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dc.creatorGarcía Barrios, Raúl
dc.creatorMayer-Foulkes, David
dc.date.issued1998
dc.identifier12795.pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11651/5392
dc.description.abstractIndividual preferences are sensitivic to particular economic interections. Complex psychological phenomena affec the meaning and ordering of their objects according to different institucional patterns and strategical arrangements. We provide an agency model that explains preference endogenity in reference to higher order normative priciples and individual moral judgment. We use this model to explain the organization of labor regimes in the firms and the formation of preferences and choice in ultimatum games. In the firm, workers judgc the fairness of the distribution of the gains from cooperation and consequently adopt working attitudes that determine the equilibrium level of information assymetry, transaction costs and innefficiency. We explore from this perspective the formation and distribution of gains from cooperation, and their relation with the adoption of different labor regimes. A regime in which the parties maintain fair working relations clears up potential market and information failures and may generate a collaborative equilibrium enhacing maximum global efficiency. Other distributive strategies, however, uncover such failures and reduce efficiency. “Efficiency wage” regimes, while having the potential for increasing fairness and efficiency, may evolve into relations generating transfers of value in favor of the firm considered unfair by the workers; and produce resource misallocation and an equilibrium where strongly dissonant workers constitute a “moral hazard” for the firm. We analyze the conditions that determine the firm’s choice.
dc.formatapplication/PDF
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherCentro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, División de Economía
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDocumento de trabajo (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas). División de Economía; 62
dc.rightsEl Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas A.C. CIDE autoriza a poner en acceso abierto de conformidad con las licencias CREATIVE COMMONS, aprobadas por el Consejo Académico Administrativo del CIDE, las cuales establecen los parámetros de difusión de las obras con fines no comerciales. Lo anterior sin perjuicio de los derechos morales que corresponden a los autores.
dc.subject.lcshOrganizational behavior -- Moral and ethical aspects.
dc.subject.lcshWages -- Econometric models.
dc.subject.lcshEmployees -- Attitudes -- Moral and ethical aspects.
dc.titleJustice and efficiency in economic relations: explaining collaboration and conflict in the firm and choice in ultimatum games
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo
dc.accessrightsAcceso abierto
dc.recordIdentifier000012795
dc.rights.licenseCreative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 4.0 International CC BY-NC-ND


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