Executive-legislative relations: the case of Mexico

Abstract

In the case of Mexico, the problem of interbranch balance and, more generally, of executive-legislative relations is important not only because, as theorists have shown, it has a major impact on democratic stability and on the presidential system's performance, but also because the country has moved into an altogether new political environment ─an environment of political plurality─ with little or no experience and the regime is still in the process of being reformed. In this sense, the discussion of the interbranch relation and balance may be of the utmost importance in drafting some of the aspects of the pending state reform. Analyzing executive-legislative relations in Mexico poses certain difficulties not found in other case studies. First, there is the wide gap between formal and informal powers of the executive. Presidents in Mexico are far more powerful than what one would have expected from an analysis of their formal prerogatives. In fact, the analysis of the formal powers granted by the Constitution to the executive and legislative branches is definitely insufficient to understand the interbranch balance of power during the long time dominance of the official party (the Partido Revolucionario Institucional) in Mexico. As it will be shown in this chapter, the explanation to this fact lies more in the party and electoral systems and in the incentives these have created, than in the abuse of power or usurpation of powers by the presidency.