Shared terrains: when and why violent resistance works

Abstract

When does vioelence help dissidents succeed? In this study, I investigate the conditions under which violence can help dissidents to achieve concessions from rulers. I reframe this problem of concessions as a commitment problem for dissdents. By distinguishing mixed campaigns where moderate and radical groups share the conflict terrain, I argue that violence works when moderates avoid coordionation with radicals. For such mixed but uncoordinated campaigns, violence raises the costs for rulers by provoking instability and by increasing the public sopport for moderates. Moreover, as moderates can plausibly deny their links with radicals, they become credible in their promises increasing rulers' utility to concede. I also explore how, conditional on this lack of coordination, higher levels of violence can be useful in they significantly raise the costs of rulers for not giving in and if, along with more violence, rulers acquire more options to co-opt dissident groups. The empirical analysis shows first that mixed uncoordinated campaigns are more likely to succeed that violent ones, although not more successful than coordinated campaigns. Second, it shows that when moderates avoid coordination and violent and non-violent actions simultaneously increase, frontal violence increases, or both violence and the number of groups increase, uncoordinated campaigns are more likely to succeed.