I analyze a problem of assigning heterogeneous agents (tenants) to heterogeneous principals (landlords), where partnerships are subject to moral hazard in effort choice. The agents differ in wealth endowment and the ...

J. D. Geanakoplos and H. M. Polemarchakis (1986) prove the generic constrained suboptimality of equilibrium allocations in two period economies with incomplete markets. In these notes we provide a complete and detailed ...

We analyse a model of two-sided matching and incentive contracts where expert investors (venture capitalists) with different monitoring capacities are matched with firms with different levels of initial wealth. Firms do ...

We develop an incentive contracting model of firm formation. Entrepreneurs of private equity firms who differ in net worth are required to borrow from institutional investors in order to finance start up projects. Investors, ...

This paper studies incentives to invest in 'group reputations' when the latter result from the inability of certain agents to recognize their partners from past interactions; (i.e., anonymity). It does this by embedding ...

In this paper we analyze the effect of market uncertainty in an overlapping generations economy with strategic interactions among agents. We demonstrate the existence of sunspot and sunspont-like equilibria in this economy. ...

In this paper we use a non cooperative equilibrium selection approach as a notion of stability in link formation games. Specifically, we first extend the global games literature, originally introduced by Carlsson and van ...