La movilización clientelar y la brecha socioeconómico-electoral

Abstract

¿Qué factores aminoran la inequidad de participación electoral? ¿Las dinámicas informales, como la movilización clientelar, pueden reducir la brecha socioeconómico-electoral? A lo largo de la tesis argumento que no sólo debemos estudiar los efectos de las reglas formales sobre el comportamiento electoral. Por ello, pongo a prueba si las ofertas clientelares disminuyen la diferencia de participación entre ciudadanos de diferentes niveles socioeconómicos. A través de tres capítulos empíricos con diferentes aproximaciones, muestro que la movilización clientelar reduce la brecha socioeconómico-electoral. La compra de voto y compra de participación electoral incentivan el voto de los niveles socioeconómicos bajos, sin afectar la participación de los ciudadanos de niveles socioeconómicos altos.

What factors reduce unequal turnout? Can informal dynamics, such as clientelistic mobilization, reduce the socio-economic-electoral gap? Throughout the thesis I argue that we should not only study the effects of formal rules on electoral behavior. Therefore, I test whether clientelistic offers decrease the participation gap between citizens of different socioeconomic levels. Through three empirical chapters with different approaches, I show that clientelistic mobilization reduces the socioeconomic-electoral gap. In the first chapter, I conducted a panel analysis using an original measurement of the unequal turnout variable with CSES data and the V-Dem dataset. I found that clientelism has the same effect as compulsory voting on unequal turnout. In the second chapter of my thesis, I test my hypothesis in Latin America at an individual level using data from LAPOP and estimating a fixed-effects model. The evidence supports that vote-buying and turnout-buying moderate the effect of education and wealth on the probability of voting in Latin-American countries, even more than party identification. The final chapter explores the micro-fundaments of the effects of clientelistic mobilization on poor and wealthy citizens. I did several interviews with political actors and citizens in a Mexican municipality which open the black box to answer why poor and uneducated citizens vote in certain moments. In short, vote buying and turnout buying incentivize the vote of lower socioeconomic levels, without affecting the turnout of citizens of higher socioeconomic levels. This novel topic brings attention to the importance of new approaches when studying underrepresentation and elections.