Pressuring the center: opposition government and federalism in Mexico

Abstract

In this paper I analyze the role the opposition has played in stimulating the debate on federalism in Mexico. I argue that both in academic and political circles, the debate has focused almost exclusively on the redefinition of inter-governmental relations, that is, how states and municipal governments can become financially stronger and legally endowed with more attributes and faculties. However, another critical aspect of federalism has received less attention, namely, the relationship of state and local governments with their own constituencies. While making states and municipal governments richer and legally stronger is important, it is clearly not enough. A federalist pact also needs more responsible, representative, and accountable authorities. Giving states and municipal governments more resources and legal attributes is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for increasing their autonomy vis-a-vis the federal government. In addition, authorities must be legitimately elected and accountable to their own constituencies, not to the federal government. As Lujambio correctly argues, "The president can decentralize fiscal resources, but if governors continue to be the president's fiiends and are imposed by the center in noncompetitive elections, federalism does not appear anywhere". The revitalization of federalism thus entails new legal rights and more financial resources, but also new responsibilities in the exercise of power.