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Transitions from Electoral Authoritarianism

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Abstract

The recent comparative literature on authoritarian institutions has been tracing the consequences formal institutions bear on the longevity of authoritarian rule. Striving to explain transitions from electoral authoritarian regimes, the present paper shifts emphasis from the presence of institutions (multiparty elections) to the political dynamics and structural contexts that surround them. Under which conditions, it asks, are authoritarian multiparty elections more likely to reproduce the authoritarian status quo? Under which conditions are they prone to produce democratizing outcomes? And under which are they vulnerable to provoke interruptions of the electoral cycle? Drawing upon the larger literature on democratic transitions, the paper proposes a simple (non-formal) decision-theoretic framework that emphasizes the pivotal role of electoral uncertainty, vital interests, and repressive capacities. In its empirical part, it explores the sources of electoral authoritarian transition trajectories on the basis an original dataset that covers (almost) the universe of authoritarian elections in the world from 1980 through 2002.

Resumen

Elecciones multipartidistas tienden a aumentar la longevidad de regímenes autoritarios, pero también contienen el potencial de provocar cambios democratizadores y rupturas autoritarias. El presente documento examina tanto las condiciones estructurales como las dinámicas políticas que influyen en las trayectorias de regímenes electorales autoritarios. Apoyado en la literatura comparada sobre transiciones democráticas, el documento enfatiza tres factores explicativos: la incertidumbre electoral, los intereses vitales de los actores y las capacidades coercitivas del Estado. En su parte empírica, explora las fuentes de diferentes trayectorias de régimen basado en una base de datos original de elecciones autoritarias en el mundo (1980-2002).

Introduction

In electoral authoritarian (EA) regimes, multiple parties compete for positions of national state power in regular elections that transgress democratic minimum standards in severe and systematic ways. These regimes offer power-holders better prospects of political survival than democratic elections as well as better prospects of physical survival than military regimes.¹ Yet, while authoritarian elections help governments to tighten their grip on power, they also contain the potential of loosening the chains of authoritarian control. Actually, much of the contemporary literature on “authoritarianism by elections” has been focusing on the dynamics of “democratization by elections.”² In addition, in rare cases, electoral autocracies suffer from regressions and terminate in civil war, military dictatorship, or some other kind of “closed” authoritarian regime.

Under which conditions, this paper asks, are authoritarian elections more likely to reproduce the authoritarian status quo? Under which conditions are they prone to produce democratizing outcomes? And under which are they vulnerable to provoke interruptions of the electoral cycle? From the viewpoint of electoral authoritarian rulers, the question is under which conditions such rulers are more likely to resist regime change, to accept democratization, or to take the (either forced or voluntary) exit route into non-electoral dictatorship. In its analytical sections, the paper develops a simple (non-formal) decision-theoretic framework that emphasizes the pivotal role of electoral uncertainty, vital interests, and repressive capacities. In its empirical part, it explores the sources of electoral authoritarian transition trajectories on the basis an original dataset that covers (almost) the universe of authoritarian elections in the world from 1980 through 2002.

Decision Parameters

Whether focusing on stability (the usual outcome) or change (the exceptional outcome), the literature on electoral authoritarianism rests upon the assumption that multiparty elections change the “game” of authoritarian governance in a significant manner. They create new actors, resources, and discourses, new restraints and new opportunities. In structural terms, electoral authoritarian regimes differ from “closed” regimes as much as from democratic regimes. However, though recognizing their structural

¹ See Cox (2007) and Schedler (2009b). On the impact of elections (with or without the admission of multiple parties) on authoritarian longevity, see also Gandhi (2008), Gandhi and Przeworski (2007), and Magaloni (2008) [add references].

² See Schedler (2002a) and (2006c), Lindberg (2006b) and (2009a), Bunce and Wolchik (2009), Greene (2007), Howard and Roessler (2006), and Pop-Eleches and Robertson (2008) [add references].

distinctiveness, this paper emphasizes one generic similarity between EA regimes and all other types of regime: the broad parameters of political actors' security and utility calculations.

The by now immense literature on political regime dynamics covers the entire spectrum of regimes as well as the entire spectrum of possible outcomes of regime struggles. Examining varieties of democracy as well as varieties of autocracy, historians and comparative scholars have studied democratic breakdown as well as the demise of authoritarian rule, democratic stability as well as the consolidation of authoritarian rule. The struggle over basic rules of the political game unfolds in different manners in different contexts. Yet, from a decision-theoretic perspective, the abstract calculus of regime supporters as well as opponents looks structurally similar across contexts. Whatever theories or methods they espouse, when comparative students of regimes try to comprehend the strategic logic of participants in regime struggles, they tend to center their attention on a small handful of fundamental decision parameters.

1. *The probability of change*: Except for “ideologically” motivated actors (mostly discounted by a literature that places its bets on the civilizing force of material self-interest), the ball of regime change only gets rolling if the game of regime change promises to lead anywhere. As long as a regime looks solid like a rock, authoritarian governments have few reasons to make concessions, and opposition actors have weak motives to get themselves into trouble.
2. *The stakes of politics*: The intensity of regime struggles depends on the expected costs and benefits of regime change. To the extent that their economic, physical, and political wellbeing depends on their continuing access to state power, authoritarian governments will resist regime change.
3. *The probability of repression*: In the last instance, the outcome of regime struggles depends on the control of state violence. As long as authoritarian governments are willing and able to mobilize state agencies of repression against challenges to their continuity, they are likely to prevail (except for the intervention of external powers).

How strong is the regime? How vulnerable? How much do opposition actors gain in the event of regime change? How much do regime actors lose? How strong are their institutional capacities of repression and how firm their grip on security forces? These are standard questions in the comparative analysis of regime stability and change. As they apply to the entire range of regimes, from totalitarianism to liberal democracy, we may also expect them to apply to electoral authoritarian regimes. Parting from these basic concerns about

institutional stability, actor interests, and the control of violence, I wish to introduce one core hypothesis and two complications. The core hypothesis: The key that unlocks the door to electoral authoritarian regime change is the creation of electoral uncertainty. Its complications: If the stakes of politics are high, insecure incumbents will defend the status quo more ferociously. If their repressive capacities are high, their chances of defensive success are fairly high.

Transitional Uncertainties

Uncertainties about the strength of basic political institutions are fundamental to the study of political regimes. The emergence of uncertainty is the defining feature of democratic transition, its recession the defining trait of democratic consolidation. Transitions begin when the prevailing rules of the authoritarian game start looking shaky. Processes of consolidation advance to the extent that democracy starts looking secure. In transitions, regimes lose their secure monopolistic position as “the only game in town” and the irruption of competing political games turns feasible. In processes of consolidation, regimes acquire such a monopoly, crowding out all viable competitors.³

The sources of uncertainty are manifold. Generally speaking, threats to regime survival may be either vertical, horizontal, or external. Vertical threats originate from below, the citizenry, horizontal or lateral threats from within, inside the ruling coalition, and external threats from without the national borders. Mass demonstrations and popular rebellions are typical instances of vertical threats, palace coups and military coups typical manifestations of lateral threats, and war and covert intervention by foreign governments paradigmatic instances of external threats. Given the empirical regularity that “most of the time the most serious challenge to dictators’ survival in office comes from high level allies, not from regime opponents” (Geddes, 2005: 6), much of the literature on the political economy of dictatorship focuses on horizontal, rather than either vertical or external threats.⁴ In a similar fashion, studies of democratic transitions have long been emphasizing the critical role lateral conflicts within the regime (elite splits) play in triggering the dynamics of regime change. As Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter famously asserted in their seminal 1986 essay, “there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence –direct or indirect– of important divisions within the authoritarian regime” (1986: 19). When the coherence of the ruling elite turns uncertain, the continuity of the regime turns uncertain.

³ The classic statements on transitions and uncertainty are O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: Chapter 1) and Przeworski (1986). On the uncertainties of democratic consolidation, see Schedler (1998 and 2001).

⁴ Notable exceptions are Wintrobe (1998) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).

The centrality of street protest in “fourth wave” transitions in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa has led scholars to reevaluate the potential of civic protest in provoking democratizing change. Yet, while single-party regimes and military dictatorships are occasionally vulnerable to challenges from below, EA regimes seem systemically vulnerable to such challenges. To the extent that elections constitute “the first and most important arena of contestation” (Levitsky and Way, 2002: 54) in electoral autocracies, they also constitute the first and most important source of threat to the survival of these regimes. Since multiparty elections open up formal venues to challenge the authoritarian regime in a peaceful manner, they tend to shape the expression of dissidence (*a*) by discouraging violent challenges and (*b*) by channeling peaceful challenges into the electoral arena. Whoever claims to have competing claims to rule, based on the principle of popular consent rather than the superiority of arms, is drawn to prove the empirical plausibility of his pretension of popular support at the polls. Protest movements as well as elite dissidents are obliged demonstrate that they are able to mobilize voters in their support. Unless vertical or horizontal threats translate into electoral threats, electoral authoritarian rulers may calmly discount them as mere noise. Thus, paraphrasing O’Donnell and Schmitter, I assert that there is no transition –direct or indirect– of uncertainties about the electoral support of the regime.

If electoral uncertainty is a necessary condition for electoral authoritarian regime change, what is electoral uncertainty? Conventionally, we tend to think that democratic elections combine procedural certainty with substantive uncertainty, while authoritarian elections combine procedural uncertainty with substantive certainty (Przeworski, 1986). In the former, the integrity of procedures is secure, while electoral outcomes are open. In the latter, the procedural quality of elections is doubtful, while their results are predictable: the ruling party always wins. However, the authoritarian project of containing the substantive uncertainty of elections may well fail. Opposition parties may succeed in creating electoral uncertainty either by mobilizing large numbers of voter at the polls in their support, or by mobilizing large numbers of citizens on the streets in protest against electoral manipulation. Opposition protests usually do not alter electoral results, but they may well introduce epistemic uncertainty about their validity. Electoral authoritarian regimes retain power through a mixture of popularity and manipulation. No one knows for sure how popular they are nor how manipulative. Massive streets protests may persuade actors that electoral outcomes were the result of authoritarian maneuvers, rather than the expression of genuine voter preferences. To assess the degree of “vertical uncertainty” an election generates, we may thus look at their results but also at the incidence of contentious action inside and outside the electoral arena.

The fledgling literature on electoral authoritarian regimes has been recognizing significant variation within the broad family of electoral autocracies. At heart, the widespread distinction between “hegemonic” and “competitive” authoritarian regimes refers to differences in degrees of regime uncertainty and thus consolidation.⁵ Hegemonic regimes are consolidated regimes, competitive regimes non-consolidated ones. The former are in equilibrium, the latter in disequilibrium. Grounded in an uncertain mixture of genuine popularity and resolute manipulation, hegemonic parties always win and win big –and are expected to keep winning and winning big in the foreseeable future. Their twin presumption of popular support and authoritarian resoluteness creates an equilibrium of dissuasion in which defection by either citizens or politicians seems not just cost-intense, but simply futile. Competitive regimes do not enjoy similar levels of consolidation. Often, they look more like “authoritarian situations” (Linz, 1973) than authoritarian regimes: fluid, insecure, inconsistent, and improvising in response to recurrent challenges from within and without. Caught up in a constant tug of war with opposition forces, they are denied the security and tranquility hegemonic systems are able to enjoy. In hegemonic regimes, opposition parties thus face the challenge of introducing electoral uncertainty, in competitive regimes the challenge of perpetuating and deepening it.

Vital Interests

To the extent that political regimes have distributive consequences, regime struggles can be expected to be distributive struggles. Even if recent debates tend to conclude that democratization has been “less consequential” than anticipated in its impact on “power relations, property rights, policy entitlements, economic equality, and social status” (Schmitter, 2010: 19), much of the comparative scholarship on regime change treats regime outcomes –change as well as stability– as a function of actors’ utility calculations (as well as their power relations). The literature is full of references to the costs and benefits of tolerance and repression (Dahl, 1971), the utility of regime change, the stakes of politics. Actors are routinely conceived as carrying different regime preferences that are derivative of their material interests. The material interests of politically defined actors are assumed to derive in the first place from their institutional location (government versus opposition), those of socially defined actors from their economic positions (poor versus rich, mobile versus immobile, state-dependent versus market-dependent, competitive versus clientelist). At the

⁵ The concept of hegemonic regimes goes back to Sartori (1976). The notion of competitive authoritarianism was introduced by Levitsky and Way (2002).

end of the day, which group of actors is able to impose its preferences depends on the power resources its members command (or are believed to command).⁶

Utility calculations appear in analyses of regime change in two main variants: continuous or discontinuous.

(a) Part of the literature on the political economy of regimes treats regimes like service providers on consumer markets. They have a cost (taxation) and they provide benefits (policies and public expenditure). Actors assess their monetary value and align their preferences and actions accordingly. On the market of political institutions, they purchase the regime that promises the highest rate of return. Under this continuous perspective of utility calculations, regime struggles are like market transactions, only with a subtle difference: the valid currency is not money, but violence.⁷

(b) Another stream of literature also recognizes the paramount importance of interest calculations, yet conceives relevant interests in discontinuous terms. Actors do not seek to maximize their payoff from political regimes, but to protect their “vital interests” from systemic threats.⁸ The notion of vital interests combines a kind of maxi-min strategy (the maximization of minimum payoffs) with a sense of priorities and thresholds: Not all losses count equal; some hurt more than others; and not all violations of interests are liable to provoke active resistance; only those that transgress subjective thresholds of tolerance. Of course, the vital interests of each group of actors are neither obvious nor carved in stone. Subject to controversy and strategic misrepresentation, their definition forms part of the political struggles of regime change.⁹

If the distributive logic of regime struggles does not lie in the maximization of profit, but in the protection of political and economic core interests, which are its implications for transitions from electoral authoritarianism? First of all, what might count as “vital interests” electoral authoritarian governments would be willing to defend to the last drop of electoral ink? Various authors have suggested plausible candidates:

- *Political survival*: the ability of the incumbent to thrive and survive after abandoning the summits of state power. The ruling party’s chances of electoral survival are contingent on its competitive strength as well as the consolidation of electoral democracy. They depends on its popular appeal

⁶ Thus, in the light of distributive struggles, regime change appears essentially as a matter of interests and power. While the present section focuses on the former (utility calculations), the subsequent section centers on the latter (calculations of power).

⁷ Most econometric work on the political economy of regimes embraces a continuous conception of regime utilities [add references].

⁸ Seminal formulations on the need to guarantee the protection of “vital interests” in processes of democratization are Dahl (1971) and O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: Ch. 4).

⁹ The concept of vital interests is categorical. Note, however, that the notion of their expected protection is continuous, ranging from probability zero to one.

and organizational capacity, but also on the institutional protection of electoral integrity and minority rights after alternation in power (see Geddes, 1999; Lindberg, 2009b; Magaloni, 2006).

- *Economic affluence*: the conservation of expensive life styles. Even if authoritarian rulers do not expect to maintain their exact levels of income after quitting power, they may wish to insure themselves against dramatic experiences of downward mobility. To the extent that they expect to conserve a powerful role within the political system, they need not worry about employment or investment opportunities in the private economy.
- *Legal impunity*: the dispensation from accountability for corruption and human rights violations. Self-enrichment and repression are routine strategies of authoritarian rulers that pay off nicely in the short run, but may backfire in the long run. Just like South American military dictators, electoral authoritarian rulers may wish to trade their exit from power against immunity from legal prosecution (see Thompson and Kuntz, 2006).

These concerns are very much analogous to the vital interests we tend to ascribe to other types of authoritarian regimes. In electoral authoritarian contexts, I would expect them to be activated by electoral uncertainties. Calculations of utility are always embedded in counterfactual reasoning. When weighting the cost and benefits of the status quo, forward-looking actors compare the balance sheet of the present with anticipated balance sheets of hypothetical alternative futures. If the status quo is not expected to change, all utility calculations are idle. In the absence of possible future worlds, if the future is no more than a continuation of the present, actors lack the reference points for the estimation of relative costs and benefits. Given the derivative nature of cost-benefit calculations from the presence of alternative futures, I hypothesize that electoral authoritarian governments care little about the protection of their vital interests as long as these interests are not apparently threatened by anyone. I expect their interest calculations to be irrelevant in the absence of electoral uncertainty. In equilibrium, electoral authoritarian rulers can afford the luxury of taking the protection of their interests for granted. However, as soon as electoral uncertainty creeps into the system, the clock of defensive interest calculations starts ticking. The higher the perceived threats to their vital interests, the more determined will rulers be in defending the authoritarian status quo.

Coercive Uncertainties

In the end, when all is said and done, the survival of an authoritarian government in the face of vertical and lateral challenges depends on its capacity and willingness to repress its opponents. More often than not, modern bureaucratic states, with their grand ambition of monopolizing the legitimate use of physical violence, are more powerful than their opponents in society, armed or unarmed, organized or disorganized. As long as security agencies and the military bureaucracy remain loyal and united under the command of the central government, state repression is likely to prevail over challenges from below or within.

Like other authoritarian regimes, electoral autocracies, officially founded upon the popular vote, find their ultimate insurance in the control of state violence. When ballots fail to provide the security they aspire to, bullets step in to do the job. If their control of state repression is secure, they will discourage the emergence of challenges in the first place and if needed suppress them in the last instance. If their control of organized violence is unreliable, they are likely to nourish the emergence of challenges from the outset and fail to suppress them effectively in the end.¹⁰

Structures of Regime Choice

Vertical uncertainties create pressures for change; threats to vital interest resistance to change; and the control of repressive bureaucracies the power to block change. None of these decision parameters is objective; they are all a matter of perceptions, and thus subject to uncertainty and controversy. None of them is determinate; their consequences depend on the contingencies of political conflict. And none of them emerges in isolation; they all interact and potentially “contaminate” each other. Still, their interplay is likely to weigh heavily in the calculus of political actors thus to affect the outcomes of their regime struggles.

Figure 1 presents five basic parametric configurations and their likely institutional results. Even if it vaguely resembles (and could easily be translated into) a strategic game in extensive form, its logic is not strategic, but decision-theoretic. It assumes the perspective of actors who calculate the expected utility of alternative courses of action by observing their environment, forming beliefs and expectations, weighting their interests. In essence, the figure charts the probable outcomes of different combinations of political stakes and repressive capacities in the presence of vertical

¹⁰ Here my emphasis lies on the probability of successful repression. I have little to say about the “costs of repression” (Dahl, 1971), a fuzzy concept whose content seems undecipherable to me, although I recognize that it is ubiquitous in the literature, in particular the literature on state repression (for an overview, see Davenport, 2007).

uncertainty (configurations 1-4). In the absence of vertical uncertainty, I assume electoral authoritarian regimes to be in equilibrium (see bottom line). Disequilibrating transition dynamics (and the corresponding calculations of interest and power) set in when vertical uncertainties set in.

Configuration 1: Threatened Interests, Reliable Repression

While all regime transitions are uncertain, some are more uncertain than others. Their degree of indeterminacy varies with their political contexts. Among the four structures of choice under conditions of vertical uncertainty depicted in Figure 1, the two extreme configurations seem more predictable, the two intermediate configurations less so. Consider the first configuration: If vital interests are under threat, yet coercive capacities intact, the predictable outcome is regime continuity. While vertical uncertainties may make the government nervous, and threats to its core interests render it averse to change, its secure ability to suppress dissidence will eventually tip the balance of power in its favor.

The 1988 presidential elections in Mexico may be an example. Through successful voter mobilization at early stages of his electoral campaign, splinter candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas succeeded in destroying the image of invincibility of the ruling PRI and creating an atmosphere of electoral uncertainty (see López Leyva, 2007). Given the ideological polarization of the campaign as well as the ruling party's near-monopoly of state power over the past decades, the stakes of the electoral game were high. At the election, Cárdenas became victim of massive electoral fraud (although it is unclear whether it was decisive for the outcome of the presidential race). He rejected the results and mobilized his followers in protest. However, he resigned to his defeat in the face of a regime whose self-confident control over the security apparatus seemed fundamentally intact, he permitted the protests to silently wither away in the weeks following the election.

Configuration 4: Secure Interests, Uncertain Repression

The fourth configuration in Figure 1 points at the opposite scenario: If vital interests are reasonably secure, while coercive capacities are uncertain, rational incumbents should yield to the pressures of democratization. While vertical uncertainties may make the government nervous, the secure protection of its core interests should render it rather tolerant to change. Uncertain of its ability to repress dissidence, the ruling party is well advised to cede to democratizing pressures. Arguably, in the decade following the 1988 watershed election, Mexico moved towards such a structure of choice: The ruling party grew more confident in its ability to survive the harsh winds of democratic competition, while it grew less confident about its ability to steal an election. Its fundamental interests seemed secure: The PRI had been

successfully adapting to an increasingly competitive environment; it held power at all levels of the political system, including the majority of state executives and municipal presidencies; it continued to control powerful interest group associations; it locked in its macroeconomic policy preferences through the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA); and any changes in the fundamental rules of the political game continued to require (well into the foreseeable future) the consent of the party. At the same time, both the institutional entrenchment of electoral democracy through a series of profound democratizing reforms and the ideological commitment of all parties to electoral democracy rendered any intervention of the armed forces in defense of electoral fraud most unlikely. The PRI's tranquil acceptance of alternation in power in the 2000 presidential elections thus seemed firmly embedded in a structure of choice that facilitated this acceptance.

Configuration 2: Threatened Interests, Uncertain Repression

The configurations of decision parameters in the middle of Figure 1 are less determinate than the outer configurations sketched before. In both scenarios, democratic change is a distinct possibility, even if regression (in configuration 2) and continuity (in configuration 3) are more likely outcomes. Consider configuration 2: If vertical threats are high, interests insecure, and repressive capacities uncertain, fearful rulers may gamble on their ability to withstand pressures from below through heightened manipulation and repression. They may try to win an election through an escalation of authoritarian strategies, they may attempt to steal an election that went to the opposition, or they may move to close down the arena of electoral competition. If they succeed, they continue presiding either a more repressive form of electoral authoritarianism or a dictatorship purged of multiparty elections. If they fail, democratization may ensue. The “electoral revolution” in the Philippines in 1986 and the later “Color Revolutions” in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine exemplify the latter possibility. They illustrate the risks electoral authoritarian rulers assume if they overestimate their command over the security apparatus and in consequence overstretch their ability to repress popular protest.

Configuration 3: Secure Interests, Reliable Repression

The third configuration in Figure 1 describes the most favorable scenario EA regimes may face under conditions of vertical uncertainty. If citizen behavior inside and outside the electoral arena creates doubts about the breadth and firmness of regime support, while at the same time the vital interests of the ruling party are well-protected and its control over security forces seems without fissures, the incumbent is actually sovereign to do as it pleases. Thanks to its credible capacity to repress challenges irrespective of their origins, it is free to perpetuate the status quo. Thanks to its prospective

ability to survive and thrive under post-authoritarian conditions, it is free to accept democratizing change. Besides, if it accepts democratization, it can impose its conditions. The comforts of power. Arguably, the diverging trajectories of electoral authoritarianism in Taiwan and Singapore may be understood in this manner. In Taiwan, the KMT, a ruling party secure in its support by a large segment of the electorate, secure in its capacity of self-defense against its democratic competitors, and secure in its control of the armed forces, resolved to steer the country through a process of negotiated democratization culminating in the 2000 alternation in power. Under structurally similar conditions of incumbent security (albeit at lower levels of electoral uncertainty), Singapore's ruling PAP has been unwavering in its technocratic determination to keep running the city-state as a dictatorial "Disneyland with the death penalty" (Gibson, 1993).

Comparative Explorations

In the remainder of this paper, I shall explore the extent to which empirical trajectories of electoral authoritarian regimes show systematic associations with the explanatory parameters outlined above. My units of analysis are authoritarian elections. My sample covers almost the universe of national elections held in electoral authoritarian regimes world wide from 1980 through 2002. It contains 124 competitive elections (73 legislative and 51 presidential contests) and 70 hegemonic elections (48 legislative and 22 presidential contests). For the purpose of the present paper, I do not distinguish between presidential and legislative contests and count concurrent elections as single national elections. This yields a total of 93 national elections in competitive regimes and 57 in hegemonic regimes (for a description of sample and data, see Appendix).

Regime Trajectories

In the present section, I examine whether the three attributes of authoritarian elections discussed above (vertical uncertainties, political stakes, and repressive capacities) co-vary with regime continuity or change at the subsequent regularly scheduled national election. If the subsequent election takes place under continuing authoritarian conditions (with a Freedom House political rights score of four or higher) I register regime continuity. If it takes place under minimally democratic conditions (with a Freedom House political rights score of three or lower), I register democratization. If the authoritarian electoral cycle comes to a halt through civil war, military coup, or the extension of presidential mandates by more than half of the original term (by decree or referendum), I register a case of interruption. If hegemonic governments lose their legislative dominance as a

result of increasing levels of competition, yet remain authoritarian, I register a transition to competitive authoritarianism.

Table 1 displays the frequency distribution of various regime trajectories within my sample of elections. The overall conservative penchant of non-democratic elections is clear. In an overwhelming majority of cases, authoritarian elections breed authoritarian elections. Almost three out of four competitive elections (73.1%) and almost nine out of ten hegemonic elections (89.5%) are followed by another round of authoritarian elections. Interruptions of authoritarian election cycles are rare events. In both subtypes of EA regimes, they do not exceed 5% of cases. It is remarkable nevertheless that more than a fifth of competitive authoritarian elections pave the way for democratic change (21.5%), while a significant portion of hegemonic elections lead either to democratization (5.3%) or a transition to competitive authoritarianism (10.5%). Given my low case numbers, I merge the latter two outcomes in the subsequent analysis into the aggregate category of “hegemonic opening” (15.8%).

The following statistical explorations examine the isolated impact each of the three decision parameters (as measured through various, more or less distant proxies) carries on the trajectories of electoral authoritarian regimes. In this sense, they are less complex than the preceding analytical propositions. My analytical framework suggests the importance of interactive relationships: political stakes and repressive capacities matter little in the absence of vertical uncertainties; in the presence of vertical uncertainties, threats to vital interests of the incumbent vary in their effects depending on the repressive capacities of the incumbent. However, even if their impact is mediated by other variables, we may plausibly expect them to carry immediate individual consequences, too. The higher the vertical uncertainties an electoral authoritarian government faces, the higher the probability of its demise. The more reliable its control of the coercive apparatus, the lower its probability of demise. The higher the stakes it needs to defend, the lower the probability of democratizing concessions.¹¹

I will explore these direct explanatory hypotheses in two simple steps. Firstly, I will draw on simple comparisons of means and cross-tabulation to examine whether my explanatory proxies co-vary (in a substantively and statistically significant manner) with different regime trajectories. Secondly, I will estimate the joint impact of some apparently relevant variables on regime trajectories through logistic regression. To begin with, Table 2 compares levels of electoral uncertainty, contentious action, regime manipulation, political stakes, and repressive capacities for five regime outcomes: the continuity, democratization, and interruption of competitive

¹¹ While my theoretical discussions (in particular Figure 1) suggested the presence or absence of categorical variables, it seems more realistic to conceive them as continuous variables, as reflected in my formulation of causal hypotheses.

regimes, and the continuity and opening of hegemonic regimes (due to the low number of cases, I do not pretend to explain the interruption of hegemonic electoral cycles).

Electoral Uncertainty

I use two indicators of electoral uncertainty: the winning party's margin of victory (voter percentages in presidential and seat percentages in legislative elections) and the fragmentation of opposition parties (Rae index). The degree of opposition unity is often taken as a proxy for opposition strength. In numerous cases, electoral coordination by opposition actors appeared as a crucial facilitating condition of authoritarian regime change (see Howard and Roessler 2006, van de Walle 2006). While this may be true for breakthrough elections, it does not seem to hold for elections preceding regime change. Differing regime trajectories are preceded by similar levels of opposition fragmentation.

Differences in mean margins of victory, by contrast, are striking, in particular in competitive regimes. Elections that predate democratization are much more competitive than those that presage continuity. Their legislative margins of victory are almost 20% lower, and their presidential margins little less than 30%. Cases of interruption, by contrast, seem to be the work of domineering executives hampered by fragile legislative majorities. In hegemonic regimes, which are defined by high degrees of electoral certainty and legislative super-majorities, it is only in the legislative arena that higher competitiveness precedes experiences of regime opening. Just right before regime change, margins of presidential victory remain at dizzying heights.

Electoral Protest

When official election results sow doubts about the breadth and depth of popular support for the regime, electoral protest by opposition actors may widen and deepen these doubts. When official election results narrate a story of triumphant success by the ruling party, electoral protest may introduce elements of doubt about its accuracy. In the first case, protest reinforces the substantive uncertainty of elections (the uncertainty of outcomes). In the second case, it introduces epistemic uncertainty (the uncertainty of interpretation).

Table 2 distinguishes between “electoral protest” and “post-electoral contention.” The former takes part in the temporal vicinity of elections and is explicitly directed against the authoritarian quality of electoral procedures. The latter refers to a variety of protest events (anti-government demonstrations, general strikes, and mass riots) that place after the election (in the three years subsequent to the election year). As the table indicates, pre-electoral protest seems relevant to posterior regime trajectories only in

hegemonic regimes. Under hegemonic rule, the incidence of active mobilization in opening elections (44.4%) more than doubles the rate of protest in stabilizing elections (17.4%).

Post-electoral protest against election outcomes suggests a somewhat more complex pattern of association. In competitive regimes, democratizing elections show a rather even distribution between acquiescence (45%), rhetorical rejection (25%), and active protest mobilization (30%). Stabilizing elections look similar, although, contrary to theoretical expectations, their level of acquiescence lies somewhat lower. Remarkably, though, none of the five instances of interruption was preceded by opposition acceptance of the previous election. Under competitive authoritarian conditions, post-electoral quiescence seems to favor democratizing outcomes, while post-electoral troubles seem to encourage the closure of the electoral arena. By contrast, the consequences of post-electoral protest look less ambiguous under hegemonic conditions. Although a plurality of stabilizing elections found acceptance among opposition parties, not a single instance of hegemonic was preceded by opposition acquiescence to the previous elections.

The often tantalizing decision of opposition actors of whether to enter the electoral arena (participation) or to remain outside and boo from the fences (boycott), shows intriguing associations with posterior regime trajectories. Opposition boycotts of elections have a bad press among students of democratization. Authoritarian rulers tend to discredit them as a refuge unpopular opposition parties seek if they do not want to assume the costs of defeat. Comparative scholars suspect such strategic readings of boycotts often contain a kernel of truth. More importantly, boycotts seem to be self-defeating. They deprive boycotting parties of experience, visibility, votes, and legislative positions, thus muting their voice in the national political arena. While their long-term benefits are unclear, their short-term costs tend to be high.¹²

As a matter of fact, in competitive regimes, participation rates are indeed highest in democratizing elections (75%). However, this group of elections also contains the highest percentage of full opposition boycotts (20%). This U-shaped pattern seems to suggest that both full participation and full boycott augment the chances of democratic change, while partial boycotts reinforce the authoritarian status quo. Notably, four of the five cases of interruption were also preceded by either partial or full boycotts. While the overall probability of electoral authoritarian breakdown is low, the either partial or complete withdrawal of opposition actors from electoral competition seems to increase it. In the realm of hegemonic party rule, electoral boycotts appear to assume a less ambiguous role. Even if the differences between boycott rates and subsequent regime trajectories lie below conventional thresholds of

¹² See Beaulieu (2006), Hartlyn and McCoy (2006), Lindberg (2006a), Schedler (2009a) [add references].

significance ($p=.202$), transformative hegemonic elections were preceded by a higher incidence of full opposition boycotts (33.3%) than conservative ones (10.9%). Just like their competitive counterparts, hegemonic regimes seem to have less troubles in weathering partial boycotts than in managing the void left by the exit of the united opposition from electoral competition.

Post-electoral Contention

In addition to articulating electoral grievances, in between and around authoritarian elections, citizens may engage civic or violent dissidence whose targets and demands bear no direct relation with electoral issues. Even if seemingly unconcerned with the electoral arena, such acts of extra-electoral and inter-electoral contention influence the climate of tranquility or threat in which rulers prepare for an upcoming election. As Table 2 suggests, the sum of protest events occurring during the three years posterior to a competitive authoritarian election is dissociated from the fate of the subsequent election. Only armed rebellions (the sum of “revolutions” and “guerrilla warfare”) seem to bear destabilizing consequences in competitive regimes. Experiences of democratization and interruption are both preceded by a higher incidence of violent challenges. Patterns of post-electoral contention look inverse in hegemonic regimes: Instances of hegemonic opening are preceded by higher frequencies of protest demonstrations, general strikes, and riots (though not quite at conventional levels of significance), while the average incidence of armed rebellion is low across cases of hegemonic continuity and opening.

Regime Manipulation

Some authoritarian rulers may practice manipulation and repression as non-instrumental, intrinsically rewarding activities. *L’art pour l’art*. In general, though, we can assume that such authoritarian strategies aim at containing vertical as well as horizontal challenges. To the extent that they succeed in doing so, and to the extent that they reproduce themselves over time (“stickiness” or “inertia” or “path dependence”), we should expect them to render electoral authoritarian regimes more resilient. To test these theoretical expectations, I explore the association of four authoritarian strategies with posterior regime trajectories: the exclusion of parties or candidates from electoral competition, the commission of electoral fraud (administrative interferences with the organization of elections), repression (violations of physical integrity) and censorship (violations of media freedom).

As Table 2 indicates, democratizing elections tend to be more inclusive, in competitive regimes (80%) as well as in hegemonic regimes (66.7%), although in the latter case the difference to conservative elections is only “weakly significant” ($p=.216$). The enactment of fraud is unrelated to subsequent regime trajectories. The same is true for repression in competitive regimes,

but not in hegemonic regimes, where violations of physical integrity show a surprising negative relationship to opening: with repression measured from 0 (lowest) to 8 (highest), transformative hegemonic elections are more repressive on average ($\mu = 4.6$) than stabilizing ones ($\mu = 3.4$). By contrast, hegemonic trajectories do not differ in their average levels of media freedom, while competitive trajectories do. With media restrictions measured on a scale from 0 (lowest) to 2 (highest), democratizing elections show lower levels of censorship ($\mu = 1.0$) than stabilizing ones ($\mu = 1.4$).

In sum, while fraud and repression do not seem to affect posterior regime trajectories under competitive conditions, both exclusion and censorship work the way they are expected to: lowering the odds of democratization. Hegemonic regimes, by contrast, seem to move with relative independence from levels of manipulation chosen by the government. The positive association between repression and opening may reflect an inverse causal relationship: Hegemonic regimes may intensify repression when they sense the possibility of change.

The Stakes of Politics

Given the complexity of the matter, cross-national data on either actor conceptions of vital interests or perceptions of threats to vital interests do not exist (and will not exist well into the foreseeable future). I can therefore only do what the literature does: use a handful of “proxies” that seem reasonably (even if distantly) related to the notion of “the stakes of politics” (the utility of holding political power). Here is my list of variables and related assumptions:

- *Wealth*: States are poorer in poor nations. They tax less and spend less. Still, controlling them tends to secure levels of income and employment stability the private sector cannot offer. The weakness of the market economy raises the comparative utility of exploiting the state. Indicator: annual GDP per capita in current Purchasing Power Parities (PPP).
- *Rents*: Rents are easy income. Rent-financed states offer access to abundant, effortless resources that are not available in the private sector. In rentier economies, distributive conflicts revolve around the control of the state. Indicator: percentage share of mineral fuel exports in total exports.
- *Public spending*: The more the state spends in relation to the entire national economy, the higher will be the utility of occupying it. Indicator: level of public expenditures (% GDP)

- *Inequality:* In societies with high levels of socio-economic inequality, the utility of holding power may lie less in the opportunities it offers for exploiting public resources than in those it provides for protecting private resources. Deep social inequalities raise the stakes of authoritarian politics, since rulers and their constituencies have more to lose in the eventuality of regime change. Indicator of income inequality: Gini coefficient.
- *Institutions:* The stakes of electoral contests can be assumed to be higher in majoritarian electoral systems, where winners take all and losers get nothing. In presidential systems, too, electoral stakes can be assumed to be higher. In presidential elections, electoral results, not elite negotiations, determine who occupies the position of chief executive. In legislative elections under presidentialism, the presidency is not at stake, yet president's capacity to pursue his legislative agenda is. Indicators: three-fold classifications of systems of government (parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism, and presidentialism) and electoral formulae (proportional representation, mixed-systems, and majoritarian systems).

My overall hypothesis is simple: The higher the stakes of politics, the lower the chances of regime change. The uncontrolled tests of bivariate association (comparisons of means) reported in Table 2 offer a mix of supportive and contradicting evidence. While levels of public expenditure and social inequality seem unrelated to regime trajectories, both wealth and oil dependence show intriguing patterns of association. Most strikingly, average wealth appears to play different roles in competitive and hegemonic regimes. As it seems, in comparative regimes, wealth favors democratic change as much as regime continuity, while poverty is destabilizing. The high stakes of poverty seem to favor authoritarian breakdown, not democratization. In hegemonic regimes, by contrast, wealth strengthens the status quo, while poverty favors processes of opening. Able to transform economic well-being into regime stability, these regimes suffer more intense democratizing pressures under conditions of poverty.

By comparison, oil exports faithfully display the expected relationship: High oil rents stabilize electoral authoritarian rule. Both in competitive and hegemonic regimes, conservative elections that reproduce the status quo take place in countries that earn more than a quarter of their export income through mineral fuels. Transformative elections take place at much lower levels of oil dependency in both subtypes of regimes (although in hegemonic regimes mean differences are not statistically significant).

Table 3 highlights the implications of poverty and oil-dependence for all electoral authoritarian regime trajectories (dropping the distinction between

competitive and hegemonic regimes). Just as the literature on natural resources and political regimes suggests, oil is a powerful stabilizing factor. Authoritarian elections in oil exporting countries (with a share of mineral fuel exports $\geq 25\%$ of total exports) almost never lead to anything else than another round of authoritarian elections (96.9%).

By contrast, just as the literature on economic development and political regimes suggests, poverty is a powerful destabilizing factor. While only half of elections in my sample take place in “non-poor” countries (with annual GDP per capita $\geq 2,000$ PPP), these comparatively well-off countries host almost three quarters of all democratizing elections (73.9%). In addition, practically all experiences of electoral authoritarian breakdown in my sample (seven of eight) have taken place in poor countries (87.5%).

My institutional variables roughly play out as expected. While conforming to my theoretical expectations, electoral systems show certain asymmetries between competitive and hegemonic regimes. In competitive regimes, systems of proportional representation (PR), in which neither losses nor victories tend to be absolute, show the highest rates of democratization, mixed-member systems the lowest. In hegemonic systems, that practically never operate under PR rules, it is mixed-member systems that facilitate processes of opening, while majoritarian rules pose firm barriers to change. Forms of government, too, show differential impacts on the two subtypes of EA regimes. While competitive presidentialism looks more resilient to change than either semi-presidential or parliamentary regimes, hegemonic presidentialism seems more vulnerable to change than other forms of hegemonic government.

Repressive Capacities

Just like conceptions and perceptions of threat, estimates of probabilities of successful repression are impossible to capture in cross-national datasets. All we have are crude proxies. As indicators of regime coherence, I use the CNTS counts of government crises and military coups for the three years previous to each election. As rough and distant indicators of the strength of the coercive apparatus, I take the level of military expenditure (as percentage of GDP) and the size of the military (military personnel as percentage of total employment). As Table 2 shows, none of these indicators vary systematically with subsequent trajectories of competitive regimes. Against theoretical expectations, processes of hegemonic opening take place under conditions of regime coherence; not fragmented, but united hegemonic governments undertake transitions in conditions of strength. In accordance with theoretical expectations, democratizing elections under hegemonic regimes are overseen by smaller military forces (although, as we found above, they take place under conditions of heightened repression).

Multivariate Regression

To finalize, in order to check the robustness of the previous findings, I run logistic regressions with selected variables that displayed significant bivariate associations with either competitive or hegemonic regime trajectories. To account for trajectories of competitive regimes, I select margins of victory, electoral boycott, a composite measure of regime manipulation (that adds all four strategies, normalized to a scale of 0-1), and the two most salient measures of political stakes: wealth and oil dependence. To account for trajectories of hegemonic regimes, I limit myself to measures of strategic behavior: electoral protest (the sum of pre-electoral and post-electoral protest), electoral boycott, repression, and censorship. Since the latter two variables seemed inversely related to hegemonic opening, it did not make sense to use the additive index of manipulation.

Table 4 contains the results for both logistic regressions. Note that it does not show regression coefficients, but odds ratios (e^b) that estimate the change in the odds of different regime outcomes for one-unit increases in independent variables. For both competitive and hegemonic regimes, the reference category is the status quo: regime continuity. When interpreting the results, we should keep in mind that both subtypes of electoral authoritarian regimes are rather stable. Transitions are the exception rather than the rule. The baseline odds of regime change are calculated by dividing the probability of regime change by the probability of regime continuity. With my sample, the odds that competitive regimes democratize are 0.29; that they break down 0.07; and that hegemonic elections are followed by a process of regime opening 0.19 (see transition frequencies in Table 1).

Competitive trajectories. As the results displayed in Table 4 suggest, the variables I chose on the basis of the previous bivariate explorations carry considerable weight in the explanation of competitive regime trajectories. With respect to democratic change, the odds ratio of margins of victory of 0.97 looks unimpressive at first sight. Yet, it implies that every percentage point by which incumbents widen their margins of victory point lowers the odds of democratic transitions from competitive authoritarianism by three percentage points. Considered the other way round: every 10% opposition parties succeed in narrowing the lead of the ruling party improves the odds of democratization by 30%. In addition, wide margins of victory (low levels of electoral uncertainty) are not just brakes on democratization. They are also buffers against the interruption of authoritarian electoral cycles ($e^b = 0.93$). Electoral certainty stabilizes competitive regimes both ways. It protects them against democratization as well as against breakdown.

Just like electoral uncertainty, electoral boycott exerts a powerful pull on competitive authoritarian regime change. Each step from participation to partial boycott to full boycott *duplicates* the odds of democratic transition(e^b

= 2.39). Even more dramatically, each move towards comprehensive boycott multiplies the odds of regime breakdown by a factor of ten ($e^b = 10.64$).

While electoral competitiveness and opposition boycotts destabilize competitive authoritarian regimes, pushing them towards democratic change as much as towards authoritarian breakdown, levels of manipulation as well as levels of income carry differential impacts on democratization and interruption. Manipulation drastically lowers the odds of transition. Each one-point move up the four point composite scale of manipulation lowers the odds of democratization by more than 70% ($e^b = 0.28$). At the same time, manipulation shows no impact on the odds of interruption. Wealth, by contrast, boost the odds of democratization (although slightly below conventional levels of statistical significance) ($e^b = 4.63$), yet compresses the odds of interruption to almost zero ($e^b = 0.004$). Put the other way round, in competitive authoritarian regimes, wealth is a motor of democratic transitions, while poverty is a powerful engine of interruptions.

Even controlling for all the other factors, oil dependency significantly depresses the prospects of democratizing competitive regimes. Every increase in oil exports by one percentage point (as share of total exports) decreases the odds of democratization by four points ($e^b = 0.96$). The stabilizing effect of oil also conspires against interruptions (although below conventional levels of statistical significance) ($e^b = 0.94$).

Taken together, electoral uncertainty, opposition participation, regime manipulation, wealth, and oil dependency explain about two fifths of variations in competitive regime outcomes (Cox and Snell $R^2 = .39$), which is a very decent level of explanatory leverage in the social sciences.

Hegemonic trajectories. In the subsample of hegemonic regimes, just as in the group of competitive regimes, multivariate regression results basically corroborate the previous bivariate findings. Both opposition choices and regime strategies strongly affect the likelihood of hegemonic regime change. Both electoral protest and electoral boycott seems to be highly effective strategies to increase the odds of opening. Censorship seems to be a highly effective counterstrategy to decrease them. The effects look impressive. A shift from acquiescence to active mobilization, be it before or after an election, triplicates the odds of a hegemonic opening ($e^b = 3.31$). A move from participation to partial boycott, or from there to full boycott, duplicates these odds ($e^b = 2.18$). At the same time, each move up the 3-point scale of censorship (0-2) decreases the odds of opening by 80% ($e^b = 0.21$).

Again, the apparent democratizing consequences of repressions are startling. In a causal interpretation of these logistic regression results, each upward step along the 9-point scale of repression (0-8) augments the odd of hegemonic opening by 50% ($e^b = 1.54$). This is not altogether implausible. Democratic change is unlikely to constitute a planned consequence of

repression, but it may well be a counter-intentional one, to the extent that repression in a decaying hegemonic regime turns counter-productive and reinforces demands for change. Besides, as mentioned before, repressions may well be endogenous to the prospects of democratizing change.

Conclusion

In this paper, I proposed a mildly complex theory to account for the various trajectories of electoral authoritarian regimes: Whether electoral authoritarian rulers cling to the status quo, concede democratizing reform, or resolve to shut down the electoral arena depends on the intensity of vertical threats they confront, their confidence in the protection of their vital interests after their eventual exit from power, and their capacity to call in the security forces in case electoral competition threatens to spin out of control. To test this (non-formalized) decision-theoretic framework, I advanced some mildly under-complex statistical explorations of authoritarian elections worldwide between 1980 and 2002. Needless to say, these empirical explorations do not amount to a full test of my theoretical propositions. My analytical overcoat hangs oversized and loose on my skeletal body of data. Still, my findings do allow to draw some tentative conclusions about the transition dynamics of electoral authoritarian regimes. I wish to highlight two core inferences that seem essentially compatible with my theoretical framework.

First of all, my findings support the notion that the conflictive encounters between ruling parties, opposition actors, and citizens in the electoral arena are key to account for the fate of electoral authoritarian regimes. In the fluid situations of competitive regimes, political stability hinges on the capacity of incumbents to manufacture large margins of victory. To the extent that opposition actors gain competitive strength in the electoral arena, the odds of regime change rise. Inversely, to the extent that regime actors contain competitive pressures through manipulative maneuvers, the odds of regime change fall. However, competitive regimes look surprisingly immune to contentious challenges from below - with one exception: electoral boycott. If opposition parties resolve to renounce electoral competition and denounce the government from the terraces, they push competitive regimes towards the edge of change where they may stumble and fall to either side, democratic change or authoritarian breakdown. As it appears, in the struggle against competitive regimes, the force of exit trumps the weight of voice.¹³

Confronting the solidity of hegemonic regimes, opposition actors face the challenge of introducing vertical uncertainties. By definition, hegemonic regimes only allow for low variance in electoral certainty. The minor oscillations in electoral dominance they register show no systematic association with the subsequent regime trajectories. However, opposition attempts to create uncertainty (through electoral protest and electoral boycott) as well as government attempts to contain it (through censorship)

¹³ On the distinction between “exit” and “voice”, see Hirschman (1970).

strongly affect the chances of hegemonic opening. Although hegemonic party rule is often grounded in structural conditions, pushing the heavy truck of hegemonic regimes from the road of authoritarian inertia to a path of democratizing change is the work of actors, gladiators in the electoral arena, not of structural forces.

However. Even if we assign primacy to the interplay of actors in the electoral arena in our explanations of electoral authoritarian regime change, my empirical findings also lend firm support to the idea that structural contexts matter to electoral authoritarian regime trajectories. The simple finding that oil exporting EA regimes in my sample have experienced almost *no* instances of regime change, while poor EA regimes have experienced almost *all* instances of regime breakdown, is a powerful reminder that actors in the electoral arena are not sovereign, but embedded in structural environments that create opportunities and constraints, generate resources and scarcities, empower and impoverish.

Appendix A: Tables and Figures

FIGURE 1. STRUCTURES OF CHOICE AND (PROBABLE / POSSIBLE) TRAJECTORIES OF ELECTORAL AUTOCRACIES




TABLE 1. TRAJECTORIES OF ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS

	N	%
COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS		
CONTINUITY	68	73,1
DEMOCRATIZATION	20	21,5
INTERRUPTION	5	5,4
TOTAL	93	100,0
HEGEMONIC ELECTIONS		
HEGEMONIC CONTINUITY	45	78,9
COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM	6	10,5
DEMOCRATIZATION	3	5,3
INTERRUPTION	3	5,3
TOTAL	57	100,0

Source: Author's Dataset on Authoritarian Elections (1980-2002).

TABLE 2. TRAJECTORIES OF ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: STRATEGIC AND STRUCTURAL CONTEXTS

		COMPETITIVE REGIMES			HEGEMONIC REGIMES	
		COMPETITIVE CONTINUITY	DEMOCRATIC CHANGE	INTERRUPTION	HEGEMONIC CONTINUITY	REGIME OPENING
ELECTORAL UNCERTAINTY						
LEGISLATIVE MARGIN OF VICTORY	∅	33,17	*14,65	16,6	72,40	*57,98
	N	50	18	5	38	7
	SD	29,92	37,01	56,65	21,15	19,14
PRESIDENTIAL MARGIN OF VICTORY	∅	37,76	***8,37	49,58	57,81	61,43
	N	34	13	3	15	5
	SD	39,69	24,28	34,86	24,84	24,14
LEG. OPPOSITION FRAGMENTATION	∅	,69	,70	,60	,53	,45
	N	48	17	5	36	7
	SD	,25	,40	,23	,29	,27
PRES. OPPOSITION FRAGMENTATION	∅	,43	,56	,57	,40	,41
	N	32	12	3	15	5
	SD	,24	,22	,32	,24	,13
ELECTORAL PROTEST						
PRE-ELECTORAL ACQUIESCENCE	N	40	12	2	38	5
	COLUMN %	58,8%	60,0%	40,0%	82,6%	55,6%
PRE-ELECTORAL ACTIVE PROTEST	N	28	8	3	8	4
	COLUMN %	41,2%	40,0%	60,0%	17,4%	44,4%
			CHI ² = ,7	P = ,699	CHI ² = 3,2	P = ,072
POST-ELECTORAL ACQUIESCENCE	N	22	9	0	18	0
	COLUMN %	32,4%	45,0%	,0%	39,1%	,0%
POST-ELECTORAL REJECTION	N	26	5	1	13	5
	COLUMN %	38,2%	25,0%	20,0%	28,3%	55,6%
POST-ELECTORAL PROTEST	N	20	6	4	15	4
	COLUMN %	29,4%	30,0%	80,0%	32,6%	44,4%
			CHI ² = 7,3	P = ,119	CHI ² = 5,5	P = ,063
ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION	N	45	15	1	31	5
	COLUMN %	66,2%	75,0%	20,0%	67,4%	55,6%
PARTIAL BOYCOTT	N	16	1	2	10	1
	COLUMN %	23,5%	5,0%	40,0%	21,7%	11,1%
FULL BOYCOTT	N	7	4	2	5	3
	COLUMN %	10,3%	20,0%	40,0%	10,9%	33,3%
			CHI ² = 9,0	P = ,060	CHI ² = 3,2	P = ,202
POST-ELECTORAL CONTENTION						
ANTI-GOVERNMENT	∅	2,40	2,80	3,00	,74	5,00

DEMONSTRATIONS						
	N	68	20	5	46	9
	SD	4,866	3,736	3,317	1,679	10,198
GENERAL STRIKES	∅	,41	,35	,60	,02	,11
	N	68	20	5	46	9
	SD	1,068	,813	,894	,147	,333
RIOTS	∅	,87	,60	1,00	,65	3,22
	N	68	20	5	46	9
	SD	2,317	1,095	1,225	1,449	6,741
ARMED REBELLION	∅	1,37	***3,65	***5,60	,37	,22
	N	68	20	5	46	9
	SD	2,108	4,998	9,209	,951	,441
AUTHORITARIAN MANIPULATION						
INCLUSION	N	35	16	3	21	6
	COLUMN %	51,5%	80,0%	60,0%	45,7%	66,7%
EXCLUSION	N	33	4	2	25	3
	COLUMN %	48,5%	20,0%	40,0%	54,3%	33,3%
			CHI ² = 5,1	P = ,075	CHI ² = 1,3	P = ,216
ELECTORAL INTEGRITY	N	14	6	2	16	1
	COLUMN %	20,6%	30,0%	40,0%	34,8%	11,1%
IRREGULARITIES	N	31	10	2	21	5
	COLUMN %	45,6%	50,0%	40,0%	45,7%	55,6%
ELECTORAL FRAUD	N	23	4	1	9	3
	COLUMN %	33,8%	20,0%	20,0%	19,6%	33,3%
			CHI ² = 2,4	P = ,654	CHI ² = 2,1	P = ,337
REPRESSION (SCALE 0-8)	∅	4,84	4,50	4,80	3,42	*4,56
	N	68	20	5	45	9
	SD	1,882	2,259	2,168	1,815	2,068
CENSORSHIP (SCALE 0-2)	∅	1,426	****1,050	1,200	1,380	1,167
	N	68	20	5	46	9
	SD	,4255	,3940	,2739	,4495	,5000
STAKES OF POLITICS						
WEALTH (GDP P.C. CURRENT PPP)	∅	2665,52	3446,00	**1378,00	4177,39	***2310
	N	67	20	5	46	9
	SD	1801,51	2160,62	424,40	4603,07	1551,34
MINERAL FUEL EXPORTS (% EXPORTS)	∅	25,02	***6,54	7,31	27,41	14,63
	N	46	20	3	36	7
	SD	32,88	8,63	11,44	29,35	22,09
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES (% GDP)	∅	22,65	28,64	16,99	23,98	21,27
	N	40	13	3	30	4
	SD	9,80	14,43	6,08	9,90	10,77
INEQUALITY (GINI COEFFICIENT)	∅	40,12	42,32	45,65	43,20	44,79
	N	64	20	5	37	8
	SD	9,32	10,06	9,94	7,15	10,94
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION	N	8	9	0	0	1
	COLUMN %	16,7%	47,4%	,0%	,0%	25,0%

MIXED-MEMBER MAJORITY	N	21	4	0	10	3
	COLUMN %	43,8%	21,1%	,0%	38,5%	75,0%
MAJORITARIAN OR PREFERENTIAL VOTE	N	19	6	3	16	0
	COLUMN %	39,6%	31,6%	100,0%	61,5%	,0%
			CHI ² = 12	P = ,016	CHI ² = 10	P = ,007
PRESIDENTIALISM	N	49	12	2	22	7
	COLUMN %	72,1%	60,0%	40,0%	47,8%	77,8%
SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM	N	12	4	3	7	0
	COLUMN %	17,6%	20,0%	60,0%	15,2%	,0%
PARLIAMENTARISM	N	7	4	0	17	2
	COLUMN %	10,3%	20,0%	,0%	37,0%	22,2%
			CHI ² = 6,8	P = ,142	CHI ² = 3,1	P = ,210
REPRESSIVE CAPACITIES						
GOVERNMENT CRISES	Ø	,63	,84	,80	,15	** ,00
	N	64	19	5	46	9
	SD	1,12	1,42	1,30	,47	,00
MILITARY COUPS	Ø	,09	,21	,20	,00	,00
	N	64	19	5	46	9
	SD	,29	,53	,44	,00	,00
MILITARY EXPENDITURE (% GDP)	Ø	2,86	2,46	3,06	2,73	1,90
	N	58	13	3	26	5
	SD	2,11	1,82	1,96	1,27	,82
MILIT. PERSONNEL (% LABOR FORCE)	Ø	1,42	1,12	1,12	1,09	*** ,56
	N	44	12	3	28	5
	SD	1,21	,87	,93	,84	,36

Source: Author's Dataset on Authoritarian Elections (1980-2002). For descriptions of variables and sources, see Appendix.

* $p \leq .15$, ** $\leq .10$, *** $\leq .05$, **** $\leq .01$

Significance tests: (a) Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) with Turkey HSD post hoc Tests, in comparisons of means between competitive continuity, democratization, and interruption; (b) bilateral t-tests for independent samples, in comparisons of means between hegemonic continuity and opening; (c) Chi-square tests, in cross-tabulations of explanatory variables with competitive as well as hegemonic regime trajectories (with Chi² and probability values given for each distribution of variables). Bold letters highlight both statistically and substantively significant differences (at a probability level of $p \leq .15$).

Post-electoral contention = Sum of protest events (as reported in the Arthur Banks CNTS dataset) during the three years following the election.

TABLE 3. TRAJECTORIES OF POOR AND OIL-DEPENDENT ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM

		NON-POOR COUNTRY	POOR COUNTRY	NON-OIL- EXPORTING COUNTRY	OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRY
REGIME CONTINUITY	N	59	59	57	31
	ROW %	50,0%	50,0%	64,8%	35,2%
	COLUMN %	76,6%	81,9%	69,5%	96,9%
	TOTAL%	39,6%	39,6%	50,0%	27,2%
DEMOCRATIZATION	N	17	6	21	1
	ROW %	73,9%	26,1%	95,5%	4,5%
	COLUMN %	22,1%	8,3%	25,6%	3,1%
	TOTAL%	11,4%	4,0%	18,4%	,9%
INTERRUPTION	N	1	7	4	0
	ROW %	12,5%	87,5%	100,0%	,0%
	COLUMN %	1,3%	9,7%	4,9%	,0%
	TOTAL%	,7%	4,7%	3,5%	,0%
TOTAL	N	77	72	82	32
	ROW %	51,7%	48,3%	71,9%	28,1%
	COLUMN %	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: Author's Dataset on Authoritarian Elections (1980-2002).

Poor country = annual gdp per capita < 2,000 ppp (current)

Oil-exporting country = mineral fuel exports ≥ 25% of total exports.

TABLE 4. DETERMINANTS OF ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN REGIME TRAJECTORIES

COMPETITIVE REGIMES	E ^B	P	HEGEMONIC REGIMES	E ^B	P
DEMOCRATIZATION			OPENING		
MARGIN OF VICTORY	,973	,020	ELECTORAL PROTEST	3,311	,089
ELECTORAL BOYCOTT	2,391	,100	ELECTORAL BOYCOTT	2,180	,159
REGIME MANIPULATION	,281	,026	REPRESSION	1,537	,075
WEALTH (LOG GDP P.C. CURRENT PPP)	4,631	,216	CENSORSHIP	,212	,173
MINERAL FUEL EXPORTS (% EXPORTS)	,960	,109	CONSTANT	,048	,062
CONSTANT		,526			
INTERRUPTION					
MARGIN OF VICTORY	,926	,040			
ELECTORAL BOYCOTT	10,637	,078			
REGIME MANIPULATION	1,341	,826			
WEALTH (LOG GDP P.C. CURRENT PPP)	,004	,173			
MINERAL FUEL EXPORTS (% EXPORTS)	,940	,276			
CONSTANT		,254			
COX & SNELL R2		,398	COX & SNELL R2	,173	
NAGELKERKE R2		,507	NAGELKERKE R2	,291	
N		68	N	54	

Source: Author's Dataset on Authoritarian Elections (1980-2002).

Competitive regimes: Multinomial logistic regression. Hegemonic regimes: Binary logistic regression. Reference categories: regime continuity.

Electoral data refer to national elections (presidential, legislative or concurrent elections). In concurrent elections, margins of victory = presidential margins, regime manipulation = mean of manipulation, and electoral protest and boycott = the highest values of protest and boycott in simultaneous legislative and presidential elections.

Appendix B: Description of Sample and Data

The Universe of Authoritarian Elections (1980-2002)

To delimitate the basket of electoral authoritarian regimes, I used, in a first step, Freedom House data (www.freedomhouse.org) to delineate a broad pool of candidates for inclusion (among countries with population > 1 million). In order to discard those regimes that were either too democratic or too dictatorial to be included in the intermediate category of electoral autocracies, I selected all countries that received Freedom House political rights scores between 4 and 6 during at least four consecutive years between 1980 and 2002.

While this first delimitation of candidate regimes relies on the criterion of political freedom, in a second step I employed institutional criteria, with a narrow focus on the electoral arena, to demarcate my universe of cases. Among the countries located at the intermediate levels of political freedom, only those qualify as electoral authoritarian that held at least one full set of multiparty elections with universal suffrage for the chief executive as well as the national legislature (Lower House).¹⁴ This set of institutional requirements excludes non-party regimes, de jure as well as de facto one-party regimes, military regimes, competitive oligarchies, and traditional monarchies. It also excludes incomplete election cycles in which a single presidential or legislative election is followed by regime breakdown (through military coup, executive coup, armed insurrection, or external occupation). As the idea of authoritarian regimes presupposes the presence of governments endowed with a minimum of external and internal sovereignty, the sample also excludes non-sovereign protectorates, like Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as cases of state collapse that fail to maintain political structures we could recognize as political regimes.

The resulting universe of authoritarian elections includes 123 legislative and 71 presidential elections that were held in 51 countries in six world regions. Table A below gives the full list of cases, Table B shows their distribution across world regions: Reflecting the subcontinent's turn from one-party rule to electoral authoritarianism in the last decade of the 20th century, Sub-Saharan Africa concentrates the largest share of authoritarian election cycles (37.1%). Due to the peace transitions in Central America and the demise of hegemonic party rule in Mexico and Paraguay, Latin America and

¹⁴ I demand direct popular elections for the chief executive in presidential regimes. In case of parliamentary regimes, I demand direct elections for the legislature that selects and maintains the government. Borderline cases included in the database are Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia.

the Caribbean comes only second, contributing a fifth of cases to the database (20.1%). All other world regions hosted around a tenth of authoritarian elections each between 1980 and 2002. Due to my exclusion of traditional monarchies, the Middle East and Northern Africa lie somewhat below that marker (8.2%), while South and East Asia, “a great storehouse of historical and contemporary electoral authoritarianism” (Case, 2006: 95), lie somewhat higher (12.9%).

Competitive and Hegemonic Regimes

To distinguish hegemonic from competitive regimes, I rely on two criteria: a minimum duration of ten years (since the assumption of power by the ruling coalition) and the continuous control of legislative supermajorities (with the ruling party holding at least two thirds of seats in the Lower House). The criterion of duration relates to the institutionalized nature of hegemonic party regimes. Hegemonic parties are no shooting stars that illuminate the party system during one or two brief elections only. Founded at the end of civil war, the achievement of national independence, or the imposition of military rule, hegemonic parties aspire to rule for the long haul and they have the resources to do so, be it primarily in terms of popular legitimacy or in terms of repressive capacities.¹⁵ The criterion of continuous legislative supermajorities derives from the notion that hegemonic regimes strive to assemble heterogeneous “oversized coalitions.” Their rather inclusive and overpowering alliance structure permits them to be invincible, and appear invincible, in the electoral arena. In the arena of constitution making, it allows them to control the basic rules of the political game and to manipulate them at their convenience (see Magaloni 2006: 15).¹⁶

Table C contains the resulting list of countries that accommodated hegemonic party regimes at some point during the period under study (1980-2002). Table B also shows the regional distribution of both hegemonic and competitive elections. Notably, well over half of all hegemonic elections were conducted south of the Sahara (54.3%). Due to the recent independence of post-Soviet countries, hegemonic elections were unknown in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus (with one disputable exception).

¹⁵ I handle the 10-year rule with certain flexibility. For instance, when Burkina Faso held its first multiparty election in 1991, only eight years had elapsed since the military coup that brought president Blaise Compaore to power. I nevertheless count the regime as hegemonic from 1991 to 2002 (when it lost its legislative supermajority).

¹⁶ Again, I grant some minor exceptions to the rule of continuous supermajorities. The governing parties of Gabon (in 1990), Guinea (in 1995), and Togo (in 1994) suffered transitory losses of their comfortable supermajorities. All three were quick to repair their electoral “accidents” and recovered their qualified legislative majorities in the subsequent elections.

Contentious Action

To capture the occurrence of opposition protest in the wake of authoritarian elections, I use a news-based measure of post-election protest from my Dataset on Authoritarian Elections. This trichotomous ordinal variable registers opposition acquiescence (score 0), the rhetorical rejection of election outcomes by opposition parties (score 0.5), and their active mobilization in protest against the election (score 1).¹⁷ From the same dataset I also use a dichotomous measure of pre-electoral protest to explore the linkage between pre-electoral and post-electoral contention. Table D provides summary descriptions of my measures, Table E shows descriptive statistics (for more extensive explications of coding rules, coding processes, and data sources, see Schedler, 2006a).

For the purpose of this paper, I use various counts of “conflict events” from the Arthur S. Banks Cross-National Time Series Data Archive (CNTS). To examine levels of “vertical threats” I employ event counts of anti-government demonstrations, general strikes, riots, and armed rebellions (the sum of “revolutions” and “guerrilla warfare”). To examine levels of “horizontal threats” I use event counts of successful military coups and government crises from the same source (www.databanksinternational.com). I compute the sum of each category of “vertically threatening” events for the three years following each election the dataset (F3), and the sum of each category of “horizontally threatening” events for the three years preceding each election (P3),

Regime Manipulation

The repertoire of manipulation electoral authoritarian rulers have at their disposition is wide, multifaceted, and open (see Schedler, 2002). In the present paper, I wish to study the individual impact of four specific strategies on subsequent levels of opposition mobilization: physical repression, media restrictions, the exclusion of parties and candidates, and electoral fraud. Table D contains summary descriptions of these measures, while Table E

¹⁷ *Acquiescence* = Either explicit or tacit acceptance of defeat by losing parties or candidates, without public criticism of the electoral process. It also includes instances of low-profile criticism of irregularities as well as formal or de facto concession of defeat, albeit with complaints about non-decisive irregularities. *Rejection* = Public statements claiming that results are falsified and thus fail to reflect the will of the electorate. The category includes rhetorical rejection (public complaints that elections were undemocratic, that manipulation was decisive, that irregularities invalidated results); public demands for the annulment of the election; judicial recourse (the formal appeal to domestic or international courts); and symbolic protest (such as the boycott of presidential inauguration or inaugural session of the parliament). *Active protest* = Active mobilization of followers in protest against election results, for instance, through public demonstrations, civic resistance, occupation of public buildings, street blockades, boycott of legislative assembly, the spontaneous outbreak to violence.

provides descriptive statistics (for more extensive explications of coding rules, coding processes, and data sources, see Schedler, 2006b).

TABLE A. AUTHORITARIAN ELECTIONS IN THE WORLD, 1980–2002

ALBANIA 1991 L	CROATIA 1997 P	KAZAKHSTAN 1999 C	ROMANIA 1992 C
ALBANIA 1992 L	EGYPT 1984 L	KENYA 1992 C	RUSSIA 1999 L
ALBANIA 1996 L	EGYPT 1987 L	KENYA 1997 C	RUSSIA 2000 P
ALBANIA 1997 L	EGYPT 1990 L	KENYA 2002 C	SENEGAL 1983 C
ALGERIA 1995 P	EGYPT 1995 L	KYRGYZSTAN 1995 C	SENEGAL 1988 C
ALGERIA 1997 L	EGYPT 2000 L	KYRGYZSTAN 2000 C	SENEGAL 1993 C
ALGERIA 1999 P	EL SALVADOR 1984 P	MACEDONIA 1994 L	SENEGAL 1998 L
ALGERIA 2002 L	EL SALVADOR 1985 L	MALAYSIA 1982 L	SINGAPORE 1980 L
ARMENIA 1995 L	ETHIOPIA 1995 L	MALAYSIA 1986 L	SINGAPORE 1984 L
ARMENIA 1996 P	ETHIOPIA 2000 L	MALAYSIA 1990 L	SINGAPORE 1988 L
ARMENIA 1998 P	GABON 1990 L	MALAYSIA 1995 L	SINGAPORE 1991 L
ARMENIA 1999 L	GABON 1993 P	MALAYSIA 1999 L	SINGAPORE 1997 L
AZERBAIJAN 1993 P	GABON 1996 L	MAURITANIA 1996 L	SINGAPORE 2001 L
AZERBAIJAN 1995 L	GABON 1998 P	MAURITANIA 1997 P	SRI LANKA 1994 C
AZERBAIJAN 1998 P	GABON 2001 L	MAURITANIA 2001 L	TAJIKISTAN 1999 P
AZERBAIJAN 2000 L	GAMBIA 2001 P	MEXICO 1982 C	TAJIKISTAN 2000 L
BELARUS 1994 P	GAMBIA 2002 L	MEXICO 1985 L	TANZANIA 1995 C
BELARUS 1995 L	GEORGIA 1992 L	MEXICO 1988 C	TANZANIA 2000 C
BELARUS 2000 L	GEORGIA 1995 C	MEXICO 1991 L	TOGO 1993 P
BELARUS 2001 P	GEORGIA 1999 L	MEXICO 1994 C	TOGO 1994 L
BURKINA FASO 1992 L	GEORGIA 2000 P	MOLDOVA 1994 L	TOGO 1998 P
BURKINA FASO 1997 L	GHANA 1992 C	NICARAGUA 1984 C	TOGO 1999 L
BURKINA FASO 1998 P	GUATEMALA 1985 C	NIGER 1996 C	TOGO 2002 L
BURKINA FASO 2002 L	GUATEMALA 1994 L	NIGER 1999 C	TUNISIA 1999 C
CAMBODIA 1993 L	GUATEMALA 1995 C	PAKISTAN 1990 L	TURKEY 1983 L
CAMBODIA 1998 L	GUINEA 1993 P	PAKISTAN 1993 L	TURKEY 1995 L
CAMEROON 1992 C	GUINEA 1995 L	PAKISTAN 1997 L	TURKEY 1999 L
CAMEROON 1997 C	GUINEA 1998 P	PANAMA 1984 C	YEMEN 1997 L
CAMEROON 2002 L	GUINEA 2002 L	PANAMA 1989 P	YEMEN 1999 P
CHAD 1996 P	HAITI 1990 C	PARAGUAY 1983 C	ZAMBIA 1996 C
CHAD 1997 L	HAITI 1995 C	PARAGUAY 1988 C	ZAMBIA 2001 C
CHAD 2001 P	HAITI 1997 L	PARAGUAY 1989 C	ZIMBABWE 1985 L
CHAD 2002 L	HAITI 2000 C	PARAGUAY 1998 C	ZIMBABWE 1990 C
COLOMBIA 2002 C	INDONESIA 1982 L	PERU 1995 C	ZIMBABWE 1995 L
COTE D'IVOIRE 1990 C	INDONESIA 1987 L	PERU 2000 C	ZIMBABWE 1996 P
COTE D'IVOIRE 1995 C	INDONESIA 1992 L	PHILIPPINES 1981 P	ZIMBABWE 2000 L
COTE D'IVOIRE 2000 C	INDONESIA 1997 L	PHILIPPINES 1984 L	ZIMBABWE 2002 P
CROATIA 1992 C	INDONESIA 1999 L	PHILIPPINES 1986 P	
CROATIA 1995 L	KAZAKHSTAN 1995 L	ROMANIA 1990 C	

P= Presidential elections, L= Legislative elections, C= Concurrent elections (within one calendar year).

Source: Author's Database on Authoritarian Elections in the World.

**TABLE B. ELECTIONS IN ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES,
BY WORLD REGION, 1980-2002**

WORLD REGION	LEG. ELECTIONS	PRES. ELECTIONS	TOTAL	%
ALL ELECTORAL AUTOCRACIES				
1 LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN	21	18	39	20,1
2 EASTERN EUROPE	13	7	20	10,3
3 CENTRAL ASIA & CAUCASUS	12	10	22	11,3
4 MIDDLE EAST & NORTHERN AFRICA	12	4	16	8,2
5 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	41	31	72	37,1
6 SOUTH & EAST ASIA	22	3	25	12,9
TOTAL	121	73	194	100,0
HEGEMONIC REGIMES				
1 LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN	5	4	9	12,8
2 EASTERN EUROPE	1	0	1	0,1
3 CENTRAL ASIA & CAUCASUS	0	0	0	0
4 NORTHERN AFRICA & MIDDLE EAST	6	1	7	10,0
5 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	21	17	38	54,3
6 SOUTH & EAST ASIA	15	0	15	21,4
TOTAL	48	22	70	100,0
COMPETITIVE REGIMES				
1 LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN	16	14	30	24,2
2 EASTERN EUROPE	12	7	19	15,3
3 CENTRAL ASIA & CAUCASUS	12	10	22	17,7
4 NORTHERN AFRICA & MIDDLE EAST	6	3	9	7,2
5 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	20	14	34	27,4
6 SOUTH & EAST ASIA	7	3	10	8,1
TOTAL	73	51	124	100,0

Source: Author's Dataset on Authoritarian Elections (1980-2002).

TABLE C. HEGEMONIC PARTY REGIMES, 1980–2002

COUNTRY	RULING PARTY	ACRONYM	INITIATION OF RULE*	REGIME ORIGIN	PERSONAL LEADERSHIP**	YEARS IN OFFICE	HEGEMONIC REGIME TERMINATION	MODE OF TERMINATION
ALBANIA ¹	ALBANIAN LABOUR PARTY (SOCIALIST PARTY IN 1991)	PT	1946		...		1992	ELECTORAL ALTERNATION IN POWER
MEXICO	INSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONARY PARTY	PRI	1929	CIVIL WAR	...		1988	LOSS OF LEGISLATIVE SUPERMAJORITY
PARAGUAY	NATIONAL REPUBLICAN ASSOCIATION – PARTIDO COLORADO	ANR	1954	MILITARY COUP, PARTY FOUNDATION 1887	ALFREDO STROESSNER	1954–1989	1993	LOSS OF LEGISLATIVE SUPERMAJORITY (AFTER COUP 1989)
BURKINA FASO	CONGRESS FOR DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESS	CDP	1983	MILITARY COUP, ELECTORAL OPENING	BLAIS COMPAORE	1983–	2002	LOSS OF LEGISLATIVE SUPERMAJORITY
COTE D'IVOIRE	DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF COTE D'IVOIRE	PDCI	1960	INDEPENDENCE, ELECTORAL OPENING	HENIR KONAN BEDIE	1993–1999	1999	MILITARY COUP
EGYPT	NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY	NDP	1952	MILITARY COUP 1952, PARTY FOUNDATION 1978	HOSNI MUBARAK	1981–
TUNISIA	CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC RALLY	CDR	1956	INDEPENDENCE, SOFT COUP 1987	ZINE EL-ABIDINE BEN ALI	1987–
GABON	GABONESE DEMOCRATIC PARTY	PDG	1960	INDEPENDENCE	OMAR BONGO	1967–2009
GUINEA	PROGRESS AND UNITY PARTY	PUP	1984	MILITARY COUP, ELECTORAL OPENING	LASANA CONTÉ	1984–2008	2008	DEATH OF PRESIDENT, MILITARY INTERVENTION
MAURITANIA	SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN PARTY	PRDS	1978	MILITARY COUP, ELECTORAL OPENING	MAAOUYA OULD SID AHMED TAYA	1984–2005	2005	MILITARY COUP
SENEGAL	SOCIALIST PARTY	SP	1960	INDEPENDENCE, ELECTORAL OPENING	ABDOU DIOUF	1981–2000	1998	LOSS OF LEGISLATIVE SUPERMAJORITY
TANZANIA	CHAMA CHA MAPINDUZI	CCM	1961	INDEPENDENCE, ELECTORAL OPENING	BENJAMÍN MKAPA	1995–2005
TOGO	RALLY OF THE TOGOLESE PEOPLE	RPT	1967	MILITARY COUP, ELECTORAL OPENING	GNASSINGBÉ EYADÉMA	1967–2005	2005	DEATH OF PRESIDENT, MILITARY COUP
ZIMBABWE	ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION – PATRIOTIC FRONT	ZANU-PF	1980	INDEPENDENCE	ROBERT MUGABE	1987–	2000	LOSS OF LEGISLATIVE SUPERMAJORITY
INDONESIA	GOLONGAN KARYA (FUNCTIONAL GROUPS)	GOLKAR	1965	MILITARY COUP	SUHARTO	1965–1998	1999	RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT (1998)
MALAYSIA	UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION	UMNO NATIONAL FRONT	1963	INDEPENDENCE	MAHATHIR MOHAMAD	1981–2003	2008	LOSS OF LEGISLATIVE SUPERMAJORITY
SINGAPORE	PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY	PAP	1965	INDEPENDENCE	LEE KUAN YEW	1965–1990
					GOH CHOK TONG	1990–2004

* Initiation of regime governed by same party, person or ruling coalition.

** Under hegemonic party rule (not single-party period).

¹ After 55 years of Communist single-party rule under Enver Hoxha, Albania counts as hegemonic system only for its first multi-party elections in 1991.

TABLE D. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

VARIABLES	DEFINITIONS / CATEGORIES
ELECTORAL UNCERTAINTY	
MARGIN OF VICTORY IN LEGISLATIVE RACES (LOWER CHAMBER)	$S_1 - S_2$ WHERE S_1 IS THE SEAT SHARE OF THE LARGEST PARTY, AND S_2 THE SEAT SHARE OF THE SECOND PARTY.
MARGIN OF VICTORY IN PRESIDENTIAL RACES	$V_1 - V_2$ WHERE V_1 IS THE VOTE SHARE OF THE WINNING PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, AND V_2 THE VOTE SHARE OF THE SECOND-PLACED CANDIDATE.
RAE INDEX OF LEGISLATIVE OPPOSITION FRACTIONALIZATION	$1 - \sum S_i^2$ WHERE S_i IS THE SEAT SHARE OF THE i^{TH} OPPOSITION PARTY (OF ALL OPPOSITION SEATS).
RAE INDEX OF PRESIDENTIAL OPPOSITION FRACTIONALIZATION	$1 - \sum V_i^2$ WHERE V_i IS THE VOTE SHARE OF THE i^{TH} PRESIDENTIAL OPPOSITION CANDIDATE (OF TOTAL OPPOSITION VOTES).
ELECTORAL PROTEST	
PRE-ELECTORAL PROTEST: OPPOSITION MOBILIZATION IN PROTEST AGAINST UPCOMING ELECTIONS	0 ACQUIESCENCE 1 ACTIVE PROTEST
POST-ELECTORAL PROTEST: OPPOSITION REACTIONS TO THE OUTCOMES OF AUTHORITARIAN ELECTIONS	0 ACQUIESCENCE 0.5 REJECTION 1 ACTIVE PROTEST
OPPOSITION BOYCOTT: PARTICIPATION OR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ELECTORAL PROCESS BY MAIN OPPOSITION PARTIES.	0 PARTICIPATION 1 PARTIAL BOYCOTT 2 FULL BOYCOTT
REGIME MANIPULATION	
EXCLUSION: EXCLUSION OF PARTIES AND CANDIDATES FROM ELECTIONS	0 OPENNESS 1 EXCLUSION
ELECTORAL FRAUD: ADMINISTRATIVE REDISTRIBUTION OF VOTES	0 NO FRAUD 1 IRREGULARITIES 2 FRAUD
PHYSICAL REPRESSION: VIOLATION OF PHYSICAL INTEGRITY (EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS, DISAPPEARANCE, TORTURE, AND POLITICAL IMPRISONMENT)	RANGE 0-8, WHERE 0 = FULL RESPECT FOR BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS, 8 = GROSS VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. CINGRANELLI-RICHARDS (CIRI) PHYSICAL INTEGRITY RIGHTS INDEX (INVERTED) (HTTP://CIRI.BINGHAMPTON.EDU).
MEDIA RESTRICTIONS: RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND MASS MEDIA	RANGE 0-2, WHERE 0 = NO MEDIA RESTRICTIONS, AND 2 = HIGH MEDIA RESTRICTIONS. ARITHMETIC MEAN OF CIRI FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS (INVERTED) AND FREEDOM HOUSE PRESS FREEDOM (WWW.FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG).

Source: Author's Dataset on Authoritarian Elections (1980-2002).

TABLE E. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

VARIABLES	COMPETITIVE REGIMES					HEGEMONIC REGIMES				
	N	MIN.	MAX.	MEAN	SD	N	MIN.	MAX.	MEAN	SD
ELECTORAL UNCERTAINTY (DAE)										
LEGISLATIVE MARGIN OF VICTORY	73	-57,49	90,50	27,48	34,39	46	,00	100,00	70,87	20,86
PRESIDENTIAL MARGIN OF VICTORY	51	-63,03	97,96	31,06	37,65	22	17,90	97,02	61,31	24,44
MARGIN OF VICTORY	94	-63,03	97,96	29,26	36,65	57	,00	100,00	66,95	23,14
LEG. OPPOSITION FRAGMENTATION	70	,00	2,09	,69	,29	44	,00	,99	,52	,28
PRES. OPPOSITION FRAGMENTATION	48	,00	,88	,46	,25	22	,00	,77	,39	,22
ELECTORAL PROTEST (DAE)										
PRE-ELECTORAL PROTEST	94	0	1	,43	,49	57	0	1	,25	,43
POST-ELECTORAL PROTEST	94	,0	1,0	,50	,40	57	,0	1,0	,50	,40
ELECTORAL PROTEST	94	,0	2,0	,92	,75	57	,0	2,0	,75	,63
ELECTION BOYCOTT	94	0	2	,48	,72	57	0	2	,54	,78
POST-ELECTORAL CONTENTION (CNTS)										
ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS F3	94	0	30	2,56	4,54	57	0	32	1,40	4,42
GENERAL STRIKES F3	94	0	5	,40	,99	57	0	1	,07	,25
RIOTS F3	94	0	13	,82	2,04	57	0	21	1,04	3,01
ARMED REBELLION F3	94	0	22	2,10	3,67	57	0	4	,40	,92
ELECTORAL MANIPULATION (DAE)										
EXCLUSION	94	0	1	,41	,49	57	0	1	,54	,50
FRAUD	94	0	2	1,07	,73	57	0	2	,89	,72
VIOLATIONS OF PHYSICAL INTEGRITY	94	0	8	4,79	1,96	56	0	8	3,55	1,87
VIOLATIONS OF MEDIA FREEDOM	94	,0	2,0	1,34	,44	57	,5	2,0	1,35	,45
INDEX OF MANIPULATION	93	,75	3,75	2,21	,70	55	,38	3,88	2,11	,77
INDEX OF TOLERANCE	93	,25	3,25	1,78	,70	55	,13	3,63	1,88	,77
STAKES OF POLITICS (WDI)										
WEALTH (GDP PC CURRENT PPP) (X 1000)	93	,57	8,08	2,77	1,87	57	,45	22,97	3,82	4,23
WEALTH (GDP P.C. CURRENT PPP) (LOG)	93	2,76	3,91	3,34	,29	57	2,65	4,36	3,41	,36
MINERAL FUEL EXPORTS (% EXPORTS)	70	,01	96,48	18,62	28,45	43	,01	89,32	25,49	28,35
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES (% GDP)	57	,00	63,90	23,74	11,03	35	,00	46,87	23,10	9,99
INEQUALITY (GINI COEFFICIENT)	90	28,17	59,21	41,09	9,61	47	28,17	56,80	43,42	7,68
MAJORITARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM	71	0	2	1,15	,78	29	0	2	1,48	,57
PARLIAMENTARISM	94	0	2	,44	,69	57	0	2	,75	,91
REPRESSIVE CAPACITIES (CNTS & WDI)										
GOVERNMENT CRISES P3	89	0	5	,70	1,19	57	0	2	,12	,42
MILITARY COUPS P3	89	0	2	,12	,36	57	0	0	,00	,00
MILITARY EXPENDITURE (% GDP)	75	,40	9,80	2,78	2,03	32	,30	5,00	2,54	1,25
MILITARY PERSONNEL (% LABOR FORCE)	60	,00	4,61	1,34	1,12	34	,17	3,50	,99	,80

Source: Author's Dataset on Authoritarian Elections (1980-2002)

dae = Author's Dataset on Authoritarian Elections, cnts = Tony Banks Cross-National Time Series, wdi = World Bank World Development Indicators

cnts Index Armed rebellion = guerrilla movements + revolutions.

P3 = Three years previous to election year

F3 = Three years following the election year

* Legislative margins of victory: seat percentages. Presidential margins of victory: vote percentages. In cases of authoritarian alternation in government (without regime change), margins of victory turn negative, thus indicating the incumbent's margin of defeat.

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