The twin uncertainty of authoritarian regimes

Abstract

Authoritarian rulers have a twin problem of uncertainty. They have a problem of “institutional uncertainty.” Their survival in power is insecure. And they have a problem of “informational uncertainty.” The foundations of their political survival are opaque. In this paper, I outline a framework for analysis that places the competitive struggle over these uncertainties at the core of competitive struggles over authoritarian stability and change. After discussing the multi-layered sources of institutional uncertainties as well as the theatrical consequences of epistemic uncertainties, I lay out the twin challenges these twin uncertainties involve for regime as well as opposition actors: the construction of political realities and the construction of political appearances.

Los gobiernos autoritarios tienen un doble problema de incertidumbre. Su continuidad en el poder es insegura (“incertidumbre institucional”) y las bases de su poder son opacas (“incertidumbre informativa”). Como argumenta el presente documento, la competencia entre gobierno y oposición por esta doble incertidumbre está en el corazón mismo de sus luchas por la estabilidad y el cambio de régimen.