Does the rotten apple spoils his companions? This is the question we analyze in the context of a repeated population game with behavioral types. Our experimental results show that the inclusion of a non-cooperative player ...

We consider two specific network structures, the star and the line, and study the set of bilateral alternating-offers bargaining procedures for the pairs of connected agents. Agents have complementary information ...

This paper reports an experiment conducted to compare two mechanisms that provide solutions to the King Solomon’s Dilemma. One of them is proposed by Moore (1992) and the other by Perry and Reny (1999). The objective of ...

Network formation is frequently modeled using link-formation games and typically present a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. Cooperative refinements —such as strong or coalitional proof Nash equilibria— have been the standard ...

This paper has two parts: In the first part, it presents a way of formalizing identity choice issues. In the main part, it looks at the incentive firms have to differentiate themselves by means of choosing meaningless, ...

This paper reports results of an experimental study of uniform multi-unit auctions in an environment of publicly known common values. We find that the bidding behavior exhibits two clear regularities: agents consistently ...

Econometric models under complete information environment with game theoretic foundations are used in this work to analyze husband and wife labor force participation in Mexico. A mechanism of equilibrium's selection was ...

A semi-empirical likelihood estimator is proposed for models where agents interact under asymmetric information. The methodology focuses on situations where some variables that were privately observed when choices were ...

The aim of the present document is to provide a relatively general definition of the notion of game in set-theoretic form, from the vantage viewpoint of structuralistic philosophy of science, in consonance with the state ...

A sender wants to persuade a Receiver to accept a certain proposal. The Receiver cares about two distinct dimensions, or aspects, of uncertailty to decide whether or not to acept. Both players begin with common marginal ...