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Obedience under normative conflict: a postconventional agency model of Milgram's experiment
(Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, División de Economía, 1997)
We model normative behavior when there is normative conflict between an agent and her context. We extended the postconventional agency model, in which norm-guided behavior may depend on context and incentives, by endowing ...
Negotiation when the size of the pie depends on how it is cut
(Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, División de Economía, 1997)
Rubinstein’s (1982) infinitely repeated ultimatum game between two players provides a paradigm to analyze negotiation. We extend his análisis to the case in which the benefits to be distributed depend on the result of the ...