Interest representation and party system in Mexico

Abstract

In this paper, I am interested in addressing one restricted aspect of the problem of cooperation in the context of economic restructuring and pressures for democratization in the Mexican political system. This aspect refers to the relations between the three principal political parties, the PRI, the PAN and the PRD, and the negotiation of rules of the game acceptable to all of them. I begin by assuming that the relatively successful introduction of adjustment policies has not been accompanied by a model of efficient and durable cooperation between principal political actors. This paper is divided into two parts. The first will attempt to show how the transformations in the Mexican development model are reflected in the party system and electoral competition. This task may appear enormous, but I think that it is possible to illustrate in a broad way some of the statements made above about the relationship between economics and politics. The second part explores more closely the problem of cooperation between the principal political parties in negotiating rules of the game that are acceptable to all: I will emphasize the strategic dimension of their relationship.