Colombia (20%) and Chile (20%).
- **Agreement in positive and negative assessments of Latin American and hispanic leaders:** José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Michelle Bachelet were given the highest scores. The worst was Hugo Chávez. Mexicans and Colombians give their own presidents a high rating, while Peruvians put their president in the last place.
- **Major differences about possible conflicts in Latin America, but consensus on the solution:** there is no agreement between Mexico and Colombia (41% and 50%) in considering the likelihood of an armed conflict



in the region, on one hand, and Peru and Chile (57% and 52%) on the other, that deem it less probable; nevertheless, the majority in all the countries agree, though not with the same intensity, that the UN should act to solve such conflicts: Mexico (60%), Peru (40%), Colombia (34%) and Chile (53%).

- **Consensus on Venezuela as the most disruptive country in the region now and in the future:** Colombians (69%), Peruvians (35%) and Mexicans (23%) think that Venezuela has been the most problematic country in Latin America in the last 10 years; however, Chileans put it in second place (22%) after Colombia (24%). In Colombia (65%), Chile (27%) and Mexico (24%) most believe that Venezuela will be the most controversial country in the next decade. The question was not asked in Peru.
- **They agree to pay more attention to Latin America, except for Peru:** Mexicans (37%), Colombians (42%) and Chileans (32%) think that their own country should, first of all, pay more attention to Latin America. Peruvians thought it should be Europe (29%), which was second for Colombia (17%) and Chile (30%), while North America is the second place for Mexico (30%).

### *Attitudes towards North America and other regions*

- **Overriding distrust of the United States, except in Colombia:** The degree of distrust in the USA exceeds the level of trust in

Mexico (61% against 25%) and Peru (57% and 35%) and Chile (53% and 35%), with the opposite in Colombia (39% trust and 22% distrust the USA).

- **Internal polarization regarding the United States, which is simultaneously seen as the country that generates the most and least confidence to maintain peace in the world in** Peru (38%), in Colombia (37%) and in Chile (28%) they identify the USA as the country that generates the most confidence to maintain world peace. Mexico (21%) puts it in second place, and France in the top spot (23%), and it is the second choice for Peru (19%), Colombia (30%) and Chile (25%). Conversely, Mexico (44%), Peru (36%) and Chile (38%) see the United States as the country that generates the least confidence. Colombia ranks it third (21%), after China (24%) and Russia (34%). The latter is ranked second for Mexico (17%), Peru (31%) and Chile (26%).
- **Friends, partners, rivals or threats** The United States is primarily seen as a partner (Peru, 42%; Mexico, 51%; Colombia, 52%; and Chile 55%), rather than a friend or a threat, China is more of a partner than a friend. The Latin American nations and Spain are primarily friends (Mexico, 54%; Peru, 57%; Colombia, 53%; and Chile, 47%) and then partners, although there is rivalry and the perception of a threat between Peru and Chile (44% and 30% rivalry, respectively), as well as Colombia with Venezuela (30%) and Cuba (12%).



- **China's economic growth is positively viewed, especially in Peru and Chile: 65%** in Peru, 53% in Chile and 46% in Mexico and Colombia consider that China's economic rise is positive for the world.





## Introduction

From the outside, one frequently refers to Latin America as a region with a clear common identity, the fruit of cultural heritage (language, religion and political doctrine) and of Spanish and Portuguese colonization, with a shared vision because of its geopolitical condition as the immediate area of influence for the world's leading power. This perception, however, is not supported by reality because by almost any means of comparison Latin America has never been a homogenous region, even though there have been periods of great convergence in economic and political projects concerning the idea of political openness and economic deregulation.

Nevertheless, this is not one of those moments of coincidence and synchronization, but a period in which the differences among nations are evident. The region has lost cohesion in recent years and the basic consensus of the 1990s are losing strength. Conflicts and disputes have reemerged and there are now distinct political visions about what the model should be and how to enter and interact within the international arena.

The four countries where we ran the survey titled *The Americas and the World 2008* (Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Peru) offered results that made it possible to construct part of an overview of public opinion and regional political culture. Despite the differences in size, geographic location, political history, ethnic

composition and economic performance, there was some convergence in foreign policy that set them apart from other countries in Latin America. These countries opted for pro-market, open trade, economic deregulation and the promotion of foreign investment in the 1990s. To a greater or lesser extent they have followed open regional strategies that foster simultaneous participation in various economic and trade integration schemes. Even though these countries have governments that vary ideologically, from the right and center-right (in Colombia and Mexico) to the left (in Peru and Chile), they all favor an economic integration model that is essentially liberal or market-oriented, unlike the other countries in the region, particularly those that form part of the so-called *Bolivarian axis*, headed by Venezuela in response to the policies of the Washington Consensus of the 1990s.

Second, despite the atmosphere of global polarization and insecurity that arose after September 11, 2001 with the fight against terrorism and military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, these countries have generally been cooperative in their policies towards the United States. In the economic arena they decided to negotiate free trade agreements with the US and in terms of security, they were willing to collaborate in fighting drug-trafficking.

Finally, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru all have a Pacific coastline and therefore they share



certain specific fields of international action and coordination in which other countries in Latin America do not participate. These elements give them special and differentiated links with the

other regions of the world, especially Asia and North America. There is therefore a high level of converging interests and strategies among these four Latin American countries. Thus the question

### Basic Indicators 2008

	Colombia	Chile	Mexico	Peru
<b>Population <sup>a</sup></b>	46,702,000	16,770,000	107,677,000	28,214,000
<b>Territory (km<sup>2</sup>)<sup>e</sup></b>	1,038,700	748,800	1,923,040	1,280,000
<b>Size of GDP (mmd PPP)<sup>c</sup></b>	320,884	230,423	1,345,530	218,777
<b>GDP per capita (PPP)<sup>c</sup></b>	\$6,640	\$12,590	\$12,580	\$7,240
<b>Annual Growth Rate <sup>c</sup></b>	8.20%	5.10%	3.20%	9.00%
<b>Trade Openness <sup>c</sup> (exports/GDP)</b>	26.10%	47.20%	33.00%	24.50%
<b>Trade Openness <sup>c</sup> (imports/GDP)</b>	27.60%	33.70%	35.40%	37.60%
<b>Migration rate 2000-2005 (migration balance/1000 inhab)<sup>a</sup></b>	-0.55	0.38	-7.82	-3.86
<b>Human Development (Index)<sup>b</sup></b>	0.787	0.874	0.842	0.788
<b>Human Development (position)<sup>b</sup></b>	80	40	51	79
<b>Participation in world exports <sup>d</sup></b>	0.21%	0.49%	1.95%	0.20%
<b>Participation in world imports <sup>d</sup></b>	0.23%	0.33%	2.08%	0.14%
<b>Military Spending (mdd)<sup>f</sup></b>	\$5,240	\$4,851	\$3,262	\$1,193
<b>Military Spending (% of GDP)<sup>f</sup></b>	4.00%	3.60%	0.40%	1.30%

Sources:

<sup>a</sup> ECLAC [www.eclac.org](http://www.eclac.org) databases

<sup>b</sup> UNDP Human Development Reports

<sup>c</sup> World Development Indicators Database, World Bank, 2007 data

<sup>d</sup> WTO Trade Profiles, 2007 data

<sup>e</sup> The CIA World Factbook

<sup>f</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2006 data



lies in the extent of the social bases that support the continuity of the foreign policy implemented so far, or whether there are cracks and possible changes of strategy as a result of the changing international situation and growing regional diversity.

### *A world in transformation*

2008 was a watershed year of rapid rupture and transformation in the international system caused by the concurrence and depth of numerous changes that took place in the world and in the Western Hemisphere in particular. First, the event that reshaped the international panorama as a whole was the change in the administration and leadership in the United States after the presidential elections that swept the Democrat candidate, Barack Obama, to power and which nurtured predictions of a major change in that country's foreign policy. This ended an eight year cycle of Republican rule in which the party's neo-conservatives managed to impose their ideological vision about the international role of the United States, centered on unilateral action and military supremacy. The presidential elections in the US unleashed severe criticisms of George W. Bush's foreign policy and opened enormous expectations for a change of strategy, at a time when the world's most powerful country has lost moral leadership and power.

The worsening of the global economy and, particularly, the financial crisis in the United States, have raised doubts about the superpower's ability to continue at the forefront of the world economy. This situation could well accelerate the

process of global power redistribution in favor of the large emerging powers, China and India, to the detriment of the developed world's established poles of economic growth. This context has been accompanied by China's sustained economic and commercial growth that climaxed in terms of its visibility with the huge display of publicity and organization involved in the Olympic Games in Beijing in September.

At a regional level, the global recession put an end to a cycle of economic growth in Latin America; after six years of consecutive growth in which progress was made in reducing poverty levels. Based on data furnished by the ECLAC, although growth continued in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008, the rate was lower (4.6%) and according to the OECD, it will not exceed 0.36% in 2009.

The bogged-down trade talks in Doha, the end of the drive to form a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the resurgence of Russian expansionism and nationalism and its military intervention in Ossetia were some other events of major importance in 2008.

### *A fragmented region*

Within a regional context, the changes have been just as dramatic: the transfer of political power in Cuba without democracy; growing tension between Venezuela and the United States; the conflict between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela as a result of Colombia's military operations against a FARC camp and its repercussions in Mexico because of the presence of Mexican citizens in the area; political turmoil



in Bolivia caused by a constitution reform process headed by Evo Morales; the growing presence of China and Russia in the region; bilateral conflicts between Latin American countries and Spain unleashed by the wave of nationalizations in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador and the absence of solutions to the problems. Additionally, there are the negative effects of domestic issues, such as governability problems, institutional weakness, corruption scandals, public insecurity and rising crime rates, as well as the political-ideological polarization.

Given this scenario, the great paradigms for economic development and global regulation are now being questioned because the international architecture meant to generate good economic conditions and security has failed. 2008 presents a situation in which most of the countries have to rethink their international insertion strategies and to give the state a new economic role, not only to overcome the recession and contain the social impact of unemployment and poverty, but also to improve their operations in a world in which the major emerging nations of the south (China, India, Russia, Brazil and South Africa) have acquired more international weight.

### *Differing national contexts*

In Colombia, the most important issues dominating public debate during the period when the survey was being taken and the previous months were both domestic and international. At a domestic level there were three issues which caught the public's attention: para-politics; clashes between the Executive and the Judiciary and a second

reelection. The para-political scandal involves the participation or collusion of government officials in paramilitary activities that have implicated more than 50 congressmen and a similar number of local and regional officials. 90% of the legislators in this case belong to president Uribe's party. The Executive has undermined the Supreme Court on repeated occasions and accused it of being infiltrated by the FARC. Similarly, the president has brushed off an investigation by the Supreme Court over his alleged buying of votes to get his first reelection through Congress. Besides appealing to public opinion to defend its functions, the Supreme Court has reported interference in its activities and a plot by government and paramilitary officials to the International Criminal Court. President Uribe's reluctance to publically declare his intention to run for consecutive reelection has muddied the national political climate concerning the presidential elections in 2010. Even after a group of citizens, with the government's blessing, collected millions of signatures to call a referendum to amend the constitution, thus permitting Uribe to run for the presidency again, he is still avoiding the issue.

Although there were no major events regarding the internal armed conflict during the time of the survey, a series of successful military operations against the FARC (Operation 'Jaque' in which 15 hostages were released, including Ingrid Betancourt and three US citizens, plus desertions by some members of the guerrilla group) helped explain president Uribe's high popularity levels and the growing optimism in public opinion regarding the future of the country.

The most important international issues during the period were related to the global financial crisis, the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the





United States and it's the presidential elections there and the conflict between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Up to the end of 2008, the Colombian government still harbored hopes of getting the FTA, even after the presidential elections had been won and the financial and economic crisis had broken out. During the period, however, there was much debate on the implications for Colombia of Barack Obama's triumph, given Uribe's very close ties to George W. Bush and the Republicans. In the case of Ecuador, the media covered the tension between the two countries that has been a constant since diplomatic ties were severed in March 2008 (after Raúl Reyes' camp in Ecuadorian territory was bombed), along with difficulties in the relations between Colombia and Venezuela.

In Chile, the major issues that appeared in the local mass media and which could have been influential in the application of the survey were related to the debate about selecting presidential candidates in the country, Chile's participation in the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the maritime delimitation dispute between Peru and Chile.

The international news items covered by the Chilean press when the survey was being applied included the Bolivian government's expulsion of the DEA representative; Barack Obama's election as president of the United States; the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum Summit held in Lima, Peru, with emphasis on the meeting of the presidents Michelle Bachelet and Alan García to improve bilateral relations. Also during the week, the local media gave wider coverage to the stalemate reached by the governments of

Santiago and Lima, triggered by the controversial statements made by the Commander in Chief of the Peruvian Army about Chileans in Peru.

In Mexico, two years after the closely-fought and controversial elections that took the PAN candidate, Felipe Calderón, to the presidency, there is an air of introspection and disinterest in public opinion. There are no election campaigns in 2008 to set a particular political agenda and, besides the waning public interest in international affairs, there are signs of weariness regarding politics and aspects of public life. The wave of criminal violence that has swept through Mexico as a result of the federal government's offensive against organized crime and drug-trafficking was the most important element in the national context. The public's withdrawal and seclusion seems to reflect a natural protection and defense mechanism to deal with a national environment in which public insecurity has made its mark due to rising crime rates; a wave of kidnappings and murders of both drug-traffickers and police agents. The public debate about oil reform that mobilized political parties and society with positions for and against opening up the oil sector and which evidenced the polarization in the country regarding issues with a high degree of content for Mexican nationalism was another subject that came to the forefront in 2008.

In 2008 Peru witnessed diverse domestic events: although the growth rate was still high, poverty has not been reduced significantly and social conflicts are increasing. Over 2008, the GDP grew 9.5%, there was a continued surplus trade balance and domestic demand shot up 13%. The economic boom evident at the



macroeconomic level contrasts with the scant reduction in poverty and the general perception that growth is not improving living standards for most Peruvians. This perception is heightened by, among other factors, rising inflation, particularly the increase in food prices.

In 2008, international affairs in which the country was an actor struck a chord in Peruvian public opinion in terms of foreign policy. In January 2008, Peru initiated legal action in the Court at The Hague to revise its Ocean borders with Chile. Peru has used an equidistant projection from the commencement of the land limit recognized by the country, the so-called Punto de la Concordia on the sea shore as the maritime limit. Chile, however, uses the parallel as the maritime limit. Although Peru claims that the maritime limits have not been established by any treaty, Chile sustains that the limits were set by the fishing agreements of 1952 and 1954. These differences and Peru's lawsuit in The Hague could have created a negative vision within Peruvian public opinion regarding Chile.

The year also bore witness to some major international events that were held in Peru. The Latin America, Caribbean and European Union Summit (LAC-EU) attended by the heads of State of these regions was held in May. The summit covered climate change and the fight against poverty. Expectations regarding the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum started to grow in November 2008. The Pacific Rim heads of state attended the summit. Both events could have created more interest in public opinion about international issues and in the participating regions, and also a sensation that Peru had taken on importance at an international level.



## Chapter 1. Who we are.

### Collective identities and interaction with the world

#### *Map of basic identities*

The map of collective identities must be analyzed in order to understand the subjective factors that play a role in opening up to the world and ties with other countries. It is particularly important to accurately determine the geographic level or space of sociopolitical interaction (local, national, regional or international) that people primarily use to identify themselves and where they erect the frontiers between themselves and the outside world. These basic identities may influence the willingness of countries to deploy a higher or lower degree of activism and presence outside their borders and whether to assume international responsibilities or not. It is also probable that the map of collective identities influences social perceptions about other countries, and the friendliness or hostility to various actors in the international system. This, in turn, may affect a government's room for maneuver when trying to promote regional integration agreements or cooperation and strategic association plans.

After two decades of economic openness, democratization and promoting regional integration in Latin America, it is important to determine how strongly the feeling of identity is tied to the nation and whether the defensive, anti-imperialist nationalism in Latin America which distrusts the outside world still exists, particularly

concerning the United States and foreign capital. We should also consider whether the current sub-regional integration models, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Andean Community (CAN), the Central American Market (MCCA) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), among others, have led to the construction of new collective identities, thus generating further fragmentation in Latin America, or on the contrary, that have united the nations and given weight to their collective action on a global scale.

#### *1. National identity as an anchor*

The data confirm that national identities and nationalist symbols are still very strong and relevant in the four countries where the survey was fielded. In Colombia and Mexico, the interviewees were asked if they identified more as a citizen of the country or as a member of the locality, department or state of origin or residence. In both countries the feeling of national identity is stronger than the local identity, although there is a high proportion (around 40%) with an eminently local identity. In Mexico, 59% of the people polled feel Mexican and 40% identify with the locality; in Colombia, 56% see themselves



as Colombians and 43% have a regional identity. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that in some regions, like Mexico's south and southeast, local identity is considerably higher (65%) than national identity (35%); something similar occurs in Colombia's coffee-producing region where most (55%) identify more closely with the regions than the country (45%).

Another way of measuring the population's closeness to the country as a whole is to ask how proud they are to have said nationality. It was noted that the feeling of national pride runs high in the countries where the question was asked; Colombia and Mexico. 90% of Colombians and 83% of Mexicans claimed to be proud of their nationalities, which is consistent with the strong feeling of national identity. Although the questions about national pride and identity were not asked in Peru and Chile, other survey data that are described below produced similar results concerning closeness to the nation and the nationalist attitudes in these countries.

## 2. *Fragmented regional identities*

There is a complex and diverse map depicting the population's identification patterns with geographical and cultural spaces that are broader than the national state, such as the Americas and the world as a whole. The four countries show a high degree of fragmentation in terms of their international identity, although the difference is more pronounced in Chile and Peru. In Colombia, 43% feel *Latin American*, 27% *citizens of the world*, 21% *South American*; in Chile, 36% consider themselves *South American*, 31% *Latin*

*American* and 29% *citizens of the world*; in Mexico, 55% see themselves as *Latin American*, 24% *citizens of the world*, 7% *North American* and 6% *Central American*; and in Peru, 27% rate themselves *Andean*, 25% are *Latin American*, 23% *citizens of the world* and 21% are *South American*. Even though the percentage of *citizens of the world* is very similar in the four countries (about a quarter of the population), there are significant variations in feeling primarily Latin American, which is the first and very prominent option in Mexico (55%) and Colombia (43%), and much lower in Chile (31%) and Peru (25%) where it is the second option after South American and Andean.


Is there a relationship between geography, economic interaction and the configuration of regional identities? Mexico and Colombia show a similar pattern in which these three variables converge. In both cases, the identification with the closest regions (*North American* and *Central American* for Mexico and *Andean* and *South American* for Colombia) has little bearing in comparison with broader identities (*Latin American* and *citizen of the world*). Interestingly, the regional identities corresponding to the most important regional economic integration schemes in which Mexico and Colombia participate (NAFTA and CAN, respectively) are the weakest. This evidence contradicts the thesis that greater economic integration among neighboring nations generates an enhanced sense of belonging to the same regional community. One possible explanation is that the countries and their populations do not perceive major benefits from subregional integration schemes; another possibility is that they do not feel part of a specific Andean or North American regional community.




### Regional identity

What do you identify yourself as?


#### Latin American




#### North American




#### Central American




#### Citizen of the World




#### Andean



#### Mercosur



#### South American



In the countries further to the south, Peru and Chile, Latin American identity is not the most important, which suggests that geographic proximity carries more weight. Peru is the only case where regional identities coincide with its geographic location and with economic integration patterns. Nevertheless, this could well be attributed to other internal ethnic factors. In Peru, Andean identity is not only understood as regional, but also sub-national, for the people who live in the mountainous part of the country.

When the categories of regional identity included in the four cases (*citizen of the world* and *Latin American* are analyzed in terms of education), it can be seen that as the level of schooling of the interviewees rises, the lower the number of people who claim to be citizens of the world, and conversely, the higher the education level, the stronger the Latin American identity. For Chile, those who do not have a formal education define themselves as *Latin Americans* (17%) and as *citizens of the world* (42%), while more of



those with a higher level of education claim to be *Latin American* (36%) and fewer say they are *citizens of the world* (14%). In the case of Peru, 13% of the population without formal education said they were *Latin American* and 28% said *citizens of the world*, however, the figure was 33% and 17%, respectively, in the case of people with more education. In Colombia, Latin American identity is less affected by education levels; nevertheless, it rises from 46% without formal education to 49% at higher levels. The decline in use of the *citizen of the world* label is constant, falling from 38% among those lacking formal education to 22% at higher levels of schooling. Finally, education levels in Mexico are much more important in the Latin American identification, where it jumps from 42% among those without studies to 70% for people with a college degree, while *citizen of the world* drops from 29% to 21% when going from zero to higher education.

## ***The many faces of nationalism***

### ***1. The symbolic dimension: international importance***

The appraisals made by people regarding their country's current, past and future importance in the world can be used as an element to project nationalist attitudes, patriotic feelings or chauvinist beliefs of national superiority, especially when there is a lack of knowledge about the country's real position in the international power structure or when this is overestimated. There is significant variation among the countries regarding the importance

given to their own country in the international field. Nevertheless, there is agreement on the retrospective and prospective importance, albeit with differing intensities: Colombians and Mexicans (58% and 52%) believe that their country is very important, while the population is more realistic in Peru and Chile, where only 27% and 40%, respectively, think their country is important at a global level. They all believe that their country is more important now than 10 years ago: Colombia (78%), Chile (88%), Mexico (64%) and Peru (70%), while the figures for the country's gaining importance in the next decade are as follows – Colombia (74%), Chile (80%), Mexico (66%) and Peru (68%). It should be noted that all the countries identify a substantial improvement in their country's retrospective and prospective levels of influence.

We wondered whether socio-demographic variables like education, age and income level influenced the population's opinions about the current, past and future importance of their country in the world. These variables have more influence on the assessment of the present than the past and future. In the four countries, youths and young adults aged 18 to 29 and people with a higher level of schooling are less likely to believe that their country is very important. Curiously, the lower-income sectors tend to have a very favorable estimation of their country's international position, which is also shared by people who think that the nation's current economic situation is better than it was a year ago.




### Country's international importance


*At an international level, how important is COUNTRY: a lot, somewhat, a little or not important?*

*At an international level, do you think that COUNTRY has more, less or the same importance than 10 years ago?*


A lot




More




Somewhat




Less




A little



Same



Not important







### Country's international importance

*At an international level, do you think that COUNTRY will have more, less or the same importance in 10 years?*


More



Less



Same



in Mexico and 67% in Peru reject the idea that naturalized foreigners can be elected to the upper or lower houses of the national congress, while 78% and 71% (Colombia), 81% and 74% (Chile), 84% and 80% (Mexico), and 80% and 74% (Peru) do not approve of people with dual nationality being elected; respectively, as President or national legislators in the country in question.

The interviewees are also reluctant to open up the borders to foreigners who want to work in the country without previously obtaining a work permit. Once again, this anti-immigrant attitude is independent of the immigrant's region of origin, which means there is no preferential or discriminatory treatment for any particular group of foreigners. Thus, regardless of their place of origin (North America, Central America, South America, Europe or Asia) there is a broad consensus on preventing foreigners from working in the country without permits. The levels of disagreement are considerable in all cases, ranging, according to the region of origin, in Colombia from 74% to 85%, in Chile from 77% to 80%, in Mexico from 71% to 78% and in Peru from 64% to 77%. In general, albeit with minor variations, there tends to be less rejection for Central and South Americas, and more rejection for North Americans and Asians.

### 2. The social dimension: attitudes to foreigners and immigration

Nationalism, in its social dimension, is a constant in the four countries, particularly regarding their fierce rejection and distrust of foreigners. Xenophobic feelings vary little according to the foreigners' nationality. There is strong opposition towards incorporating naturalized foreigners into the national community as citizens with full rights: 73% in Colombia, 70% in Chile, 79%

### 3. The political dimension: national sovereignty and jurisdiction

Questions were asked about the hierarchy of international treaties in domestic law and the jurisdiction of international courts to try fellow citizens in order to determine the level of political





nationalism, measured through the traditional concept of adherence to national sovereignty, political independence and non-intervention in a country's internal affairs. The results show that political nationalism still exists in the four countries; contrary to what is stipulated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to which the four countries are adhered to, 67% in Mexico believe that national laws are above international treaties, as do 56% in Peru, 53% in Colombia and 52% in Chile.

Nevertheless, there is a significant variation among those polled regarding the jurisdiction of international courts over citizens of their countries who have committed crimes against humanity and have not been tried by national courts. The interviewees are divided, Mexicans and Peruvians tip slightly in favor of not accepting the universal jurisdiction of international courts (in Mexico, 47% against and 43% in favor; in Peru, 50% against and 42% in favor). In contrast, most Chileans and Colombians agree (in Chile, 52% in favor and 42% against; in Colombia, 56% in favor and 36% against).

There are various possible explanations to why all the countries believe that national law prevails over international law, while some would be willing to accept the jurisdiction of international courts. The differences in the willingness to accept international rules suggest that the rejection is not general and it could be subject to other considerations. A possible explanation of why Colombia and Chile are more willing to delegate authority to international organizations when dealing with human rights, even if national laws are preeminent over international laws, is that there are doubts as to whether the national courts

are capable of meting out justice. Another possible explanation is imbedded in their history; they give more weight to the defense of human rights than national sovereignty.

#### ***4. The cultural dimension: how much dissemination of ideas?***

Regarding the cultural dimension of nationalism, the interviewees were asked whether they thought the dissemination of foreign ideas and customs in their countries was something positive or negative. There is a relative consensus that cultural dissemination is good; but there was a major difference in the intensity attributed to the benefit of cultural influence: 60% of the Peruvians, 50% of Mexicans, 44% of Chileans and 41% of Colombians approve of the dissemination of foreign ideas and customs in their countries.

What variables influence the degree of cultural openness? Schooling level, for one, is positively associated with the degree of cultural openness. In Peru, 71% of the population with higher education has a favorable view on the dissemination of these ideas and customs, compared with 40% with no formal education. A similar ratio is repeated, with minor differences, in Mexico (55% of college graduates, 33% without studies) and Chile (48% of college graduates and 32% without studies), but not in Colombia. Age is another variable that affects perceptions regarding foreign culture: younger people tend to be more open to ideas and customs coming from outside the country. For example, in the same decreasing order of intensity as with




education, in Peru 64% of those aged 18 to 29 approve of the dissemination of foreign culture in their country, while 48% of those older than 60 agree; in Mexico, it is 56% and 41%, in Chile 56% and 32% and in Colombia, 45% and 38%, respectively.


### Foreign ideas and customs

*Is it good or bad to disseminate the ideas and customs of other countries in COUNTRY?*


Good



Bad



Depends (spontaneous)



### 5. The economic dimension: globalization, free trade and foreign investment

The results indicate the nationalism is stronger in symbolic social, political and cultural aspects than in issues that are directly related to the economy, such as foreign trade, foreign investment and globalization. The very different ways in which these three dimensions of the economic relationship with other countries are perceived is interesting. In general, free trade and direct foreign investment are seen more positively than globalization. This is consistent with the findings of other studies indicating that the term *globalization* is a broad and ambiguous concept which includes economic and cultural aspects, whereas free trade and foreign investment allude to realities that are more tangible and immediate for the common citizen. Given the broad implications of the term globalization, as well as its association with the so-called anti-globalization movement, it is more likely to be given a negative evaluation.

There is general agreement among the four countries on the benefits of free trade; additionally, all of them approve of international trade, especially Chile: 83% in Chile, 67% in Peru, 61% in Mexico and 49% in Colombia think that free trade is beneficial for their respective economies. Furthermore, the consensus is repeated, with the same order of intensities, as to whether free trade is positive for their own living standards and for the country's workers, respectively: Chile (72% and 69%), Peru (61% and 64%), Mexico (55% and 59%) and Colombia (64% and 42%). Finally, the interviewees in all four countries agreed, albeit



with less intensity, that free trade is beneficial for the environment: Chile 53%, Mexico 47%, Peru 45% and Colombia 35%.

Regarding direct foreign investment, the findings on international trade are largely repeated: sizeable majorities in the four countries say it is positive, but the levels of approval vary greatly. 90% of Chileans believe that foreign investment benefits the country a lot or somewhat, compared with 83% in Colombia and 70% in Mexico and Peru.


Finally, globalization is the only item where there is no clear consensus among the four countries concerning international economic relations, because the perceptions of its benefits vary dramatically: although 77% of Chileans consider it to be generally good (which is similar to South Korea, China, India and Taiwan, the Asian nations where the survey was fielded in 2006), 62% in Peru, 48% in Colombia and just 38% in Mexico think it is positive.

### Free trade


*In general, do you think free trade is good or bad for...?*

#### The economy of developed countries


Good



Bad




Depends (spontaneous)




### The environment


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Bad




Depends (spontaneous)




### Standard of living of people like you


Good



Bad




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


### The COUNTRY's economy


Good



Bad




Depends (spontaneous)




### Agriculture


Good



Bad



Depends (spontaneous)







## Globalization

*Do you think that the greater economic contact with the other economies of the world, which is known as globalization, is generally good or generally bad for COUNTRY?*


### Generally good




### Generally bad




### Neither good or bad (spontaneous)



### Depends (spontaneous)



### DK/NA



## *How distant and detached is the world?*

### *1. Interest and knowledge gaps*

How interested are the interviewees in international affairs? The level of interest in international affairs varies tremendously in the four countries. There is more interest in Colombia and Chile (80% and 74%, respectively), where people are very or somewhat interested in the news about relations with other countries, but it is lower in Peru (63%) and Mexico (52%). The level of interest in international affairs, however, is similar to other issues in national politics that more directly affect the interviewees (these subjects were only included in Colombia and Mexico), such as finances and the economy, or the country's political and social situation.

Interest in international affairs is directly related to education in the four countries: the higher the level of schooling, the greater the interest in external events. When comparing those without formal education with college graduates in the four countries, it can be seen that interest (people who closely follow international news) jumps from 23% to 62% in Colombia, from 31% to 51% in Chile, from 13% to 36% in Mexico and from 18% to 43% in Peru.


The levels of knowledge and information about international problems and realities vary greatly in the four countries, with Mexicans being the least informed. For example, the number of people who know the meaning of the initials OAS and FIFA in Colombia (63% and 58%, respectively) is similar to the level in Peru (62% and 54%) and Chile (60% and 69%); nevertheless, only 24% and 44% of Mexicans could identify them correctly.




### Interest in the news

*When you follow the news, how interested are you in your country's relations with other countries?*


Very




Somewhat




Little



Nothing



Don't follow the news (spontaneous)



Knowledge of the euro as the common currency of some countries in the European Union and the name of the president of the United States is higher among Colombians (65% and 80%, respectively) than among Mexicans (42% and 67%). These questions were not asked in Chile or Peru. The only subject where there is a similar level of knowledge in these countries is in the initials of the United Nations, which were correctly identified by between 61% and 63% of the interviewees in the four countries.


Not surprisingly, people with higher levels of schooling are more knowledgeable about international affairs. There is an enormous difference in the correct identification of certain information between people without formal schooling and those with a college education. For example, the correct identification of the initials OAS rose from 31% to 87% in Colombia, from 24% to 92% in Chile, from 5% to 44% in Mexico and from 9% to 91% in Peru.

## Knowledge of initials


Tell me the meaning of the initials on this card:

### OAS


Correct



Incorrect




DK/NA




### FIFA


Correct



Incorrect




DK/NA




### UN


Correct



Incorrect



DK/NA



## 2. Forms of contact with the world and its limits

The level of direct contact with foreign countries is relatively limited. In all countries, with the exception of Peru, the interviewees were asked how many times they had been abroad. The results were very similar: 68% of Mexicans and 71% of Colombians and Chileans said that they had never left the country.

Levels of indirect contact with other countries, however, are much higher. Barring Chile, the three other countries share a high rate of emigration and a sizeable portion of the population receives remittances. Over half the population in Mexico



(56%), Peru (64%) and Colombia (61%) have relatives living abroad, compared with 36% of the Chileans. If the question is narrowed down to whether a member of the interviewee's immediate family unit lives abroad, the proportion falls to 29% in Mexico, 28% in Peru and 22% in Colombia, compared with 9% in Chile. It should also be noted that the same percentage of interviewees in Colombia, Mexico and Peru receive remittances from abroad (15%), as compared to just 2% in Chile.


The people with the highest education levels and those who claim to be in a favorable economic situation are the most likely to have a relative living abroad. The percentage of people without formal education and those with a college degree who reported having a family member living abroad rose from 31% to 76% in Colombia, from 17% to 51% in Chile, from 50% to 66% in Mexico and from 38% to 73% in Peru. If the comparison is made between families who identify their economic situation as very precarious and those who say it is good, the percentage of affirmative answers about family members living abroad climbs from 61% to 74% in Colombia, from 27% to 44% in Chile, from 50% to 64% in Mexico and from 37% to 75% in Peru. This indicates that the higher the income or education level, the higher the probability of going abroad, as can be seen further on, which is not only applicable to travel for work or pleasure, but also to economic migration to countries that offer better job opportunities.

Finally, the people polled in Colombia and Mexico were asked whether they would go live abroad if they could; 48% of Colombians and 40% of Mexicans said they would. When


## Relatives living abroad

*Do you have any relatives living abroad?*

Yes




No




*Do you have relatives that used to live in this household and now live outside COUNTRY?*

Yes



No









### Remittances

*Do you or any members of your family receive money from relatives working abroad?*

Yes




No



to 29 would emigrate compared with 34% of people older than 60; 51% of those with a college education would leave as against 31% of those with no formal education; finally, 56% of people who claim to be well-off would emigrate and 48% of the underprivileged would to the same.

asked whether the United States would be the destination country, the percentages dipped slightly: 33% and 34% for Colombia and Mexico, respectively. It is important to mention that the intention to emigrate is higher among young people, those with higher levels of schooling and people in a more comfortable economic situation, which refutes the hypothesis that it is the poorest and least educated who emigrate. In Mexico, the desire to leave the country is twice as common among the group aged 18 to 29 (51%) as for those over 60 (25%), while 49% of those with a college degree would leave, compared with 28% of those with no formal education. Additionally, 48% of the people who define themselves as comfortably-off would emigrate, as against 35% who say their economic situation is dire. The data are similar for Colombia; 61% of people polled aged 18





## **Chapter 2. Task list.**

### **Foreign policy concerns and priorities**

Once the collective identities of Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Peru had been described – interest in and knowledge about international affairs, levels of contact with other countries, the perceived closeness or distance in their interaction with the outside world – we analyzed the perceptions that are directly related to general orientation, priorities and lines of action concerning foreign policy in the countries being studied. In this regard, there are variables which could determine the possible range of actions by influencing social perceptions concerning the priorities and strategies in managing foreign affairs. In our opinion, the possible foreign policy activities and agendas were constrained by the assessment of the world, the situation in Latin America and the governments' performance. It is particularly important to determine the degree of optimism and pessimism about the outside world; what is seen as a threat and what is regarded as an opportunity; how different government actions are evaluated; how international activism is understood and, finally, the appropriate political agenda in a globalized world from the population's point of view. The purpose is to create a study framework that would allow us to determine the extent of real connections between the public's national and international concerns on one hand, and the tendency to get involved with or stand apart from the global environment and


clearly identify the priorities of their respective country's international activity, on the other.

#### ***Pessimism about the world situation***

First, perceptions about the global situation were analyzed. Pessimism predominated regarding the current world situation compared with 10 years ago; most people think that the world is worse now than it was 10 years ago; 66% in Mexico and Peru, 60% in Chile and 59% in Colombia. The outlook for the future is not much better; 58% of Mexicans, 54% of Chileans, 52% of Colombians and 50% of Peruvians think the world will be worse in the next 10 years. As can be seen in chapter 3, the pessimism about the world contrasts with an optimistic view of the current and future situation in Latin America.

## Current world situation

*In general, do you think the world is better or worse than 10 years ago?*




## External threats: social problems as a priority

The data confirms that the most important global threats are widely shared and that they have a marked social implication. All four countries agree that the five most serious threats (which appear among the top six mentioned in all of the countries analyzed) are: drug-trafficking and organized crime, global warming, global poverty, high price and shortages of food and epidemics like AIDS. The four countries also agree that the least serious threats are: the rise of China as a world power and populist leaders.

The global issues that are more closely related to a person's wellbeing and which are closer to the interests of the region are more important. This could be explained by the fact that problems linked to personal wellbeing affect the country's internal governability, which, in turn, has repercussions on an individual's security. That is, the world is seen through a national perspective. On the other hand, the traditional subjects of international security (nuclear arms and international terrorism) appear half way down the list in all cases. Furthermore, all these threats are perceived with greater intensity by Chile and Colombia, followed by Peru, and to a lesser extent, Mexico.

## Future world situation

*In general, do you think the world will be better or worse in 10 years?*





## Serious threats

*I am going to read a list of items that may or may not affect the most important interests of COUNTRY in the next few years. Tell me if you think...(option)...is a serious threat*

Threat	Colombia	Rank	Chile	Rank	Mexico	Rank	Peru	Rank
Drug-trafficking and organized crime	86%	4	89%	4	79%	1	78%	6
Global warming	89%	2	92%	2	77%	2	85%	3
Shortages and high price of food	89%	2	93%	1	73%	4	89%	1
World poverty	90%	1	92%	2	73%	4	89%	1
Epidemics like AIDS	85%	5	86%	6	75%	3	85%	3
Nuclear weapons	81%	6	87%	5	64%	6	79%	5
International terrorism	74%	8	83%	7	63%	7	77%	7
Border conflicts and territorial disputes	71%	9	71%	9	49%	9	63%	9
Cut-offs in power supply	54%	10	71%	9	43%	11	46%	10
Guerrillas	75%	7	83%	7	46%	10	67%	8
Populist leaders	52%	11	57%	11	37%	12	35%	11
China as a world power	33%	15	30%	12	32%	15	29%	12
Tighter immigration policies in the United States	48%	12	NA		51%	8	NA	
Illegal immigrants	48%	12	NA		37%	12	NA	
Violent conflicts (ethnic and sectarian)	45%	14	NA		37%	12	NA	



*Assessment of government response to current challenges: some are more critical than others*


The interviewees were asked about the government’s performance regarding economic policy, public security, education and foreign policy. The evaluations vary greatly from one country to another and between the policies analyzed. Firstly and consistently, the evaluations were higher in Colombia in all the items, while the ratings given by the Peruvians were the worst. The least disparate evaluations were made by the Chileans (54% strongly or somewhat agree in economic policy, 46% in public security, 57% in foreign policy and 48% in education), whereas the Colombians (71% in economic and foreign policy, 61% in education and 81% in public security) are the most uneven. Secondly, the subject with the highest rating among Colombians is security (81%), as was education for Mexicans (53%) and foreign policy for Chileans (57%) and Peruvians (49%). Thirdly, as regards foreign policy, Colombians (71%) and Chileans (57%) strongly or somewhat agree with the government’s performance in this subject, while Mexicans (45%) and Peruvians (49%) are less positive.

**Government performance**


*Do you agree or disagree with the government performance concerning...?*

**Economic policy**


Strongly agree




Somewhat Agree




Somewhat disagree



Strongly disagree



DK/NA







### Public security policy

### Foreign policy



Strongly agree

Strongly agree





Somewhat agree

Somewhat agree





Somewhat disagree

Somewhat disagree





Strongly disagree

Strongly disagree



DK/NA


DK/NA






### Education policy


#### Strongly agree




#### Somewhat agree




#### Somewhat disagree



#### Strongly Disagree



#### DK/NA



The results are more interesting when the opinions on the policies evaluated and the level of education are analyzed. The most interesting trend shown by the data is that the public, educated or otherwise, is quite capable of discriminating among policies when evaluating them. For example, on many occasions, there is a positive correlation between the level of schooling and the degree of support for the government. However, there is an inverse relation in others. Thus, in Colombia, there is an inverse relationship between education and evaluation for economic policy, security and education in which the higher the education level, the lower the evaluation. In foreign policy, however, there is no definitive relationship. In Peru, the direct relationship is satisfied for both economic and foreign policy, while the opposite it true for education and public security. In Chile, there is no correlation between economic policy and the education policy. Nevertheless, there is a correlation for foreign policy: the higher the education level, the higher the degree of approval of the government's performance in the subject. The relationship with public security is weak. Finally, in Mexico, there was no relationship between education and assessment of foreign policy; however, in the other three policies there is an inverse relation: the people with the least schooling give governmental performance the highest grades.





### *Limited and selective international activism*

In order to determine possible foreign policy actions for the countries making up the study, the people polled were asked whether it is better for the country in question to actively participate in world affairs or to stand aside. The vast majority of the interviewees prefer active participation, with a high degree of intensity: 81% in Peru, 80% in Chile, 75% in Colombia and 69% in Mexico would like to see their countries play an active role in world affairs.

When the international activism variable is cross-tabulated with education, there is a resoundingly positive relationship between both. For example, 90% of the people with a college degree in Chile are in favor of active intervention; this figure falls to 71% for those with no formal education. The relationship is even more evident in Peru where 91% of those with a college degree opt for activism, while 47% of those with no formal education are of the same mind.


The same direct relationship applies to the individual income variable: the higher the earnings, the higher the percentage of people who support active participation. Once again, the most significant changes are in Peru where 62% who do not make enough to survive prefer active participation, compared with 87% for those who make enough and can save. In Chile, these percentages are 67% and 86%, respectively.

There is also a positive relationship between the favoring activism and the retrospective evaluation of economic situation, which is much less pronounced, with the exception of Peru, than in the other two cases above. In Colombia,


### Participation in world affairs

*What is better for the future of your country, active participation in world events or standing aside from world affairs?*


Active participation



Stand aside



Neither one (spontaneous)



the tendency towards active participation rose from 70% to 90% when going from a negative opinion of the current economic situation, to those who think it is much better. The increases for Mexico and Chile, however, are less marked; from 68% to 70% and from 77% to 80%, respectively. Finally, the relationship with age is less clear. In the case of both Peru and Mexico, the youngest people polled were the most in favor of activism. 71% of Peruvians over the age of 60 want to see the country participate more actively, compared with 83% of the group aged 18 to 29. Among



Mexicans, the figure rises from 59% of the group over 60 to 71% for the younger segment. There is no clear trend, however, for Colombia and Chile.

The people polled were asked questions with a specific context in addition to those of a general nature, in order to more accurately determine their willingness to actively participate in international affairs. Consequently, in order to determine whether the people would opt for international activism in a subject that might be of minor importance, they were asked whether their country should increase, decrease or maintain the number of embassies in Africa, the continent with which Latin America has the weakest ties. The logic is simple. If they want to increase the number, then activism is obviously more solidly based than for those who want to cut or maintain the number. In this regard, the percentages are very indicative. Maintaining the number of embassies prevailed in both Chile (48%) and Colombia (40%), while most Mexicans (40%) said it should be increased. The question was not asked in Peru.

A second specific question consisted of ascertaining what measures a country should take when faced with situations in the global scenario. The interviewees were then asked what the country should do in case the army or an armed group in a Latin American country overthrew a democratically-elected government. Most of the Colombians (41%), Chileans (40%) and Mexicans (39%) would rather wait for the international reaction and then act. In Peru, however, the majority (35%) opted for a public condemnation of the events, without severing diplomatic ties, which is the second option for the other countries. Cutting diplomatic ties with the new government was chosen by 23% in Chile, 17% in Peru, 15%

in Mexico and 10% in Colombia. The option of doing nothing at no point exceeded 10%.



## Participation in world affairs

*What is better for the future of your country, active participation in world events or standing aside from world affairs?*

	Active Participation	Standing aside	Neither one (spontaneous)
<b>COLOMBIA</b>			
<b>Income</b>			
More than enough	79%	11%	7%
Just enough	76%	14%	9%
Not enough	73%	15%	8%
Very difficult	73%	20%	6%
<b>Education</b>			
None	69%	15%	15%
Basic	65%	22%	9%
Middle	76%	13%	9%
College	80%	11%	6%
<b>CHILE</b>			
<b>Income</b>			
More than enough	85%	10%	2%
Just enough	82%	12%	3%
Not enough	73%	18%	6%
Very difficult	67%	20%	4%
<b>Education</b>			
None	70%	19%	5%
Basic	67%	24%	3%
Middle	82%	11%	5%
College	89%	5%	2%



### Participation in world affairs

*What is better for the future of your country, active participation in world events or standing aside from world affairs?*

	Active Participation	Standing aside	Neither one (spontaneous)
<b>MEXICO</b>			

#### Income

More than enough	80%	16%	3%
Just enough	72%	17%	8%
Not enough	64%	24%	6%
Very difficult	63%	22%	6%

#### Education

None	56%	27%	5%
Basic	64%	23%	7%
Middle	71%	20%	7%
College	88%	7%	2%

### PERU

#### Income

More than enough	87%	10%	2%
Just enough	82%	12%	3%
Not enough	77%	16%	3%
Very difficult	63%	24%	5%

#### Education

None	47%	28%	7%
Basic	71%	19%	3%
Middle	83%	12%	3%
College	91%	7%	1%



### ***Foreign policy agenda in a global world: shared priorities***

It is necessary to determine whether the priorities for these countries' populations converge or not in order to identify what common measures could be taken in the field of foreign policy. If the priorities of various political communities are similar, joint action will be easier than if they differ widely. Interviewees were therefore asked to state what specific actions would be considered a priority in international events. The options offered could be differentiated along two lines: those with a high social and immediate content and those of a more multilateral nature.

The results suggest that there is broad consensus regarding foreign policy priorities in the four countries and that the population gives greater importance to the issues that affect the social conditions inside their respective countries. Consequently, the traditional issues of security and promoting trade are added to a new social agenda. Once again the four countries agree, with a slight variation in order, on the five most pressing foreign policy priorities: fighting drug-trafficking and organized crime, protecting the environment, protecting citizen's interests in other countries, promoting exports and protecting land and sea borders. It is important to note the importance given to protecting the environment and fighting drug-trafficking and organized crime, as they are ranked first and second in Mexico, Chile and Colombia.

Following the same pattern as in their perception of threats, there is also agreement in the four countries on the less-important priorities: bolstering the UN and the OAS and helping

spread democracy to other countries. As can be seen, multilateral issues are much less important than those which affect an individual's wellbeing and the country's internal social conditions. Apparently, relations with the world are seen as an opportunity to improve one's own economic wellbeing, personal security and the country's situation. As in the case of threats, there is greater intensity in the preferences shown by Chile and Colombia, followed by Peru and Mexico, to a lesser extent.



## Importance given to foreign policy goals

*How important should the following objectives be for country's foreign policy?*

Goal	Colombia	Rank	Chile	Rank	Mexico	Rank	Peru	Rank
Protecting the environment	90%	1	91%	1	76%	2	87%	1
Fighting drug-trafficking and organized crime	90%	1	87%	2	81%	1	79%	4
Protecting borders	82%	6	85%	3	65%	6	80%	2
Attracting foreign investment to COUNTRY	77%	9	82%	4	62%	7	67%	7
Promoting the country's products	87%	3	81%	5	71%	5	77%	5
Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons	78%	8	80%	6	56%	10	60%	10
Fighting international terrorism	75%	11	80%	6	61%	9	72%	6
Promoting regional integration	77%	9	78%	8	52%	11	65%	8
Protecting citizens living abroad	86%	5	77%	9	76%	2	80%	2
Spreading democracy to other countries	53%	15	55%	11	37%	14	50%	11
Strengthening the UN	57%	13	52%	12	42%	13	47%	12
Supporting less-developed countries	69%	12	62%	10	47%	12	61%	9
Strengthening the OAS	54%	14	51%	13	31%	15	43%	13
Attracting tourists	81%	7	NA		62%	7	NA	
Promoting the country's culture	87%	3	NA		73%	4	NA	



***Multilateralism and rules of the game: who should be in charge of world order and how***

A battery of specific questions was included in order to establish the role that should be played by the major powers and multilateral organizations in ensuring stability, order and peace in the international system. It would appear that there is a preference for a multi polar world where various powers are the leaders. There is also a multilateral tendency that supports endowing international organizations, particularly the UN and its Security Council, with sufficient authority to carry out their activities and even use military force.

On the first point, the survey sought to determine how positively or negatively China's economic growth compared with the United States was perceived, in order to measure the preference for a multi polar distribution of international power. The results suggest that majorities in all four countries think it is a positive development. Nevertheless, there are fundamental differences: 65% in Peru, 53% in Chile and 46% in Mexico and Colombia think it is positive for the world.

Furthermore, when this question is linked to education levels, the results reveal that the higher the level of schooling, the more likely people are to see China's economic growth as something positive. In Chile, although 46% of those without formal education think it is positive, the figure jumps to 58% among college graduates. The increase is from 31% to 51% in Colombia and from 37% to 50% in Mexico, respectively. As on other occasions, Peru was the most extreme, with an increment of 40% to 72%, when going from the uneducated to the educated.

The level of confidence in the role of the major powers is essentially uneven. When asked about the level of confidence in the countries with the greatest capacity to influence the state of peace in the world, the results indicate that none of the Security Council nations managed to reach 40%. The most reliable country in this endeavor is the United States for 38% of Peruvians, 37% of Colombians, 28% of Chileans, and 21% of Mexicans. France came second in the four cases.


In clear contrast with these results, there is a high degree of polarization, shown by the fact that the United States is also identified as the country that generates the most distrust in guaranteeing international peace and security: it is ranked first by Mexico (44%), Peru (36%) and Chile (38%), and third in Colombia (21%), after China (24%) and Russia (34%). Russia consistently appears in second place for Mexico (17%), Peru (31%) and Chile (26%). This positioning could be related to the legacy of the Cold War or to the recent examples of Russian military cooperation with Cuba and Venezuela, both of which have strained relations with the United States.




### Countries that generate the most confidence to maintain peace

Which of the following countries generates the most confidence to keep world peace?


China




Russia




United States




Other




France




None



Great Britain



DK/NA









### Countries that generate the least confidence to keep peace

*And which country generates the least confidence to maintain world peace?*


China




Russia




United States




Other




France




None



Great Britain



DK/NA





When we compare the percentages of countries that are most trusted with those that are least trusted in more detail, we see that there is a positive rating for the United States by the Peruvians (2%) and the Colombians (16%), – that is, more confidence than distrust – whereas there is a net negative balance of 10 and 23 points for Chile and Mexico (the difference between the percentage trusting and not trusting the United States to keep the peace). The balances are much more positive than negative for both France and Great Britain. The results for China, however, were more negative than positive, as only Mexico gave them a net positive balance of 3 points. In all cases, Russia has the lowest degree of trust of all the countries, with a very negative 33 points in the case of Colombia.

What do the people polled think about international organizations? The interviewees were asked to rate the UN, OAS and NGOs, multinational companies, the European Union, NAFTA and Mercosur on a scale of 0 to 100, where 100 represents a very favorable opinion, 50 implies neutrality and 0 is a very unfavorable opinion, which is how attitudes towards international organizations and institutions are measured and determined. The four countries reported very similar findings in terms of affinity for international organizations made up of member states, at both a global (UN) and regional (OAS) level. Even if there are differences in the grading scales, the UN is the most highly rated organization in the four countries, followed by the OAS (except in Chile where it was placed fourth). This suggests a clear preference for international organizations with member states over regional integration mechanisms, such as

the European Union or Mercosur, and private or social international organizations like NGOs and multinational corporations.

NGOs are not very popular in the four countries, especially in Chile and Mexico. In terms of regional integration, the European Union is more highly rated in all cases, except for Chile (where it is marginally surpassed by Mercosur) and it does better than the regional integration mechanisms like NAFTA and Mercosur. Transnational corporations, however, are in the middle of the table in Mexico and Colombia, while they are in the second to last place in Chile and Peru.

Once the international organizations had been evaluated, the next step was to determine what actions they should be allowed to carry out, according to the people polled. In terms of international security, most of the population in the four countries agreed that multilateral organizations should have the power to act and impose sanctions. When asked whether the UN Security Council should have the right to authorize the use of military force to avoid grave violations of human rights, such as mass-murder, 81% in Chile, 70% in Mexico, 65% in Colombia and 63% in Peru said that it should. However, when the authorization to use force is to reinstall a democratic government that has been overthrown, the percentage of support declines, although retaining a majority in all cases; 68% of Chileans, 56% of Mexicans, 48% of Colombians and 52% of Peruvians.

As regards their country's participation in peacekeeping operation, most of the Mexican (60%) and Colombian (48%) subjects are in favor. 30% in Colombia and 28% in Mexico



were against, while 17% of Colombians and 7% of Mexicans thought it depended on the circumstances. The question was not asked in Chile or Peru.

Nevertheless, there is an interesting contrast in the affirmative results for participation in peacekeeping forces and the affirmation that in order to solve international problems, the country

should accept the United Nations’s decisions, even if they are unpopular. The only majority in favor of this statement was in Chile (64%). The majority of people in Mexico (55%), Peru (46%) and Colombia (45%), however, disagree. The contrast of hierarchy in terms of international treaties and national laws is, nevertheless, more important. Specifically, the people polled were

### Averages in the thermometers of international organizations

*On a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is a very unfavorable opinion, 100 represents a very favorable opinion, 50 is neither favorable or unfavorable, what is your opinion of the following international organizations? If you have no opinion or if you have never heard of the organization, please tell me.*

Organization	Colombia	Rank	Chile	Rank	Mexico	Rank	Peru	Rank
UN	71	1	60	1	78	1	60	1
OAS	68	2	57	4	67	2	58	2
European Union	65	3	55	5	66	3	58	2
Multinational corporations	61	4	50	6	66	3	53	5
NGOs	59	5	49	7	64	6	55	4
Mercosur	59	5	58	2	61	7	52	6
CAN	58	7	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
UNASUR	57	8	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
NAFTA	57	8	58	2	65	5	NA	NA




asked whether international covenants and treaties should be above national laws. Most disagreed and opted for national laws. Notably, 67% of Mexicans disagreed, followed by the Peruvians (56%), Colombians (53%) and Chileans (52%).


### Accepting UN decisions

*In order to settle international problems, COUNTRY must accept the UN's decisions, even if it does not like them*


#### Agree



#### Disagree



#### Depends





## Chapter 3. Contrasting visions of Latin America

### *Map of affinities, sympathies and antipathies*

What is the interviewee's perception of other countries? When using a scale of 0 to 100, where 100 represents a very favorable opinion, 50 implies neutrality and 0 is a very unfavorable opinion, an interesting coincidence came to light: Colombians, Chileans, Mexicans and Peruvians hold developed and distant countries in a more favorable light than their own Latin American neighbors. The score ranges do, however, vary considerably from one country to another; Mexicans have the most favorable affinity levels (from 47 to 71 points and rating 4 out of 19 countries that is, slightly under 20% with under 50), followed by the Colombians (37 to 70 points, unfavorably evaluating 8 of 19 countries, 42% of the total) and Peruvians (36 to 65 points and negatively evaluating 7 of 14 countries, exactly 50% of the total), and the Chileans with the lowest approval rating of the outside world (33 to 60 points, evaluating 11 of 19 countries, almost 60%, with less than 50).

The countries which are consistently given a better evaluation are either first world countries or have undergone a recent surge in development, such as Canada (Colombia, fourth with 63; Chile, second with 59; Mexico, first with 71; Peru, fourth with 60), Spain (Colombia, second with 68; Chile,

fourth with 58; Mexico, second with 66; with the exception of Peru, which rated it negatively with 44 in tenth place), Germany (Colombia, sixth with 59; Chile, fourth with 58; Mexico, third with 65; Peru did not include it in the survey), Japan (Colombia, eighth with 57; Chile, sixth with 57; Mexico, fifth with 64; Peru, first with 65) and China (Colombia, eighth with 57; Chile, first with 60; Mexico, third with 65; Peru, first with 65).

Also, four countries shared the worst evaluations: Iran (Colombia, Chile and Peru, last with 37, 33 and 36, respectively; Mexico, twelfth with 53), Venezuela (Colombia, third last with 43; Chile, fifteenth with 36; Mexico, last with 47; Peru, second last with 42), El Salvador (Colombia, second last with 42; Chile, third last with 35; Mexico, fifteenth with 50; Peru did not include it in the survey) and Cuba (Colombia, fifteenth with 44; Chile, fifteenth with 36; Mexico, third last with 48; Peru, tenth with 44). The four countries share a lack of development and the first two are identified as conflictive in the international arena. Significantly, the countries in the region that are most clearly identified with radical-left positions (Cuba and Venezuela) enjoy the least affinity.

The four countries coincide regarding their affinity towards Latin American nations: the countries for which there is most affinity in Latin America are the two most important nations in



### Averages in the countries' thermometers

*Please give me your opinion on some countries, zero being a very unfavorable opinion, 100 expressing a very favorable opinion and 50 neither favorable or unfavorable. Use any number from 0 to 100; the higher the number, the more favorable your opinion of the country. If you have no opinion or if you have never heard of the country, please tell me.*

Colombia			Chile			Mexico			Peru		
Country	Degrees	Rank	Country	Degrees	Rank	Country	Degrees	Rank	Country	Degrees	Rank
United States	70	1	China	60	1	Canada	71	1	Japan	65	1
Spain	68	2	Canada	59	2	Spain	66	2	China	65	1
Brazil	64	3	Australia	59	2	Germany	65	3	Brazil	62	3
Canada	63	4	Germany	58	4	China	65	3	Canada	60	4
Mexico	61	5	Spain	58	4	Brazil	64	5	United States	60	4
Germany	59	6	Japan	57	6	Japan	64	5	Mexico	56	6
Chile	58	7	Brazil	56	7	United States	62	7	Argentina	50	7
Argentina	57	8	United States	53	8	Argentina	60	8	Colombia	48	8
China	57	8	Mexico	47	9	Australia	60	8	India	45	9
Japan	57	8	South Korea	44	10	Chile	58	10	Spain	44	10
Australia	54	11	India	43	11	South Korea	55	11	Cuba	44	10
Peru	49	12	Argentina	41	12	Iran	53	12	Chile	42	12
South Korea	47	13	Guatemala	38	13	Guatemala	51	13	Venezuela	42	12
India	46	14	Colombia	37	14	Colombia	51	13	Iran	36	14
Guatemala	44	15	Venezuela	36	15	El Salvador	50	15			
Cuba	44	15	Cuba	36	15	Peru	49	16			
Venezuela	43	17	El Salvador	35	17	Cuba	48	17			
El Salvador	42	18	Peru	33	18	India	48	17			
Iran	37	19	Iran	33	18	Venezuela	47	19			



the region in terms of GDP, population, size and regional power, that is, Brazil and Mexico. Brazil is consistently ranked first in the region in all cases (Colombia, third with 64; Chile, seventh with 56; Mexico, fifth with 64; Peru, third with 62), followed by Mexico (Colombia, fifth with 61; Chile, ninth with 47; Peru, sixth with 56).

To what extent do historic or contemporary disputes affect a country's perceptions about its neighbors? In the case of Chile and Peru, the confrontations between the countries have negatively impacted the affinity the populations feel for one another. Chileans feel an affinity of 33 for Peru, which is second to last in their list of preferences, while the Peruvians give Chile the third to last slot in their affinities, with 42 points. In a similar vein, Colombians have an unfavorable perception of Venezuela and gave it 42 points, which is the third to last place. Mexico's perception of Guatemala is close to neutrality, with 51 points, and puts it in 13<sup>th</sup> place out of 19.

Finally, the case of the United States deserves special mention. With the exception of Colombia, where it is rated highest with 70, it is in the middle of the table in the other three countries and always at a favorable level of affinity: Chile, eighth with 53; Mexico, seventh with 62; Peru, fourth with 60. Additionally, distrust in the US also predominates, except in the case of Colombia; in Mexico distrust in the United States exceeds trust (61% versus 25%), Peru (57% versus 35%) and Chile (53% versus 35%), while more Colombians trust (39%) than distrust (22%).

Apparently, the assessment of a country is significantly affected by the appraisal of said country's leader, that is, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero is identified with Spain, Hugo Chávez

with Venezuela and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva with Brazil, among others. The scale applied to evaluate countries was used and the people polled were asked about their perceptions of 12 North American, Latin American and European political leaders: the responses strengthen the conclusions regarding the opinions held about the countries in those regions as the decreasing order noted for countries was maintained.

As with the countries, there is significant coincidence in the positive and negative evaluations made by the people polled concerning leaders. The leaders best appraised consistently include Zapatero (Colombia, 62; Chile, 52; Mexico, 61; Peru, 56; always in second place), da Silva (Colombia, third with 59; Chile; second with 52; Mexico, third with 60; Peru, first with 62) and Chile's Michelle Bachelet (Colombia, fourth with 57; Chile, first with 60; Mexico, fifth with 58; Peru, third with 53), while those with the worst evaluation are always Chávez (Colombia, last with 34; Chile, second last 29; Mexico, last with 36; Peru, second last with 30) and Raúl Castro (Colombia, third last with 43; Chile, third last with 36; Mexico, third last with 46; Peru fourth-last with 39). Colombians, Chileans and Mexicans gave their own heads of State a higher rating (60, 74 and 67, respectively), while Peruvians ranked their leader in last place with 29 points.

As regards George W. Bush, there is considerable variation: Chile and Mexico put him in the last and second to last positions with 28 and 45 points, respectively, while Peru and Colombia put him half way down the table, 7<sup>th</sup> out of 11 and 4<sup>th</sup> out of 12, with 42 and 57 points, respectively.

There are also differences concerning knowledge about regional leaders. In general



### Averages in the leaders' thermometers

*Please measure your opinion of some of political leaders of the region. Use any number from 0 to 100; the higher the number, the more favorable your opinion of the leader. If you have no opinion or if you have never heard of the leader, please tell me.*

Colombia			Chile			Mexico			Peru		
Country	Degrees	Rank	Country	Degrees	Rank	Country	Degrees	Rank	Country	Degrees	Rank
Álvaro Uribe	74	1	Michelle Bachelet	60	1	Felipe Calderón	67	1	Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	62	1
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero	62	2	José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero	52	2	José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero	61	2	José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero	56	2
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	59	3	Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	52	2	Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	60	3	Michelle Bachelet	53	3
Michelle Bachelet	57	4	Felipe Calderón	43	4	Cristina Fernández	59	4	Álvaro Uribe	49	4
George Bush	57	4	Álvaro Uribe	42	5	Michelle Bachelet	58	5	Cristina Fernández	47	5
Felipe Calderón	54	6	Álvaro Colom	39	6	Álvaro Uribe	55	6	Felipe Calderón	44	6
Cristina Fernández	49	7	Evo Morales	37	7	Alan García	52	7	George Bush	42	7
Alan García	48	8	Alan García	36	8	Evo Morales	50	8	Raúl Castro	39	8
Álvaro Colom	44	9	Cristina Fernández	36	8	Álvaro Colom	50	8	Evo Morales	37	9
Raúl Castro	43	10	Raúl Castro	36	8	Raúl Castro	46	10	Hugo Chávez	30	10
Evo Morales	41	11	Hugo Chávez	29	11	George Bush	45	11	Alan García	29	11
Hugo Chávez	34	12	George Bush	28	12	Hugo Chávez	36	12	Álvaro Colom	NA	





terms, there is a high degree of ignorance about the leaders, with the exception of those who are at the forefront of international politics, particularly Chávez and Bush. The least-known heads of state are Cristina Fernández of Argentina and Álvaro Colom of Guatemala. The Brazilian Lula da Silva, the Chilean Michelle Bachelet, the Peruvian Alan García, the Colombian Álvaro Uribe, the Mexican Felipe Calderón and the Spaniard Rodríguez Zapatero are in the middle range, where there is knowledge of approximately 95% or more about them in their own country, identification by close to 2/3 in neighboring countries and 1/3 in geographically distant countries. Colombians are generally better informed about regional leaders, followed by the Chileans and Peruvians, with the Mexicans at the lowest average level of knowledge.

### *Evaluating relations with countries from the region*

In order to delve further into the public opinion concerning the relations of the four countries with the rest of the world, they were asked if they saw certain countries as friends, partners, rivals or threats. Of the four options, “friendship” generally prevailed.

The United States is one exception, with all the countries perceiving it more as a partner than a friend (Colombia, 52% versus 41%; Chile, 55% versus 32%; Mexico, 51% versus 28%; Peru, 42% versus 40%). The following exceptions were also reported: Mexico sees Canada as a friend and a partner in equal proportion (44% for both options); Chile regards China (61% versus 31%)

and Japan (57% versus 33%) more as partners than friends, which is also the case of Peru with China (42% versus 41%). Possibly due to historic and current confrontations, Chile and Peru consider themselves rivals (44% of the Peruvians and 30% the Chileans), while 30% (the most common option) of Colombians regard Venezuela as a threat (23% see it as a rival, 22% as a partner and another 22% as a friend).

There seems to be little relationship between affinity and “friendship” as the latter predominates in cases of both high and low affinity. Furthermore, neither term specifically implies that the relationship with the country in question is seen as strategic; it could be ventured that the countries categorized as partners are particularly important in economic terms for the nations in question, while those identified as rivals are neighbors with which relations have historically been strained and problematic. The most important friends for the four countries are nations in Latin America: for Colombia, they are Argentina, Peru, Brazil and Chile; for Chile it is Brazil; for Mexico they are Peru, Brazil, Chile and Argentina and for Peru, they are Argentina, Brazil and Colombia.

### *Limits to relations with the United States*

The United States plays a fundamental role within the region and this, of course, affects perceptions about the country. Knowing the attitudes towards the United States makes it easier to understand what kind of relations could exist between the super power and Latin America. We therefore need to ask whether there is a feeling of trust,



indifference or distrust towards the United States. As mentioned above, distrust predominates. 61% of Mexicans, 57% of Peruvians and 53% of Chileans distrust the United States. The most trusting are the Peruvians and Chileans (35% for both) compared with 25% in Mexico.

The other question concerns feelings of admiration, indifference or disdain for the United States. Unlike the the section on Trust above, here there is no common ground. Admiration is stronger than disdain for both the Peruvians (53% and 24%) and the Chileans (36% and 28%). Mexico is divided into thirds: 33% declare indifference, followed by 30% who express admiration and another 29% feel disdain. Colombia is dealt with separately because in the other three countries there were two questions comparing trust-indifference-distrust, on one hand and admiration-indifference-scorn on the other, and in Colombia they were compacted into one. In any event, the total of positive categories (39% trust and 16% admiration) outweighs the negative ones (22% distrust and 3% disdain).

Cross tabulations of the variables for trust and distrust in the United States with age show that, in all the countries, young people distrust the United States more, while the older group, especially those over 60, show a much higher degree of trust. This is particularly marked in Chile, followed by Colombia. Although 29% of Chileans and 33% of Colombians aged between 18 and 29 trust the United States, 52% and 51% of the populations in Chile and Colombia over 60 have faith in the US. Something similar happened in Mexico and Peru, albeit less decisively. Just 26% in Mexico and 32% in Peru aged between 18 and 29 have faith in the United States, while 29% of Mexicans and

36% of Peruvians older than 60 trust the US.

Despite the prevailing feeling of distrust in their relations with the United States, cooperation with this world power is approved in specific cases, such as fighting drug-trafficking. The degree of cooperation, however, varies considerably from one country to another. In the case of Colombia, unlike Mexico, this vision of the United States is much clearer. For example, 72% of Colombians support receiving financial aid from the United States to fight drug-trafficking and organized crime, compared with just 55% of Mexicans who agree. The question was not asked in Chile or Peru. As regards extradition, the interviewees were specifically asked whether they agreed that criminals hiding in the United States or in their own countries (Colombia, Mexico or Chile – the question was not asked in Peru) to avoid justice should be sent to the country where they committed the crime to be tried and punished. Although there is a clear majority in favor of extradition in all three cases (Mexico 58%, Colombia 65%, Chile 82%), there is a big difference in intensity from one country to another.

This cooperation, however, is never absolute because when they were asked how closely their country should work with the United States using a scale of 0 to 10 (where 0 is working alone and 10 means working very closely), both Mexicans and Chileans put the optimum level of cooperation at 6, whereas for Colombians it's 7.4. The rejection of unconditional cooperation with the United States in pragmatic questions is shown by the fact that 57% of Colombians and 61% of Mexicans disagree that their countries should make decisions jointly with the United



States to solve problems if this implies assuming commitments that they do not like. There are no data for Chile or Peru that show their opinions on this matter.

### ***Latin America: Level of attention and priority***

In order to determine how the priorities in the countries' relations to Latin America are articulated, and to find the likelihood of these intensifying in the future, it's useful to know which region is considered by the people interviewed as most worthy of attention, as well as analyzing their regional identities and their intensity..

This first question to be asked in this respect concerns the world region the interviewee's country should pay more attention to. In general, there are coincidences in the priorities. 42% in Colombia, 37% in Mexico and 32% in Chile have Latin America as the first choice, compared with 24% in Peru, which prefers Europe as a priority region (29%). Europe is the second choice for Chileans (30%) and Colombians (17%), while Mexico (30%) ranks North America in second place.

Although the priorities for relations are mostly centered on Latin America, interesting correlations appear when this is studied in greater detail. For example, for all the countries, the higher the education level, the greater the importance given to ties with Europe and Asia, but not to Latin America or North America. In Chile, 16% and 6% of those with no formal education say that Europe and Asia are, respectively, the regions deserving most attention. When going to a graduate level,

the percentages climb to 35% for Europe and 18% for Asia. A similar pattern is followed in Peru: 14% for Europe and 5% for Asia, which climbs to 28% and 26%, respectively, for college graduates. In Colombia, the change concerning Europe is 7% to 21%, and for Asia, 0% to 11%. Finally, in Mexico, 5% of those with no formal education opt for Europe, compared with 15% of college graduates, and the percentage rises from 1% to 5% for Asia.

Age also seems to be an important variable when opting for Europe. In Chile, in the 18 to 29 segment, 28% chose Latin America and another 28% went for Europe while Latin America predominates in the other age groups. In Peru, this is the only age segment that gives Europe priority (33%) over Latin America (19%). In both Colombia and Mexico, however, the Latin America option is stronger than Europe. In the case of Colombia, 40% go for Latin America and 19% for Europe, while in Mexico, 36% opt for the former and 9% for the latter.


Mexico could be a bridge between Latin America and North America because it is geographically in the latter region, but it has closer social, cultural and political ties with the former. Nevertheless, it is important to know how the rest of Latin America perceives Mexico, as this helps define what Latin America is in the collective imagination. In this regard, there is an interesting contrast between what Colombians and Chileans think about Mexicans. According the Mexicans, 58% claim to be more Latin American, while 28% feel more North American. The contrast is evident: 53% in Chile and 36% in Colombia regard Mexico as more North American than Latin American; for 39% of the Colombians




### Regions of the world by priority level

Which region of the world do you think COUNTRY should pay more attention to?


North America




Middle East




Latin America




Africa




Europe




Oceania



Asia



DK/NA





and 38% of the Chileans it is more Latin American. This question was not asked in Peru.

### *Scope for friendship and cooperation with Latin America*

In order to rank the Latin American countries in the region and the world, and to determine how many different Americas are perceived and which they are, the first question was about the importance of the country and its situation regarding Latin America and other countries in the region and, secondly, there was an analysis of the reactions in the event of an armed conflict.

In general, there is a high degree of optimism regarding the past and future of Latin America. A majority in all the countries think that Latin America is better now than 10 years ago and that it will be even better in a decade. Nevertheless, the intensity of the two answers varies. The Chileans (67%) give the highest score for the region's situation compared with 10 years ago, followed by Peruvians (51%), Colombians (48%) and Mexicans (42%). The order is repeated when the question is about the next decade: 61% of the Chileans think that Latin America will be better, followed by 54% of Peruvians, 45% of Colombians and 43% of Mexicans.

In all cases, there is an increasing relationship between the evaluation of the situation in the region and education. It could be said that the higher the level of schooling, the better the assessment of Latin America compared with 10 years ago. For example, 74% of the Chileans with a college degree think that the region is better, compared with 53% of those with no formal

education who think the same. The differences in opinion follow a very similar line in Colombia, albeit with different percentages: 38% of those with no formal education think that Latin America is better, whereas 56% of the college graduates share this opinion. Mexico is where the differences are smaller: 38% of those without schooling and 44% of the college graduates think along this line. In Peru, however, the difference is much more marked: 12% of those with no schooling think that the region is better, compared with 62% of college graduates.

When, instead of including the perception of the situation in the Americas 10 years ago, they are asked about the situation in 10 years time and this is cross-tabulated with the education, income and retrospective economic situation variables for the country, there is a positive correlation. Thus, in the four countries, the higher the education level, the better the assessment of the region's situation in the next 10 years. Similarly, the same relationship exists if said variable is crossed with the individual economic situation and the country's retrospective economic conditions, albeit to a lesser degree.

Perhaps one of the indications that the region will be better is evident in the perception that there will be more economic integration in the future. 81% of Colombians and 73% of Mexicans think so. This question was not asked in Peru or Chile.

One of the best ways of analyzing the extent of cooperation in the region is by looking at the aspirations of the people polled regarding their country's future in the region. To this end, the interviewees were asked how much they agreed that the country should be a leader, should




### Current situation in Latin America

### Future situation in Latin America


*In general, do you think Latin America is better or worse than 10 years ago?*

*In general, do you think Latin America will be better or worse 10 years from now?*


Better




Better




Worse




Worse




Same (spontaneous)




Same (spontaneous)



DK/NA



DK/NA





participate with other countries without trying to be the leader or should stand aside from most Latin American initiatives. Most of them opted for cooperation: Peru (58%), Colombia (53%), Chile (50%) and Mexico (46%). For 41% of the Mexicans, 39% of Chileans, 32% of Colombians and 30% of the Peruvians, regional leadership should be sought. The isolationist option never even reached 10%.

When relating this variable to education, it should be noted that although the option of being a regional leader never exceeded participating with other countries without being the leader, the higher the education level of the interviewee, the higher the percentage of those who claim the country should be a leader. No age relationship was noted however.

In the same vein as the above question, there were questions about the most influential country in the last 10 and in the next 10 years. The results indicate, one hand, a lack of consensus and on the other, excess nationalism. Thus, Mexicans (22%) and Chileans (22%) think that their country was the most influential in the region in the last decade, while the Colombians mention Venezuela (29%) and the Peruvians cite Chile (24%). Much more notably, however, in the next decade 29% of Chileans, 28% of Mexicans and 23% of Colombians think that their own countries will be the most influential in Latin America; Peruvians give this distinction to Brazil (25%), which as ranked second by Mexico (15%), Colombia (20%) and Chile (20%). Therefore, the only consensus concerns the past and future importance of Brazil.

This lack of initial consensus becomes clearer in the division between Brazil and Mexico when deciding who should occupy the United Nations

Security Council seat to represent Latin America. Most of Colombians (34%) and Chileans (45%) say that Brazil should take the possible new seat to represent the region in the Security Council, whereas the Mexicans (65%) think it should be Mexico and the Peruvians (51%) opt for Argentina. Brazil is second for Mexicans and Peruvians (21% and 11%) and Mexico is the second choice for Chileans and Colombians (19% and 21%).

The above takes on more weight when the interviewees are asked whether there is now more or less probability of an armed conflict in Latin America compared with 10 years ago. Evidently, national considerations condition the answers, and lead to major differences. There is agreement in Mexico and Colombia (41% and 50%) considering the likelihood of an armed conflict in the region, compared with Peru and Chile (57% and 52%) that deem it less probable.


Interesting results arise when we study the relations of this variable with others. For example, in Chile, Colombia and Mexico – to a lesser extent in Mexico than in the other two cases – the higher the level of education, the higher the percentage of people who say there is now more probability of conflict than 10 years ago. In Chile, 26% of those with no schooling say there is more likelihood of a conflict, while 42% of college graduates think the same. The changes are less marked in Colombia and Mexico. In the case of Colombia, 46% of those with no formal education say conflict is more probable, as do 55% of college graduates; in the Mexican case, the percentage climbs from 41% to 45%. Fewer college graduates (20%) in Peru, however, think a conflict is possible, compared with (36%) of those with a middle-level education.




### Role in Latin America

*Which of the following statements comes closest to what you think about COUNTRY's role in Latin America?*


*COUNTRY* should try to be the regional leader



*COUNTRY* should participate with other countries, without trying to be the leader



*COUNTRY* should stand aside from most of the efforts by Latin American countries



It is also necessary to mention the direct relation between conflict and the evaluation of the retrospective economic situation. In short, the worse the appraisal of the current situation compared with last year, the higher the percentage

of people who say conflict is more likely. The most substantial changes among the four countries is in Chile, with an increase from 30% (when the assessment is more positive) to 40% (when it is more negative). Something similar occurs, albeit to a lesser extent, in Peru (from 33% when it is more positive to 39% when it is more negative), in Colombia (from 47% to 52%) and in Mexico (from 39% to 44%).

Although there are divergences regarding the probability of an armed conflict, the reactions of said countries in the event of a conflict must be determined. For example, we asked how the country should react when confronted with a coup d'état. Most of the Colombians (41%), Chileans (40%) and Mexicans (39%) would rather wait for the international reaction and then take action. 35% in Colombia, 32% in Mexico and 26% in Chile would opt for publically condemning said actions, without breaking diplomatic relations. Peru differs from the other three. The majority (35%) chooses condemnation, followed by waiting for the international reaction (30%). Although the option of doing nothing got about the same level of support in the four cases (9% for Peru, 7% for the rest), there are differences of opinion about severing relations with the new government: 23% of Chileans, 17% of Peruvians, 15% of Mexicans and 10% of Colombians would do so.

In addition to the role to be taken by a country in the event of an armed conflict in the region, the interviewees were also asked which actor in the international community would be the most suitable to take action if there was an armed conflict in the region. Most of the population in the four countries thinks the UN would be the







### Probability of an armed conflict in Latin America

*Do you think there is now more or less probability of an armed conflict in Latin America compared with 10 years ago?*


More




Less



Same (spontaneous)



DK/NA



most suitable, although the majorities vary in intensity: 60% in Mexico, 53% in Chile, 40% in Peru and 34% in Colombia. Colombia and Mexico give greater weight to the regional blocs (24% and 11%, respectively) and the OAS (20% and 10%). The OAS is the second most popular in Peru (25%) and in Chile it ties with the regional groups (14%).

With all of this information, it is necessary to determine which country has been the most problematic in the last 10 years and which will cause the most conflicts in the next decade. Looking backwards, there is almost total consensus on which country has been the most problematic: Venezuela. This is the opinion of 69% of Colombians, 35% of Peruvians, 23% of Mexicans and 22% of Chileans. In the case of the latter, 24% think it was Colombia, which is shared by 22% of Mexicans and 11% of Peruvians. 27% of Peruvians say that Chile is the most problematic, while 15% of Chileans point at Peru.




As regards the future, there is a consensus on Venezuela: 65% in Colombia, 27% in Chile and 24% in Mexico (this question was not asked in Peru) say that it will be the most conflictive country in the next 10 years. The following countries are put much lower: 17% of Chileans think it will be Bolivia and Colombia; 13% of Colombians mention Ecuador and 17% of Mexicans think it could be Colombia. Interestingly, Brazil and Mexico, the largest countries in the region, are not seen as having been problematic in the last decade and probably will not be in the next 10 years, and were given scores of 2% or less in all case (except for Mexico, where 4% consider the country will be the most problematic).


### Measures taken after a coup

*If the army or an armed group in a Latin American country overthrew the democratically elected government, do you think COUNTRY should...?*


Sever diplomatic ties with new government




Publicly condemn the actions without severing diplomatic ties



Wait for the international reaction and then act



Do nothing







### Actions in the event of an armed conflict in Latin America

Who do you think should take measures to solve the problem in the event of an armed conflict in Latin America?


UN




Group of countries outside the region




OAS




Other




USA




Nobody



Group of countries in the region



DK/NA







## Conclusions

One of the best known arguments in the field of international relations is that geography determines the fate of countries that share the same space and face similar challenges. There are geographical differences in Latin America that make the region a plural and differentiated space where distinct visions about the relationship with the world coexist. In the midst of these differences, however, there is an air of common concern regarding a turbulent global environment and a shared interest in tapping a regional setting that offers opportunities. The data and results of this report on the perceptions and attitudes about the world in Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Peru exemplify the Latin American plurality in the current global situation.

As regards the differences in the perceptions of the world held by Colombians, Chileans, Mexicans and Peruvians, we found that although the levels of direct contact with the outside world are similar (except for a specific aspect in Chile, where migration and the receipt of remittances is considerably lower), the levels of interest, knowledge and international activism are higher in the three South American countries than in Mexico. The differences are more marked with Colombia and Chile than with Peru. These differences between the Latin America of the North and the one in the South can be seen in many of the questions throughout the survey, but

they are most evident in those that measure the seriousness of perceived threats and the priority level given to diverse foreign policy objectives. Generally speaking, the response percentages in Mexico are lower than in the other countries in these batteries of questions, which could mean that Mexicans have less intense opinions on these issues. Mexico, therefore, seems to be more withdrawn, uninterested and ambivalent about the world than are Colombia, Chile and Peru.

Nevertheless, when we take a closer and more detailed look at specific subjects in the international agenda, the gap in the general climate of public opinion between North America and South America disappears while, at the same time, points of convergence and divergence among the four nations that cross the two subregions emerge, which leads to a more complex scenario. In terms of regional identities, Mexico and Colombia differ from Chile and Peru in the preeminence of their Latin American identification and the South American or North American identities do not prevail in any of the four countries. In terms of cultural dissemination, the map is different because Peru and Mexico are more open than Colombia and Chile. Alignments once again shift concerning economic nationalism: Chileans and Peruvians favor globalization, yet Mexicans and Colombians distrust it. Nevertheless, in the identification of



rivalries and threats, the enmity between Chile and Peru is evident. As regards feelings towards the United States, distrust prevails in Chile, Mexico and Peru, whereas Colombia seems to be the exception because of its evaluation of the US.

In summary, based on the above reflection regarding the empirical evidence gleaned from the survey, it can be seen that the Latin Americans' mental map of the world does not entirely coincide with the map of geopolitical and economic realities. That is, the coincidences and divergences in perception cut across various traditional subregions that are often invoked by the economic integration and political cooperation projects which coexist in Latin America.

On the other hand, there is empirical evidence suggesting that there are areas where a Latin American sphere does exist, because in certain issues, the opinions and attitudes held in the four countries tend mostly to run along the same lines. The most noteworthy coincidences may be grouped into the four following large areas: a) nationalism and defensive attitudes concerning the outside world still exist in symbolic and cultural issues, such as national pride, rejection of foreigners and opposition to immigration, but not for economic matters like trade and foreign investment, where there is a favorable opinion of openness; b) there is a shared international agenda in which social, economic and security concerns and objectives that have a bearing on the population (including the environment, drug-trafficking, trade, protection of borders and fellow citizens) are preeminent over less tangible matters (like multilateralism, international cooperation, regional integration and furthering democracy); c) from the viewpoint of public opinion in these

countries, the Latin American region as a whole is seen with more optimism, tranquility and confidence than the rest of the world, and it is therefore an anchor and a priority in relations with the outside world; and d) affinities for developed or economically successful countries (Canada, Spain, Germany, Japan and China) tend to be stronger than for their own Latin American neighbors, with a consensus regarding those with the lowest affinity (Venezuela, El Salvador and Cuba), while all the countries agree in their positive assessments of the region's leaders (Lula da Silva, Rodríguez Zapatero and Bachelet) and their negative evaluations (Chávez and Castro).

After analyzing the similarities and differences of the four Latin American countries included in this study, it is necessary to determine the extent and depth of the common patterns found in the attitudes of their populations in order to make more general conclusions. Beyond the historic and contextual condition imposed in the mental map of people when they are citizens of or residents in a given country, it is necessary to determine the importance of socioeconomic characteristics and individual demographics in forging attitudes about the world. The data suggest, in general, that age, education level and, to a lesser extent, income, play a very important role in shaping certain aspects of how people see the world.

In all four countries young people, college graduates and those who are economically well-off are the sectors of society that are more open to the outside world in terms of knowledge, contact, interest, identity, inclination to cultural change, proclivity to international participation, multilateral commitment, sympathy for free trade and foreign investment. Disinformation,



lack of interest, localism, passivity, shunning multilateral aspects and economic and cultural nationalism, however, are more marked in older adults, the less educated and those who do not make enough money to cover their needs. It is therefore feasible to expect that as social conditions improve in Latin American countries, the probability of greater internationalism in the population will increase.

The above conclusion, however, must be qualified. The data collected by the survey also suggest that, in Latin America socio-demographic factors do not sufficiently explain other aspects of social orientation to the outside world. These perceptions seem to be more closely linked to symbolic, cultural or ideological variables. The most important case concerns attitudes to foreigners. No significant differences were found in the four countries in the different age groups and education and income levels regarding the rejection of foreigners and immigration. In this respect, they are social perceptions that are generalized in Latin America.

Finally, one of the most important conclusions derived from the results of this study is that when assessing the government's performance, the population makes the evaluation with a degree of independence from educational levels, age and income, and according to the kind of public policy in question. It should be noted that socio-demographic variables tend to have less bearing on social perceptions regarding the government's performance than when dealing with general orientations towards the world. That is, young or older people, with or without formal education, and the rich and poor, may be equally critical of certain public policies while they approve of the

government's actions in other fields. The public distinguishes and discriminates various social spheres of government policy, especially when dealing with areas that affect the population in general and generate social goods like education, public security and foreign policy. This finding has important implications because it sends a very clear message to the political leaders who are responsible for running the government in that the population is concerned about the concrete results evident from the government's actions and policies.

## Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning
<b>AIDS</b>	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
<b>CCGA</b>	Chicago Council on Global Affairs
<b>CIDE</b>	Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
<b>COMEXI</b>	Mexican Council for International Affairs
<b>DK/NA</b>	Don't know / No answer
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FARC</b>	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
<b>FIFA</b>	Federation International de Football Association
<b>ICC</b>	International Criminal Court
<b>IFE</b>	Federal Electoral Institute
<b>INEGI</b>	National Institute of Statistics and Geography
<b>ITAM</b>	Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de Mexico
<b>MERCOSUR</b>	Southern Common Market
<b>MFA</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>NAFTA</b>	North America Free Trade Agreement
<b>NGOS</b>	Non-governmental Organizations
<b>OAS</b>	Organization of American States
<b>PSU</b>	Primary Sampling Units
<b>SPP</b>	Security and Prosperity Agreement of North America
<b>SSM</b>	Secondary Sampling Units
<b>TSM</b>	Tertiary Sampling Units
<b>UN</b>	United Nations Organization
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>USA</b>	United States of America
<b>WTO</b>	World Trade Organization



## METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

### Colombia

#### Summary table

<b>Target population</b>	Colombian citizens over 18 years old residing anywhere within the national boundaries.
<b>Size of sample</b>	1500 people
<b>Data Collection technique</b>	Face-to-face personal interviews in private homes.
<b>Margin of error</b>	+/-3.0 for data referring to the entire sample.
<b>Date of survey</b>	October 6th to October 29th, 2008

personalized collection system was used, with in-house interviews as well as follow-up interviews over the telephone by supervisors to 20% of the homes sampled.

The sampling framework used was the DANE map for each of the selected departments. The sampling was stratified and multi-tiered where, in stage one, municipalities from different areas of the country were identified; in stage two blocks, proportional to social strata and rural corrections, were selected, and in the final stage homes were selected randomly from within these segments.

A total of 1500 households were interviewed, calculated to a level of confidence of 95% for estimates and an expected margin of error of +/- 3%. This sample size is representative at the regional and department level, but not at the municipal level. Table 1 shows the number of surveys applied in each of the municipalities visited.

Field work was carried out between the sixth and the 29th of October, 2008. In order to collect the data, work groups were organized in the cities of Bogota, Medellin, Cali, Barranquilla, Cartagena and Pasto, from where survey-takers travelled to reach every location in the sample. A



**Table 1 . Sample size by department**

Department	Municipality	Urban surveys	Rural surveys
<b>Atlántico</b>	Barranquilla	30	
	Soledad	10	
	Sabanagrande	10	
	Baranoa	10	
	Puerto Colombia	10	
<b>Bolívar</b>	Cartagena	20	
	Villanueva	10	
	Turbaco	10	
	Arjona	10	10
<b>Magdalena</b>	Santamarta	10	
	Ciénaga	10	
	Pueblo viejo	10	10
<b>Cesar</b>	Valledupar	10	10
	San Diego	10	
<b>Guajira</b>	Dibuya	10	10
<b>Córdoba</b>	Montería	10	
	San Pelayo	10	10
	Cerete	10	10
<b>Sucre</b>	Sincelejo	10	
	Sanpues	10	10
<b>Cauca</b>	Popayán	10	10
	Santander Quilichao	10	10
<b>Valle</b>	Cali	50	10
	Yumbo	20	
	Jamundi	20	
	Dagua	20	10
	La Cumbre	20	
<b>Nariño</b>	Pasto	20	
	Chachagui	10	10
	La Florida	10	10

Department	Municipality	Urban surveys	Rural surveys
<b>Putumayo</b>	Mocoa	10	
<b>Antioquia</b>	Medellín	60	
	Bello	20	10
	Envigado	20	10
	Itagui	20	
	Sabaneta	20	10
	Copacabana	20	
	San Pedro	10	10
	<b>Choco</b>	El Carmen	10
<b>Santander</b>	Bucaramanga	10	
	Lebrija	20	
	Giron	10	10
	Florida blanca	10	10
<b>Norte de Santander</b>	Cúcuta	10	
	El Zulia	10	10
	San Cayetano	10	
<b>Cundinamarca</b>	Bogotá	270	
	Faca	10	
	Madrid	10	
	Zipacon	10	10
	Cajica	10	10
	Sopo	10	10
<b>Boyacá</b>	Tunja	10	10
	Combita	10	10
<b>Casanare</b>	Yopal	20	
	Aguazul	10	
<b>Meta</b>	Villavicencio	10	
	Acacias	10	
<b>Huila</b>	Neiva	10	
	Rivera	10	10
<b>Tolima</b>	Ibagué	10	
	Robira	10	10
	Cajamarca	10	
<b>Caldas</b>	Manizales	10	
	Villa María	10	
	Neira	10	10
<b>Risaralda</b>	Pereira	10	
	Dosquebradas	10	10
	Santa Rosa de cabal	10	
<b>Quindío</b>	Armenia	10	
	Calarca	10	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1210</b>	<b>290</b>



## Chile

### Summary table

<b>Target population</b>	Chilean citizens 18 years or older residing in urban or rural private homes.
<b>Size of Sample</b>	1574 people
<b>Data Collection Technique</b>	Personal 'Face-to- face' interviews in private homes.
<b>Margin of Error</b>	+/- 2.9 for data referring to the whole sample
<b>Date of survey</b>	From November 3rd to December 3rd, 2008

- Universal: Population over 18 living in private households, urban and rural.
- 319 communes (n=342) 98,3% total population according to census figures.
- Sample of 1574 people (Mahalanobis-Deming Probabilistic.) No replacements and an estimate of 375 per region

1. Northern Macro-Region: Regions 1, 2, 3 and 4 (n=403)
2. Central Macro-Region: Regions 5, 6 and 7 (n=383)
3. Southern Macro-Region: Regions 8, 9 and 10 (n=393)
4. Metropolitan Macro-Region: Metropolitan Region (n=395)

Maximum error by region: 5,5

Maximum sampling error: +/-2.9 % (95% confidence level).



Table with sampling error margins at a national confidence level of 95%

Estimated percentage by the sample (point estimates)	Margin of error
5%	±1.3
10%	±1.7
15%	±2.1
20%	±2.3
30%	±2.6
40%	±2.8
50%	±2.9
60%	±2.8
70%	±2.6
80%	±2.3
85%	±2.1
90%	±1.7
95%	±1.3

**To minimize errors:**

- (a) Structured questionnaires were used and previously tested in approximately 50 interviews, 30 in urban areas and 20 in rural areas, prior to commencing definitive field work in order to avoid structural errors in their design or wording.
- (b) Interviews were personal and took place at the subject’s own home. Interviews were conducted by teams of trained survey takers (especially re-trained for this survey)
- (c) Up to 4 attempts were made to complete each interview – the initial attempt and up to 3 follow-up visits if needed until the selected person for a particular household was located.
- (d) After 4 failed attempts at an occupied household, it was marked as ‘not taken’.
- (e) In order to maintain the probabilistic nature of the sample these cases were not replaced. Rather, additional sub-samples, held as a reserve, were used to obtain the desired sample size for each Macro-region.
- (f) Randomly selected unoccupied homes were not replaced for the reasons outlined above.
- (g) Up to 30% of each survey taker’s work received oversight in the form of follow-up visits.
- (h) 100% of questionnaires were submitted to manual editing to verify the internal coherence



of the answers and, in case of doubt, the appropriate measures were taken.

### *Logistic Notes*

Survey taker's training and instruction:

Metropolitan Macro Region: October 30th 2008

Northern Macro Region: October 31<sup>st</sup>, 2008

Central Macro Region: November 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2008

Southern Macro Region: November 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2008

Fieldwork

November 3<sup>rd</sup> to December 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2008

Data coding and input

November 22<sup>nd</sup> to December 4<sup>th</sup>, 2008

Data input validation

December 4<sup>th</sup> to December 6<sup>th</sup>, 2008.

Processing and inflator introduction.

December 6th to December 8th, 2008

## Mexico

### Summary table

<b>Target population</b>	Mexicans, 18 or older, residing in any state in national territory
<b>Target population</b>	2400 persons
<b>Data Collection technique</b>	Personal "face-to-face" interviews in private homes
<b>Sample error</b>	+/-2.0 for data referring to the entire sample
<b>Survey date</b>	August 14 to September 6, 2008

A representative sample of the national population (18 or older and residing anywhere in the Mexican Republic) of 2400 interviewees was used.

The size of the sample made it possible to analyze the results at both a national and regional level. This, the stratification of results by region was as follows:

1. Northern region: Baja California, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Sonora and Tamaulipas.
2. Southern region: Campeche, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco and Yucatán.
3. Central region: Aguascalientes, Baja California Sur, Colima, Distrito Federal (Mexico City), Durango, Estado de México (State of Mexico), Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Michoacán, Morelos, Nayarit, Puebla, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Tlaxcala, Veracruz and Zacatecas.

The size of the sample and the errors are distributed as follows:

Domain	Sample size	Theoretical margin of error
North	730	+/- 3.7
South	480	+/- 4.5
Center	1180	+/- 2.9
National (entire sample)	2400	+/- 2.0



The electoral sections of the country according to the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) were considered as the reference sample structure and the updated data from the last federal election (2006) were incorporated. The electoral sections were the Primary Sampling Units (PSU) for the multiphase sampling model. As a first selection stage, the PSU were ordered by regions and states in terms of the number of voters registered in each one, to later generate a *commencement seed* at random to generate the first conglomerate of PSU. After this, a systematic criterion was applied to generate the other conglomerates until obtaining all the commencement points necessary to complete the sample required. Ten interviews were made in each PSU selected. In the second phase of the sampling, 2 blocks (*manzanas*) of each electoral section were chosen; these blocks were the Secondary Sampling Units (SSU). The number of interviews carried out in each SSU varied, depending on geographical conditions and urban distribution. The rural percentage in the sample was 27.8%, that is, commencement points (640 interviews).

The SSU were chosen systematically, in terms of household densities in each block of the *barrio*, *colonia* and *community* where the interviews were held. In order to capture the variety of opinions within an interview zone, an effort was made to ensure that the SSU selected were sufficiently far apart within the PSU (electoral sections). The third phase of the sampling was the selection of households of tertiary sampling units (TSU); each TSU was selected by following a systematic method in terms of the household density of each SSU (block). A single person who satisfied

the sampling requirements (18 or older and residing at the domicile) was polled in each TSU. These people were chosen at random with a final quota adjustment and a population distribution parameter by gender and age as a result of the II INEGI Housing and Population Census in 2005.

The interviews were applied from August 14 to September 6, 2008. All the interviews were applied face-to-face in the households selected during the sampling process. There was only one interview per household selected. The average interview application time was 30 minutes.

Some 38 survey takers, 10 field work supervisors, 6 coders, 8 entry clerks, 2 analysts and a project supervisor were involved in the interview process.

The coding, entry and processing of the information was carried out from September 1 to 30, 2008. The resulting estimates of the database are adjusted by gender and age, while taking the results of the INEGI Census of 2005 as a parameter. The results at a nationwide level are adjusted by the population weight of each regional stratus.





## PERU

### Summary table

<b>Target population</b>	Peruvian citizens of 18 years or older of all levels of income, residing in the country's major cities
<b>Size of sample</b>	1235 people
<b>Data Collection technique</b>	'Face-to-face' personal interviews in private homes.
<b>Margin of error</b>	+/-2.77 for data referring to the entire sample
<b>Date of survey</b>	September 5th through 8, 2008

### *1. General survey information*

- 1.1. Type of investigation: Quantitative study  
Opinion Poll
- 1.2. Technique of study: Direct personal interviews in selected households
- 1.3. Description: Elaboration of a National Opinion. Survey on Peru's relations with other countries.

### *2. Sample design*

- 2.1. Field of Study: Men and Women over 18 years of age of all levels of income residing in the country's major cities.
- 2.2. Geography: 74 districts in 15 urban provinces belonging to 14 regions of the country. (See table page 89).



THE AMERICAS AND THE WORLD

Department	Province	Districts
<b>Lima</b>	Lima	Cercado de Lima, Ate, Barranco, Breña, Carabayllo, Chorrillos, Comas, El Agustino, Independencia, Jesús María, La Molina, La Victoria, Lince, Los Olivos, Magdalena del Mar, Miraflores, Puente Piedra, Rímac, San Borja, San Luis, San Juan de Lurigancho, San Juan de Miraflores, San Martín de Porres, San Miguel, Santa Anita, Santiago de Surco, Surquillo, Villa El Salvador, Villa María del Triunfo
<b>Callao</b>	Callao	Callao, Bellavista, Carmen de la Legua, La Perla, Ventanilla
<b>Ancash</b>	Santa	Chimbote, Nuevo Chimbote
<b>Arequipa</b>	Arequipa	Arequipa, Alto Selva Alegre, Cayma, Cerro Colorado, Jacobo Hunter, Mariano Melgar, Miraflores, Paucarpata, Socabaya, Yanahuara, José Luis Bustamante y Rivero
<b>Cusco</b>	Cusco	Cusco, San Sebastián, Santiago, Wanchaq
<b>Ica</b>	Ica	Ica, Parcota
<b>Huánuco</b>	Huánuco	Huánuco, Amarilis
<b>Junín</b>	Huancayo	Huancayo, Chilca, El Tambo
<b>La Libertad</b>	Trujillo	Trujillo, El Porvenir, La Esperanza, Víctor Larco Herrera
<b>Lambayeque</b>	Chiclayo	Chiclayo, José Leonardo Ortiz, La Victoria
<b>Loreto</b>	Maynas	Iquitos, Punchana, Belén, San Juan Bautista
<b>Piura</b>	Piura	Piura, Castilla
<b>Puno</b>	Puno	Puno
	San Román	Juliaca
<b>San Martín</b>	San Martín	Tarapoto



The provinces the interviews were held in gather together 49, 41% of Peru's total population.

2.3. Date of Survey: Between September 5th and September 8th, 2008.

2.4. Sampling Framework::In Metropolitan Lima and Callao blocks were selected using the 2004 INEI digital map for Metropolitan Lima's 31 districts and Callao's 6. Those districts which didn't form part of the sampling Framework in Lima were: Chaclacayo, Lurigancho, Cieneguilla and the resort districts located north and south of the city. The 2005 INEI census map was used for fieldwork in provincial cities.

2.5. Size of Sample: 1.235 people interviewed with a margin of error:  $\pm 2,77\%$  and a confidence level of 95%, assuming a 50%-50% rate of heterogeneity, under the assumption of simple random sampling.

2.6. Sampling procedure:: Sampling was probabilistic, multi-tiered and by conglomerates. In the first stage a computer-generated selection of sample blocks was made; in the second stage a selection of households was chosen through systematic sampling.

In Metropolitan Lima and Callao, 8 surveys were taken per selected Primary Sampling Unit. In other cities within the country 5 surveys were taken per Sampling Unit.

A systematic sampling of households was undertaken for every block following the procedures outlined below:

- The systematic or constant jump, obtained by dividing the total number of households in each block by the 8/5 surveys to be taken was calculated using a computer. This number determines the interval between selected homes in each block.
  - A computer was used to calculate the Starting Household, a random number between 1 and the constant number. This number determines the first household within each block to be surveyed.
  - To cover each block, the Survey taker stood in any corner of the selected block and began their rounds moving in a clockwise direction.
  - In case of absence or rejection, selected households were replaced with the adjacent household. Likewise, if not enough surveys were lifted within a single block the survey taker moved on to the adjacent block, located within the same sampling area.
- 2.7. Work with quotas: Selection of interviewees was made through age and gender quotas, determined by the demographic distribution of the population. In Lima, a quota table was used to determine the distribution of the 8 initial surveys: 4 men and 4 women, 3 people between 18 and 29 years old, 3 people between 30 and 44 and 2 people 45 or older.



- In other major cities, quotas were randomly allocated by computer for each primary sampling unit.

2.8. Weighting: Results were weighed as a function of the population for each city in the country, as given by the 2005 census results provided by the INEI. For Metropolitan Lima and Callao, the weighting also incorporated the weight of each zone in the city (see next table).

### ***3. Field work and oversight***

3.1. On-desk supervision: 100% of surveys were revised by hand to ensure each questionnaire was filled in properly. In this stage it became possible to identify and correct mistakes, as well as to recover misplaced data.

3.2. Field supervision: As well as an on-desk revision, a field supervision process was also undertaken. This implied follow-up interviews with previously surveyed people to verify that the data gathered was authentic and truthful. To do this a field oversight card was designed to help the supervisor verify the interview subject's general information, (name, age, profession, etc.) the location/address where the interview was conducted, its duration and that the correct selection methodology was followed. This oversight procedure took the form of follow-up visits in the days following the lifting of the survey to at least 30% of polls taken and in at least one area, randomly selected for each one of the interviewers.

3.3. Survey takers: Previously selected and trained students from various faculties at the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Peru took part as survey takers in Lima and Callao.

Surveys elsewhere in the country were lifted with support from local survey takers with whom the IOP-PUCP has worked in previous occasions.

### ***4. Data processing***

4.1. Digital input Data from the surveys was entered into a specially programmed data base, with validity checks and alert messages in case of discrepancies. To insure the quality of the data a double input process was followed, which allowed us to evaluate the input procedure and correct any possible mistakes.



### **Field Work**

Colombia

Leonardo García (CEDE, Universidad de los Andes)

Chile

Miguel Angel López (Universidad de Chile and KAMPO S.A.)

Mexico

Pablo Parás and Carlos López (DATA)

Peru

Fernando Tuesta (Institute of Public Opinion, PUCP)

### **Graphic Design**

Antonio Ruano

### **Editing**

Javier López y Díaz

### **Translation**

Martha Alicia Bravo

*Intertraducciones*

Graham McSkimmings

*Intertraducciones*

[www.intertraducciones.com](http://www.intertraducciones.com)

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