Spending for political survival: elections, clientelism, and goverment expenses in Mexico

Abstract

The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the Mexican federation and most states, as they are controlled by a hegemonic power that is for the first time being electorally challenged, should spend at least part of their budgets strategically. In particular, there are three ways for a government to spend its funds. It can spend money throughout the nation based on economic necessities, or it can bring in electoral or clientelistic interests into the calculus. I test these latter two possibilities, hypothesizing that the PRI-controlled governments spend more in the run-up to both state and federal elections and to pay-off their clients. To test this hypothesis I use multivariate regressions to correlate electoral timing and results with spending on social programs (in particular Ramo 26, PRONASOL and INFONAVIT), federal public investment, debt, and federal-to-state transfer payments.