Emergencies without emergency powers: extra-constitutional governance in the first federal republic

Abstract

In this paper I will explore the performance of the liberal constitutional model that excluded emergency provisions between 1824 and 1834. I will establish that this omission did not preclude governments from taking action as they saw fit to face challenges of different nature. Finally, I will try to demonstrate that the absence of emergency powers in the 1824 constitution --a legacy of liberalism-- led to de facto arbitrary rule. I will explore the particular institutional consequences of this omission in effective governance. The first section of the paper provides the theoretical underpinning of my argument. The absence of legitimate emergency powers had several institutional consequences. One of them was to impair the constitution by calling into question its effectiveness. Illegal facultades extraordinarias also created incentives for political actors to attempt coups and thus hindered stable governance. The second part of the paper will analyze the 1824-1834 historical period. In 1835 the 1824 constitution was suspended by a centralist government that drafted seven constitutional laws. These laws, however, were even more adamant than the 1824 charter in their explicit condemnation of extraordinary faculties.