Legislative programmatic agenda strategies among Mexican ruling parties

Abstract

Unlike the opposition, incumbent parties are usually held responsible for addressing public issues (Abramowitz, 1975). The fact that their positions depend on the popular vote inevitably creates a prime necessity to offer visible results that convince and sustain the high regards of voters. The dynamics of this proselytist motivation suggest that, as elections come closer, incumbents might be prone to modifying their legislative activities following a vote-seeking logic. This work proposes that, as elections come closer, incumbent parties strategically modify their legislative programmatic agendas (an arrangement of issues and policy jurisdictions which parties and legislators push forward into). Promoting programmatic agendas addressing salient jurisdictions can earn electoral support for incumbent parties. Nonetheless, the time it takes for each issue to lay electoral rewards is not homogenous. Thus, triggering political actors into strategically shifting their legislative program to pay more attention to the issues that offer immediate electoral payoffs, while downplaying those which take longer to generate benefits. On top of that, I also contend that shifting the agenda towards jurisdictions that retrieve votes in the short run is exacerbated by populist parties.