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dc.creatorCampos Vázquez, Raymundo M.
dc.creatorMejia, Luis A.
dc.date.issued2016-09-13
dc.identifier.issn2196-436X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11651/3236
dc.descriptionCorruption, cooperation, leader, public goods, laboratory experiment
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we analyze the nature of cooperation in different corruption regimes. In a laboratory experiment with university students in Mexico, individuals play first a corruption game and then a public goods game. The corruption game is divided into three groups: high- and low-monitoring scenarios as well as a control group not exposed to the game. The public goods game is divided into three groups: the standard game, a game with centralized punishment executed by an exogenously assigned leader, and a game similar to the second one, but adding the possibility of counter-punishment. There are four key results. First, there is more corruption in the low-monitoring group. Second, in the public goods game there is less cooperation in the low-monitoring group than in the group with more intensive monitoring. Third, the option of punishment increases cooperation, but the sensitivity to punishment is greater in the high-monitoring (low-corruption) group. Fourth, the option of counter-punishment of the leader decreases cooperation. Our results highlight the importance of corruption in decreasing trust and social capital and show the difficulty of promoting cooperation when corruption is prevalent.
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dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherCentro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
dc.relation.ispartofLatin American Economic Review, volumen 25, número 1, septiembre de 2016
dc.rightsLa revista Latin American Economic Review autoriza a poner en acceso abierto de conformidad con las licencias CREATIVE COMMONS, aprobadas por el Consejo Académico Administrativo del CIDE, las cuales establecen los parámetros de difusión de las obras con fines no comerciales. Lo anterior sin perjuicio de los derechos morales que corresponden a los autores.
dc.source2196-436X
dc.titleDoes corruption affect cooperation?: a laboratory experiment
dc.typeArtículo
dc.accessrightsAcceso abierto
dc.recordIdentifier000003236
dc.rights.licenseCreative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 4.0 International CC BY-NC-ND
dc.relation.project"Centro de Estudios Espinosa Yglesias (CEEY)"
dc.identifier.citationEn: Latin American Economic Review, volumen 25, número 1, septiembre de 2016
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s40503-016-0035-0
dc.identifier.urlhttps://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40503-016-0035-0


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