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Sectoral public power and endogenous growth
(Centro de Investigación y Docencia Ecónomicas, 1997)
We study growth in an economy composed of sectors producing specific goods with advantage under fragmented competition. The government allocates public inputs. Sectorial political power defines government objectives and ...
Obedience under normative conflict: a postconventional agency model of Milgram's experiment
(Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, División de Economía, 1997)
We model normative behavior when there is normative conflict between an agent and her context. We extended the postconventional agency model, in which norm-guided behavior may depend on context and incentives, by endowing ...
Negotiation when the size of the pie depends on how it is cut
(Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, División de Economía, 1997)
Rubinstein’s (1982) infinitely repeated ultimatum game between two players provides a paradigm to analyze negotiation. We extend his análisis to the case in which the benefits to be distributed depend on the result of the ...