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Obedience under normative conflict: a postconventional agency model of Milgram's experiment
(Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, División de Economía, 1997)
We model normative behavior when there is normative conflict between an agent and her context. We extended the postconventional agency model, in which norm-guided behavior may depend on context and incentives, by endowing ...
Democracia y desarrollo para México
(Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, División de Economía, 2012)
Desarrollamos un punto de vista que sintetiza las corrientes principales del pensamiento económico: neoclásica, keynesiana y marxista, así como las conclusiones de la teoría moderna del crecimiento económico, discursos que ...
Justice and efficiency in economic relations: explaining collaboration and conflict in the firm and choice in ultimatum games
(Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, División de Economía, 1998)
Individual preferences are sensitivic to particular economic interections. Complex psychological phenomena affec the meaning and ordering of their objects according to different institucional patterns and strategical ...
Negotiation when the size of the pie depends on how it is cut
(Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, División de Economía, 1997)
Rubinstein’s (1982) infinitely repeated ultimatum game between two players provides a paradigm to analyze negotiation. We extend his análisis to the case in which the benefits to be distributed depend on the result of the ...