Reform of justice and the proliferation of human rights non-governmental organizations in Mexico (1977-1994)

Abstract

Why do citizens in non-democratic settings, where widespread cynicism and personal risks to activists make independent organization unlikely, nonetheless sometimes organize civic vigilance that is customarily associated with democratic settings? In particular, why did human rights NGOs suddenly proliferate in Mexico after not forming when such groups appeared in Latin America's other major countries? In contrast to group theories that emphasize changes in resources available for mobilizing social demands, this paper argues that institutional reforms to Mexico's justice system created incentives for some citizens to improve the provision of justice directly by creating NGOs that supply human rights services to other citizens. Subnational data on change over time is used to test the plausibility of this argument. The study finds a sequence of judicial reforms matched by jumps in the proliferation of human rights NGOs in Mexico. The findings suggest that even where democracy is not consolidated, government institutions may inadvertently foster independent civic organization.