Constitution-making and institutional design: the reform of presidentialism in the Argentine Constitution of 1994

Abstract

This paper presents an analytical framework for the study of constitutional design from the point of view of the structure of interaction and mechanisms of institutional selection that affects the behavior and choices of the actors involved in a constitution-making process. This framework is used to explain the various limitations introduced to the structure of presidential powers in Argentina in the constitutional reform of 1994. I argue that the content of this reform was a result of two main factors. On the one hand, a configuration of institutional preferences that, though opposed, made possible a compromise between the interests and ideas of one actor with those of the others. On the other hand, a distribution of political and institutional resources among the actors that, in spite of certain asymmetry, prevented any of them to impose their preferences unilaterally. Both factors facilitated a consensual process of constitution-making from which emerged a new structure of checks and balances able to produce a more stable and legitimate practice of government than in the past.