The political economy of autocracies: risk and human development under authoritarian rule

Abstract

In this doctoral dissertation, I aim to explain why, even though the opposite would be expected, there are some authoritarian leaders that implement welfare policies. My argument is that autocrats at risk of losing power are more likely to be responsive to social demands and therefore have a greater propensity to implement redistribution and public spending policies that improve the human development of the population. More specifically, I argue that the risk of losing power (and thus of implementing redistributive policies) is greater in the presence of executive elections or splits within the authoritarian elite. I examine the different implications of my theory in three different chapters. In the first of them, I address the risk of losing power from the perspective of executive elections. To test this argument, I analyze data from 135 autocracies over time and the evidence of statistical models supports this argument. In the second chapter, I analyze the risk of losing power and its effects on human development from the perspective of splits within the authoritarian elite. To test this argument, I use information from 246 executive elections in authoritarian regimes. Empirical evidence shows that autocrats facing such splits are more likely to improve people's quality of life. In the final chapter, I explore the implications of the theory of splits within the elite for electoral authoritarianisms. To test this extension of my argument I use an integrated mixed research design with evidence from the Mexican case. I analyze both nationally and subnationally partisan defections and competitiveness in executive elections. Evidence is consistent in showing that splits within the PRI led different autocrats to implement development policies so that the ruling party would not lose power.