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dc.contributor.advisor Dr. Luis de la Calle
dc.creator Macías Medellín, Martín
dc.date.issued 2020
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/11651/4276
dc.description.abstract When does vioelence help dissidents succeed? In this study, I investigate the conditions under which violence can help dissidents to achieve concessions from rulers. I reframe this problem of concessions as a commitment problem for dissdents. By distinguishing mixed campaigns where moderate and radical groups share the conflict terrain, I argue that violence works when moderates avoid coordionation with radicals. For such mixed but uncoordinated campaigns, violence raises the costs for rulers by provoking instability and by increasing the public sopport for moderates. Moreover, as moderates can plausibly deny their links with radicals, they become credible in their promises increasing rulers' utility to concede. I also explore how, conditional on this lack of coordination, higher levels of violence can be useful in they significantly raise the costs of rulers for not giving in and if, along with more violence, rulers acquire more options to co-opt dissident groups. The empirical analysis shows first that mixed uncoordinated campaigns are more likely to succeed that violent ones, although not more successful than coordinated campaigns. Second, it shows that when moderates avoid coordination and violent and non-violent actions simultaneously increase, frontal violence increases, or both violence and the number of groups increase, uncoordinated campaigns are more likely to succeed.
dc.format application/PDF
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher El Autor
dc.rights Con fundamento en los artículos 21 y 27 de la Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor y como titular de los derechos moral y patrimonial, otorgo de manera gratuita y permanente al Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C. y a su Biblioteca autorización para que fije la obra en cualquier medio, incluido el electrónico, y la divulguen entre sus usuarios, profesores, estudiantes o terceras personas, sin que pueda percibir por tal divulgación una contraprestación.
dc.title Shared terrains: when and why violent resistance works
dc.type Tesis de maestría
dc.accessrights Acceso abierto
dc.rights.license Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional CC BY-NC-ND
thesis.degree.grantor Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
thesis.degree.name Maestría en Ciencia Política
dc.relation.dataset https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/MHOXDV
dc.relation.dataset https://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/global-terrorism-database-gtd
dc.relation.dataset https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/?lang=en
dc.relation.dataset http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/
dc.relation.dataset https://sites.google.com/site/joseantoniocheibub/datasets/democracy-and-dictatorship-revisited
dc.relation.dataset https://www.v-dem.net/es/


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