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Now showing items 1-6 of 6
On the existence of sharecropping
(Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, División de Economía, 2011)
When tenancy contracts are subject to ex-post limited liability, it is optimal for the landlord to offer the tenant the entire crop share since full incentive leads to higher production even in the bad state of the nature, ...
A note on bargaining over complementary pieces of information in networks
(Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, División de Economía, 2011)
We consider two specific network structures, the star and the line, and
study the set of bilateral alternating-offers bargaining procedures for the
pairs of connected agents. Agents have complementary information ...
An assignment model of monitored finance
(Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, División de Economía, 2014)
We develop an incentive contracting model of firm formation. Entrepreneurs of private equity firms who differ in net worth are required to borrow from institutional investors in order to finance start up projects. Investors, ...
Competition and bank risk taking in a differentiated oligopoly
(Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, División de Economía, 2014)
We re-examine the relationship between the degree of deposit market competition and bank
risk taking in a model where banks compete in differentiated deposit services. When banks
invest their deposits directly, as has ...
Incentives and competition in microfinance
(Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, División de Economía, 2014)
We develop a model of competition among socially motivated microfinance instituions (MFIs), where the MFIs offer repayment-based incentive contracts to credit agents. The agents gather information regarding a borrower, and ...
Principal-agent assignment: implications for incentives and income distribution in tenancy relationships
(Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, División de Economía, 2010)
I analyze a problem of assigning heterogeneous agents (tenants) to heterogeneous principals (landlords), where partnerships are subject to moral hazard in effort choice. The agents differ in wealth endowment and the ...